You mind quoting where I’ve said that? Because I have no idea what you’re talking about.
Sure, e.g. here:
Or here:
Or here:
Or here:
All of these are, in one way or another, reacting to the claim that for the free will defense to go through, one only needs the possibility that it wasn’t within God’s power to create a better world (proposition (3) in this post). They do so by discussing countervailing possibilities: of a world with less suffering, of benevolent entities in a safe existence, and so on, claiming explicitly that such possibility, not necessity, suffices to resist Plantinga’s argumentation.
Where did any of those claim a refutation?
The point is, the free will defence posits the (implausible) possibility that this is the best possible world. It’s usually left implicit, in fact, because it’s so implausible.
I am pointing out that it seems trivially obvious that a better world could have been made. But it is just possibilities both ways. Neither logically refutes the other. As with other empirical claims, it’s about which hypothesis better fits the data we have. I have been very clear about this.
I’ll go back to the analogy of the (omnimax) Healthy Eating God. Cakes raining from the sky every day doesn’t refute the possibility of such a god existing. Perhaps if we knew everything that H.E.G. knows, we’d know that this is the healthiest achievable world overall? But this possibility doesn’t take away from the fact that, today, based only on what we know now, it really looks like H.E.G. doesn’t exist or we got his properties wrong.
Well, you are saying that the possibility forms a response to Plantinga’s claims, that it questions the premise, and that the onus of showing necessity isn’t on you—but that’s exactly how it is: you need to show necessity to question the possibility that this is the best God could do. Indeed, when I cite this to you, you explicitly reject it:
The point is: Plantinga’s argument derives the consistency of the existence of a tri-omni God and that of evil in the world from the possibility that God couldn’t have created a better world. That doesn’t mean that evil and a tri-omni God are possibly consistent, it means that if the possibility that God couldn’t have done better is given, they are simply and fully consistent. Against this, arguing for the possibility that God could have done so simply does nothing at all.
Yes. But if it is possible that God couldn’t have done better, then we know that evil and a tri-omni God are compatible. Pointing to the possibility that God could have done better does nothing to cast doubt on that. You can’t then point at the existence of evil in the world and claim this as evidence against the existence of such a God. This evil only establishes the possibility of us not living in the best possible world—perhaps increases its likelihood, making it plausible, highly likely, what have you: none of that tips the needle. Certainty is the only thing that would.
You’re treating this as if it’s the balance of evidence which decides whether we should believe in a tri-omni God, as if we ought to have less of an issue if the world overall was nicer. But that’s just missing the point: if the problem of evil went through, then any amount of evil would suffice to disprove a tri-omni God, and in just the same way, if it doesn’t, no amount of evil can do so. Indeed, it can’t even logically tip the scales: you’re just as reasonable believing in a tri-omni God in a near-perfect world as you are in an absolute hellhole, because the only thing you have to go by is that neither of these conditions are in tension with the existence of a tri-omni God.
Or, to state the same thing differently, Plantinga’s argument can’t tell you whether you ought to believe in God; but it does tell you that, if you think you have reason to do so, the existence of evil should not impinge on this belief, because its existence is perfectly consistent with that of a tri-omni God.
Whether we live in the best possible world, that is something where empirical data can influence our credence. In a world where, as I said above, the only evil is that a baby’s candy got stolen once, one can validly be more persuaded that one does than in the world as it is, and in the present world, one can take this possibility more seriously than in one where everyone is just in flesh-rending pain all the time. But the credence allocated to this being the best possible world does not translate to a credence allocated to the existence of a tri-omni God: the possibility that we do live in the best possible world entails the evil we’re seeing in the world is consistent with the existence of a tri-omni God. It’s a logical mistake to think that, because the world seems worse than it might be, we have less reason to believe in such a God.
