If it is possible for a being to paint the wall green, then a being incapable of painting the wall green is not omnipotent.
God is incapable of painting the wall green.
Therefore, if it is possible for a being to paint the wall green, then God is not omnipotent.
It is possible for a being to paint the wall green. (This is the weak premise in your argument, I think.)
Therefore, God is not omnipotent.
I do think it follows, if God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, then any evil which exists is necessary; if unnecessary evil exists, God cannot be omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.
Once again, I will state that the disagreement starts with definitions.
@Der_Trihs seems to think omnipotence means that the god can change events at will. That by being able to change events at will, the existence of evil is not acceptable. He is rejecting the claim in the FWD argument that god must allow evil to provide moral choice. He defines a “world” as whatever we are experiencing, in the manner of statements like “Let’s make this a better world.” If we can make it a better world, then any doesn’t god?
@Voyager appears to think of omnibenevolence as an inherent aspect of god. Thus it is a limit to what God can do, just like being paralyzed limits what a person can do.
@Half_Man_Half_Wit says that a world is the whole essence of everything and that any interventions by god are an inherent part of that world. Omnipotence is limited by logical constraints, and one of those constraints is that for there to be moral choice, there must be bad to counter the good, and that bad must lead to consequences.
He also says that omnibenevence is a deliberate choice by god, that god physically could do evil acts but doesn’t want to do evil. By having perfect willpower he can refrain from evil.
These are within the context of the FWD and presumptions that a good could exist, not that he believes his exists.
@Mijin’s argument is that the FWD provides that there could be evil and God be omnibenevolent, but that observations about the amount of evil in the world - especially natural evil - can be assessed to cast doubt on the omnibenevolence claim.
@Half_Man_Half_Wit is sticking with the formal logic that we only know there can be evil and an omnibenevolent god, and that we don’t have any further information to assess of the amount of evil we see is reasonable for god to still be omnibebevolent.
I’m trying to understand the issues that seem inconsistent to me. I don’t know what a “world” is in the context of alternative scenarios. Does god intervening in the innate function of the universe count as a separate world? If not, what does?
Is it a separate world if god were to choose to not be omnibenevolent? Or is god outside the world? How does any of that square with the notion that an omnibenevolent God would choose the best possible world?
If I understand @Half_Man_Half_Wit, he is saying the FWD shows a conceivable way omnibenevolence is compatible with there being evil in the world. Ergo, the two are not incompatible. If there is a way they can coexist, then coexistence is possible.
That’s what the logic says. And within the FWD there is not enough information to say more.
Sure. But we don’t live strictly in the FWD. Indeed, @Half_Man_Half_Wit says that the conditions of the FWD need not even be true. Yet somehow we can not use our additional experiences to evaluate if those conditions are met.
If there is a god and there is evil, all the FWD days is that does not exclude that the god is omnibenevolent.
But if the conditions of the FWD are not constrained to be true, if we don’t have to be living in the best possible world (whatever that means), then we can evaluate the world by other standards. We can examine if the BPW concept makes sense or applies to our world.
Presumably @Half_Man_Half_Wit thinks that if the two concepts are not incompatible, then that lack of incompatibility is a permanent logic state. Thus even if there is no free will, the logical state still says the two concepts are not incompatible. If there is any way that could be compatible, then they are compatible, regardless of whether the stated conditions meet the terms of how they are shown to be compatible.
But while they may not be incompatible, they are still inconsistent. It is inconsistency we are measuring by looking at the state of the world, by evaluating the level of evil by whatever means we have. Inconsistency stacks up to likelihood even if it doesn’t preclude coexistence.
This is the fundamental disagreement at odds with the argument.
You’re making this out as if everyone is just making things up as they go along. But not all definitions are born equal: we work with those that work, that capture the notions we intend them to. If somebody uses an inconsistent definition, they’re not just offering an alternate point of view, they’re just wrong.
