Perhaps “axioms” would be a better word than “beliefs.” One of your axioms is that everything must be caused. Hence, free will cannot exist. But that appears to me to be begging the question.
I’m essentially defining all faith beliefs as “religious.” If you object to me making that equivalency, that’s fine. I can just call it a faith belief.
The machinery itself is entirely caused and controlled by deterministic variables. It decides nothing. It’s just a mechanism.
It means that what is “up to us” is not up to us.
To quote Schopenhauer, “we can do what we will, but we can’t WILL what we will.”
Not quite, I said that “will” has to be either random or determined (or a combination of both). The will can’t will itself, because then something has to will THAT, and something has to will THAT into infinite regress.
Can you be less vague?
The mind was created by deterministic processes, yes. But whenever I ask a random stranger to get into my trunk, a bit of processing goes on in their minds, and then they usually respond with a “fuck no!”. That processing is commonly referred to as “making a decision”. If you disagree on this definition, then you will need to expand and clarify on what you think a “decision” is. A check-out machine reads a bar code and through internal processing decides on whether it’s cereal or jam or something else. At least that’s how* I* see it.
As I said previously, I believe the mechanism itself is the “will”. Perhaps we need a clearer definition of this term as well. But by referring to it as “just a mechanism” you are not actually contradicting me.
I fail to see the logical connection between our minds being deterministically created, and your suggestion that our minds are no longer involved in making decisions.
Are you suggesting that the cash machine would have to create it’s own internal circuitry in order to be defined as “self-determining”? If that were the case, then given that particular definition, I would reconsider whether the cash machine has “free will”. Conveniently, human minds can be seen as self-determining using that definition, since people can make active decisions to change their minds. The human mind is fascinating in the sense that it can also change itself without any present input to it (eg dreaming, thinking in a sensory deprivation tank, etc). I disagree with his statement that we can’t will what we will.
I think your problem is that you fail to separate the world outside the mind/machinery from that which is within it. Do you object to this separation? If we are talking about the mind and the will, I fail to see how you can maintain an argument without separating the mind from the rest of the universe around it.
I’m not sure what exactly is supposed to be ‘free’ in this case. Could the machine display any other price when given the barcode, without anything tampering with its internal wiring? If not, how is it free? The state of the world at the point that it reads the barcode completely determines the state of the world at the point it displays the price. Commonly, this is taken to be the antithesis of freedom.
If a ball rolls down a hill, is it free? If, during its rolling, it scatters off some strategically placed poles on that hill, is it free? If one uses the ball to implement the computation yielding the price from reading the barcode, is it free? If your answer to these changes at any point, then what differs from the previous case(s)?
Can you elaborate on that point? Are you saying that it’s okay to punish people for their actions, regardless of whether they had any choice in committing those deeds?
On a related note, are you saying that we never need to decide if somebody deserves to be blamed for his or her actions? After all, that would require pondering the concept of blame, would it not?
Only in a purely mechanistic worldview.
The mechanism for making the decision is caused by external factors. The mechanism can olny “decide” what it’s caused to decide
This is compatabalism. It basically just narrows the definition of “free” to the ability (or at least the illusions of the ability) to make decisions and ignores the question of “what wills the will.” This is done in order to salvage a case for moral accountability, but (if you ask me), it really concedes to determinism in the long run.
I didn’t say our minds weren’t involved in making decisions. I’m saying that our minds can’t decide what they want to decide.
I’m saying that “self-determination” is not possible. You can’t decide what your will is going to be. In order to do that, you would need another will to decide it. The will can only be an effect, not a cause.
That’s part of your problem right there. The mind is not, in any way, separable from the universe, but even if it were, it still could not will its own will.
In any worldview. It’s a logical problem, not a physical one.
Dennett’s said some illuminating things on how to found a judicial system in a deterministic reality. He talks about a concept he calls evitability – the potential to act differently in a set of distinct, but very similar situations. Think about a putt in golf: the way you make it, plus the characteristics of the terrain, completely determine whether or not the ball will go in; i.e. exactly the same situation will always have exactly the same outcome. But, you can train yourself to raise the chance that in a set of similar situations – similar distance, wind conditions, grass, temperature and whatnot – you are more likely to make the putt; i.e. a greater percentage of those situations result in you sinking the ball. You have raised your ability to evade missing, your evitability. The same, then, goes for committing the socially desirable act in a given situation: an agent with low evitability will do the wrong thing in a greater percentage of similar situations than an agent with high evitability. Punishment then is designed and intended to raise an agents evitability.
Yep. Those sanctions affect future choices.
Assigning consequences and shame serves to shape and influence future choices.
