I’m surprised you think that.
Should we abolish the Senate, too?
I’m afraid I don’t see how your interpretation contradicts that of EnderWay. It’s true, as you say, that direct election was problematic due to varying levels of enfranchisement. ( The major factor in that being not the varying property requirments but rather slavery. Nonfreeholding whites could be enfranchised but the South wasn’t going to allow their slaves to vote despite Madison’s facetious suggestion that they could. ) But it is also true that, as EnderWay says, that there was a compromise allowing for more representation for small states that their population ( and wealth ) would merit. Neither intrepretation covers the entirety of what occured but both are true as far as they go.
Or at least, so it seems to me. If you would care to get down to brass tacks I’ll be happy to cite my position. It would probably be easiest to just tell me which constitutional sources you are using since I have ( other than Charles Warren ) all the standard authors on the federal convention: Farrand, Beard, McDonald, Wood, Rossitier, Drinker Bowen, and the Colliers. At least, I believe those are the standards. I’m only an amateur and my historiagraphy is hit and miss. Mostly miss. I’ve got them and more on my bookshelf and it’s easier to resolve disputes if you are using the same sources.
Unless you want to go to the primary sources in which case I only have access to what is available online. Which is mostly Madison’s Notes. If so I’ll post my shorthand notes for discussions of presidential elections to make it easier to find specific speeches. ( In 2 parts to get it to fit. )
TIMELINE OF THE FORMATION OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
May 29th, 1787
Virginia Plan introduced. It calls for the Executive to be chosen by the National Legislature.
June 1st, 1787
The Executive is first debated. A single President or an Executive Council are considered.
James Wilson supports election by The People “in theory”.
George Mason supports the idea but finds it impractical. He suggests Wilson consider this point.
John Rutledge proposes election by the upper House of the National Legislature.
June 2nd, 1787
James Wilson produces “practical” plan.
“* that the Executive Magistracy shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided into -------- districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature elect -------- members for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive magistracy, that the said Electors of the Executive magistracy meet at -------- and they or any -------- of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body -------- person in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested.*”
Elbridge Gerry seems to have proposed to modify this plan to give state legislatures control over the electors.
Hugh Williamson wondered about going to the trouble of electing elecors to vote when the state legislatures already were elected.
Mr Wilson’s proposal was voted down.
June 9th, 1787
Elbridge Gerry proposes election by executives of the states.
Edmund Randolph opposed.
The motion fails 0-9-1.
June 15th, 1787
New Jersey Plan introduced. It calls for election by Legislature.
July 17th, 1787
Govurneur Morris objected to the Executive being chosen by the Legislature. He felt the latter would lend itself to intrigue. He admits some difficulties with a popular election but moves to include them.
Roger Sherman prefered the decision by the Legislature, and raises the “Favorite Son” argument: the fear that people would always vote for a candidate from their state.
James Wilson addresses the arguments against a popular vote. He dismisses the example of the Diet of Poland and offers a choice by the legislature if no majority can be reached.
Charles Pinckney argued a popular election would be controlled by a few designing men in the most populous states. He thinks the Legislature the best place to pick the President.
Govurneur Morris replies:
“* It is said that in case of an election by the people the populous States will combine & elect whom they please. Just the reverse. The people of such States cannot combine. If their be any combination it must be among their representatives in the Legislature. It is said the people will be led by a few designing men. This might happen in a small district. It can never happen throughout the continent.*”
He goes on to describe the intrigue to be expected in a legislative election.
George Mason remarks that his opponents are trusting the legislature in some points and putting no confidence in it here. He again argues that a popular election is impractical. He deems it “* unnatural*” and compares it to referring a “* trial of colours to a blind man*”.
James Wilson points out that there are areas where the legislature should not be trusted. He gives appointment of other high officials as another example.
Hugh Williamson repeats that people will only vote for local candidates.
The motion is voted down, 9-1.
July 19th, 1787
Govurneur Morris, during consideration of a term limit on the Executive, points out that no term limit would be needed if elected by The People… He moves to reconsider the mode of the Executive.
Rufus King didn’t favor the term limit and felt that choice by The People was best. He also doubted that a majority would be achieved and felt that electors would best do the job.
William Patterson agreed and proposed each state recieve one to three electors.
James Wilson opined that the idea of election by legislature without a term limit was unpopular and “* he perceived with pleasure that the idea was gaining ground, of an election mediately or immediately by the people."
James Madison confirms the problem of appointment by the legislature without the term limit. He comes out in favor of the theory of election by The People. He dismisses the “local candidate” theory but points out, " There was one difficulty however of a serious nature attending an immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes. The substitution of electors obviated this difficulty and seemed on the whole to be liable to fewest objections.*”
Elbridge Gerry confirms the term limit problem. He argues that people would be mislead in a popular vote and urges electors be appointed by the Executive of each state.
The motion is passed unanimously.
Oliver Ellsworth fleshes out Patterson’s earlier suggestion and moves to include it. Jacob Broome 2nds.
John Rutledge stood for election by legislature with a term limit.
Mr Gerry reaffirms his preference and feels that Mr Ellsworth’s proposal is the best alternative. He fleshes out the ratio a bit further.
The motion is divided. The question to let electors appoint the Executive passes 6-3-1. The question of whether state legislatures will choose the electors passes 8-2. The question of the ratio of electors to states is postponed.
July 20th, 1787
James Madison points out that Mr Elseworth’s proposal doesn’t take into account that someday all of the state will have enough people to have three electors.
Elbridge Gerry reintroduces his proposal for the number of electors for each state. There is some wrangling over the ratio of electors.
Hugh Williamson proposes that a state should be alloted the same number of electors as it has seats in the Lower House.
Mr Gerry’s allotment is passed 6-4.
Mr Gerry and Govurneur Morris move that the restriction “* that the Electors of the Executive shall not be members of the Natl. Legislature, nor officers of the U. States, nor shall the Electors themselves be eligible to the supreme magistracy.*” It is agreed to.
July 21st, 1787
Hugh Williamson moves that electors be paid for their service. This is agreed to.
July 23rd, 1787
William Churchill Houston and Richard Dobbs Spaight move to reconsider appointment of electors by state legislatures.
The motion passes 7-3 and another to discuss the item the next day pases 8-2.
July 24th, 1787
Houston moves to get rid of Electors in favor of appointment by the national legislature. He feels it unlikely that capable men would be willing to serve as Electors in the distant states. Spaight 2nds.
Elbridge Gerry opposes. He asserts that the election would be considered important enough that the best men, the governors of states would serve as Electors. He repeats the dislike for the term limit he feels necessary if the position is appointed by the legislature.
Caleb Strong makes that point that the term limit is not the only check on an appointed Executive. Elections may change the composition of the legislature that picks the Executive and thus he can’t just rely on those who selected him the first time. He feared that Electors were vulnerable to the same weaknesses as the legislature and called for simplicity. He agreed that the best men wouldn’t volunteer to act as Electors.
Hugh Williamson calls for legislative appointment with a term limit. He vigorously defended the term limit but allowed that he would agree to a ten or twelve year term.
Gerry moves that state legislatures vote in the same ratio he gave for Electors. He proposes that if no majority is found then the first House could pick 2 out of the top four nominated by the states and the 2nd House could choose the winner. Rufus King 2nds.
Mr Gerry’s motion is greeted with so many nays that no roll is called.
Mr Houston’s motion passes 7-4 and legislative appointment is again penciled in. There follows general disagreement concerning the length of term and religibility of the Executive.
