Alan Sokal, is that you?
Were you equally sad to see the disappearance of the other aspects of these complex social relations? Spousal beatings, rape in marriage, women as chattel etc? Because once those things disappeared we no longer had anything even vaguely resembling the social relations we had for 99.9% of the last ten thousand years.
And good riddance to them all IMO.
Obviously, people in that culture have no idea that there is any such thing as parentage other than motherhood. They have no idea that men have anything to do with childbirth whatsoever, so the notion of “fatherhood” is simply alien to them.
Are you joking? Do you honestly believe that that webapage was written by a Trobriand Islander?
Or do you also struggle with a sentence like “Cro-Magnon people did not consider viral diseases distinct from bacterial diseases”? After all, if Cro-Magnon people had no concept of bacterial disease, how could they say that?
I really hope that this is some sort of joke.
Alan Sokal did an awesome thing. And it has nothing to do with what I just said.
It’s a commonplace that social rules create causal relations. There’s a social rule that says you shouldn’t take things from people without giving them money–and sure enough, you can find a direct causal relation between the taking of things and the giving of money–but only because there is that social rule. If the rule weren’t there, there’d be no causal relation between taking things and giving money.
Do not misread me, please, as having said all causal relations are caused by social rules.
I understand the distinction you’re making. (It’s called the de re/de dicto distinction.) I just don’t think that’s how this sentence is written in this article. I think that when this sentence says “fathers” it means “those considered fathers in the Trobriand culture.” That makes the most sense, since the sentence goes on to say that fathers may assume special social responsibilities toward the child.
In other words, I interpret “fathers” in taht sentence de dicto, you interpret it de re, and I argue that the de dicto interpretation is correct.
Again, what I’m saying is just this: having established that X is the genetic parent of someone, you are not licensed thereby to infer that X is the social parent of that person. You need more information before you can draw that conclusion.
Surely you don’t disagree with that, do you?
I don’t see that we are disagreeing, except in use of terminology. I do not agree with the authour of the article.
If the author is saying “X is the fact, but someone in a position of special privilege prefers it to be Y, so Y it shall be without further ado”, I’m saying “at the moment of birth, and indeed until some sort of parental bond is formed between father and child, the biological indicia of fatherhood (as determined if necessary by a DNA test) ought in ethics and law to determine who has the rights and duties of fatherhood”. Which I think directly contradicts the author.
The “fact” of fatherhood has both a biological and social component - the one generally of course dictates the other.
That didn’t make it any clearer. Who is issuing these licences?
Can you just explain it in English?
WTF?
If you aren’t talking about causation then how can you possibly claim that “If my position were false, then in every case, once you’ve established genetic parentage, you’ve thereby established social parentage with equal certainty.”
If Biological Parentage doesn’t cause Biological parentage and it isn’t correlated with it, then then how the hell can knowing one tell you a damn thing about teh other?
I do believe you are making less sense with every post.
Again, WTF?
Mechanics doesn’t require or even imply exceptionless causation.
Application of kinetic energy causes a ball to roll. Basic mechanics. That doesn’t mean that all rolling balls have had kinetic energy applied, or that all kinetic energy causes balls to roll.
Where did you get the idea that mechanical causation is exceptionless?
Yeah, you are “licenced” to make precisely that inference.
What is your argument? That if the correlation isn’t 100% perfect it’s impossible to draw inferences from it?
Having established that house X is one fire, do you also conclude that you are not licensed thereby to infer that it is an emergency. That you need more information before you can draw that conclusion, because there are exceptions in a minority of cases?
This makes no sense at all. A correlation can be perfectly useful in drawing inferences without without being 100% accurate.
Of course I disagree, it’s an obvious nonsense. We all make inferences from imperfect correlations all the time. In fact one of the underlying principles of science is that all correlations are imperfect, yet we can make inferences depsite that.
Wow imma hafta think about this one.