Perhaps it’s easier to look at the opposite case. If the problem of evil goes through, and you see a baby’s candy being stolen, you know with absolute certainty that there’s no God. There’s no balance of evidence here: the certainty is immediate and unassailable. Pointing to the fact that other than that, the world is good, does again nothing to tip the scales. You know that God and evil are inconsistent, and there’s evil, so there’s no God. You know that because the existence of evil renders it impossible that we live in the sort of world a tri-omni God would create. The degree of evil doesn’t matter: any evil at all suffices. But by the same token, the degree of evil doesn’t matter if the two premises are, in fact, consistent: the existence of a tri-omni God is just as consistent with a little evil as it is with a lot of it; it’s consistent with any amount of evil. Nothing more is needed!
For the 80th time, it could do them, but the moment it does do them it is no longer omnibenevolent. God B, on the other hand (who you keep ignoring) doesn’t claim omnibenevolence and can do these things. If the nature of God A includes omnibenevolence, it cannot do things that increase suffering.
How is choice in omnibenevolence? If you program a robot to always act in ways the minimize suffering, does it have a choice not to? If a god must act in ways to minimize suffering, to maintain omnibenevolence, it has no choice either - except in the case where two actions have the same impact on suffering.
If a God chooses to do evil - which the Biblical god clearly did, for example - it is clearly not omnibenevolent.
So god can change the world to make it better, but couldn’t make a better world in the first place.
In other words, it’s not evil if God does it.
Look, I already said I can’t find a flaw in Plantinga’s logic. The flaws to me are in the premises. The tri-omni god seems a muddled and self- contradictory concept. If there’s a problem of evil, it’s buried in the concepts of the omnis.
Which means his argument is nonsensical and pointless. It tries to define good and evil in a way that renders the concept meaningless - if anything fits the definition of “good”, then it’s worthless definition. It defines good in a way that makes it undesirable; if the Holocaust is good, then we should be evil. And it defines “omnipotent” as synonymous with “powerless”.
It’s nothing but a desperate attempt to save the “tri-omni”" concept by re-defining the terms into something absurd. And of course, it’s not an honest argument; it’s not a conception of God anyone actually follows, it has no other purpose but to “win” arguments like this and will otherwise be ignored.
It’s a symptom of how absurd the entire concept is, that its defenders are driven into using such dishonest and absurd arguments to defend an indefensible position.
And for the 80th time, ‘can’t do it and remain omnibenevolent’ is not, nor does it entail, ‘can’t do it’.
God B, as I’ve said many times now, can’t do anything God A can’t do, but does certain things God A won’t do, due to the latter’s omnibenevolence.
The point is exactly that omnibenevolence doesn’t amount to a program—then it would not be benevolence, at all. Rather, it consists in the fact that, faced with the possibility of doing evil, an omnibenevolent God consistently chooses not to. This doesn’t diminish its powers, it’s merely a description of its actions, which are such as to maximize goodness.
Yes, the whole tri-omni characterization is a much later thing. The general notion is that God revealed their characteristics in stages; but this isn’t a theological debate we need to get into.
No. The best possible world merely includes certain actions of God at certain points.
Where’d you get that from? I’m merely saying that whether God does evil ‘for the greater good’, permits evil, or anything of that sort isn’t a question we need to settle for the applicability of the free will defense.
But it’s the tri-omni God that leads to a supposed problem of evil in the first place; Plantinga’s argument just takes off from there. If there’s a sufficiently well-defined concept to lead to such a problem, then we can appeal to Plantinga’s defense.
All of that is made-up nonsense with no connection to the actual argument. There is no change to the definition of good and evil, the Holocaust is an unequivocally evil thing, omnipotence means the ability to do anything it is possible to do, and again, the concept of ‘tri-omni’ is the same as that which goes into the problem of evil in the first place. Once more, this is not a fringe argument: it’s because of its simple and clear logic and definitions that it has found basically universal acceptance among atheistic and theistic philosophers alike.
None of that it true. The argument that this is the best of all possible worlds and that the omnipotent creator is omnibenevolent means that the Holocaust was a good thing. Otherwise, he wouldn’t have made it happen.
As multiple people have pointed out repeatedly, we can simply look around and see how bad the world is. We can also see innumerable ways to improve it even with our own abilities, much less omnipotence. Which means that it is either impossible for this to be the “best possible world”, or that the “good” of the creator is the “evil” of humanity.