James Wilson proposes a new method of selecting the Executive: He suggests a leaving the choice to a few members of the legislature, no more than 15, drawn by lot.
Govurneur Morris stumps against legislative appointment as the worst alternative. He prefers another mode and offered to consider Wilson’s latest.
Mr Wilson moves to include “* the Executive be chosen every ------- years by ------- Electors to be taken by lot from the Natl Legislature who shall proceed immediately to the choice of the Executive and not separate until it be made.”*
Daniel Carroll 2nds.
Gerry opposes. He dislike leaving it to chance and feels that no form of legislative appointment is a good one.
Rufus King also dislikes the chance of drawing lots. He moves to postpone.
Wilson, who earlier had a motion to postpone voted down 2nds and reiterates his preference for resorting to The People.
Mr Morris points out that the odds of a single state having a majority were slim indeed.
A vote to on whether Mr King’s motion to postpone is in order passes 7-4. Postponement is agreed to.
July 25th, 1787
Oliver Ellsworth attempted to cut through the term limit problem and moved in favor of legislative appointment unless an Executive had served a full term. In that case the decision would be left to Electors chosen by state legislatures.
Elbridge Gerry shares his dislike of legislative appointment yet again, pronouncing it “incurable” and proposes still another plan: appointment by state Executives with advice from their Council or in their absence, Electors chosen by the state legislature.
James Madison, in a long piece, examines the proposals. He now comes out strongly against legislative appointment; the choice would cause tumultuous division in the legislature, the Executive was liable to be dependent on the legislature, and foreign powers would have footing for intrigue ( he gives the Holy Roman Empire and Poland as examples ). He objects to leaving the choice to the state legislatures because it would upset the balance of power between the states and the general government. He rejects appointment by state Executives because he feels them to be open to intrigue as well. He then considers what is left, Electors or The People themselves. He praises the idea of Electors and proclaims they can be made free of cabal and corruption. He then announces he prefers direct election by The People. He now concedes the “local candidate theory” and repeats the concern for loss of influence of the South due to it’s restrictive voting qualifications.
Mr Ellsworth repeats the “local candidate” argument.
Mr Ellsworth’s motion is denied 7-4.
Charles Pinckney moves to include a limited religibility, a person could serve in six of twelve years, in order to make legislative appointment more attractive.
George Mason concurrs and opines that this leaves the Executive independent enough. He then admits there is some cause for concern of foreign influence under legislative appointment.
Pierce Butler clarifies that the pitfalls to be avoided are “cabal at home and influence from abroad”. He feels legislative appointment cures neither. He favors appointment of Electors by state legislatures with the term limit and doesn’t want any ratio of electors. He feels the states should be equal.
Mr Gerry allows that Pinckney’s plan does cure legislative appointment a bit.
Govurneur Morris again argues against legislative appointment. He claims to favor it least and election by The People best. He now comes out in favor of Wilson’s drawing of lots.
Hugh Williamson suggests having each man vote for three candidates in an election of The People as a safeguard against the “Favorite Son” problem.
Mr Morris likes the idea of multiple votes and proposes that each man vote for 2, one of whom is not from his state.
James Madison finds the proposal attractive but worries that voters would use the 2nd vote on someone that couldn’t possibly hurt the chances of their first choice. He raises the possibility of limiting the eligibility of Executives from the same state.
Gerry goes into his “Ignorant Populace” schtick. He claims that the Order of Cincinatti will control every election by The People.
John Dickinson claims to have long favored popular election of a Executive Magistrate. He feels the objections to it are less than the objections to all others. He proposes that The People in each state choose a candidate and have another body, the national legislature or Electors, choose from among them.
A motion to alot more time to Williamson’s idea fails 6-5
Mr Pinckney’s motion also fails 6-5.
Gerry and Pierce Butler moved to commit the matter to the Committee of Detail.
James Wilson objects.
John Langdon was in favor.
July 26th, 1787
George Mason examines the proposals. He invokes the “Ignorant Populace” chestnut against popular election. He refers to “* strong arguments*” against appointment by state legislatures or executives. He mentions the accepting and then rejecting the idea of Electors. He rejects Williamson’s attempt to solve the “Favorite Son” question and repeats the charge that the Cincinnatus would control “A popular election in any form”. He rejects the most recent proposal, from John Dickinson, for the opposite of the “Favorite Son”. He rejects it because no candidate unpopular within his own state could win, even if the unpopularity was the reason the rest of the nation favored him. He states that the lottery is so unpopular that it doesn’t bear examination. He concludes that legislative appointment is the only choice left. He felt that a term limit was necessary for this mode and moved to include one in the working document. William Richardson Davie 2nds.
Benjamin Franklin supports the term limit, speaking of it as a promotion from public servant to master.
Col Mason’s motion passes 7-3-1 and a seven year term limit is added to the Legislative appointment.
Gouverneur Morris proclaimed himself now opposed to the entire plan for the Executive. He points out that they were proposing no term limits on Judicial and Legislative officials. He also lands a sarcastic barb in Dr Franklin’s talk of “promotion”.
The Resolution for the Executive passes 6-3-2.
The Resolutions are sent to the Committee of Detail.
August 24, 1787
There is discussion over the method of voting within the Legislature. A joint ballot is voted in 7-4. A requirement that the winner recieve a majority passes 10-1.
James Madison: “* This surely can not be unreasonable as the President is to act for the people not for the States.*”
Daniel Carroll and James Wilson move for popular election.
The motion fails 9-2.
Gouverneur Morris again stumped against legislative appointment. He again claims that the term limit will not make the Executive disinterested because he will strive to please the Legislature in expectation of joining or rejoining it. He moves the Executive be appointed by Electors chosen by The People. Daniel Carroll 2nds.
The motion fails 6-5.
A later motion calling simply for Electors ( however selected ) fails 4-4-3.
September 4th, 1787
The Committee of Eleven delivers a compromise Report. Each state will have the same number of Electors as Congressmen and control over how they are selected. The Electors will meet in the states and vote for 2 candidates, one of which can’t be from that state. The votes will be counted by the Senate, which would pick the winner if no candidate recieved a majority.
James Madison expressed concern that choosing the President and the Vice from the five with the most ballots would lead Electors to use their votes to control candidates for senatoral selection rather than try to form a majority of their own.
Gouverneur Morris agreed.
Edmund Randolph and Charles Pinckney asked for an explanation for the change in mode.
Mr Morris, speaking for himself and the committee, delivered these objections to legislative appointment: 1, it lent itself to intruigue and faction. 2, the “* inconveniency*” of the necessary term limit. 3, it must leave the impeachment of a President to the very body that elected the President. 4, it was unpopular in the convention. 5, many favored a popular election. 6, the need to make the Executive seperate from the Legislature. He stressed again that Electors would be uncorruptable because they would meet seperately.
George Mason didn’t object but felt that lacking a majority of Electors for a single candidate ( which he felt was almost certain ) the Senate was the wrong body to appoint.
Pierce Butler admitted that the plan wasn’t perfect but allowed that it was better than legislative appointment.
Mr Pinckney listed his objections: 1, the Senate would always make the choice. 2, the candidates will be unknown to the Electors who would be unable to judge them. 3, the lack of term limit was dangerous. 4, it would leave the choice to the Senate which was the body that could impeach the Executive.
Hugh Williamson was concerned that the President would be dependent on the Senate for another term. He felt limiting the Senate’s choice to the 2 leading candidates would be the least to be done to lessen this dependence.