If anyone else wants to jump in here…
Anyway I’ll come back to this later today, I need to drive a car now.
Basically: I am just arguing that the inference “x is the g-father, therefore x is the s-father” is not one that will get you the right answer in 100% of cases. I took the OP (and later SteveMB to be assuming otherwise. I think maybe we don’t disagree?
As for exceptionless causal rules, I figure it’s an exceptionless causal rule that when an object heavier than air on earth has nothing applying any upward force to it, it moves downward. That’s the kind of thing I meant by my uncareful use of the term “mechanics.”
How can I make inferences without reference to causation? I infer from 2 is greater than 1 and 1 is greater than 0 that 2 is greater than 0.
So you honestly think that the article was written by a Trobriand Islanders to be read by other Trobriand Islanders?
Because if it was written by, you know, Americans, to be read by Americans, then it would use “father” to mean what American understand by “father”, not what Trobrianders understand by it.
This latest little gem has taken this thread past the point of being ridiculous. Either present your evidence that Trobrianders have a concept of fatherhood, or I am outta here.
Your position has been well and truly revealed as nonsense at this stage.
So, facing that situation of 10 industries, if you only have the time/resources to make one of them “gender neutral,” do you really think there is no difference which one you pick?
Once again, I don’t think McDonagh made a good argument. I am just opposing the idea that it is completely off the reservation.
I’ll answer this in a moment.
This too.
Like I said, it looks like the best resources are going to be physical books here, but I have found a couple of relevant links:
http://www.everyculture.com/Oceania/Trobriand-Islands-Marriage-and-Family.html
http://www.everyculture.com/Oceania/Trobriand-Islands-Kinship.html
These articles are fraught through and through with the presumption that the Trobriand Islanders consider some people to be “fathers” to other people. How it’s determined who gets to be a “father” isn’t specified here, though. But you were looking for evidence that they have a concept of fatherhood.
To answer the previous questions:
I don’t think the wiki article was written by a Trobriand Islander, rather, I think that the sentence you quoted means “father” in the sense of “those Trobriand Islanders consider to be fathers.” I have an argument for this view. My argument is that the sentence goes on to state that “fathers” can have special social roles concerning their children. How can I explain the fact that the sentence says this? If, by “father,” the sentence only means “biological father,” then since we already know the Islanders don’t know about biological fatherhood, it would be pointless to claim that “fathers” can have special social roles. So I don’t think the sentence means “biological father” when it says “father”. But then, what does it mean? I guess something more like “one filling the social role ‘father’.” But obviously they don’t mean 'one filling the American social role ‘father’" since it’s not talking about Americans. Rather, it’s pretty clear it means 'one filling the Trobriandian role ‘father’."
So now I’m going to try to tackle the one I said “Imma hafta think about that one” about earlier.
But it’s clear we’re coming from very different ways of thinking about things. Of course I think mine’s better in the sense of more accurate–why would I think this way if I didn’t think it was the most truth-preserving way of thinking available?–but the task of explaining why is by no means trivial since it’s almost like we don’t speak the same language. (Literally: something I took to be plain language using baby words, you said wasn’t even English!)
See that’s what I was just talking about. That you don’t know what it means for an inference to be licensed… I’m actually dumbstruck. You said “WTF” later on to something I took to be sort of blatantly obvious, and my reaction here is similar. WTF.
Okay but getting past the puzzled stare reaction, I’ll try to explain what I mean by a licensed inference.
Take two propositions, X and Y. An inference is basically an act of reasoning that looks like this: X, therefore Y. In other words, an inference takes one proposition (X) and uses it as evidence for, or a reason for believing, another proposition (Y).
There are an infinite variety of inferences people can draw. Some of them are stron, and some of them are weak. A weak inference is one (X therefore Y) where the X is not good evidence for Y. It doesn’t give you a good reason to believe Y. A strong inference is one where the X does give you a good reason to believe Y.