Medieval theologians often imagined a ‘better’ world created by God; this world was ‘paradise’, inhabited by the worthy after death. This world was inhabited by saints and angels, powers and dominions, constantly praising God in serried ranks arranged on either side. They even persuaded painters to depict this perfection; it looked like this.
To my limited mortal mind, it seems ridiculous that and omnimax god could do this for everyone, but doesn’t; instead we all gave to suffer on Earth and in the mortal universe first. Why not skip to the praising and stuff first?
Perhaps that would be just boring. Against boredom the gods themselves contend in vain, so they make suffering a thing to make things more interesting.
This is, again, complete nonsense. The argument is that it wasn’t within God’s power to create a world free of evil, that hence, the best possible world is one containing evil; but that doesn’t make the evil any less evil.
And as is abundantly clear from the simple logic of the argument, this has absolutely no logical force as a counter.
No, your argument is nonsense. The world isn’t simply “just a little bit evil”, it’s full to the brim with evil and suffering, and we can easily see ways to improve it. The claim that a god couldn’t trivially make a better one is simply absurd. And ignoring that doesn’t change it.
The idea that this is the best possible world is outright impossible. Not just unlikely, impossible. And any argument base on that idea, also impossible.
No, I am responding to you. I’m not arguing with Plantinga.
You went further than Plantinga’s argument. You made the claim that we have no reason to see the existence of an omnimax god and suffering as incompatible, and that’s the claim I have been challenging for at least the last 5 posts, and you keep deflecting away from it.
If you just said “oh, obviously on the face of it, these things are incompatible, but there might be additional information for why this is the best world an omnibenelovent being would make” I would have agreed and moved on. But you can’t budge an inch, in this, or any other debate.
No: you are talking again about the logical problem of evil and I’ve said – many times at this point – that I am speaking empirically, not about the logical problem. The existence of cakes from the sky would give me reason to doubt the existence of the omnimax healthy eating god, and the existence of so much apparently random suffering gives me reason to doubt the existence of an omnimax god.
We both agreed that in no possible world could an omnipotent god create something too heavy for it to lift. It is not that he doesn’t choose to, it is logically impossible and thus not a limitation on omnipotence.
Now, tell me of a possible world where a god can do an action that increases suffering while being omnibenevolent. All possible worlds are not limited by what god supposedly chooses. You admit that God can do something that increases suffering.
Where do you get the idea that omnibenevolence involves choice? I don’t see a reference to that on the Wiki page for it. (I’m not denying someone might have come up with the idea, but it does not seem to be mainstream.)
Choice in general seems to be problematic. If a prophecy fails, how can we tell the difference between a god who just chose not to see the future and one who cannot? If God could not defeat chariots of iron, is it because he couldn’t or he chose not to? You are making a non-tri-omni god indistinguishable from a tri-omni god who chooses not to do things.
Again, tell me the possible world where God A can do all the things God B does and remain omnibenevolent. Its choice is limited. You can find possible worlds where God A can cause any number to come up on a die, so that he chooses a “3” is in no way limiting to his omnipotence, But he cannot increase suffering and remain omnibenevolent. Obviously God B has no such problem.
Well that destroys the possibility that this is the best possible world including God acting to change events.
Of god has the power to intervene, he clearly isn’t. That desroys the claim of omnibenevolence.
If god can only intervene sometimes because most of the time intervention would break his world (or however to put it), then he’s not omnipotent. This isn’t creating a rock too heavy for him to lift. This is in the definitions. If “world” includes god changing outcomes along the way, then he’s not doing that. If “world” is what he set up as a system, then any interventions make his world morally worse.
If god seeks the greatest moral good, and his taking an evil action will lead to an increase in the overall greater moral good, then he can and must take that evil act. But apparently by increasing the greater moral good, that evil doesn’t count as evil. That’s the direct meaning of what you said.
I think it is relevant for the free will defense. The free will defense requires that this could be the best possible world, that god chooses not to do evil, and that evil occurs.