Mr Morris explains that the main benefit of Electors is their incorruptability. He attempts to seperate this from the rest of the Executive debate. Adjustments such as a term limit could be made to this mode as easily as any other.
Abraham Baldwin thought the plan was looking better than when he first saw it. He felt as time went by and people grew more familiar with residents of other states that the Electors would more often reach a majority.
James Wilson repeats earlier reasons to favor this mode over legislative appointment. He also dislikes the Senate involvement and suggests the Legislature as the contingency plan.
Mr. Randolf prefered legislative appointment. He also complained that the Senate was inappropriate. He worried that states close to the capital would have an advantage in that body.
Mr Morris replied that the Senate was preferred because it was smaller, the President would be beholden to less people. He expressed confidence that the President would seek reelection through competence.
September 5th, 1787
Charles Pinckney repeated his objections from the day before.
Elbridge Gerry ** doesn’t** object to the new mode but warns his final approval will depend on the powers delegated to the Executive.
John Rutledge opposed the new mode. He felt it empowered the Senate overmuch and he restated his support for a term limit. He moved in favor of legislative appointment.
The motion failed 8-2-1.
George Mason repeated his objection to Senate involvement. He felt that the Executive and the Senate in colusion could unbalance the government. He moved to waive the majority requirment and take whomever got the most votes. Hugh Williamson 2nds.
Govurneur Morris tried to downplay the chances of not reaching a majority. Each Elector has 2 votes so 1/4 of the total is considered a majority. If the sitting President is popular, he will get the majority, if he is not then his opponents are likely band together to remove him.
Col Mason makes the point that those that feel a failure to reach a majority is unlikely should be willing to give way on the eventuality with those who don’t.
Roger Sherman claims the advantage of the “small” states in the Senate is balanced by the advantage of the “large” states in nominating the candidates to it.
Col Mason’s motion is denied 8-2.
James Wilson moved to place the contingency appointment in the entire Legislature instead of the Senate.
James Madison felt it imperitive that the contingency be made as unlikely as possible and fleshed out the “Big Neighbor” argument. States with more people would have more Electors. With those votes “big” states could keep any candidate from a majority and and send the question to the Legislature where they also have more votes. Madison felt that if every state had an equal say in the contingency then the populous states would be motivated to settle the question in the electoral college.
Edmund Randolph and John Dickinson object that senatoral appointment makes that body overpowerful.
Mr Wilson’s motion fails 7-3-1.
Mr Madison and Hugh Williamson move that election in the college require a pluality of 1/3 at the minimum.
Elbridge Gerry objects that this leaves the selection in the hands of three or four large states.
Mr Williamson counters that in the senate 1/6 of the population living in seven states could make the selection.
The motion fails, 9-2.
Mr Gerry proposes yet another scheme. The Legislature as a whole would select six Senators and seven Representatives to appoint the Executive.
Rufus King opined that the greater influence of the “small” states in the senatoral appointment ( compared to their influence in the entire Legislature ) was balanced by the greater influence of the “large” states in choosing the candidates placed before it. He also reminded the delegates that the representatives of the “small” states had agreed to lessen the power of the Senate by forbidding it to originate tax bills.
George Mason moved to have the Senate choose from the top three. Mr Gerry 2nds.
Mr Sherman found this limitation to make the whole mode unacceptable. He preferred the top seven or thirteen candidates be eligible.
The motion fails 9-2.
Richard Dobbs Spaight and Mr Rutledge moved to have the top thirteen candidates eligible for senatoral appointment.
The motion fails 9-2.
Mr Madison and Mr Williams move to lessen the requirement of majority of Electors to a majority of votes. Should some Electors fail to cast a ballot this would make refference to the Senate less likely.
The motion fails 7-4.
Mr Dickinson moves to clarify the wording to make it clear that a majority of Electors is necessary rather than a majority of votes as sought by the previous motion.
The motion passes 9-2.
Col Mason expressed his unhappiness that the chosen mode was aristocratic.
September 6th, 1787
Rufus King and Elbridge Gerry move to exclude officers of the federal government from serving as Electors.
This is agreed to.
Mr Gerry never seems to run out of proposals. His latest is a further contingency on the contingency plan. Should a sitting President, or anyone else, fail to gain a majority of electoral votes then the issue would be decided in the Legislature rather than the Senate.
Mr King approves of the plan. He thinks it a good compromise and unlikely to be used often.
George Read disagreed, indicating that the issue wasn’t settled.
Hugh Williamson approves of the seperation of Executive and Senate.
Roger Sherman liked the Resolution as it stood but was still willing to consider changes. He introduces the idea of voting in the Legislature by states, as the populous states have the advantage in Electors.
Govurneur Morris praised the new plan.
James Wilson gives an extended diatribe against the dangers of the overpowerful Senate as proposed.
Mr Morris replies by comparing the new proposal to the previous agreement and finds the Senate no more powerful. For the electoral part of the argument he maintains that the Senate is no more powerful if it appoints a President out of the top five vote-getters only if there is no majority than if it shares appointment with the House and chooses any citizen.
Hugh Williamson repeats that the problem is provisional appointment by the Senate.
Alexander Hamilton shares his dislike of the general plan but feels that the new proposal is better. While he feels it necessary with Legislative appointment, he doesn’t favor a term limit. He thinks the Executive will use his power of appointments to subvert the government if ineligible and use corrupt influence upon the Legislature if reeligible through them. He thought failure on the part of the Electors to reach a majority was likely and so no hope for Legislative appointment, even as a contingency. He was in favor of taking the winner of a plurality of electoral votes. He states that the argument against it is that too few votes could win but that the Senate could appoint the man with the fewest votes.
The voting on the Report begins.
Selection by Electors, their numbers fixed by Congressional representation, who shall be appointed as each state legislature directs.
This motion passes 9-2
Richard Dobbs Spaight and Mr Williamson move that the Electors meet at the capital.
This motion fails 10 -1
For the Electors to elect a majority of Electors must be reached rather than a majority of actual votes.
This motion passes 8-3
If no majority is reached then the Senate will decide the question.
This motion reached a 7-1 majority before the vote call was stopped.
James Madison moved that a quorum of 2/3 of the Senate be necessary for this. Charles Pinckney 2nds.
Nathaniel Gorham objected that this might delay the choice for a long time.
This motion passes 6-4-1
Mr Williamson suggests that the choice be made in the House with voting by state.
Mr Sherman agreed, since it was his idea in the first place, and so moved.
George Mason agrees.
The motion passes 10-1
Govurneur Morris suggests that the sitting President only be allowed to be relected by the Electors and should he fail to reach a majority he should be ineligible for contingency appointment.
A seperate motion to have the House decide between 2 candidates that tied in the electoral college passed 7-3-1
September 7th, 1787
Elbridge Gerry moved that in the contingency appointment in the Legislature, no state should cast a vote with less than three members. If a state had less than three Representatives it’s Senators would fill in. Also that a majority of all states be necessary rather than just those present. James Madison 2nds.
George Read objected that states with a single Representative would have no vote if any of it’s Congressmen were ill or absent for another reason.
Mr Madison pointed out that a single Representative was no less vulnerable.
“* He thought it an evil that so small a number at any rate should be authorized, to elect. Corruption would be greatly facilitated by it. The mode itself was liable to this further weighty objection that the representatives of a Minority of the people, might reverse the choice of a majority of the States and of the people. He wished some cure for this inconveniency might yet be provided.*”
Elbridge Gerry withdrew the three member requirement and the majority of all states was agreed to.