Basically, not to make too many bones about it, by “licensed inference” I meant “strong inference.” Why “licensed?” Because there are rules by which you can determine which inferences are strong and which inferences are weak. (Well, there are difficult cases as well, but for many inferences, there are rules to help you out.) Inferences which follow these rules are licensed.
Now, what was my claim? I’m going to put it in three different ways:
-
Having certainty about genetic fatherhood does not license certainty about social fatherhood.
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You don’t get social fatherhood from genetic fatherhood for free.
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The inference “x is the g-father, therefore x is the s-father” is not licensed.
And another claim I’d defend which implies the truth of all of the above:
- Genetic fatherhood is not the same thing as social fatherhood.
The first three I understand to be equivalent to each other. The fourth I understand to be true and to imply the other three.
As far as I can tell, the OP and SteveMB are making arguments which presume that all four of these claims are false. That is why I was moved to give arguments for them–since I think they are true.
Here are arguments for each of the four claims:
Argument for 1)
Since I can be certain (for good reasons) about who the genetic father of a person is, while being uncertain (for good reasons) who the social father is (for example, if it is possible the person may be adopted), it follows that 1)certainty about genetic fatherhood doesn’t license certainty about social fatherhood.
Argument for 2)
Since, in the case of an adopted person, I can establish genetic fatherhood while still having to add in information about signed papers and personal history etc in order to establish social fatherhood, it follows that 2)you don’t get social fatherhood from genetic fatherhood for free.
Argument for 3)
This one’s harder, because whether an inference is licensed or not depends on how strict you need your rules of inference to be. If we’re talking about purely logical derivation, then of course the inference isn’t licensed: it is logically possible for a person to be the genetic father and yet not the social father. (Not even just logically possible either–it’s downright actual. It really happens.) Now, I actually took the OP and SteveMB to be denying exactly this–in other words I took them to be presuming, in their arguments, that you can derive s-fatherhood from g-fatherhood purely logically. But I’m not sure you would think that. I think that you would be inclined, rather, to say that once we’ve established g-fatherhood, we’re licensed to infer s-fatherhood within a certain margin of error, or in other words, with some fairly-large-but-less-than-100% degree of certainty. Taken as a factual claim, I actually agree with this. What I disagree with is any further inference from this factual claim to a view that people generally ought to consider s-fatherhood to follow from g-fatherhood. The fact that there’s a correlation between the two does not mean that it’s right for people to try to require that all s-fathers be g-fathers or that all g-fathers be s-fathers. Nor does it mean it’s right for people to require that everyone should try their best to make sure s-fathers are always g-fathers to the best of their ability. The mere fact of correlation–even if it’s a causal relation and not just a correlation–does not give us any reason to think that’s how things should be. As you’ve probably heard before, you can’t get an “ought” from an “is”.
Argument for 4)
Well I mean, surely you get the idea, right? Of course s-fatherhood and g-fatherhood aren’t the same thing, since we can find plenty of s-fathers in the real world who aren’t g-fathers.
Which is true, in your opinion, of the following two options:
A) An adopted father isn’t really a father, we just call him that by courtesy.
B) The word “father” has both a biological and a social sense, and an adopted father really is a father in the social sense, and really isn’t a father in the biological sense.
To disagree with my 1) 2) 3) or 4) is to affirm A. Is A the one you agree with? If not, then you, like me, should be agreeing with 1), 2), 3) and 4). And why do I bother to argue for them? Because their negations appear to me to underly the reasoning found in the OP and in SteveMB’s posts.
Wow it’s been a long time since anything I’ve read has made me this angry. The idea that a woman has the right to commit paternity fraud is as odious to me as saying a man has the right to rape a woman purely because he has the strength to make it happen.
Not only is the article morally repugnant, it’s also incredibly stupid. DNA tests, in general, are beneficial to women! Once paternity has been proven via a DNA test, a woman can legally force the father of her child to pay child support. The author seems to think that back in the day, if an unmarried woman had a child with two possible candidates for paternity that she just got to pick one, and he automatically acted as a father to the child. That’s not how it worked. Generally speaking, when that scenario happened both men would tell the woman to piss off, and she’d be left raising the child on her own.