If god has the power to do evil but chooses not to, that could be omnibenevolence. If god can do an evil act to increase the overall moral good, then either god is not omnibenevolent, or it’s not evil when God does it.
That’s basically “the ends justify the means,” and “god works in mysterious ways,” rolled into one.
Maybe god didn’t create heaven, he just lives there.
Maybe souls/beings require a brief (compared to eternity) period to have moral choice in order to separate the worthy from the unworthy.
Maybe suffering is required to shape souls/beings into moral creatures worthy of heaven.
Theology can make up all sorts of reasons.
Benevolence is a trait of mood, internal identity, and emotions. The objective measure is its effect on actions. Benevolence has to be a choice, or it’s not a moral act.
To put it another way, one can be as well-meaning as possible, but if it doesn’t lead to actions to carry out that good intent, then it’s irrelevant.
Why does benevolence have to be moral? Anything that God does is moral by definition, if you accept objective morality. Which of course means that drowning most of the world was a moral act.
I agree that actions are necessary for omnibenevolence - God just can’t watch. But if benevolence defines God’s actions, and limits them, then God cannot do things that another possible God can do. And that means God with benevolence as a requirement is not omnipotent.
Certainly you can define gods which aren’t benevolent. Zeus and his buddies hardly were. But if you are talking Christian God, you are out of luck.
It’s an inherent consequence of attributing multiple infinite, absolute qualities to a being; you end up with paradoxes as they conflict with each other (and themselves). Such as, can God change the world in a way he can’t foresee? Any answer violates either omniscience or omnipotence.
I have explained it to you I think three times now, only for you to summarily ignore it each time. Plantinga’s argument, if it goes through, establishes that the existence of evil and of a tri-omni God are not incompatible. Hence, that they are is false. But one can’t have sound reasons to believe a falsehood, since sound reasoning only establishes truth. Consequently, if Plantinga’s argument goes through, there can be no sound reasons to believe that tri-omnihood and evil are incompatible. Thus, any such reason is either logically flawed, or starts from false premises. To me, this is just elementary logic.
They are incompatible on the face of it, but thanks to Plantinga’s argument, we now know better. Again, take the example of falling into a black hole: it might seem obvious that one could fire one’s engines to at least slow down the descent. But that turns out false. If after this has been demonstrated, you still hold that because it seems as if we could delay hitting the singularity by means of firing strong enough engines in the right way, you’re just wrong.
Also, and I really think this is the sticking point here, for the argument to work, it need not be the case that this is the best world a tri-omni God could create. The premise that “God is omnipotent and it was not within his power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil” (premise (3) above) “need not be true or known to be true; it need not be so much as plausible”.
As best I am able to tell, you’re simply logically in error. You’ve been shown a proof that 1 + 1 = 2, yet persist in the position that you’ve got good reasons to think it might be 3. So how should I budge? Should I just accept what to me seems plainly logically fallacious?
Above, you’ve said that you at least on certain occasions like my ‘take’ on certain issues. I think this presumes that on those occasions, you think me not a complete idiot. So isn’t it at least somewhat strange that on just those occasions where I happen to disagree with you, I suddenly seem to lose all sense? Isn’t it at least possible that I might have a point even when I differ from you?
The evidence you’re pointing to is at best evidence against (3), but again, (3) need not be true in order for the existence of evil and a tri-omni God to be consistent; they are so, independently of whether (3) is true. And collecting evidence for a premise (that evil exists) consistent with a second premise (that God does) can’t logically lower our credence in the latter. You could argue for a further premise that tries to put some limit on the amount of evil a tri-omni God should permit, and then gather evidence that there is more evil than that in the world; but then, you haven’t given anybody a reason to believe in that further premise.
Again: being unable to do something and remaining omnibenevolent isn’t the same as being unable to do something simpliciter. Being unable to have sex and remain a virgin isn’t being unable to have sex.
