Here is where we disagree. You posit that “Any act of describing, distinguishing, or classifying objects based on a perceived property appeals to universals”. I do not see that, nor do I see how it answers why “the question of universals” impacts the sciences. If the question is whether or not we try to describe the observable world in terms of predictable properties, well then, duh, of course we do. The “problem” was, I thought, whether abstractions had an independent existence outside of what I refer to as conceptual space and the relationships between those idealized abstract objects that exist in conceptual space, and those posited independently extant abstractions out there in reality, and the examples of the class. I sort of read “the problem” as a hybrid between “the chicken and the egg” and “the tree falls in the forest” conundrums.
So let us use your examples. “Photons!” We have an object in our conceptual space that we have called a photon. We have various properties that we attribute to it. We have modelled it against what we have observed and have made predictions to test our model of what it is. We have developed tools to extend our perceptual abilitities in order to better test and refine the shape of that object in our conceptual space so that it better fits something that we believe is real that is out there. The conceptual space object “photon” has changed shape often in the last 100 years. In the sense that this object has properties in our mind it is an abstraction for some real entity. But it is still a metaphor for the real thing, and science is always looking for better poetry.
In short, the question of universals, does not inform the process, any more than what humans already do so well by our very nature: attempt to perceive predictable patterns in the observable world around us in the pursuit of salient goals.
One wonders by what principle you suppose arguments may be transferred. Perhaps it has to do with not recognizing universals?
It is not an instance, it is a class of punishments. “The death penalty” covers various punishments. As a means of classification, it recognizes the property of “death” or “causes death” that multiple instances may share. Feeling these classifications are real (death actually happens to multiple humans), I find seperating it from other types of punishment to aid in my understanding and ability to seek out new information.
They were never supposed to. They were supposed to indicate that even though we may not be able to definitively select on stance to the exclusion of all others, that this does not mean the issue is not critical. You indicated the problem cannot be settled. I indicated that whether or not this is the case, our answer affects other things we find important.
As you no doubt have surmised several times, this is not the question.
First, I see no direct connection between chicken and egg problems, but that is neither here nor there. I am not sure what you mean to elucidate in this passage; the debate between nominalism and realism revolves around whether or not such qualities may be said to exist. Previous answers to metaphysical questions like “what does it mean to exist” are assumed to be answered and don’t necessarily impact this question. For example, idealists hold that all existence is mind-correlative or perhaps even mind-dependent. As you might surmise, then, they can (though needn’t necessarily!) answer that universals do exist as much as anything else my mind thinks up does. But again, this is neither here nor there. Hopefully it did help to focus the question at hand.
Yes yes, this is all fascinating and well within the domain of science as an epistemogically sound method. But the question I want you to answer is, “However we manage to describe them, and however we choose to adjust our answers over time, are there more than one of these entities that share the same properties?” Were wave theorists and corpuscular theorists describing the same things? Obviously their, as you call it, conceptual spaces were not strictly aligned.
Again, every empirical investigation will have this quality. It is not surprising or unexpected that we do not have perfect knowledge. Indeed, epistemology would be very boring if we could.
Illustrate how the aspect of ‘objective existence’ of universals affects something (important, especially).
And I used the word “instance” to mean “instantiate a category”. The generic category I intended for both “jail” and “death” is the state of punishment (confined,dead) and not the method.
Again I just must not understand the significance of the question. Yes, there are entities that share at least some of the same properties to at least some degree … 100% true for conceptual space and the working asumption is that these are reasonable models for real space as well. The different theorists were both descibing the same set of observations, more or less, and were both trying to form a model of what light is made of. If that means that universals exist then again, no duh. And the point is?
Not put too fine a point on it but is that what all those linked pages of obfuscatory speechifying on universals really boil down to?
You do realize that Kant was a scientist before he was a philosopher and that his take as a philosopher was a reflection of the science of his time? Cutting edge for the time but dated by now. In those heady days interdisciplinary was virtually the only way of the intellectual.
And this is precisely how immanent realists feel universals exist: instantiated in particulars. So perhaps you see my confusion.
Not “no duh”. It is precisely there that the debate goes on. Of course, I feel that immanent realism is obvious, but… here we are.
Kantian philosophy is still very strong. Don’t let anyone convince you otherwise. People still get their PhDs by working on Kant wrt modern issues in philosophy, science, etc. In fact, I just made friends with one this weekend. Was he wrong about some things? Oh, sure, at least most agree he was. But again, who has made perfect knowledge a condition placed on anyone? I don’t see it. Well, Rand, maybe…
Right now, all I’m asking for are illustrations of how the objective existence aspect of universals affects what we can say for the world, or how we think about it.
If you’re unconcerned with correctness, II Gyan II, then the issue is uninteresting. If you’re unconcerned with the validity of various methods of investigation into said correctness, then the issue isn’t important, etc.
I have to go out of town this week, I can’t guarantee any responses until the weekend.
I don’t understand why you think I’m obfuscating. Is science investigating anything other than our own concepts? Is the pursuit of knowledge something besides just psychology (psychologism)? Do you feel the answer to “does hydrogen exist?” is irrelevent to human activity?
Why do you propose we do science if all means of qualification are just in our head? Why would we continue to use language that ostensibly acts as if these things exist when we could change it to something more accurate?
One wonders how you’d derive this proposition, or why you’d even bother to assert it.
And of what use is a symbol placed in front of every proposition? What meaning could it have? None. “Within my mind’s world as far as I can tell…” as opposed to what? Things you can tell?
Well, you’re right, most people don’t have a firm grasp on subjectivist metaphysics, usually because they spectacularly fail to account for most human activity, but I guess since it is all in my head anyway, I’m only arguing with myself. That about cover it?
Nope. It is not all in your head. You don’t know that. It might be, or it might not. As per curreny dogma, there’s no way to verify either possibility. What’s simply happening is that an underlying dilemma is being acknowledged (that these things could or could not be just in my head). An aspect is being explicitly recognised, which people take for granted. The only difference the recognition of this aspect could possibly make is with regards to ontology. But even there, I don’t currently think it’s significant.
Of course not, because any attempt to seek evidence requires such prior claims as universals to be known, and if you refuse to answer them, then you will refuse to know.
They were never supposed to. They were supposed to indicate that even though we may not be able to definitively select on stance to the exclusion of all others, that this does not mean the issue is not critical. You indicated the problem cannot be settled. I indicated that whether or not this is the case, our answer affects other things we find important.
Was he wrong about some things? Oh, sure, at least most agree he was. But again, who has made perfect knowledge a condition placed on anyone? I don’t see it. Well, Rand, maybe… 