Exactly, well put.
And I am still of the opinion that your position is not sound until you add an additional premise; as best as I can tell, all of the premises you already put forward as necessary to consider the evidentiary problem of evil, I have admitted are compatible with classical (Reformation) theism. If you have a coherent argument, without additional premises, then it is objectively irrational for people to believe in classical theism. I think the additional premise you must add to make a coherent evidentiary problem of evil is fundamentally incompatible with classical theism (which arguably nullifies the utility of the evidentiary problem of evil in the first place).
I do not take the extra step to argue that classical theism is better than a system of beliefs that is susceptible to the evidentiary problem of evil. The Plantinga quote about sensus divinitatus is totally independent of my criticism of your position qua the evidentiary problem of evil on its own terms.
You provided an analogy where a purported vegetarian has meat in his fridge, with the purported vegetarian being analogous to an omnibenevolent God, meat being analogous to suffering or evil, and the fridge being analogous to the world. But so far you have failed to show why we would expect a vegetarian’s fridge to be devoid of meat, unless we first make the (reasonable) assumption that someone probably consumes the types of food found in his fridge.
You appear to admit the necessity of this reasonable assumption about the world–that a person probably consumes the types of food found in his fridge–because you lamented the end of all logic and reason if I would not assent to that premise. And I do so assent. But now you need to circle back and complete your analogy with the tri-omni God, because from where I’m sitting, the argument you used for the vegetarian only worked with additional knowledge. By analogy, the argument you use for God only works with additional knowledge. Can you identify that knowledge, and is it something you have already put forward as assumed by the evidentiary problem of evil (thus proving your position is sound), or is it something new? If the latter, is it incompatible with classical theism?
~Max
The God that is proposed to exist is claimed to be omnibenevolent. In the same way we know that a vegetarian does not eat meat we know an omnibenevolent God does not want suffering.
If necessary suffering is necessary because without it there is a logical inconsistency, then an omnibenevolent god must eliminate all unnecessary suffering. If God wants the suffering to occur, then it is desired suffering, which would make that God not omnibenevolent.
Again, I am not saying it is real mathematics. I’m representing the relationship between the concepts. Like any metaphor, it is a visualization tool. Like every metaphor, it is flawed.
So your response is “God wouldn’t do that”. Now who is claiming knowledge about how much evil is gratuitous?
Now you are rejecting the hypothetical. The statement was about trying to evaluate if God is onmibenevolent, and the hypothetical was chosen because it is assumed that an omnibenevolent being would not make us live in a hell-world, so if we were living in a hell- world, we would have grounds to doubt God is omnibenevolent. The counter argument proposed is that we don’t know, maybe that is the level of evil necessary to make a consistent function world.
Now you seem to be saying that we know God is omnibenevolent and we know God would not make a hell world. But the point was not we are living in a hell world, the point was that if we were living in a hell world, we would have reason to reject the premise God is omnibenevolent. In other words, the amount of evil experienced in and of itself is enough to doubt even though the level of necessary evil is not known.
Your response is now to argue we know something about how much evil is expected.
For a certain definition of rational.
It just feels to me like so much of the argument is “This impossible, perfect being is constrained from doing these impossible, perfect things because logic demands a limitless being has limits.” Talk about squaring a circle.
You know what, fine, I’m not gonna haggle about semantics with you. But I wasn’t misrepresenting your argument, not intentionally at least, my point was merely that there’s an actual contradiction, so a reductio in the strongest sense, within your position, while mine just involves accepting a logical triviality that you find hard to come to terms with.
Again, that is contradictory. This would only be the case if your expectation of evil was zero. If that were the case, then the probability of observing evil in a universe with a tri-omni God must likewise be zero, as the expectation is just the probability-weighted sum of all possible amounts of evil, which is zero only if all the weights are. Then, any single observation of evil would, in fact, be enough to deductively conclude that no God can exist, since the fact that the probability of observing evil given that there is a God is zero entails that the non-existence of God follows logically from that of evil.
