BTW Gyan9, your sig is most apt for this discussion!
Well… What if everything inside our heads is put together into sense the same way everything outside is, like when we look at a sofa, or we listen to music…
For instance, we imagine a blue box inside our heads, we can “see” it kind of blurry and dreamlike in our heads if we focus.
I had this idea that perception and consciousness is no different from say, when ice turns into water under heat, it just functions a little differently.
If we think that everything around us and inside us are electrons and whatnot, and the atoms then go into very complex patterns.
Like when we imagine the blue box, our minds atoms control the chemical and electrical impulses, everything turns into the pattern that our brain interprets as a blue box.
And then think about how ice turns into water, molecules and heat and whatnot causes a reaction that melts the ice.
My point is then, what are universals and perception really?
If the illusion that is perception, cognitive ‘nature’ and everything else is controled by the same thing that controls the melting ice, how do we know perception really exists?
What if we aren’t any more cognitive than that piece of ice?
We just think we are… (paradox :P).
It’s hard to explain but, about universals, if ‘green’ and ‘white’ and ‘hardness’ is only a certain state at the quantum level, and only a certain interaction at the molecular level, then how can we differentiate it from when water turns into ice?
We have no more choice in the matter to see it as white, as when ice melts.
I don’t know where you’re going with that, DSeid. I was about to underline all the universals that were necessary to developing that post’s point, whatever it was, and then ask you if they existed, but I fear you’d again not answer the question.
If you suggest that what you know of the world is filtered through sensory apparatuses, then I would assume you feel universals exist, because you just used their existence to explain your knowledge.
Gyan9, I would suggest the same to you. How would you know? I don’t know how you would know, but you appealed to universals in an attempt to explain these “properties”, so I guess you have to fall somewhere on the universals problem.
How did I appeal to universals?
Though I suppose you might claim that only one of these exists, and it is yours.
I won’t claim that only one these does exist, but that I can’t know if others do as well.
I’ve really tried to answer Eris. Really. I believe that universals definitely exist as objects in conceptual space and that these conceptual space universals correlate in some way with things in reality in some predictable and salient way. If you want to call those properties of the real world universals then fine by me. I’ll not object although I’d likely not use that phrase myself. Of more immediate importance they correlate well enough with the perceptions of others such that knowledge can be shared.
I’ve been thinking a bit about the context in which this question of universals became so central to philosophy and why. It originated out of people thinking from a Christian philosophy in medieval times and developed more fully in an era when people thought of the mind not as an emergent property of the matter that it consists of, but as the “ghost in the machine” - an eternal soul, in a time before evolution was a common model, in a time when space within the universe was thought of as a static entity which could be described in, aptly put, Cartesian coordinates, functioning in a nice linear fashion. The question makes sense within that framework.
But for one who comes from a framework which presumes that the ability to form systems of knowledge evolved, that knowledge systems themselves evolve along the lifetime of both individuals and along the lifetimes of cultures, that there is no “ghost in the machine” but that the ghost is emergent of the machine, and that knowledge like the universe is does not exactly function a nice linear fashion, that space itself is a nonstatic entity, the question of a priori universals becomes less significant. How knowledge evolves becomes the more interesting question.
IMHO of course.
And it is in that sense that Gyan9’s liguistic reference to Escher is so apt.
I think you underestimate the issue, but I am at a loss (again) with how to proceed. The problem of universals impacts science, mathematics, history, biology, anthropology… the list goes on and on.
Sorry, Gyan9, I assumed we were a hair beyond solipsism or Cartesian skepticism. If we’re not, I agree that universals is a subject not worth taking a stand on.
Well Eris, you’ve been a source of education about this subject so far. Very seriously. I may see it differently than you do, but before that first thread I had never heard of the question of universals at all. So how about if we proceed by your explaining how the question of universals “impacts science, mathematics, history, biology, anthropology”, etc. and we can compare and contrast how different perspectives on the question impacts the approach to each. Perhaps I’ll come away with a different estimation of the question. Or perhaps you’ll see the utility of the perspective that I (and I believe Gyan9) see the issue from. We’ll see. I’m open to being convinced. So long as your mind is open as well.
