You are essentially arguing that quantum uncertainty makes some things “non deterministic.” But the only “non-deterministic” aspect is purely random. In the quantum mechanical view of the world, the behavior of the wave function describing the probability of where/when to find a cosmic ray is totally deterministic. So where/when the cosmic ray is found is determined by:
Purely deterministic wave function evolution, and
A purely random probability distribution determined by the wave function
So I think it is totally reasonable to call anything described by quantum mechanics, such as a cosmic ray, “deterministic” with the understanding that there is also an additional component of purely random chance. The reason why I take the time to emphasize this point is because the above proviso is totally reasonable to be taken as implicit in the context of this discussion – purely random chance is a trivially un-interesting form of “free-will” (or of non-determinism) that I think we can all agree is not worth dwelling upon.
I must admit I’m confused - what is non-deterministic in your view? Saying the outcome of something is randomly deterministic sounds like an oxymoron. Hell, you could say that your computer suddenly moving itself to the next room because of uncertainty is deterministic also.
Like I said, I don’t know what free will means, but what I was trying to get out was that actions with a random component can simulate free will. Whether these actions actually are examples of free will is up to each person to decide.
Idle question: if free will doesn’t exist specifically because of connection to the brain and its function, is it possible to create technology that will predict, with 90% or better certainty, how a person will think, react, and/or feel given specific stimuli? How specific would it need to be?
Could we ever accurately chart an entire life this way if we got in at the proper point in a person’s life?
I think the answer to both questions is no, because external deterministic variables are always ongoing. A hypothetical technology which can accurately predict specific neurological responses in a given individual (a tall order, but not theoretically impossible) still can’t predict all of the external variables. You can’t know if the person is going to get hit by a car or win the lottery, or any number of other things that can profoundly affect (or end) an individual’s life.
I’ll have to think more about this. I’m still of the view that sources external to the body are behaviour-manipulating, and things internal to the body are behaviour-forming. I understand that most causes are internal, and hence my view that it’s very difficult to be deprived of free will under any circumstance (unless the ability to choose is also removed). Is there a difference between sugar and cocaine however…? I would suggest that once the cocaine is inside you, it becomes a part of the person, and thus free will is preserved. What if someone was force-“fed” cocaine… ? I’m not sure yet.
I believe the cash register can be “free”, yes. But does it deserve legal rights the way intelligent/sentient beings do? I don’t believe legal rights naturally follow from giving something freedom, or free will. Legal rights follow from being human. That’s arbitrary, yes, but has nothing to do with the issue of free will itself.
Again, this will require further analysis before I can comment. I will say, however, that I do NOT believe sensory stimuli can coerce someone to commit an action against their will as long as they are still capable of making decisions and choices. I can see how there may be something to discuss here, I’ll admit. Can you perhaps give some examples of sensory stimuli that would temporarily remove free will without removing the ability to choose or make decisions?
Yes, my example was a poor one, and I withdraw it. My only purpose for it was to illustrate the correlation between internal & external forces VS what is considered legal & illegal action. I can elaborate with a better example, but I believe you understand what I’m trying to say, since I articulated it better in a previous post.
Yes, this is what I’m talking about. My struggle, as can be seen, is determing what is “external”. I’ve outright defined it, but some people don’t like my definition and are making outrageous demands for me to come up with a justification for it. Clearly it’s going to require more work.
Yes, the will and the mind aren’t technically identical, but both are held within the human brain. I believe the brain holds both our conscious and unconscious thoughts, however. I like the previous example of the will as the sloshing around of brain chemicals inside our heads… Well, at least the ones that are responsible for “wanting”.
If for “free will” to exist, the will needs to be able to will itself, then I believe this is clearly possible. As least for a few cycles of regression. Looking forward: I can will myself to have more mental fortitude, which results in me willing myself to take on more difficult tasks, which results in me willing myself to attempt a failed climb of Mount Everest.
It’s clear, however, that eventually the reverse tracing of cause-effect will show that the chain leaves my mind and my body. Thus, the will cannot be an original source or original cause. Nothing originates inside the will.
