A few thought experiments seem to drive people one way or another when thinking about consciousness. I would like to avoid trying to debate what consciousness is since last time I asked my qualifications (not too intuitive but not too explicit) didn’t go over well. So, if you believe consciousness exists, then we can get to the nitty gritty.
Several issues can be explored in thought experiments. One of these is the question of continuity with respect to “cloning.” Consider the following issue:
It is scientifically possible to completely scan an entire person and replicate that person somewhere else. The scan is done entirely in parallel (that is, all parts are scanned simultaneously—remember, this is a thought experiment) and the reconstruction is also done entirely in parallel.
First case: destructive scan
In this scenario the act of scanning is destructive. There is nothing left of the object being scanned. You are scanned, and then reassembled on the other side of the planet after some time lag.
Q: Is it still you?
Second case: harmless scan
In this scenario the act of scanning is non-invasive. The object being scanned is not destroyed. You are scanned and reassembled on the other side of the planet after some time lag.
Q: Is it still you?
My responses to the question
In both the first case and the second case it is still “you.” For the first case, I do not feel that consciousness needs to be continuous in order to keep its ontological identity (though I am not certain exactly what I mean by that, I am certain that my intuitive definition does not require continuity). Thus, to you—who was scanned—you felt no lapse. You were conscious at point A and then you were “suddenly” conscious at point B. Though it seemed to you that there was no lapse in time, there, in fact, was. This had no bearing on your consciousness.
The second case is somewhat perplexing (this is where physicists might take a time-travel tack and say, “It must violate some not-yet formulated laws of physics because such a thing is absurd” but I am not requiring that the universe make sense), and people have had many different views of identity in particular. I am inclined to believe that both can be identified as seperate individuals, though both would claim to be you (especially so if you had the idea that it was a destructive scan even though it wasn’t).
But in light of the second response the first response seems incorrect, doesn’t it? Should we say, in light of the second case, that the first case merely represents the creation of a you-like-clone and that, in fact, it isn’t really you? This is where people toss in the idea of continutity of identity, but in the first case it seems clear to you that it is certainly you, and it is also clear that your existence was not continuous!
Hmmm…