Well, DSeid, as I indicated earlier in the thread, particle physics is a pure exercise in universals. Electrons, for example. Wavelength of a photon. Photons! Etc. Each of these, objects distinguished by their properties. To deny those properties is to deny those objects. Biology, of course, classifies organisms based on their properties–I trust the obviousness of the application of universals strikes you here. Anthropology is also all about classification among various traits, the least of which are multiple instances of ‘humans’.
Mathematics is what started the whole thing off. Did I link to Stanford’s page before? In any case, here it is again. They have a different entry on properties which has a similar discussion, only isn’t rooted in the medieval history of it.
At any rate, mathematics is overflowing with universals. In fact, it is where the appeal to platonic realism is strongest. The example Stanford gives is a proof about triangles. They note:
Any act of describing, distinguishing, or classifying objects based on a perceived property appeals to universals; if this activity is epistemologically sound (i.e.–you can gain knowledge from this) then I’d say you’ve accepted the existence of universals.
But (at least) I don’t dispute that universals exist within our mental schema and that’s where your universals-manipulating activity takes place as well. The puzzle is on its “objective existence”.
Sure, Gyan9. No one disputes the concepts or language. They question whether concept or language obtains. I do not see how to leave solipsism or Cartesian skepticism about the real world without holding that universals exist.
As per the above, you hold that universals are assumed to exist, in order to support realism. You haven’t deduced that they do exist objectively. I would say that it’s a metaphysical dead-end and hence unsolvable philosophically or physically.
Well, let’s not be hasty. You are correct that there isn’t some strict, undeniable deductive process that will demonstrate once and for all that universals exist. This makes it a point of contention, philosophically. The question is unresolvable, yes. However, that doesn’t make it a dead end, because how we answer that question significantly impacts what we may say about the world. Some people who think things through often find that conclusions that must be accepted from a position are unacceptable, and have to re-evaluate their assumptions. So for instance, if I held I was a realist wrt universals, but it led me to some conclusion like “everything is the same” and everything clearly isn’t the same, then I’d have to rethink my position, wouldn’t I?
Interesting but unresolvable questions aren’t dead ends. They’re Great Debates. 
Not necessarily. It depends on what you mean by ‘unacceptable’ (“everything same” is too vaguely defined to be a valid example of an unacceptable conclusion). In any case, philosophy can conclude things that are counter-intuitive (“A is clearly, oops, NOT B”), but that does not mean the philosophy applied is wrong.
It is not a question of intuition. My example was only meant to be illustrative of finding something wrong with reasoning as it applied to other knowledge, not as a strict measure of when people should change their minds. Here is a better example if you really need it: I once held, for example, that the death penalty is an appropriate penalty for various crimes and that the government may exercise it, while also holding that we should not kill innocent people in any justice system. I came to find out that these two positions could not simultaneously be met, and so one of them had to give.
[ol][li]I send you to the store for a loaf of bread. Can you succeed or fail to succeed at this task? How, without appealing to qualities multiple objects may share/instantiate? Suppose you bring home a ham that had been labeled “wheat bread”. Does this represent success? Why or why not?[/li][li]I ask you to check the tempurature every ten seconds of a vessel we just set up on a bunsen burner. Do you know where to look? How, without appealing to the existence of temperature, a quality multiple objects may have? Suppose the thermometer reads “-10C”. Do you simply write it down without another thought? If not, what does this tell us about how we relate universal qualities to particular events?[/li]I write the word “universal” on a piece of paper. You come by and write the word “universal” just beneath it. I ask you, “Why did you write the same word beneath mine?” Can you answer this question, or is it nonsensical?[/ol]
BTW, that last post was directed at II Gyan II, not Gyan9 who apparently no longer exists. 
Why? Your arguments as stated don’t contradict. It’s the execution, but that’s not a matter of philosophy. Make the analog arguments for incarceration on general: jail is appropriate penalty for various crimes; govt. may exercise it AND innocent people should not be jailed. (Of course, difference here is the third generic argument which is the prioritizing of a single error as opposed to success rate of penalty). Tolerable in one instance (“jail”) and not in another.
In any case, again, I don’t see how your arguments relate to objective existence of universals. I can accommodate all of them in conceptualism.