(Hrmm. This may be incorrect, since genetically/biologically-determined drives towards things like sex or food exist. But since my hands are full at the moment, I’m gonna pretend I didn’t realize this. This may be worth coming back to later, however.)
Threads like this come up periodically on the board, but I never seem to notice them in time to get in at the beginning of the discussion. Consequently, I end up posting something 3 pages when, when others have tired of the discussion
Reading through the thread, I think the question of how reasonable a definition is hasn’t been looked at enough. A couple posts in the beginning of the thread asked for the definition of “free will” first, before they answered the question. Don’t get me wrong, definitions are important, but we should define (philosophical) things according to how well they help us answer our questions.
“Free Will” is the answer to a question about who we are. It’s about why we can (or whether we ought to) hold people accountable for their actions, and if it’s ok to punish people when they do wrong. It’s about whether our decisions have meaning, or are “just chemicals.” (Can you imagine what would happen if “I don’t have to listen to your argument, it’s just a bunch of chemical reactions” was considered a valid retort in debate?) It’s also about why we treat humans different than animals, or computers.
Borzo’s definition is too broad. Under his definition, free will fails to differentiate us from price scanners. On the other hand Der Trihs’s definition requires that all decisions be completely disconnected from reality, which has nothing to do with any notion of or desire for free will. Clearly, we need to consider something between these extremes.
Of course, there’s a semantic issue. Even if we have morally important meaning behind our decisions, it might be virtue of something that we can’t reasonably call “free will.” I see that several posters in this thread argue that decisions have morally important meanings (or, at least, we should act as if they do) for purely consequentialist reasons.
I subscribe to a compatibilist notion of free will, one that is quite similar to the libertarian notion. My view comes primarily from Dan Dennett, who discusses why many anti-free will arguments seem compelling, but are flawed. This post is already pretty long, so I’ll just start with one argument.
Since you quoted Dennett before, I’m surprised that you make the infinite regress argument, since he has shown it to be faulty. I’ll quote the passage from Darwin’s Dangerous Idea:
So, what makes the idea of “the will” sufficiently different from the notion of “mammals” that the infinite regress argument is valid?
I’d say you misunderstood. There seem to be three possible solutions to the infinite regress argument. For the case of mammals, these are:
[ol]
[li]There has actually been an infinite number of mammals in existence. (Conflicts with our knowledge of cosmology, at least).[/li][li]There was a regress stopper, a first mammal. (Contradicts our understanding of evolution).[/li][li]There are no mammals. (Ridiculous. Clearly there are mammals)[/li][/ol]
Dennett asserts that there is a fourth option: that “mammal” is a concept that is fuzzy at the boundary. There is no principled way to divide your ancestors into “mammals” and “non-mammals,” and we should accept this fact and become comfortable with it.
With free will, you’ve (rightly, I think) rejected possibilities 1 and 2, and concluded that 3 must be true. How can you reject 4 as a possibility? For example, starting with a “proto-will” in childhood, which gradually forms itself until you have a full free will in adulthood?
I think we have *effective *free will (from a compatabilist stance, natch) - the issue, to me, isn’t whether our motivations for actions are deterministic (they are), it’s whether all those motivations render themselves open to introspection. Can a person reasonably uncover their every motivation? I’d say no, it’s not possible, given the way the mind operates. Most could be discovered, but there will always be those factors that arise out of the body and brain’s own internal structure. To me, that’s the barrier line between the kind of determinism that I would call un-free (what my social influences are, what my sense experiences are, my upbringing, etc) and the kind that is, for all non-pedants, absolutely free. The question, to my mind, shouldn’t be “if I put *you *in exactly the same circumstances again, would you make the same choice”, it’s “if I put another person, with exactly the same circumstances outside their body, in your position, would they make the same choice”
In my view, a ‘soul’ would be non-deterministic. It would have some form of ‘intelligence’ that would allow it to make non-deterministic decisions, whose non-deterministic component was not purely random (ie trivial). But I, like many others here, think such a concept is incoherent.
Well, think about torture. Sufficiently unpleasant stimuli entering the mind via sensory channels are capable of overriding any contrary will – i.e. by torturing people, you will eventually get them to do anything, irrespective of their will. I don’t think I can bring myself to think actions committed under such heavy duress free, with the implied responsibility of the agent for their consequences.