That’s too simplistic. The will can be a cause of the will in a completely deterministic fashion, as what we will affects the world (and us as part of it), and the world affects what we will. In a similar way, the gravitational field is a cause of the gravitational field, or the way a river flows, which is determined by the shape of the river bed, influences the shape of the river bed, and hence, the way the river flows.
The machine is free from tampering. It is allowed to function on it’s own without interference. The machine can display any price within it’s database, but it reads the barcode, and makes a decision to choose what price it will display. I fail to see how it’s predictability has anything to do with freedom. It should be kept in mind that the machine could (as it happens in practice sometimes) fail to correctly read the bar code - though I don’t believe this has anything to do with it’s freedom.
I don’t believe that freedom has anything at all to do with predictability. Freedom has do do with the absence of outside control, coercion, and force. Think of “freedom” in the political sense.
As for your ball analogy, I don’t really like it. 
But mainly because it’s flawed slightly. I define the will as the machinery of the mind. I describe this as a box with inputs and outputs. (If you disagree with this analogy, please make it known.) The things in the box are in the box, and the things outside the box are outside the box. The problem with your analogy is that you blur the lines between what’s inside the box and outside.
The first part of your analogy suggests the ball is the subject, and the poles on the hill are the outside inputs. The second part suggests that the ball AND the poles are the subject (ie “in the box”), and that the barcode is the outside input. Unless you mean that the ball is the subject, and the poles are the “medling forces”? It’s a little unclear.
This is the same issue as Dio seems to be having. In order to discuss this meaninfully, you have to seperate what is “inside the box” and what is “outside the box”.
No. To separate between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the box is fallacious. There are no sharp boundaries like this present in the real world; the causal chain leading to a decision being made does not terminate at the border of the box, it continues into it, and any description without the complete chain of causality is incomplete. For instance, one could use my rolling-ball example to implement the mechanism by which the register determines the price to print out: For each dark stripe on the barcode, a pole is placed in the path of the ball at a certain point, then the ball is set to roll. Bouncing of the poles, it lands in a certain spot at the bottom of the hill, which corresponds to a certain price. This is how the machine makes the decision which price to display – it is uniquely determined by the setup. It is forced, by the setup, to display a certain price. Any other mechanism you could think of is essentially equivalent.
I still think that such discussions can be made so much more incisive by focusing on a single, very simple physical example:
Can an electron have “free will” in choosing whether to be observed in a spin up or spin down state?
Suppose it can. What then, does it mean for it to have “free will?” I suppose it means that it can choose “up” or “down” such that, if its choices are observed repeatedly, no pattern can be found that would allow one to algorithmically encode its decision-making (where use of a pure random number generator counts as part of an algorithm). Does anyone disagree?
Dio:
Yes, we agree here.
What is wrong with compatabalism? It defines “free” as “free from interference”. The only other definition of “free” is “unpredictable” (correct me if I am wrong). We should probably agree upon a clear definition of “free” so that this conversation can be meaningful.
Can you explain why this would be required in order to be free? I fail to see the logical connection.
How do you respond to my examples of the human mind modifying itself? What about the more simplistic example of the self-modifying cash machine?
I assume that you will say it self-modified based on … deterministic causes? Well, what if those causes came from the mind itself? If it’s internal, then I fail to see the problem in my argument. Are you going suggest that the chain of cause-effect will eventually leave the mind? If so, why is this relevant?
What do you mean it is not separable from the universe? I just arbitrarily seperated it, and didn’t even break a sweat. I did this through defining the word “mind”. I assume you aren’t claiming that the mind and the universe are one… so what are you stating here exactly? Are you saying I can’t draw a box around the mind? If so, why not, and what is your reasoning?
I state that the mind can will it’s own will, because this mind-in-a-box can change itself free from immediate outside influence.
Well I would argue that the poles are inside the mind (ie box) of the machine. This does not mean that the causal chain is broken at any point - far from it! Causuality continues into the box, yes, but the causality that happens inside the box is the process known as “making a decision”.
In a sense, the machine is forced to display a certain price, and with this I agree. But the key question is: is this force external, or internal? The poles are inside the box, and therefore I suggest that there is in fact free will. If I were to stick my fingers into the cash machine’s box, and move the ball around, then that is an external force - aka a lack of free will.
Typically, this would be taken to be a position that runs counter to the ordinary definition of free will, then.
Well, but the placing of the poles is determined by the dark stripes on the barcode, which is external to the box, the force thus comes from the outside just as much as your fingers in the box (that sounds dirty…) do; hence, I don’t think the inside/outside separation is very useful.