Because he begins his post with:
I take that as saying that the primary reason the framers chose an EC, rather than direct popular election, was that direct election would have under-represented small states. I don’t believe that the timeline you’ve posted supports that contention.
Part of the problem is that we view the debate from a 21st-Century perspective, wherein direct election forms the most obvious alternative. But as your timeline indicates, direct election wasn’t the primary alternative in 1787–most of the debate revolved around an EC versus election by the legislature. Direct election received only sporadic and very general consideration, so that it’s difficult to isolate the relative importance of the reasons why it was rejected. But Madison mentioned the difference in suffrage whenever it was brought up, and my contention is that this formed a more insuperable obstacle to direct election than large-versus-small states.
Absolutely. But the compromise shouldn’t be advanced as the reason why the EC exists.
Wow, what a pair of posts, 2sense.
EnderWay, I’d like to apologize to you for moving this thread. 
I first want to compliment you on the clarity of presentation and intellectual honesty you have shown in this thread. I quoted the above passage specifically because I think you are alluding to an idea that I would like bring up. This person also eluded to the idea:
IT seems that the EC is a comprimise in the same sense that our governmental system is a comprimise, that is, between the idea of a supreme federal government and our roots as a conglomerate of semi-autonomous entities, and confederation. Obviously, a direct confederation did not work, as history shows. So we moved more to a federal system, with a decent amount of strength in the federal government. As you pointed out, states were still fighting for their own rights and supremecy until the civil war.
I think that the electoral college reflects this comprimise between confederation and federal strength. Are states their own, independant entity? Or are they just small parts of a larger whole? I think that the confusion comes because they are, in fact, both at the same time. To use your example, California, it seems that the people in an individual state vote specifically for their state’s vote. It is a strong indication that the state is an individual entity, with it’s own rights and power over the citizens. It indicates that the citizens of California speak as a unit, and while some my disagree, the majority of this single entity have voted for candidate X.
But, they are also part of a whole, which is why more populous states seem to have more weight. As citizens, we are part of a larger whole, the Union. As such, more people = more voting weight on a national scale.
I agree that the system is flawed, and in this age of strong federalism, outdated. Just trying to shed some more thoughts on the subject. Any thoughts? Am I completely off here?
Strictly speaking, no we do not need an electoral college. Nor, do we necessarily need states, we could just redistrict the entire country into “Districs” all of roughly equivalent population if we wanted.
We could also get rid of the senate and the house and just have one, unicameral legislator.
However while I don’t think we need these organs of government to actually have a functioning Republic, I do think this is the best way. Firstly I think it would be inappropriate to get rid of the electoral college because it would be yet another blow against federalism and another step towards centralization.
Local government tends to be more responsive to local needs, and to be more able to deal with local needs, thus local government should have more power over local issues. That’s why States need to be fairly unrestrained in operating intra-state affairs. The balance of power between Federal and State government is a zero-sum game. If the State government loses power, then it means the Federal government gains power. Which I tend to view as being bad in general. Although of course I do think it’s wise that the Federal government has the ability to protect certain innate right’s of citizens that some States may not respect as much as others.
I also think the United States as a whole is one of the most diverse states in the world. From one region to another you have a huge diversity of political ideas and opinions. And I think people should be able to speak “as a region.” A direct vote implies that there is “one American voice” when there really is no such thing. The electoral college lets political opinions be heard on a State-level, which is more appropriate considering how individual and unique, politically, each State is.
I only think a direct election is best in a small fairly homogenous country where local government isn’t as important
Naturally, since I don’t read IMHO I am grateful you did move it. And within a couple days of my rejoining the board. What luck!
The fight against ignorance ain’t easy. I shoot down hollow pro-EC claims but they reappear in the next debate. All of the arguments I’ve made here I’ve made before, in one form or another. In fact, I would have just linked to the timeline except the original copy seems to have disappeared in the Winter of Our Missed Content.
In any case, I hope EnderWay isn’t too disappointed. Perhaps the insights, thoughts, and comments he has received are more weighty and certainly more copious than he was counting on but we have kept it polite. Hopefully he is learning something. I often do in these threads. And I also hope you will follow along. If you haven’t abandoned your pro-EC stance perhaps it will be easier to see the value of my points when they aren’t tearing down your own.
Hmmm. Perhaps you are right about what EnderWay was saying. Lacking his coming along to dispute you I’ll concede the point. Certainly you are right about the rest. The ahistorical view that the debate in 1787 was EC vs Popular Vote is a common misunderstanding. Very astute of you to point it out.
My interpretation of the timeline is that direct election received no consideration at all. In fact, I argue that it was introduced solely as a stalking horse for the preferred choice of the large state nationalists. As for why it couldn’t be taken seriously the suffrage problem indeed looms large. I think we also have to look at the premodern elite sensibilities of the Framers and, perhaps more importantly, at the incredible difficulty of transmitting information across the US given the technology of the late 18th century. The story of the ratification of the Constitution is rife with false rumors that prominent members of one side or the other ( mostly the “Antifederalists” ) from other states had recanted or had never even adopted their true position in the first place.
When the new federal government got off the ground people, literate members of the leasure class, complained at the difficulty of getting trustworthy information from other parts of the country when Congress wasn’t in session. Nor were Congresscritters always reliable. During the tax resistance in what is today eastern Pennsylvania in 1798 ( which has come to be known as “Fries’s Rebellion” or the “Hot Water War” ) some Members of Congress deliberately misinformed their constituents about the status of the Direct Tax. These were people who lived along streams that emptied into the Delaware which flowed past the federal capital in Philadelphia and they didn’t know any better. Imagine how tough it would be for illiterate farmers from Maine or the Carolina backcountry to get reliable information on which to cast their ballot.
Thank you! I’ll take credit for the honesty but the acclaim for the clarity belongs to our fellow Great Debaters who have whipped earlier semi- and incoherent forms of my arguments into shape with their merciless attacks. You seem like a person with a decent curiosity about the world. I encourage you to spend the money to join. We will iron out the wrinkles in your worldview and writing style in no time. Not that the process will be painless, of course. Far from it.
Yes, I agree so far.
Here I don’t agree but unless you are especially interested I suppose there’s no real point of digressing into an exposition of the successes of the preconsitutional American Union ( we aren’t singing God Save the Queen after all ) and of the faults of the “Crisis With Framers To The Rescue” myth that pervades our historical literature. Though I will say that it seems that for annonymous internet posters intellectual honesty is mostly a matter of swallowing your pride when you make a mistake; for professional historians bucking the ideological needs of the day can be detrimental to your career.
Also I should point out that use of the term “federal” is tricky in America because we use it to refer to our government which, as you say, is a compromise between a completely centralized or national govenment and a decentralized or confederated government. Before the semantic confusion brought on by the “Federalists” ( who are more accurately described as “nationalists” ) and still in large part today the term “federal” refers to the latter sort. So by adopting the Constitution the United States became less rather than more federal. Similarly, to point out the strength of the central government today as compared to centuries past you would say that we live in an age of weak federalism.
No, you aren’t off at all. You have formulated a working overview of the Electoral College. Now it is time to ask the right question. The question, of course, is “Why?”
To use Shagnasty’s formulation, why should we allow the somewhat sovereign states to determine how every resident’s share of the state’s electoral power will be used? His answer is that because regional preferences are important. I respond by asserting that regional preferences should be considered exactly as important as the number of individuals who base their vote upon them. That is, I think people should be free to vote as they please and not have their electoral power usurped by the state. In this sense, proponents of the Electoral College have taken an anti-freedom stance.