Where do you get the idea that it doesn’t? Again, just from the etymology, it is connected to volition, to wishing to act a certain way, not to being constrained or forced to do so. If a being were simply unable to do bad, then there would hardly be any need to refer to its intentions or wishes, since no matter what those were, it would do good. There would hardly be any moral credit allocated to such a being’s acts, whereas benevolence is typically thought to entail a good intention shaping good actions.
And while I don’t have the time or inclination to go hunting for cites, Google’s AI, when asked ‘does an omnibenevolent God have the power to do evil’, offers the following:
Philosophically, an omnibenevolent (all-good) God is generally considered unable to will or choose to do evil because evil contradicts perfect goodness, even if omnipotence (all-power) technically means possessing all possible powers; however, some theological views suggest God can allow evil for greater good (like free will) or use “evil” acts (like destruction) as part of His ultimate good, but still not act malevolently, presenting a core tension in the Problem of Evil.
So here, to, the emphasis is on not choosing evil, rather than on being unable to do evil. Now of course all AI answers should be taken with a hefty grain of salt, but I’d say it’s at least statistical evidence that the connection between omnibenevolence and choice is indeed present in the training data.
Again, it seems to me unreasonable that to have a power, one needs to exercise that power. An omnipotent God could presumably destroy the world at any time, but that doesn’t mean he has to do so. Powers are about what one can do, not what one actually does. (See shin-kicking etc.)
None of this follows. A world is some sequence of events; depending on those events, a world has some amount of total evil, and some amount of moral value, i.e. of good deeds chosen over bad ones. Some world has the least overall evil with the greatest overall value, and this is the world (read: sequence of events) God instantiates. Any change of the events within this world then can lead only to a worse, less morally valuable, or otherwise impossible world. This isn’t changed if some of the events within the world are godly interventions. So the best possible world may (but doesn’t have to) include these interventions, yet God can’t change anything about this world without it no longer being the best possible one.
I can’t see how anything I said could be interpreted this way, could you elaborate? I said e.g. that whether evil acts for ‘the greater good’ are evil is a matter of debate (see the Kant example), and I said that some theologians have held that God may permit evil; but this doesn’t make such evil ‘good’, somehow.
No. The free will defense works even if this is not the best possible world. Again, that “God is omnipotent and it was not within his power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil” (premise (3) above) “need not be true or known to be true; it need not be so much as plausible”.
That’s a false dichotomy. Doing evil for the greater good may well be permissible if your aim is to maximize good, but that doesn’t mean it’s no longer evil.
I think the mistake you are making is switching from a strictly logical basis to how we evaluate empirical claims.
It’s easy to show the flaw here with an argument from absurdity:
Let’s say that our world was like many people’s conception of hell: burning fires, skin healing just so it can be burned again, all that jazz. And heck, we can even throw in that God himself appears to smile and laugh at our suffering.
Now; according to Plantinga’s reasoning, we can still argue that, technically-speaking, none of that would prove that God is not omnibenelovent. There might be reasons like free will that make even hell the best possible world overall. And hypothetically there might be sound reasons for a caring God to appear like he relishes suffering. To which I say (inbetween screams) “sure…that’s implausible, but possible”.
But your claim is that none of that would even give us reason to doubt the existence of an omnibenevolent God. You are going much further than the logical claim, into absolute absurdity.
Heck, by this line of reasoning, all of science would be irrational. Because we don’t strictly prove things in science too, all we ever have are levels of confidence.
The empirical claims, as noted, create only a tension with premise (3), but since the truth of that premise isn’t needed for the argument, that simply doesn’t do anything.
It need not be the case that we live in the best possible world overall. It can be absolutely false that this is the best possible world, and still pointing at evil wouldn’t allow you to logically lower the credence allocated to the hypothesis of the existence of God, because their existence and that of evil are not in tension. You’re simply aiming at entirely the wrong target.
And again I explained to you why this follows logically, and again you simply choose to ignore it.
Completely beside the point. The evidence you’re pointing to does validly speak against the plausibility of (3); the issue is just that the plausibility of (3) is not a prerequisite to the compatibility of evil with the existence of a tri-omni God.