I don’t think it’s terribly outrageous to demand some general applicability. Anyone can come up with a definition that works for the easy cases…
This is all I wanted to point out.
Well, evolutionary reasoning, which Dennett is very fond of, isn’t universally applicable. It only works (as you seem to realize) when what is taken to be a sharp divide actually is more like a gradation – i.e. when something we think of as a sharply defined set (for instance the category ‘mammal’) actually isn’t that sharply defined. In such cases, it can do great things; it is to a certain extent natural for us to think in set-like structures, but in reality, those sets often turn out to be somewhat arbitrarily defined, and there are cases where membership to such a set is uncertain. This often leads to fallacious arguments, such as that life can’t possibly come from non-life, or consciousness can’t emerge from non-conscious processes. (I sometimes call this the ‘first tool fallacy’: since for any tool, you need tools to build it, either tools must have always existed, or there must have been a special, first, unbuilt tool.)
However, whenever there actually is such a sharp divide, no amount of evolution is going to get you across it. And, for a truly libertarian notion of freedom, the divide must be a sharp one, as the divide between the determined and the un-determined is sharp: no process, starting from exactly deterministic dynamics, can get to a point where the state of the system at t isn’t strictly determined by the state of the system at t - 1. It may (and usually, rather quickly will) get to a point where the problem of such determination is intractable, but in principle, determinism remains strict even then.
Dennett, of course, doesn’t argue for a libertarian notion of freedom – to him, the idea that an agent could have done otherwise in the exact same circumstances seems to be as absurd as it is to me. His notion of freedom, as far as I understand it, is built around expectations. And for this notion of freedom, an evolutionary argument is possible: very simple microdynamics, which are trivially predictable, can in aggregation yield behaviour as complex and unpredictable as anything in the universe. The divide between ‘predictable’ and ‘unpredictable’ isn’t sharp, and from predictable processes, unpredictable ones can indeed evolve, to the point that it is for any finite agent impossible to perfectly predict the actions of such a system – that its actions may defy any rational expectations, which is, to Dennett, the only kind of freedom that makes sense.
So whether or not Dennett’s argument works depends on what notion of freedom you apply – if it is the notion born out of metaphysical libertarianism, the infinite regress argument still holds; but if you agree with Dennett’s flavour of compatibilism, it presents a plausible way how to get ‘more and more free’ systems out of perfectly predictable ones.
This is interesting. If 2 people in the exact same scenario/situation make different choices, does that somehow imply the existence of free will (within that particular scenario, at least)? I like this idea, though I’m not 100% sure why. I suspect it’s because it necessitates “freedom” in the sense that if outside forces were completely compelling, then both people would have to do the same thing. The cause-effect chain (outside the person) is the identical for both people, yet this is not enough to create identical results. I think the above stands alone by itself as something to consider - and I don’t feel that having “mystery” behind a person’s choices is required to make this example work.
When someone is tortured, do they lose the ability to choose or decide? If the brain’s ability to make decisions is removed, then they have lost their free will. If they simply choose to do what is demanded of them, in order to avoid torture, then their free will has made a choice. The problem with torture is not the removal of free will, it’s the forceful constraint to limited choices.
Does the fact that we would not hold the person responsible for their choices under torture imply that we as a society believe they had their free will taken away? Why is it that if another human compels me (eg through torture) to commit terrible acts, it’s not my fault, but if I’m compeled by pornography, poverty, social pressure, violent films, etc, it is my fault? It’s because 99% of people face pornography, poverty, social pressure, violent films, etc without becoming serial murderers. It’s all about how normal the choices presented are. Confinement and torture are neither considered normal nor acceptable by society, and so we make exceptions with respect to legal responsibility. We as a society feel that if you were to end up on some snowy peak following a plane crash, and had to wait 3 weeks to be rescued, and had to resort to some light cannibalism to stay alive, we’d let it go because of the unnaturalness of the situation, not because your free will was temporarily suspended.
