—However, if physical characteristics can not account for free will, then it is entirely reasonable to say that some non-physical component is necessary – whatever that non-physical component may be.—
This is as pure an arguement from igorance as one could make. We have no idea a) if a “physical” explanation for “Free Will” could be made or b) what exactly we are even trying to explain (i.e. this supposed concept of free will)
In fact, it seems nonsensical to even speak about “physical” explanations before you’ve even described what “physical” is in contrast to. You can’t define things purely by negation (i.e., this thing is non-physical): you have to explain what they are. Personally, I think describing things anything as metaphysically “physical” is a confusing mistake to begin with. I just want to know about things
—Free will: The ability to freely make choices (as opposed to, say, those decisions being ordained by the laws of physics).—
This definition is cognitively empty. What does “freely” add to hte concept of "make choices, and, indeed, how does the “making” avoid nulifying the “freely”? As far as I can tell, any attempt to explain the concept nulifies it. Which is why it “explaining” it requires approaches like negation and arguements from ignorance.
Further, whatever you could possibly mean by this, how would you go about demonstrating that it actually happens? How do you tell true uses of “free will” (in the strong sense) from abscences of it?
To be clear: there are two senses of free will. The weak sense is simply the idea that choices come from inside a being: persent outside influences do not entirely decide persent decisions. Almost everyone agrees with this sense, and it likewise has no need of an “anti-physical” recourse. But the strong sense is something else entirely. It seems to mean that a being makes choices without it’s OWN NATURE deciding the choice. I.e., the “will” it is “free” from is it’s OWN WILL. This is the concept I think is pure, unintelligible nonsense.
—Moreover, we don’t HAVE to know how it works to believe that it exists. People knew about gravity, long before they knew how it worked (and to this day, we still don’t completely understand how it works!).—
Poor analougy: we DO need to at least know what it is we’re talking about before we can discuss something’s existence. How would we know what to look for otherwise?
Gravity is a phenomenon we can at least describe. Free will is not. Instead of describing a phenomena, it is describing a lack of phenomena: a complete separation of a being from it’s own acts. It’s essentially saying that a being’s nature does not determine it’s choices. This is not a phenomena, but a denial of a phenomena. Legitimately describing a phenomena woudl involve stating what DOES determine the choices made. (but doing so would, of course, negate the concept)
And how can we ever really be sure this is even what’s happening, when we only have an incomplete understanding of the nature of beings to begin with?
Again: what is going on when there is “free will” vs. when there is not? How can we tell the difference?
Even worse, this claim goes directly against what you are saying about the physical world! If you admit that you don’t know how free will “works,” then how can you possibly conclude that it cannot “work” in a “purely physical” (whatever the heck THAT is) world? It is YOU that seems to be demanding an incompatibility in how free will “works” and our present knowledge of reality (who ever said it was complete?), and yet, you don’t even know what it is or how it works.
Your problem is, indeed, not like the problem of gravity. We can at least see that an explanation of gravity would enrich our understanding of it. But any explanation given of “free will” would negate the concept! Where does the choice come from? Why one choice and not the other? Answer these questions and you demolish the concept itself.
—Nobody’s saying that the existence of a soul is a complete, testable explanation for free will.—
No, the problem is that it’s NO EXPLANATION AT ALL. It does absolutely nothing as far as “explaining” anything. It offers nothing in the way of an alternate avenue for the concept. In fact, it only compounds the problem by adding yet another entity that cannot itself even be described or explained. It’s like saying that the explanation for “groixplix” is a “flizpliz.”
—Rather, the point is that physicality can not adequately explain free will, so it is entirely reasonable to say that some non-physical attribute is necessary to explain it.—
No. I recognize no such concept of “physicality” until you can explain what the alternative IS. Further, you cannot even explain the “it”: so how would we even know what we’re looking for?
—Huh? Who said anythign about “blaming or condeming” being a violation of natural law?—
My point was your arguement boils down to: if we didn’t have free will, then it would be nonsensical to blame or condemn. So… very well, it is nonsensical. The fact that we engage in nonsensical behavior doesn’t provide us with any reason to think that we have free will. But actually, I don’t think all senses of blame are nonsensical.
—The point is that it is irrational to cast blame on something that had no choice in the matter.—
Only for a certain understanding of blame (intentional stance). It is still quite meaningful to, when determining what crushed the car, to put the blame on the tree, which was always to some degree likely to fall down. This leads us to be more wary of parking cars under trees. Saying that things are only acting according to their nature does not prevent one from identifying that nature as the contributor to some bad (to me) situation.
—Do you blame your car wheni t breaks down?—
Something about the car certainly led to it breaking down. If I don’t want the car to break down, isn’t the car the place I should look first for a solution to the immediate problem?
—Do you blame the vending machine when it swallows up your quarters?—
One vending machine swallows quarters. Another does not. When a certain vending machine swallows quarters, it is perfectly rational to notice that fact and either fix the machine, or use one that doesn’t swallow quarters. The machine can certainly be blamed for the problem. So can the person that built the machine. So can the person that so poorly educated that person on how to build vending machines. Causes of problems, and hence the blame for them, can link backwards.
Humans have an additional psychological component for making blame_itself_ a means to correcting the problem, not just identifying it: when I blame a person for their bad behavior, in addition to simply identifying it, there is the hope that I can actually change their nature via shame or guilt or another such avenue.
But in a certain sense (heavily simplified, but still analogus), this is really no different than changing the nature of the liable-to-break-down car or the nature of an unstable tree. Cars can be tuned up with tools: human beings can be changed by experience and emotional or moral appeals from other people.