DSYoungEsq has failed to address the issue of “Why?” Instead he has concocted the false dilemma of ( continuing Shagnasty’s formulation ) “Either you acknowledge regional preferences or you do not.” He has avoided the crucial question of how to best determine the relevancy of regional preferences as compared to other factors that might go into determining a person’s choice for president. So he really hasn’t provided any justification for keeping the EC at all.
Anyways, nice post.
Just my 2sense
I’m having trouble following your anti-EC arguments. Maybe you could come out with your actual stance, mixing in your history lessons with your vague and non-specific arguments gives me no idea as to the specifics of your position.
From what you’ve said in this thread though, I will offer some responses.
This is interesting historically (well only vaguely interesting, everyone learns this in Junior High School) you point out a problem with the election system in 1800 that was fixed. You don’t continue on with why the EC is still a failure or is flawed today.
I’ve already agreed with this in this thread. I don’t think we need a Senate, either. Or even States for that matter. But that isn’t necessarily an argument against the EC. There’s lots of things we don’t need that we’re certainly better off having than not.
And just because States won’t leave the union over an action doesn’t mean the action is acceptable or right.
I’ll disagree with this. The States would be less sovereign, the people would be just as sovereign (the States ARE the people who live there you know.) Anyways, removing the EC would clearly be another blow against Federalism. Unless you are for a completely centralized government, and against the vertical division of governmental power, then a step towards weaker State governments can’t be viewed as a good thing.
What you’ve done here is throw out something intended to derail people who support the EC. I think this shows the EC works exactly as it should. The EC reflects the regional preference of California, in that the STATE supported John Kerry. If we went to direct election then the liberal tendencies of the region wouldn’t be represented like they are now.
With this we’ve officially moved into “out there” scenarios. States aren’t going to collude like this in any electoral system.
Anyways, I’m not sure that state legislatures have the power you think they do. States get to decide how their electors are appointed, yes. But all states have passed satutes that clearly call for direct election, and there’s probably even some states with this written in the state constitution. The only way the State legislatures would pass laws changing the way electors are chosen (away from a popular vote and given to State legislatures) is if we assume state legislators aren’t politicians. Since they are, this could never happen. The people of any state would put the entire legislature out of work if they passed a bill taking away their right to cast a vote in the Presidential election.
What you propose is a theoretical power. I can talk all day about highly theoretical powers the President has. But they will always be powers in theory, because using them would result in political suicide.
This solution would again assume that Congressmen aren’t politicians, it assumes States wouldn’t pitch a holy fit. More than likely this proposed law would be overturned very quickly by either the supreme court or an outright constitutional amendment passed over the congress. Of course congressmen wouldn’t do something like this because it would be disastrous politically.
I’m also not quite sure Congress has this power, I’m not saying they don’t, but I won’t buy into it without some sort of cite. I don’t actually think Congress has the authority to choose the manner in which States decide on electors. The Federal government does have some power over elections, but I don’t think there’s any clear precedent it goes this far.
States can’t withhold highway funding carte blanche, they have to at least have a reason RELATING to interstate commerce or the highway system. That’s why Congress could force the 0.08 BAC law. This law would be challenged IMMEDIATELY in the SCOTUS, and given the make up of the current SCOTUS it would be struck down and the SCOTUS would find that it had absolutely nothing to do with interstate commerce and was outside the powers of congress. People seem to think withholding highway funds or using the interstate commerce argument are infinite in their power. That is not the case, there are limits. For example in the early 2000s a rapist was sued in federal court by the rape victim. This was the product of a new law which allowed this, because it was argued that rape affects interstate commerce. The court overturned this law 5-4.
Regional preferences within itself are a compelling reason. And if you go to a one-man, one-vote system regional preferences will not be represented in the same manner.
But anyways, do you consider Representative democracy in general to be anti-freedom? Is it anti-freedom that a member of the House of Representatives decides yea or nay on the nation’s laws in my stead? I don’t think so, not by any stretch of the imagination.
I argue that on top of the need for regional preferences, State governments deserve a say in the election of President. And the only way State governments can get a say is through a system which apportions votes via State divisions.
You act as though States having power is contrary to people having power, that is not the case. State governments represent the people of their State, just like a Congressman does. Each state has it’s own laws, interests, economy, et cetera. By having an Electoral College we allow our states a say in the election of the President. Take this away and the States have basically no power when it comes to the election of President.
Many of the posts you’ve made on this thread are, quite frankly anti-freedom in my opinion. You talk about all kinds of borderline constitutional schemes to alter the election system in violation of the constitutional intentions vis-a-vis changing something like this, you talk about enacting laws that would allow congress to reach into state legislatures and modify and create state-specific law however they choose. You’re arguing clearly for an omnipotent central government, and possible working towards the destruction of all local government, which would be both a disaster for freedom and liberty as well as for government efficiency.
These comments are off base because the conditions that lead to the sad state of electoral accuracy we currently suffer under would be eliminated along with the Electoral College. The EC encourages electoral decay because it leaves things to the individual states who often in turn leave things to counties and municipalities many of whom have limited taxing power and pressing problems. In a choice between funding schools or elections, the later loses out.
Plus in many states there is a dominant political party which has an interest in poorly run elections because they will control the bodies that resolve disputes and thus they will win more closely contested elections. These are the main lessons of Florida 2000: don’t put the burden of maintaining elections on those who can least afford it and don’t let the fox guard the henhouse.
If instead we cut down on the bureaucracy by replacing the 51 seperate organizations with a single federal electoral organization we would have a comprehensive nationwide system where fair elections everywhere would be in everyone’s best interest since the outcome of elections would depend on votes from everywhere. Plus, historically neither party has been able to totally dominate the national scene for very long.
I would suggest doing away with the FEC and lumping elections in with the Census Bureau. Maybe move the Census itself to an odd numbered year so it’s not going on during a federal election. Then we would have our elections run by professionals instead of often leaving them to be handled by well meaning but ill trained volunteers. ( Besides, the elderly people who run them now are dying off! )
I haven’t addressed the rest of Fern Forest’s post because until someone provides a justification for bundling individual votes together at the state level I feel that arguing over how to best determine aggregate state electoral power is premature.
I do agree that our primary system needs a lot of work. If she would start a thread on the topic I would be willing to contribute my ideas.
The problems with the EC are not something that happen only once or twice a century. The Electoral College depresses turnout because most of us live in “safe states” where the outcome has already been determined before Election Day. Hell, electoral polling has gotten so precise, despite the exit poll flap that year, that in the days before the 2004 election it became fairly certain that Pennsylvania, one of the three major “swing states”, would go Democratic. Presidential elections are the big draw but many people say they just don’t see the point because they know how their state will go before they have a chance to turn up at the polls.
And just because you go to the polls there is no guarantee you will have any effect on the vote that counts, the electoral vote. If more of the people in your state vote for another candidate then that person will gain your share of your state’s electoral power as well. This happened to me in 2004. I didn’t vote for Kerry but my choice was ignored and my electoral power usurped in his favor.
And even if you are voting along with the plurality in your state and your choice is represented in the electoral college you don’t have the same impact there as voters in the plurality in other states because of a variety of factors. States have varying ratios of people to electoral votes, turnout ratios, and margins of victories. Even if everything goes right for you you can’t ever get an equal vote. Never.
In sum, half the people don’t bother to vote. Nearly half of those who do fail to see their ballot translate into any electoral power. And those who do vote and get their votes to count in the electoral college never get them to be counted equally. The inequities of the system are massive and omnipresent. They have affected every single individual vote and nonvote in every single presidential election in our nation’s history.