Even the wording you’re using—‘make this a better world’—disagrees with the way @Der_Trihs is using the term, because it, too, views a world as a continuing affair across time. And that’s just also how the term is used in modal arguments: “A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been” (my italics). Moreover, it’s also the only notion that makes sense: if we are to speculate about God’s reasons for acting a certain way, we ought to imagine adopting their point of view, which just by omniscience considers the world in its full history. It is after all from this perspective that we can judge moral value and the total amount of evil contained.
One wonders why, though, if not solely to assume his conclusion that omnipotence and omnibenevolence are in conflict. What would you call an omnipotent being that just chooses to do good things?
I’m not saying things definitely are that way—I’m not familiar enough with the debate to commit to any firm theological stances. I’m merely saying that the possibility that an omnipotent being could just choose to act in the interest of maximizing goodness, which seems sufficient to call them ‘omnibenevolent’, shows that the two notions are not in logical conflict.
If that were all, I wouldn’t opposed that claim. But his position is that evil is in any circumstance enough to lower one’s credence in the hypothesis of a tri-omni God, which is just factually wrong. I’ve given an explicit example: how do you choose whether we’re in case 1, where there are 10% raisin cookies in gran’s jar and thus, drawing one should reduce our credence in this one being hers, and case 2, where there are 60% raisin cookies and credence is increased instead?
Again, the sentence ‘every raisin cookie (observation of evil) should lower our credence’ simply is logically equivalent to knowing a particular bound to the total amount of raisin cookies (evil). There’s no two ways about this.
I’ve given explicit conditions about how and when evidence should influence our credence. It’s just that these conditions aren’t met. Again, just go back to the raisin case and ask yourself how you could judge whether you’re in case 1 or 2. If you can’t do so—and from the mere information that you should expect some fraction of raisin cookies, you transparently can’t—then you simply can’t tell which way the evidence should pull. You need additional information—arguments, hypotheses, beliefs—to do so.
This confuses a few different things. The FWD is absolutely true in that its conclusion holds, i.e. that God and evil are not incompatible (and that thus a world created by a tri-omni God holds some expected amount of evil). What is not necessarily true is that this is the best possible world, that we have free will, or even that God is constrained to create a particular kind of world: the argument is just that if these were true, then God would be tri-omni while there is some unspecified amount of evil in the world. Hence, whether or not these things are true, God’s tri-omnihood and evil are consistent (there exist possible circumstances where both obtain).
This isn’t something I think, it’s something that is the case. If there is no contradiction between two premises, then it’s always possible for both to obtain. Again, there’s just no way around that. What is possible, however, is to find a third proposition that is inconsistent with the conjunction of the first two. If one then has better grounds to believe in that one obtaining than in either of the first, one of those must go out of the window.
I don’t know how to parse this in a way that’s not straightforwardly contradictory. Logically compatible positions are always consistent, since they could both obtain at the same time. There’s nothing that can be done to ‘make’ them inconsistent; they can at most be inconsistent with further information.
I don’t think you’ve shown that this is ‘the’ disagreement with the argument (and if it was, then it seems just to be a basic logical error). Rather, what this attempt to summarize the state of play shows is that while you’re all sure I must be wrong, you all think I’m wrong about different things, and I’d suspect disagree among one another about the arguments each is making. But if there actually were some mistake to the reasoning I just mostly relay from better informed people than myself, then one would expect its detractors to converge on that mistake. So if you’re all barking up a different tree, should you each really be confident you’ve got the right one?
This gets to the heart of the matter.
The problem of evil is not necessarily the logical problem of evil; the claim of incompatibility in a formal logical sense. It also includes just that the observation of a great deal of apparently unnecessary suffering is not what we would expect if there is an all-powerful being that wants suffering to be as close to zero as possible. i.e. the evidential problem of evil.
Now, yes, “as close to zero as possible to zero” might yet be the world we see, but every instance of random suffering gives us reason to doubt, just as every time I see you with a cat on your lap gives me reason to doubt that you are allergic to cats.
Does anyone claim that Plantinga’s argument solves the evidential problem of evil?
I’m not talking about the logical PoE specifically. This may be the context in which the argumentation was developed, but (obviously!) its implications hold generally. You can’t just say, oh, I’m talking about a different thing, and then just disregard it—the fact that there is a non-zero amount of expected evil doesn’t just magically go away.