If there is any reluctance on my part, it’s because I know you’ll likely be misled into thinking that I’m making some great concession in this admission, which you, being unwilling to make the same concession, can then use against my position (as you have in fact done). So my point has just been to show that no concession is being made at all: it’s a triviality, and as such, no problem to admit at all. Given that it’s not the case that any evil at all deductively disproves God, we have no information about the amount of evil to expect.
Now, in hell, one could make a tremendously convincing evidential argument from evil, I’d imagine. But one still would have to make that argument.
God isn’t the only limiting factor here, however. Possibility also is: God can’t do what’s impossible. And the whole point is basically that we have no good gauge on what is possible, and what’s not; hence, we need to make further assumptions.
Err, how exactly did you arrive at that functional form? Why not, e.g., e^{-G}? This is already an additional assumption that I can’t see any justification for.
How so? I could be as benevolent as possible, but that doesn’t make the bulk of evil in the world disappear. Benevolence, without knowledge and power, itself has no effect on evil.
That expression has a perfectly well defined limit, \lim_{G\to\infty}\frac{1}{G}=0.
Sure, but that lands us exactly back at the point we started: there is some nonzero, but unknown, amount of evil in a world with a tri-omni God. What have we gained?
Exactly. That’s all the point I’ve been making: we don’t know if the observed amount of evil is actually grounds on which to reduce our credence in the existence of God.
We don’t see any trend at all; we simply see the end result. Even granting your ad-hoc formalization, if the expected amount of evil was 2 million, that could just as well be the endpoint of a downwards trend as benevolence increases as 2 could be. The only thing we know is that if there is a certain amount of evil X in the world with an omnibenevolent God, there would be more evil in a world with a merely ‘pluribenevolent’ one. But observation of evil in our world can’t differentiate between the two cases without making assumptions on the expected amount.
Because here, we have lots of background data on the amount of control a person typically exerts over the amount of meat in their life, and it’s in the end that background data you’re appealing to to form your judgment. If we were thrust into a situation with no such background data, we would have no (logically sound) grounds on which to make such a judgment.
Again, the entailment from ‘any amount of evil yields disconfirming evidence for God’ to ‘God and evil are logically incompatible’ is immediate: because any evil can only possibly yield evidence for God if your expectation is zero, which it can only be if the probability that evil exists if God does is likewise zero. If on the other hand there’s a nonzero expectation of evil, then if you’re judging the existence of God to be less likely based on any amount of evil, then for quantities of evil below that expectation you’re just wrong in that judgment.
This conclusion can be deduced from the definitions of God and His attributes, without any further knowledge whatsoever. It is a solution to the logical problem of evil presupposed by the evidentiary problem of evil.
Quite to the contrary, traditional Christian belief posits the existence of Hell. Why would we assume God would not make Hell? Logically, the existence of Hell adds nothing to the evidentiary problem of evil. We are still presented with three possible explanations (deduced from the definition of God and His attributes):
- (Tri-omni) God exists, and this is the best compossible world.
- (Tri-omni) God does not exist, and this is not the best compossible world.
- (Tri-omni) God does not exist, and this is the best compossible world.
And a number of additional premises:
- No suffering is inherently good.
- Some suffering has cosmic instrumental value. (categorical; does not imply such suffering actually exists)
- No suffering with cosmic instrumental value is gratuitous.
- All suffering without cosmic instrumental value is gratuitous.
- There is no gratuitous suffering in the best compossible world.
- We observe lots of suffering.
- Some observed suffering has local instrumental value. Such suffering may or may not be gruatuitous.
- Some observed suffering has no apparent local instrumental value. Such suffering may or may not be gruatuitous.
Now, it may be that a denizen of Hell constantly observes suffering. But without additional premises, I assert he has no rational basis to make an inductive leap and conclude the probable existence of gratuitous suffering.
There are premises that would complete an argument. For example, either of these could inform an inductive argument:
- Absence of evidence is evidence of absence.
- The cosmic instrumental value of suffering is readily discernable by human faculties.
~Max
Again, your issue is more with the original problem then, than with anything that I’ve added to the conversation. If you think that suffering is not a negative in itself, then fine, you’re “immune” to the problem of evil: it simply isn’t a problem at all in your world view.