You might claim that I’m reducing the problem to the point where free will always exists and therefore becomes a somewhat meaningless measure - and I agree - that’s what I’m doing. Some people might have an issue with how I resolve this with legal responsibilty, since they may not feel comfortable with my previous paragraph. Well… my answer to that is that legal responsibility should not be determined through measures of free will. Free will should have nothing to do with legal responsibility. People who are permanently and clinically insane should still be in jail, whether or not they have any free will. The purpose of the legal system is to protect society. If Ted Bundy could have proved or convinced us that he had no free will, we still should have gotten rid of him because he was a danger to society. His free will with respect to the crimes he commited was never actually relevant.
Okay. I thought about it some more, and I’m ready to hear your opinion on what you think about instinctual drives (eg food or sex) that have a source cause purely in the mind and not caused by anything external? You could always suggest that the actual “cause” is the lack of food in the environement, for example, or maybe the genes themselves that lead to such instinctual desires?
It’s not, by virtue of them being different people. Or, turned around, if all possible causal factors influencing their decision were equal (genes, upbringing, history, experiences, etc.), those two persons would be effectively identical. That’s one reason why I think it’s hard to effectively separate internal and external causes – what’s internal to you now, was external to you in the past; you react with fear to fire because you’ve been burned once, you politely say please and thank you because you’ve been raised that way, and whatever’s genetically determined about you originally was part of your parents.
Honestly, I don’t know one way or the other, having thankfully never been tortured. But it would not at all surprise me if prolonged torture eventually turns people into willing collaborators, to whom it is effectively impossible to choose differently than is expected of them.
For another interesting case, perhaps consider language manipulation à la 1984. Language shapes our thoughts; deprive people of the possibility to formulate an option, and you deprive them of the possibility to choose that option.
You brought up the issue of legal responsibility, and from context, you seemed to have a different opinion then, insinuating that a distinction between free and unfree actions is critical to questions about legal rights, freedom, liberty and legal responsibility (back in this post).
I don’t differentiate between kinds of causes, so why would I think somehow differently of those than of others?
Please tell me how I can determine if something is non-deterministic? A non-deterministic Turing machine is one that goes to a random state. Random means not-determined - thus RNGs in programs are properly referred to as pseudo-random, since they are not actually random.
If you move to a random state, that means the state you pick is not a function of the state you are in, the inputs, or the previous states you were in. How is that distinguishable from non-determinism?
It’s clear we don’t have total free will, as the insanity defense, psychotics, and phobias clearly demonstrate. It is also clear that our actions are not predictable, even by ourselves.
Souls don’t exist, but let’s say they do. Would they have free will? The common idea of a soul is something with a personality - not all souls are equivalent, right? If God created souls, then God creates these personalities. If the souls randomly get generated (using 2 12 sided dice?) their characteristics will be set. Anything with inherent characteristics does not have total freedom of decisions, and so doesn’t have free will, under the strict definition, at least. If the soul’s personality is altered by inputs, either when embodied or when not embodied, the situation gets even worse.
One could, as a thought exercise, envision something that is non-deterministic, yet non-random – an agent, faced with a choice between A and B, for which no sufficient reason compels it to choose either, and which nevertheless chooses, say, A consistently. There’s no chain of causes leading it to choose A, so it’s non-deterministic; yet, it’s clearly not random (well, it might be, and you’re just exceptionally lucky), either.
Or my earlier suggestion, of a future that does not (fully) supervene on the past – i.e. for any history, there exist multiple consistent ways to continue it. There appears to be nothing that necessitates that the choice then must be random (though that is one way for things to continue); one could, for instance, appeal to a dualist construction, in which something – say, a soul – that is not part of the world we talk about when we talk about the past, and not determined by it, chooses which possible future is actualized.
I’m not sure that either is a valid concept of non-random non-deterministic, i.e. libertarian, freedom – I flatly can’t imagine how a choice could possibly be made in the first case, and the second might just appear to be non-deterministic due to our ignorance, since we are limited to reason based on what we observe in the material world. But it’s all I can come up with.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but you view the will as the output itself, yes? And that *everything *else is an input. Not just inputs happening currently, but all inputs into the will that have ever happened? This would include genetics, traumatic childhood experiences, etc.