That this is something we would not expect is exactly an appeal to additional information. It’s claiming to know, given that there is a tri-omni God, how much evil we ought to expect. But this isn’t something you can take just for granted.
Again, take the example of the raisin cookies (I swear, this whole thing would be over if anybody just bothered to think through the examples I give). The information you have isn’t sufficient to tell whether you should expect 10% or 60% raisin cookies (or any other percentage). Yet depending on which of these cases obtains, the same evidence either decreases or increases your expectation. Hence, whether evidence should decrease your expectation depends on additional information.
No, and neither do I. The claim is merely that one needs to posit additional information, such as ‘in a world created by a tri-omni God, there should not be more evil than…’. Without this, there simply is no evidential case possible. Take the first premise of Rowe’s formulation of the evidential argument: “There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.” This is a nontrivial assumption: it can be false. Not any observation of evil suffices to fulfil it. Only evil exceeding this threshold counts as evidence against a God.
In the raisin analogy, this amounts to a premise of the form ‘gran would not include more than 10% raisin cookies in her jar’. This depends on additional knowledge, it has to be argued for separately; and without it, evidence just can’t gain any purchase.
If there is one thing virtually all theologists agree on, it is that the Biblical God is not utilitarian (primarily motivated to maximise human happiness or reduce human suffering). Early writings by theologists such as Origen, Augustine, and Athanasius draw on the Platonic, teleological tradition. To them, suffering could be inherently good. Reformation theologists in the modern era, like Luther, Calvin, Edwards, and Plantinga, tend to view suffering as a necessary means to an end, that end being salvation and ultimately the glory of God.
Saying a being acts in a certain way does not prove anything. Asserting the being is omnipotent but does not do certain things does not prove omnipotence. Saying that a being can throw any number but chooses to only throw even numbers does not support that the being actually can throw any number. That has to be demonstrated. Especially if you claim the being has the property of throwing only even numbers.
It is not a matter of losing powers, it is a matter of having power in the first place. It is a matter of testing the assertion of omnipotence.
Now, if your answer to my challenge is that the being can do evil, and thus becomes almost totally but not completely omnibenevolent, I’m happy. Strict omnipotence and omnibenevolence thus are incompatible - but not almost omnipotence and almost omnibenevolence.
I have been careful to not accuse you of believing in any of this stuff. My question was about the difference between omnibenevolence as an inherent property of a god, and omnibenevolence as a description of what a god does. You seem to be using the second, and I was wondering how that concept is logically defensible in our universe - not whether you believed it or not.
I’ll wait for your answer to whether omnibenevolence is a property or a description. And, god being forced to do things seems to be allowed in Christianity. Ask one why God needed to have Jesus die to forgive sins, instead of just forgiving them, and you’ll often get an answer that God has to do it that way. Growing up Jewish, where I asked for forgiveness of sins through prayer every year without human sacrifices involved, I deeply think this is ridiculous, but there you are. God being constrained to do good by his inherent nature seems no more absurd. And he clearly doesn’t only do good, as I mentioned.
That comes from what I get from believers who believe in a tri-omni god. In case you missed it, I offered the possibility that omnibenevolence is descriptive, not prescriptive. The problem with that is that we have very little reason to believe that a supposed god is maximally good. If it is an inherent property of god, then one can claim that the seemingly obvious counterexamples are not counterexamples if you could see all their impacts. The idea that god is inherently omnibenevolent is unfalsifiable. If it is descriptive, then this argument doesn’t work, since claims that anything god does maximizes good are inherently circular.
No, the religious side, always, picks its definitions according to their usefulness in pushing their religion, manipulating people’s emotions, and demonizing the opposition. And cares nothing for consistency. They will "make things up as they go along, using whatever definition they find useful for their agenda even if it contradicts the one they used ten seconds ago. Honesty, consistency and logic mean nothing to a believer, they violate faith.