“If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It” ain’t gonna cut it here.
Why not? As one international electoral expert testified Mexico had a succesful election in 2000 but not the United States. If Mexico can do it, why can’t we?
“I organized the observation of elections in Mexico and the United States. We had judged that the minimal standard for a good successful election is one in which all of the parties and candidates could accept the process and the results expeditiously. According to that standard, the implausible occurred last year. Mexico had a successful election; we didn’t.”
- Robert Pastor, Gertrude White Professor of Political Science at Emory University
If you care to run a search of this forum you can find out for yourself that I was arguing for doing away with the EC before, during, and after the 2000 fiasco. Also, I would suggest reading this thread over carefully. I believe it is full of good reasons to get rid of the EC. Yet I don’t find a single compelling argument for keeping it.
Just my 2sense
- The idea that a federally managed election machine would be anything other than an insane bureaucratic nightmare is in itself fairly presumptuous. As it is now we’d have to rely on basically all of the same State institutions that already exist. There’s no way the Federal government has the micromanagement abilities to take care of polling places on the local level all over the country.
The Federal government would have to divide it’s management, subdivide it, subdivide it again and again. And what divisions would they use? I’m going to guess they’d tend towards using the state-county-precint divisions that already exist, because established polling stations already follow these lines. There would be boards and committees for each of these levels in each part of the country.
Basically you’d have the exact same system as now, but it would be Federally operated from top to bottom. I don’t think that would necessarily make things any better (or necessarily any worse, either.)
And I don’t know that this gargantuan organization would be any better funded than it is now.
I’m not claiming direct election is impossible because of bureauctratic problems. I’m just claiming that all of your issues relating to poorly managed polling stations and etc would remain under federal management.
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Why is it necessarily considered absolue that all people should have the exact same amount of electoral power when it comes to electing the President?
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Why is it considered a good thing that more people vote? Actually, the fewer people that vote the higher percentage of the voters that are actually informed, “good” voters.
2sense welcome back.
I will point out that my post doesn’t do as you say in conclusion. It is only once you make the assumption that the discussion about value of state qua state vs. state as administrative boundary should be resolved a particular way that the issue I framed becomes without value. And, as you know, I disagree with your assumptions, and your conclusions, on that issue. But we won’t go there; I doubt if you’ve changed your mind at all in 5 years. 
But I will caution those who want to view the issue as being between a general election and some other proposal, for which the EC is a compromise that this shows a fundamental lack of understanding as to how the electors were chosen prior to the 1820’s. A general vote of the populace was not the consistent practice by any means.
Of course, framing the issue on the basis of what people were talking about in 1787 is ridiculous anyway. Let’s frame the issue on the basis of what we have now.
I would say that is the reality on the ground at present, and that it is a fine reality … the action of the Southern states wrt slavery and then Jim Crow leads me to distrust state governments’ ability to govern wisely.
Hmmm. It seems to me that you are more often having problems with my points because they are specific. That is, you often seem to be looking at them as if they were general anti-EC arguments and missing the context they were offered in. They stand on their own and don’t require an overarching theme to connect them. In fact, they don’t necessarily connect to any ultimate position but rather to the context they are given in. Still, my position in this thread can be summed up as such: I believe that if you are going to hold an election, all citizens should have an equal say in the election unless there is good reason for it to be otherwise. I have yet to see any justification here for deviating from the principle of “One Man. One Vote.”
I am tempted to challenge you to provide an example of a political problem caused by the failure to allow seperate balloting for president and vice president in the 1788, 1792, or 1796 elections. Certainly your average junior high student can’t answer that question and I doubt you can either. But let it go.
The context you seem to be missing here is the statement, 2 paragraphs before the one you quote, where I state that, “The system for electing the chief executive produced in the federal convention of 1787 was thought to be a workable compromise…” I do not go on to discuss other EC problems because that is not the point of the paragraph. It is merely a caveat offered to qualify the previous statement.
The context you seem to be missing here is that my words were offered, not to justify any action, but merely to agree with ** EnderWay** that states aren’t going to be leaving the Union. I state that I would and will argue against the EC and not that I am because that paragraph did not contain an anti-EC argument.
Here you haven’t missed any context. In fact, you are right that I could have been more specific. You are also correct in stating that a state is the people who live there. But the word can also be used to refer to the geographical area it encompasses or the government of the state. I was using the latter definition and that’s why I didn’t say “the people of the states” are a bit less sovereign and the people as a whole are a bit more sovereign.
By “sovereignty” I refer to actual usable power, not the idea that the people are the ultimate source of all political power. I am saying that power ( in this case individual voting power ) would be removed from the state government and given to the people at large. I’m afraid your statement in the earlier post that I never got around to fisking is incorrect. The balance of power between Federal and State government is a not a zero-sum game. To use the language of the 10th Amendment, I am saying that voting power would not be delegated to the United States or to the states but reserved to the people themselves.
Thus you are also wrong to assume that a move from the EC to a direct vote would be centralizing power. On the contrary, a direct vote represents a decentralization of power. To use my state as an example, voting power would be taken from Harrisburg and given, not to Washington DC, but to me and the rest of the people of Pennsylvania.
The context you seem to have missed is that my argument is in response to Shagnasty’s false claim that a direct vote could allow a handful of the largest states to completely control the election and that the liberal voting population of California would have undue influence. He had it backwards for the reasons I explained.
The question of whether the actual result was as intended or not did not enter into it. And now that you bring that up, I can only agree if we moved to a direct vote the tendencies of the region wouldn’t be represented like they are now. I don’t see any reason why they should be. I see no reason why the preference of the Kerry voters in California should have any more influence than their numbers warrant.
Again the context you are missing is the same as the previous point. Certainly it is ridiculous to believe that states would act in this manner. The point is not to build a realistic scenario but rather to show that under the EC the choices of people in many states could be made totally irrelevant unlike under a direct vote as Shagnasty mistakenly claimed.
Florida, 2000. The GOP controlled Florida legislature was preparing to discard the results of the popular election and nominate a slate of Republican electors should the court ordered recount show that Gore received more votes than Bush.
What backlash? A consistent majority of Americans would prefer to abandon the Electoral College since at least 1950 when polling on the question began.
I must admit I am not sure how this works either. I remember reading ( I believe more than once ) that there are precedents that the Congress can regulate the election of presidential electors as an extension of their authority over congressional elections but have never actually gone looking for the cases. If I get time I’ll look into it later. I believe you are right that the federal government can’t just outright mandate how electors are selected. Thus the incentives.
I believe you meant to say that the federal government couldn’t just withhold highway funding without cause. I disagree. It is federal money so of course they get to decide how it is used so long as no rights are violated in the process. States have no right to a proportional share of federal funding. If they did it would be bad for the red states, which tend to take in a disproportionate amount of federal funding.
I’m afraid I don’t understand this argument. I’m willing to stipulate regional preferences but I don’t see how, by their very existence, this necesitates they be given more weight than other preferences. And again, I see that restricting the influence of regional preferences to only those individual votes they affect to be a good thing. If I want to base my vote on other preferences, and I do, then I see no reason why I should not be free to do so.
The context you seem to be missing here is within the very paragraph you quote. I was careful to specify that only in the sense that they support allowing individuals to have their electoral power usurped by the state are EC supporters opposing freedom.
I’m afraid I don’t see any argument here. Why do you think states deserve a say in the election of a president? And I’m not sure what you mean by “the need for regional preferences”. I have stipulated that these preferences exist. What is so special about them?
