OK, let’s focus on “He values goodness above all else”. You mentioned in the OP an “allegedly omnibenevolent God”. It seems clear that Ludovic is positing <>~OB (omnibenevolence). Then you say “It makes sense to me to posit the essence of an omnibenevolent God as being, well, benevolence”. You then use the essence of OB to speculate that God values goodness, and then to demonstrate that evil doesn’t exist, therefore proving that God and evil don’t coexist. However we hadn’t yet established OB as a premise. Do you have an argument that establishes OB?
Pretty much, I think. As I said in the OP, if evil exists then God sustains it (and therefore cannot be good). But if evil exists and it is anywhere near the ordinary definition of evil, then it is destructive. An omnimalevolent necessary being should already have destroyed all of existence.
I would call a God that destroys all of existence omnidestructive. An OM God might maintain existence as a medium for evil.
Okay, but then you’re just renaming what I called goodness in the OP — that which makes a free moral agent happy. Has anyone read the OP? 
So happy = good, and if evil exists, an OM God would be happy, therefore he’d be good. Gotcha.
Of coruse, if A implies B, then we can’t just say that Not A implies Not B. That’s a denial of the antecedant. Besides, you haven’t eliminated the equivocation. Refering once again to the OP, the conduction of goodness (love) edifies all free moral agents who conduct it. It cannot be the case that one is happy while the other is not anymore than it can be the case that one photon is light while another is dark. Now, for those agents who enjoy inflicting and/or receiving misery, it would have to be the case that the objective happiness is itself so inclined for the theory to hold that God is sadistic. In other words, if all agents who love are happy, how can that be evil? To be consistent, you would have to asert your enjoyment of torture and your gladness that all are being tortured. But most alarmingly, perhaps, you’d have to admit to believing in God since something you perceive as morally edifying (goodness, though you spell it e-v-i-l) indeed exists. Which is okay by me if it’s okay by you.
Just a side note here. (I’m working on the references you gave me; things aren’t looking good, but I’m not ready to get into that just yet.) What I want to address is this notion that, by supposedly using the existence of evil as an argument that God does not exist, the implication is that hard atheists believe in evil. I would interpret this argument as a reductio ad absurdum by the hard atheists of the predominant theist belief that evil exists, yet there is an om3i God behind it all. I.e., it is not an expression of belief in evil per se but a belief that simultaneously believing in evil and the om3i God results in a fatal contradiction.
Note: I am not saying that Libertarian believes in the existence of evil nor am I saying that the hard atheists’ argument is either valid or sound, I’m just saying that the use of evil in the argument does not imply that hard atheists believe in the existence of evil.
Because love and happiness are not permanent states, and may just be the absence of evil.
Faldage, I think you made a good point. It certainly doesn’t necessarily mean that atheists believe in evil just because they invoke evil to assert that God and evil cannot coexist, given the common and coherent meanings of the terms. And, as you further pointed out, I wasn’t saying that was the case. My point, of course, was that positing that evil exists is, because of the ubiquity of existentialism, rather unremarkable these days. But when approached essentialistically, evil does not seem to be a noumenal.
Zwaldd, I didn’t defined love as a state; I defined it as a mechanism. And happiness is merely what makes goodness aesthetically valuable.
Only to a being that values goodness. You’ve presumed God values goodness. Ludovic posited a God that values evil. We’re back to the beginning.
Well, Libertatian, I think I’m going to need a philosophic jackhammer to get through Hegel.
Hegel:
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Existence, on the other hand, would do Bill Clinton proud.
SEoP:
This is the second of three paragraphs that seem to boil down to a simple. ‘We don’t have the foggiest idea what we’re talking about.’
Well, that’s exactly what I said. If we’re going to call goodness “evil”, then we’re right back at the same place. People accuse me from time to time of redefining words. But I’m not the one suggesting that goodness is that which destroys and evil that which edifies. Maybe someone will be along soon to suggest that we call it XJ-14. 
Faldage, I understand your frustration. Hegel was the last great essentialist until Plantinga. The portion you quoted was really part of a long semantic chain. Maybe his own summary of his views will be more clear to you. “Being is not to be what it is and to be what it is not”. That’s all he’s saying.
But I wish you would give the Stanford site a second chance. It’s quite a bit to read through, I realize. But just because the realists run into conflicts with their interpretations of existence does not mean that those who write about the reaslists’ confusion are themselves confused. They do know what they’re talking about, but reading it takes patience.
We’re back to the beginning because you haven’t proven that God values goodness.
It’s a premise. Please see the OP. (No, seriously, please see it.) If you disagree with the premise, then you agree with its opposite. (A or Not A). I’ve already explained why destruction cannot be God’s most valued aesthetic. How about you explain why I’m wrong? Let’s stop with the hot potato method of debate. Stand in one place and argue your point, please. (But please see my points first. I spent hours spelling them out.)
Aha! I get it now!! We’re all being whooshed. I can see it now, in the bucolic little village of Elysianfield in Transtyxia, on the edge of the Elysian Common, there’s a little pub, the Bee and Essence. In it four philosophers are sitting around watching us on the big screen TV, drinking their favorite, each taking a shot of Metaxa everytime one of us quotes him.
Landlord! I’ve already paid for the one for the with the chubby face, swilling the lager by the stein. Serve him up a shot.
Now, “And certainly that greater than which cannot be understood cannot exist only in thought, for if it exists only in thought it could also be thought of as existing in reality as well, which is greater.” Give one to the fellow over there with the crooked halo and the pint of best bitter…
And, “…metaphysics studies whatever must be true of all existent things just insofar as they exist, [and] it studies the general conditions which any existing thing must satisfy.” One for the dandy over there with the krater of watered down wine.
Finally, “I was too loved to have doubts about myself…” One for the sour looking chap with the bottle of vin ordinaire,
Addressed 03-19-2004 12:28 PM.
Addressed 03-19-2004 01:01 PM
I’m just rebutting your arguments. If it seems like hot potato to you, you may consider that your argument is circular. Just a thought!
Faldage, I’ve lost track of your complaint. Are you wanting like a philosophy comic book or something?
Zwaldd, actually the argument is not circular for exactly the claim you just made — that the premise is not proved. If the premise were the conclusion, then the argument would be circular. But if you insist on saying that the premise is not proved, as you did on 03-20-04 07:26 PM (Eastern), then the argument cannot be circular.
Something that makes sense would work for me. ‘Things aren’t what they are and are what they aren’t’ doesn’t hack it. So, failing anything sensible coming, I’ll just take my hat in my hands and back slowly out of the tent. Y’all keep buying those philosophers their Metaxas.
You said “if [the premise] is true, then the rest has to be true.” Now you acknowledge that the premise is not proved. Good enough!