The cash register analogy would be described as having the final price as the output, and the bar code as the input… as well as the price scanner as an input, and the internal computer chips (or poles) as inputs, etc. You view the entire cash register as an input itself, correct?
I can understand this view. I prefer my view because it incorporates “the self” into the system. I do not view an old childhood traumatic incident as an input into the *current *system. I view it as shaping the system (in the past) such that it is now incorporated into the sysstem itself (ie into the self, or into the will). Of course defining what the “self” is an excercise in drawing lines, but I do not view that as a futile or meaningless excercise (in general). Perhaps in his particular discussion, however, it may be.
I think that the torture would eventually change the person, and make them into someone who would will (with free will) something that they would have previously never considered.
I’ve always found this interesting, but can’t really tell if it’s true or not. If it were true, I would view language’s impact on the will in a light similar to genetics.
As an aside, it’s only fair to suggest things that I believe could make a will “unfree”. I’d consider TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation) as way to lose free will, or also the technique of directly stimulating neurons electrically. This still allows people to make decisions, but the substrate/neurons/machinery is modified to such an extent that the output is wildly different than under natural circumstances. You’d ask how this is different than sensory input that might have the same effect. But once again I’d say that these techniques violate the physical integrity of the human brain.
If they had permanent effects on the subject, then I would say the person is now a different person and has a self that was different from before. I read a study where TMS induced religious-spiritual moments in the subject (“I saw and met God, and now know the meaning and purpose of the universe!”). These effects persisted for months after the TMS session, and became incorporated into who these people were.
I have since revised and updated my views on free will and it’s relation to legal rights, freedom, libery, and legal responsibility.
If a person was deprived of choice, then their actions aren’t a result of free will, and they do not have legal responsibility for those actions. This rarely happens in practice however. Someone who blacks-out while driving on the highway, and kills a few innocent people, might seem like an interesting example. But the driver did not willfully kill anyone. He may still be punished, however, for choosing to drive a car with a known medical condition that led to frequent blackouts. He should be punished for making the choice to drive, not for the consequent deaths themselves.
If a person is allowed to have choice (ie has “free will”), but isn’t given any *reasonable *choices, then they might not be held legally responsible. Such as torturing someone to give up vital information, or to commit acts of violence. As a society we understand that if a human isn’t given the opportunity for a “good and reasonable choice”, then they can’t be held responsible for a bad choice. (eg torture VS giving up government secrets are neither good nor reasonable choices).
If a person was deprived of choice, such as through insanity, we may not view them as “responsible” for acts such as murder. But legally, they should still be responsible. Why? Because our laws are there to protect society, and this insane person should no longer be a part of it. We therefore say they are “legally responsible” and do away with them. (For the record, I dont’ believe the insanity defense is real, since I believe he was still able to make choices. Similarly, claiming that you were abused as a child as a defense for your own child abuse is merely readjusting the focus on a part of the cause-effect chain that’s external to one’s self. It’s irrelevant to determing whether or not you are safe for society.)
The purpose of societal laws is to protect society. You don’t need to willfully make bad choices in order to be acted upon (ie locked up). Does this mean that I view free will as less relevant to the discussion of legal responsibility? Yes.
I initially suggested that free will is relevant because a free will is likely to repeat an act given the same situation. If murder was commited through an act of free will, then they may murder again. If murder was coerced and not commited through an act of free will, then if the coercion is removed, the act is not likely to repeat. But since my view is that free will is almost always preserved, this is not a relevant observation anymore. I’ve updated my view such that it no longer references the coercion of free will (into un-free will) but instead revolves around the manipulation of available choices.
I don’t think I am able to envision a system that is non-deterministic and non-random.
About the only way I can do it is if there is an external input that I don’t have access to which is providing the non-deterministic attribute, but then that is essentially random because I don’t know what is influencing it.
So, how do you decide which choice is A and which is B? You just moved the randomness down the chain.
If the soul is making choices, it then becomes part of the world. I think I covered the problem of the soul having free will in the post after the one you responded to.
I agree that some things that look non-deterministic might not be. Loaded dice, loaded roulette wheels, loaded random number generators. I think we can ignore these false non-deterministic things for the purpose of this discussion.