In this limited sense, it is the case. I wanted my electoral power in 2004 to go to David Cobb yet all of my state’s electoral power in that year was given to John Kerry.
I’m afraid I don’t see the point here. Yes, if we take away a state’s authority to usurp the electoral power of their residents they will have no electoral power. How is that a problem?
Um, no. I am advocating the use of federal power only to decentralize electoral power. I want individuals to be able to control their own electoral power. You can’t get any more local than that.
Just my 2sense
I am of course following it; these threads interest me. I am also of course certain that neither of us will change the other’s mind. But you’re still interesting to read.
Sure - I’ve often asked why black people should have the same pull at the ballot box. And don’t forget women.
I’d like to see your criteria for determining how “electoral power” should be allocated.
Debates over the electoral college typically address the wrong questions and as such generate more heat than light. This is no exception.
There exists a science of electoral rules, called “social choice theory,” the study of collective decision-making. You can find more information about a critical early finding here.
In order to assess a preference aggregation rule, it pays to examine its formal properties, for example, transitivity, monotonicity, acyclicity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, weak Pareto, etc. An analyst can determine the “best” rule by selecting the rule that fits desirable conditions and has desirable properties.
What Arrow’s Theorem tells us, speaking nonrigorously, is that there is no rule that satisfies all the properties that we usually consider desirable. We usually have to trade off between three broad categories of properties: collective rationality, equality, and resoluteness. For example, dictatorial rule is great for collective rationality and resoluteness, but is terrible for equality. Pareto extension rule wins the equality and rationality properties, but it is terribly irresolute. Finally, majority rule is both equal and resolute, but it lacks collective rationality.
You don’t believe me?
Consider Condorcet’s Paradox. Although individual preferences are acyclic, there is a cycle on the collective preference under majority rule. Such cyclicity is irrational.
If still don’t believe me, I’d be happy to suggest some primers on social choice theory and voting theory. You can see the most important results derived therein. But for now, consider this. In voting systems as in all things, there is no such thing as a free lunch. If you change a voting system to improve one property, you necessarily worsen it in another.
Consider how preferences are aggregated in the US by presidential election. First there is a plurality vote. The electoral college maps this plurality vote to a simple majority. Simple majorities have some extremely desirable formal properties. They are equal and they are resolute. When the number of possible outcomes is sufficiently restricted, they are even acyclic. They meet the desirable criteria of voting rules.
However, when you expand the number of possible outcomes, the collective rationality of the decision produced by majority rule erodes. The finding here is a little involved, so if you are interested, try googling the “Nakamura theorem.” In a world of viable third party alternatives, majority rule can produce a cycle on a social preference, which anyone with a pulse would agree is not desirable. It can also conceivably fail to produce a winner at all. This is what loosely we call “irresolute”, and it is extremely undesirable. However, a majority rule that restricts outcomes to fewer than the Nakamura number is extremely desirable.
How do we do this without crushing the possibility of third parties?
America’s answer is its plurality popular vote.
So, as 2sense insists, why don’t we just keep the plurality vote and toss out the electoral vote? As it turns out, the plurality rule has some extremely undesirable properties. First and foremost, a plurality rule is not decisive. Second, a plurality rule is only acyclic if the number of alternatives is fewer than three. These two properties are terrible. First, if the rule is not decisive, then a social preference can not be explained by the preferences of the members of the winning coalition. Second, plurality rule can produce an unwanted cycle any time the number of candidates is greater than 2.
The beauty of the electoral college is that it scrubs the undesirable properties of plurality rule while at the same time preserving its desirable properties, that is, a guaranteed outcome even when the set of outcomes grows larger. It maps an outcome derived by a rule that is irrational, that is, may have a cycle, to an outcome that cannot have a cycle by definition using a rule that always produces an outcome.
From a formal (or mathematical) point of view, this is very good and very fair.
From a practical point of view, it is also neat. We all hate the high cost of campaigning and we consider it socially wasteful. The electoral college constrains high levels of campaign spending to states whose electoral votes are in play and are pivotal. If candidates has to try to maximize their vote share by maximizing their actual voters, we should expect to see campaign costs skyrocket and advertising blasted at just about everyone. This is not desirable. Plurality voting also promotes strategic (insincere) voting and drives out third parties (see Duverger’s Law). This will be exacerbated in a world without the electoral college.
In sum, the more decentralized the voting system, the greater the collective irrationality. Plurality voting scrubbed by simple majority rule tries to embody the best of both worlds. It has undesirable properties, but a social preference is guaranteed. Simple majority rule is typically “fairer”, but a social preference cannot be guaranteed when the number of outcomes is greater than two. The electoral college permits enough decentralization to satisfy our normative desire for “equality” but uses simple majority rule to offset the collective irrationality implied by plurality rule.
I hope that this in some small way helps. Social choice theory really is very interesting, and it is difficult to delve into the interesting findings without building up the fundamentals. I don’t think the SDMB is a very good place to do this, so if anyone is actually interested, I can make a few book suggestions.
It was nice of you to welcome me back. You are the only one to do so. :eek:
I’m sorry if I mischaracterized your post. I didn’t mean to. That seemed an accurate summary to me and I’m afraid I still don’t see why it isn’t. Nor do I understand how it requires assumptions about the value of statebased voting as opposed to individualbased voting before your post becomes without value. The complaint I have about your post is that it does not seem to provide any way to compare the value of these things. In fact, it seems to actively prevent meaningful comparison by presenting it as an “either/or” proposition.
Certainly I have changed my mind about the EC over the last 5 years. I did so by comparing my former position to a position based on new information. When I found my old position wanting, I abandoned it. That is how I seek to judge the EC. To determine its value not from unchangeable assumptions but rather by exploring its benefits and drawbacks ( which necessarily requires starting from assumptions about what is beneficial and problematic, of course ).
I have found many drawbacks to our electoral system but so far I have not found one single substantial argument in its favor. I’m not being facetious when I say that I have not found a reason for keeping it more weighty than “It’s fun to watch the states turn colors on Election Night.” I’m not closeminded about the EC. I am not only willing; I am eager to learn more about it. Explain to me the value of allowing states to usurp the electoral power of individuals. Or why that perception is flawed. Because I just don’t get it.
Am I a clown?! Do I amuse you!?! 
Seriously, I don’t see why one or both of us can’t change our opinion so long as we keep an open mind. Which I pride myself in doing.
Just my 2sense
Speaking of addressing the wrong question, why have you entered a discussion of the Electoral College with an arcane exposition of preference voting? Personally, I don’t have the math to follow most of what you are saying but a simple explanation of why any of the above is relevant here would be helpful.
What does “map a plurality vote to a simple majority” mean? In fact, I can’t follow the rest of the paragraph either.
Actually my question would be “Why don’t we just not have an electoral vote at all and use a simple runoff election?”
Again, this is mostly greek to me though I have run into the electoral math of Condorcet and Arrow before. My take was that, contrary to the assurances of proponents of IRV, once third party candidates become viable there is no way to avoid strategic voting. Therefor the best we could hope for would be to make the strategies as simple as possible. Thus, we should avoid preferential voting altogether and just have a runoff when no one gets a majority in the first round. At that point I had thought, nay- fervently hoped, that I could wash my hands of the matter. It’s not that I’m anti-math, it’s just that I don’t have the vocabulary so math talk makes me feel stupid.
Again I don’t know what “maps” means in this context. And it would be helpful if you would compare the EC to a simple runoff election.
How is it from a human point of view?
Aha! 2sense find return to solid ground comforting!