No, it’s just irrelevant. We don’t see “a non-zero amount of expected evil” and suffering (the latter of which you still haven’t addressed), we see an absolutely massive amount of both that are clearly unnecessary. The entire point of focusing on bad logical arguments and sneering at facts is to dodge the issue that those facts prove that the all-important omnimax god is false. That we can just look at the world and see that it’s false.
The faithful just ignore that because denial of the truth is a virtue to the faithful. The more someone denies something they know to be true, the more faith they display and thus the more virtue they demonstrate. Only the wicked consider facts important; a virtuous person will go knowingly to their death to uphold a lie. One only need watch the news to see that happen.
No; in that analogy, it would be “asteroids full of raisin cookies falling on the planet killing most of the planet while dictators force-feed nations of people raisin cookies until they burst does not prove that there’s too many raisin cookies.” If the analogy is not absurd, then it doesn’t match the claim it is being mapped to.
You’re still not quite understanding the scenario. Take an omnipotent being. They can do, well, anything at all. Ok? Good things, evil things, funny things, educational things, all the things. I’m presuming that at least for the purposes of this argument, you’re granting this is possible. Right? Ok.
Now, the omnipotent being does things. They can do all the things, but they end up doing only some things. Meaning, there are things they don’t do, but could do. Because not doing something doesn’t mean not being able to do something. It just means not doing that thing. As in, they could, they just don’t. With me so far?
This being is still fully omnipotent. They can still do all the things. But they only do some of the things. There are things they don’t do. That is not a problem. These are still things they could do. They are still as omnipotent as ever. Just choosing a set of things doesn’t make them less omnipotent.
Ok. So we have an omnipotent being that does some set of things. They don’t do all the things, but could do all the things. This is the situation of every omnipotent being. No being does all the things. They all only do some things. So our omnipotent being is exactly like all omnipotent beings.
There is no need to demonstrate their omnipotence by doing things they don’t do. They started out omnipotent, and haven’t lost their omnipotence. That there are things they don’t end up doing doesn’t change that. Nor do the characteristics of the set of things they end up not doing. It doesn’t matter what they don’t do, they’re still omnipotent. If they didn’t do funny things, they might be boring, but still omnipotent. If they didn’t do strange things, they might be ordinary, but still omnipotent. And so on. Every omnipotent being does just a subset of things they could do. This does not mean they are unable to do the things they don’t do.
Is there anything about this you disagree with so far?
Again, not being committed to belief in any kind of God, I’m obviously not committed to the claim that God’s actions in this world are benevolent. That’s independent of the question whether omnibenevolence and omnipotence are compatible. Apart from this, the logical defense of God’s benevolence given the existence of evil in the world is, of course, the free will defense. I think I might have mentioned that somewhere.
This is a good observation because it touches on the difficult task of assessing or quantifying the presence of evil in our world. When we look closely at wildlife and the broader natural order, the sheer amount of suffering and predation is hard to ignore. Cruelty seems woven into the fabric of life itself. Many atheists may interpret this as an unavoidable consequence of evolution: an indifferent process driven by survival, competition, and adaptation. Yet the same individuals may be far less comfortable accepting the notion of necessary evil in a universe intentionally created by a deity.
Besides, concepts like evil and suffering are hard to define. It’s difficult to imagine a world entirely free of suffering because even minor forms of discomfort like boredom, frustration or dissatisfaction can escalate into terrible distress. Thus, the complete elimination of suffering may be not only unrealistic but incompatible with the psychological and existential structure of conscious beings.
That’s just medically untrue; there are people who physically lack the capacity for various negative experiences like pain and fear due to damage or abnormalities in the brain. Now, that’s a bad thing for them in practical terms since we don’t live in a world without danger, but they are still mentally “there”.
Certainly, it would be trivial for a god or even a medical science somewhat more advanced than ours to just put a low ceiling on how much a creature is physically capable of suffering.
I find this approach limited. I don’t think it evaluates evil and suffering properly because it only considers physical pain and fear. This means that if a person with cannibalistic tendencies managed to consume human babies without causing them fear or physical pain, then everything would be fine.
Obviously not. The implications are more complex and so the definitions should be expanded so that all the aspects of suffering and evil should be considered.
The wings of the ostrich flap away;
her plumage is lacking in feathers.