This article was stupid and immoral, and I can’t believe anyone would agree with the author.
I guess what makes me…not exactly uncomfortable…uneasy, maybe, is the idea that it’s normal and right to base your entire relationship with a child on something that without technological intervention you cannot see, may not be able to perceive, and would never know. It seems odd to call something based in nature “unnatural,” but it does seem unnatural. We are categorizing and labeling people on their genetic code. I don’t know, maybe this is something we’ve done in a clumsy way for most of human history, but I’m not sure. I think human relations and connections have always taken precedence.
It seems like there is a trend of pseudo-Darwinist gaming. Between this and Pick-up-Artist movements and the growing popularity of pop-evolutionary-biology, it seems like we are eager to not only understand but to apply these things to our daily lives. We are thinking consciously in terms of perpetuating genetic code, finding optimal mates, optimizing the amount of energy we put into our offspring while ensuring they have a good chance of spreading your code, etc.
I can’t put my finger on why it unsettles me. Maybe it’s just ruining some of the "magic’ of the human experience? Or it recalls eugenics and other unsavory misapplications of science and pseudo science? Or maybe it just exposes to harshly some natural realities. I’m not sure.
I already don’t feel comfortable with “father” being reduced to “someone who cuts a check once a month according to a standard formula.” At the risk of sounding like Kanicbird, I guess I find it troubling to add another layer of distance between human relations. We are social creatures, and have worked hard to develop functioning families and societies. While of course these are going to change with material and political changes, I think technology can bring more disruptive changes because technology to some degree doesn’t evolve precisely according to needs like social institutions. To some degree technology just happens.
Anyway, I recognize this isn’t a coherent argument. I’m not even really arguing. But it’s stuff to think about.
I’d guess it unsettles you because it’s irrational. There’s no reason to assume that the way evolution made us is the way we ought to be.
My genes’ “values” should never be taken automatically to be my own values.
For the record, I think you’ve been pretty clear.
Even in the example dialogue you give, you make a serious error. Nobody is affirming the consequent here. Instead of:
Premise 1: A -> B
Premise 2: B
Conclusion: A
The argument, even in the italicized example you yourself give, is clearly:
Premise 1: A -> B
Premise 2: A
Conclusion: B
In other words, modus ponens.
I think you’ve conflated two issues - the above fallacy (which isn’t being committed), and the difference between deduction and induction. I think Frylock should not have said “with equal certainty”, but I knew what he was getting at. I’d say something like, “If biological fatherhood causes social fatherhood, then if we know bio-fatherhood, we also know social fatherhood with a degree of certainty equal to the strength of the causal link.”
I think what Frylock means by not getting social fatherhood “for free” is that in addition to knowledge of bio-fatherhood, we also need to add information on how strong the causal link is. If it were “free”, we’d just assume that bio-dad is social-dad in every single circumstance. Since that’s clearly not the case in the real world (e.g., adoptions), then we have to know additional information in order to know how strong the causal link is.
Does that make sense?
The author would be incorrect, of course. Being able to positively point to the proper father makes it possible to secure child support payments which, in turn, will make it easier for the woman to support her child. It certainly confers a greater advantage over the mother than not having any way of establishing paternity. I question her premise that women could point to any male she slept with and claim that he was the father and in turn being able to draw based on that claim.
Good point. I suppose if the author starts off with a ridiculous premise then there’s no conclusion we can reach that isn’t as ridiculous.
Odesio
It isn’t irrational at all. DNA tests and the current child support system go hand in hand.
Women need a way to identify the father to secure payments, and men need a way to avoid being defrauded. Even if you made having sex come with the potential of payments regardless of genetics, it is too easy for either party to lie about having had sex. The test doesn’t lie.