No, not quite. Again, when I say, “That paper is white,” I am not asking you to consider how I perceive it. Someone else has said it much better than I ever could:
Just to clarify, we’re talking about universals as something shared among people and not something consistent in time within a person?
Universals are qualities that may be predicated of something. Adjectives, qualifying names, etc. Color, hardness, length, type, etc. Colors are an easy example, but by no means the most important.
They should be called ‘properties’. What does the word ‘universals’ connote?
“Universal” contrasts “particular.”
Yes, agreed.
Alternative configurations exist, and therefore universals exist.
[sub]Just like goblins, Zeus and the Tooth Fairy![/sub]
It seems like you are taking the answer to the question as a given. The question, if I follow, is “Are there Universals that exist indepenant and seperate from perception?”. If the answer is yes, then our perception is the processing and interpretation of these universals. But I don’t see any reason to take this as a given, an axiom. It may very well be that it is perception that shapes and determines reality, and as such there is no reality (and therefore no Universals) that are seperate from perception. This implies that perhaps we can change apparent Universals with proper control of our perception.
Certainly, the Placebo effect matches up well with this Holographic view of the body. But this thinking extends outside of the body as well. Conciousness may very well produce the Universe instead of the other way around.
This all sounds very strange, but the strangest part is how well it meets up with reality. When we look at the world at the Quantum level we find that existence is very much dependent on perception. The infamous 2-slit experiment shows that the location of a subatomic particle is not defined until it is observed. Perhaps Universals are the same way. They are not locked until observed. The Holographic theory is applicable here because it offers a great description of the how the mechanics of a perception-based reality might work. If you take it as a given that perception is dependent on the Universe, then of course there are Universals indepdendant of us. But there is no good reason to take that as an axiom. I feel that there is plenty of data that suggests the opposite. It’s still a mystery, but I am not prepared to accept as a given that anything exists as anything until it is percieved.
Basically it’s the same issue the whole “tree falls in the forest” thing trys to cover. Of course a forest would be covered with perceptive creatures or it wouldn’t be a forest - so the analogy breaks down.
DaLovin’ Dj
Eris,
Let me try this again. We will use that example of a piece of white paper.
Both of us look at it and call it “white”. Is “white” a “universal” ascribed to that piece of paper? And what does accepting that premise imply about how we approach knowledge and knowing compared to the alternative?
If we accept that “whiteness” is an entitiy that exists in isolation, independent of our perception and of other colors, and that the paper has that universal, then our knowledge of that paper becomes a static entity. It is white.
If we believe that there is no universal of “whiteness” but that “whiteness” is a meaning imposed by us upon perception, reliant upon what we bring to the process and upon the context, then inquiry is opened up. Surrounded by brighter objects, we realize that we instead percieve the paper as gray. We begin to understand that “whiteness” is a relative thing. We recognize that bumblebees react to a checkerboard pattern on that paper that is visible only in the UV range, outside our perception. We begin to understand the evolutionary pressures that led us to see only within certain parts of the light spectrtum and why other creatures respond to other portions of the light spectrum. We realize that in other light spectra various shapes become apparent. Our understanding becomes part of a dynamic process. We are open to new knowledge.
I am sure that there is Truth out there on the other side of the curtain that is our perceptions, “that the Universe is independant of our perceptions”. (Okay, not sure, but I accept that it is there on faith.) But we are apparently forbidden from knowing that Truth. Instead we try to make sense of the shadows that fall on the curtain and what pushes forth. I am aware that I percieve what has been biologically selected as salient for me to percieve but that other information exists beyond my current perception that may be salient if only I could detect it and make sense of it. As cultures we take the clues from what we can perceive and attempt to develop the means to perceive more. We are the actors imposing meaning, trying to peep a little bit behind the curtain, trying to get closer to the Truth that always is just beyond our view, beyond our grasp. To briefly lapse into religious imagery: when we accept any perception as “Truth” on anything more than a probationary basis we become presumptuous fools who concietedly believe that we have been granted a look at the face of God and have lived to tell the tale; even Abraham wasn’t allowed that.
Hi DSeid. I think you’re too hung up on the perception angle, and I think using a specific color is what’s causing us to travel this road. I’ll address your post, but suggest an alternate line of enquiry at the end.
I’m going to use the symbol ‘white’ to indicate the universal in question, and the symbol “white” to indicate the word. White, without any quotes, will then be the quale.