It is too strong a word to say that I hate the high cost of campaigning but certainly it is a negative. If it could be done cheaper then, great! But as far as campaigning in general, I believe you are wrong. I think it’s socially benefical rather than the opposite ( though again, if we could get the same bang for less bucks, great! ) Despite complaints about being inundated with campaign adds the people in the battleground states tend to be more informed. ( This from Professor Patterson of Harvard’s Vanishing Voter Project. ) More informed voters = Good.
Also, as I was going to explain to Martin Hyde regarding turnout, settling on representatives isn’t the only purpose of elections. The reason the Bushies keep touting the supposedly high election turnout in Iraq is that voting ties people to their government. That is, by participating in electoral politics and feeling you have had a fair say, even if your candidate fails to win, diverts energies that might be spent trying to make your point elsewhere ( see Timothy McVeigh ).
You seem to assume that there is some absolute cost requirement. That is, if you are spending X on campaigning in 10 states it will cost 5X to campaign in all 50. That is not how it works. In politics in order to be competetive you have to be able to spend at least close to what your opponent is spending. Under that formulation if you are spending X amount under the EC then if we abandoned it you would still need to spend X. X being as much as you can get your hands on. Rather than everyone getting more advertising we in the swing states could expect to get less.
Of course, campaigning has its social value so if we had an electoral system that more people considered fair it would be worth it even if elections themselves cost a bit more.
I don’t need anyone to explain how plurality elections discourage third parties. I’m Green and have a fine grasp of the social pressure to conform, thank you very much. What I don’t understand is why you believe the Electoral College discourages strategic voting or promotes third parties in any way. Also a comparison to a simple runoff would be more helpful.
I can’t follow this paragraph. What does “collective irrationality” denote in this context and why does it increase as the voting system is decentralized? How does the EC use simple majority rule? I’m guessing it has to do with “mapping”? How have you quantified our "normative desire for ‘equality’ " to reach the conclusion that we are, or should be, satisfied? And when you scarequoted “equality”, I take it that means you are using the word as the rest of us would? That is, in the usual subjective human way?
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The SDMB is not a great place to build up the fundamentals of social choice theory. It really does provide amazing insights into how social choices are made. This stuff isn’t simple, and simplifying it into sound bytes is not always helpful. If you are really serious about it, pick up a book. Like I said, I am happy to suggest one. Until then, I will do the best that I can.
This should be self-evident.
Everyone has private preferences over outcomes. Everyone sorts them in some order. Most preferred, next preferred, least preferred, etc. People pull the lever in the voting booth based on the way they order their preferences. Individual choices are aggregated together based on some rule and become a single social choice. In other words, the voting rule maps millions of individual choices into one social choice, just like the operation “addition” maps N integers into one integer, the sum of the operation.
The popular vote is a plurality. The winner of the popular vote in each state gets the delegate’s electoral votes (setting aside Maine and Nebraska for a moment). In order to win the election, you need a majority of electoral votes. The electoral college aggregates all of the social choices of the individual states and picks a winner by simple majority.
Lots of individual choices > State social choice > electoral votes > simple majority > winner
The outcomes of the state elections by plurality rule are aggregated together. These inputs are mapped to a single output, the winner of the election. Just like addition maps a bunch of integers to a single sum.
Ok, let’s think about that. As a matter of fact, this is how elections work in France. As you highlight, this has some desirable properties. But there’s a big trade-off, commonly called “contradiction consistency.” The math ain’t hard, but I’ll spare ya. Here’s the intuition: a rule is contradiction consistent if some alternative x is chosen in a large contest S, then it should still be chosen in any smaller contest T that involves some but not all of the original alternatives and no new possibilities.
As it turns out, and you are just going to have to take my word for it, runoff rules are not contradiction consistent. It can be demonstrated that the winners of the larger and the smaller elections can be different even without placing strange restrictions or assumptions on the preferences of the voters. I think this is a massive weakness of runoff voting. It is an example of “collective irrationality.”
I think it’s really neat. But tastes can differ. Mathematics provides a better basis to compare competing systems.
Regarding campaigns:
I find this extremely hard to believe. Campaigns are characterized by misinformation and deceit. I cannot critique Patterson’s study because I am not familiar with it. I will hold my peace about it until then.
I vehemently disagree with this. Voting does not “tie” people to their government in any concrete sense whatsoever. The fact that I voted does not diminish my dissatisfaction with my government. Nor was it pivotal in any way, shape, or form to my decision not to blow up my office building. It turned out to be an utterly insignificant act that I only performed because in the US, we have a powerful social norm of voting whether or not we believe it will make an impact.
Did Timothy McVeigh vote?
At the end of the day, this argument is utterly unfalsifiable, since we cannot observe all of the people who did vote and, as a consequence, did not blow up their office buildings. And McVeigh is dead, so we cannot ask him.
This administration touted the Iraqi turnout because it was the only result it had delivered in years of effort, blood, and treasure. It is interesting to recall that in Iraq, there is an even more powerful social norm of voting. After all, Saddam always seemed to win 99% of the vote share. A history of coercion takes a long time to ebb away.
This is neither rigorous nor is it borne out by the data.
First, there is an absolute minimum cost to campaign. While it is debatable how to calculate it, it is easy to point out all of the “must-haves” that a candidate simply needs to secure in order to make his election viable.
Empirically speaking, you are misinformed with respect to your assessment of how much a candidate has to spend. The spending burden is not on both candidates but on the challenger. How much needs to be spent is a function of the incumbency advantage, among other things. Formal models of campaign spending abound. Again, I have plenty of reading suggestions.
Social pressure to conform has absolutely nothing to do with the discouragement of third parties. Rational people typically do not vote for candidates whose probability of victory is so low that their vote is wasted, unless this is a strategic vote.
If anything, plurality > electoral college is better for third parties. I live in NYC. I believed that Kerry would carry my state. I could have voted for Nader in an effort to help him get his 5% to receive federal campaign funding because I knew my vote would not hurt Kerry. A lot of people were able to make this choice and get more bang for their vote. I did not, because my feelings for Nader are neither weak nor positive.
Fibber, you said you were familiar with Arrow’s theorem. The following summary is both very quick and extremely dirty.
Suppose three candidates: Bush, Kerry, and Nader. Suppose an electorate has preferences over each of the candidates. Let’s say everyone’s preference orderings are transitive. If I prefer Kerry to Bush and Bush to Nader, then I prefer Kerry to Nader. Suppose plurality rule. Voting produces a social ordering that is an aggregate of individual choices. Plurality rule maps individual choices to the social choice, like your keyboard maps letters to your monitor.
For a plurality rule election with more than two candidates, it is possible that the social preference ordering produces a cycle, that is, society prefers Bush to Kerry and Kerry to Nader and Nader to Bush. A cycle is an example of extreme collective irrationality produced by the aggregation of rational individual preferences and a voting rule that we think is fair.
This is a Very Big Deal.
The winner of a presidential election may not be a Condorcet winner. The victor may not be preferred to all other candidates in pairwise comparisons but may win nonetheless.
Because you need 270 electoral votes to win. This makes it a “q-rule,” of which simple majority is an unweighted special case.
I haven’t. This is a very troublesome issue and you are right to raise it. In this context, I believe equality is satisfied when it is possible for every single voter to be a member of a winning coalition of voters, and no single voter or group of voters has to be a member of the winning coalition for a candidate to win. In other words, there is no dictatorship or oligarchy. Technically speaking, of course.
Quite the contrary. I meant it as above, to distinguish it from the touchy-feely and very vague colloquial way. I hope the above has clarified.