When she abandons her eggs on the ground
and lets them warm in the sand,
She forgets that a foot may crush them,
that the wild beasts may trample them;
She cruelly disowns her young
and her labor is useless; she has no fear.
For God has withheld wisdom from her
and given her no share in understanding.
Yet when she spreads her wings high,
she laughs at a horse and rider.
Job 39:13-18 (NABRE)
Had God created a world of ostriches*, the world would be devoid of love.
~Max
* as here described - a zoologist will probably tell you ostriches are highly devoted parents
How much suffering? Some people seem to suffer a great deal more than others.
So this boils down to either most people having a lot of unnecessary suffering (if the bar for required suffering is very low), or “mysterious ways” (if the bar is different for different people because reasons).
I don’t see that this particularly helps though, given that the world is also very boring, frustrating etc. So it’s almost a problem a lesser evils. Whether it is possible to have a reality with zero boredom, it’s pretty clear we are very far from any optimum.
Do you think I invented the evidential problem of evil? It’s a recognized part of the PoE and no, it does not claim any additional knowledge than we can observe. That’s why we talk about doubt and not know.
The irony of you saying the part in brackets, when you ignore my examples, e.g. of dark matter, of whether kind acts can give us reason to think god is kind etc, which are analogous to the reasoning here. And I did respond to the raisin cookie example, even though it isn’t.
In the raisin cookie example, you included the premise that we know grandma would make at least one raisin cookie, even though she doesn’t like them, because of reason R. In the PoE, there is no “R” that we know to be true. We only have free will proposed as a possible (and entirely unconvincing IMO) R. Your analogy snuck in the conclusion as a premise.
I have never made such a claim. The claim is simply that, knowing only that an all-powerful being wants suffering to be as close to zero as possible, every observation of suffering (especially if it looks random and/or gratuitous) gives us reason to doubt.
To go back to an example you didn’t respond to, the claim that you are allergic to cats does not entail knowing you will have zero cats around you – e.g. it might be your partner has a cat and so you take anti-histamines and the like and try to bear it.
However, all else being equal I would not have expected to see you with a cat. And if I’m constantly observing you with different cats of course I have increasing reason to doubt the claim.
They can all lead to equally unbearable suffering. This is inherent to the condition of a conscious being, for whom a world free of suffering is impossible.
Firstly the issue, in terms of PoE, is whether this world is at an optimum level of suffering. Is the suggestion really that God could not make this universe even a tiny bit less painful, boring and/or frustrating? This is the ideal world?
Otherwise god is engaging in gratuitous suffering, which is contrary to the definition of omnibenevolence.
Secondly, I wouldn’t agree with the claim that the absence of suffering is impossible; we don’t know that. Certainly we can make thinking agents that don’t seem to suffer. Of course, one could posit that an entity capable of experiencing pleasure must necessarily also be capable of experiencing pain. But I see no reason to believe that claim.
Uh, why do you think it’s useful to throw the same link back at me that I already provided in the post you’re replying to…? Besides, I’ve referred to the evidential PoE and its concrete formulation several times before, starting about 150 posts ago. The reason for this is that valid formulations of this include something you refuse to admit, namely, an explicit bound on the amount of evil one should expect in a world created by a tri-omni God, as explicitly quoted on the part of the post you chose not to reply to.
It explicitly does, it’s in the very link you provided, I even quoted it in my post. We need some argument, e.g. Rowe’s fawn, to the effect that there is evil in the world that exceeds what we should expect with a tri-omni God. (The so-called ‘factual premise’ of the argument.)
No, that is not a premise of the raisin example. The only thing we know is that there may be a non-zero amount of raisin cookies present, and that hence, the expected amount of raisin cookies is greater than zero. This exactly parallels the situation in the PoE, where the fact that there is a non-empty overlap G\cap E means that likewise, we ought to expect a non-zero amount of evil on average.
And this is false. It’s like saying that in the raisin example, any observed raisin cookie gives us reason to doubt this is gran’s jar. That simply and unambiguously isn’t the case. I’ve given an explicit demonstration of that fact.