We consider that the paper has a quality ‘white’ that other objects may also have. We ascribe the word “white” to this quality. We experience this quality as a quale (plural: qualia) in some manner. If you are an idealist, you might suggest that this quale is all there is. If you are a realist, you might suggest that the paper causes some quale, which may or may not be distinct. If you are a transcendental idealist, you might find that the whiteness is strictly correlative to your quale, though you are not directed at your quale, you are directed towards its source. So there is actually a great range of subtlety available to us here. I am trying not to adopt anything other than not being a nominalist, because I’m just not a nominalist and can’t defend it. If you asked me which of the above was the case, I’d suggest transcendental idealism. But really, this is leading us astray from the issue which is whether or not the quality “white” exists. No one argues that the quale appears to us.
Here’s the thing: whether or not ‘white’ exists in isolation is part of the question. Immanent realism denies that ‘white’ can exist in isolation: its manifestion strictly depends on the existence of particulars.
I think you’re missing part of it: perception of what? That’s the thing… qualia is an area of much debate all on its own. But are you suggesting that perhaps that’s all there is? (No, you’re not, as later paragraphs elucidate.)
Of course. There’s many fascinating things we can do to toy with how we perceive things. How does this answer the question of whether or not what we’re perceiving is there?
In the other thread, for example, a poster nen was perturbed because I insisted that an echoing canyon has the universal property of “erl-voice” because when I yelled something, it reflected back at me. He found the idea absurd. I suggested that this was only part of a larger property of “reflecting sound”-- a property I feel exists. Some things reflect sound. He, and it seems you, would have me question whether or not this underlying property exists because through different activities we may alter our perception of it. On its face, the idea (to me) starts to lose some merit. I may change the way my monitor appears to me by looking at it from different angles. What of it? --should I claim my monitor doesn’t “really” exist because when I take two steps to the left it looks different?
As for the last paragraph, I’m not sure what to make of it. We’re not falling prety to some specious and limited dogma. New information would mean new universals for us to discover and know, as well. I don’t see the problem. “Absorbs ultra-violet radiation” could just as well be a universal: multiple things can do it/have that property. How is accepting the existence of universals locking us in to some position that contrasts the acquisition of new knowledge?
Suppose we took a different universal, ‘length’. Not “five inches”, not “ten centimeters”, not even ‘ten centimeters’, but ‘length’. As far as English speakers go, ‘length’ is a universal, and multiple objects have ‘length’. How would you respond to this example?
Eris,
No, the color example was merely convenient and serves as a metaphor for other types of knowing.
I guess I really do not get what you are getting at.
Are you asking:
“Does the universe include things that exist along various dimensions whether we percieve them or not?” Probably, but we can never know for sure. As mentioned by DalovinDJ, some very serious physicists take the position that the universe only exists after it is perceived (!?)
“Do those dimensions exist?” Sure, but some can only exist as a function of our perception. Sound, color, beauty, hard, smooth, sweetness, etc. … are all dimensions that only have meaning as a function of perception and often only have meaning in relation to other objects.
“Can we know about the world with a system of knowledge that includes universals without particulars?” No, not the world that we try to live in anyway. The two require each other. One cannot exist without the other. In this regard I prefer to use the words “exemplars” and “prototypes”. They bootstrap each other and a prototype can be an exemplar for a higher level of analysis that it is nested within. The prototype of White is known only by having experienced white exemplars. The prototype of Color is only known by experiencing various exemplars of colors including White. And prototypes help us organize “the blooming buzzing confusion” that is the world around.
Well, sure, the question has received treatment for centuries; foremost in my mind would be Berkeley. Again, this “never know for sure” stuff is just… a seperate topic. There’s no need to qualify empirical knowledge with such caveats, empirical knowledge is always open to revision. It’s part of its nature. I do not consider empirical statements to be dogmatic. Assuming you’re not the ultimate skeptic and allow for some kind of knowledge, the question of universals should be answerable.
I don’t understand this focus on perception. When you ask someone to hand you a pencil, do you expect them to reach into your brain and manipulate the conscious object of your intentions? Of course not. You’re talking about the pencil. We feel ‘hardness’ in some ways, but we may measure them in others (a relative hardness scale). The dependence on the existence of other objects is just a consequence of their empirical (not necessary) nature. Sweetness per se is not just a function of our sensory apparatus called a “tongue”. We might measure it in terms of the quantity of various compounds.
What I’m asking is whether you feel universals, as we’ve been discussing, are psychological fictions or not. Are there white things. Are there objects with length. Etc.
Well, this I agree with. I’m not sure if anyone around here would be a platonist, though I know of someone who is at least a mathematical platonist, maybe I can get him to register here if that discussion ever comes up.
It seems you are a pretty typical immanent realist except for the fact that you seem to quarrel with the issue. I am unclear why.
What, specifically, is your objection to the existence of universals? How does this objection fail to apply to that which you do feel exists?
I would say the existence of ‘whiteness’ for an observer depends on the perceptual/cognitive apparatus of the observer and is dependent on existence of particulars. What would this position be called?
It sounds like conceptualism. See also Stanford’s summary. It still might be immanent realism. I’m not sure… you indicate
But no one disputes this. The question is whether there is some correlation between what you perceive to be a predicable property and some predicable property (i.e.-do they exist or are your perceptions mistaken in some way). I would ask you the same thing I ask DSeid: assuming you don’t deny all knowledge, how do you distinguish universals which seem to exist but don’t from particulars which seem to instantiate universals and do exist? Why grant existence to this piece of paper, but not its color, or any means you use to identify it?
It seems I’m labelled a conceptualist. I see these “properties”, assignable to “particulars”, and their demarcation/delineation (this is its color, that is its length) as the output of a particular perceptive/cognitive schema and apparatus.
Boy hiddie, let’s examine our terms.
Of course “universals” exist. By the very act of defining them
they exist as a concept.
But is there a quality (a universal) that has a functional value
that is universally held in common with more than
one distinct entity?
No!
I mean “yes”! But they are just perceived qualities that only
resemble the attributes of seperate entities that seem to us to
have an apparent functional value.
But first, in order to be true to the logical constraints imposed
by our languages, we must first determine whether or not the
characteristic of “twoness” exists within the absolute Universe.
We don’t know, do we?
My focus on perception is central because I think it is imperative to realize that any conversation about what we think the world is, is really about what the human animal sees of the world and how he represents it.
From your link, it would appear that I align most with either conceptualism or modern realism. I place the emphasis on the role of cognition.
Is there a correlation between what we percieve as a predicable proerty and some “real” predicable property? Certainly. What sort of correlation is what we do not know. They are inter-related but seperate worlds: objects in real spacetime which have some universal attributes; and objects existing in conceptual space. Those objects in conceptual space are formed out of experience with exemplars. They include entities very specific/particular to the very abstract/universal. The latter are the only universals that we can ever really handle.
So I do not object to universals that exist a priori or deny their existance. I am agnostic to them. I merely state that a priori universals are outside our knowing and, more importantly, not actually the universals that we handle, the universals that exist within conceptual space, even if it turns out that they occassionally correlate with each other quite well.
“The output of a cognitive apparatus.” Can multiple things be a “cognitive apparatus”? If so, how does this impact our perspective on universals, Gyan9?
DSeid, I am puzzled by that skepticism. But I won’t attempt to address entire epistemological arguments here. Nevertheless, I am intrigued that you can know so much about perception without having access to these, as you put it, a priori universals. Indeed, it seems (to me) to be impossible to claim that they are merely a result of our sensory organs without already assuming that the term “universal” connotes something real (in this case, a sensory organ). As I said, I don’t like conceptualism or nominalism.
Not an unified one. But your question doesn’t make much sense to me. Can you rephrase it?
Does there exist more than on object that is a sensory apparatus? Is “sensory apparatus” a universal that exists?
Eris,
I don’t understand what you don’t understand here.
What I know of the world is filtered through perceptual apparatuses. How I think of it is, to no small extent, limited by the wiring of my brain. For example, I cannot visualize an object with four spatial dimensions and rotate it in my mind, even though I can become convinced that describing objects in eleven dimensions more closely correlates with their “true” nature. I came into the world prewired to find meaning in certain types of patterns, with filters in place to find certain sorts of input and to exclude certain others. With those tools in place I formed a system of knowledge; I populated my conceptual space with various objects and, for lack of a better term, meta-objects. These are the objects that I actually experience on my side of the cutain. They connote “something real” but they themselves are not those real things. In practical life we handle them as if they are the real things, and most of our experience allows us to get away it. We hang on to them because the correlation is usually quite good for the range of our usual experiences. But it occassionally fails. When the correlation fails we form a new match or a new object. We re-orient.
What is true for the course of the development of knowledge in an individual is self-similar for the the larger scale of societal and cultural knowledge over generations.