But I would reject the notion that this is the typical world view even among Christians.
IME when confronted with extreme suffering, Christians will talk about this being a fallen world. Or of going to a better place. IOW tacitly agreeing that the suffering, in itself, is just bad. People don’t typically tell a couple whose child has been diagnosed with leukemia that maybe it’s a good thing.
There is no contradiction, just you equating different things.
There is no line below which we ignore evidence. I’m simply saying that, if forced to set how much suffering I would expect to see in the creation of a god defined as wishing to minimize suffering, then the answer is zero. But my argument isn’t based around trying to set a line, or rhetorically make an issue of the fact that there isn’t a line, yours is.
It’s not contradictory, it’s how we reason about virtually all empirical claims. I don’t need to make a prediction to evaluate evidence.
What? I am making the evidential argument, and it is convincing.
And you haven’t made any argument against it, just made the absurd claim that we should ignore infinite suffering merely because we haven’t set some baseline of how much evidence to ignore.
And I’m explaining that that’s only possible if the probability of evil existing if God does is zero. You keep ignoring this, so unfortunately, I don’t know why that doesn’t seem to connect with you. But it’s straightforward: if there is a nonzero probability of something, then you must expect a nonzero amount of that something.
I mean, of course you need to make a prediction to evaluate evidence. It’s how we test a hypothesis: see what it predicts to happen, then check if that’s actually what does happen.
The only way to evaluate evidence is in relation to the hypothesis you’re seeking to test. Thus, you need to know what evidence to expect, given that the hypothesis is true (or false). Only if the evidence disagrees with that expectation, does it disconfirm the hypothesis.
No. You’re arguing that any occurrence of evil at all counts as evidence against God. That is not the evidential argument from evil, since that argument is explicit about needing to establish that there are instances of gratuitous evil, which exceed what you ought to expect if there were a tri-omni God. This is the factual premise of the argument, and without it, the argument is simply unsound.
I’ve given the argument many times now, to utter silence. I’ll give it one more time, in the hopes that you might finally at least point out where you disagree. So as explicit as possible:
There’s two options. Either, if there is a tri-omni God, you ought to expect zero evil, or you ought to expect a nonzero amount of evil (this is trivial, of course). In the first case, if you ought to expect zero total evil, then the probability of evil occurring if God exists must be zero, since any nonzero probability would lead to a nonzero expected amount of evil. If the probability of evil occurring given that there is a tri-omni God is zero, then the existence of God and the occurrence of evil are logically mutually exclusive: there is no possible case in which there is evil, and God exists. Consequently, any evil at all deductively excludes the possibility of God’s existence. This is exactly the logical argument from evil. Consequently, if the logical argument from evil is defeasible, then the expected amount of evil given that a tri-omni God exists must be nonzero.
Thus follows case two: there is some expected amount of evil even if a tri-omni God exists. Then, a hypothesis cannot be disconfirmed by finding what should be expected if it is true. Consequently, if the amount of evil in the world is equal to what we should expect, given that a tri-omni God exists, we have no grounds on which to disfavor the hypothesis that a tri-omni God exists. Finally, we have, as of yet, no idea of the amount of evil we should expect, given that a tri-omni God exists, beyond simply that it is nonzero. Consequently, there is no amount of evil such that we can say that it disconfirms the hypothesis that a tri-omni God exists.
If we do want to argue that the evil we observe disconfirms the hypothesis of God’s existence, then we need grounds on which to claim that the observed amount of evil exceeds what should be expected. We have no deductive means of establishing such grounds, hence, we have to resort to probabilistic, inductive means. As the IEP puts it:
The probabilistic nature of such arguments manifests itself in the form of a premise to the effect that “It is probably the case that some instance (or type, or amount, or pattern) of evil E is gratuitous.” This probability judgment usually rests on the claim that, even after careful reflection, we can see no good reason for God’s permission of E. The inference from this claim to the judgment that there exists gratuitous evil is inductive in nature, and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument.
This is where the factual premise in evidential arguments from evil comes from. It is an absolutely necessary, genuinely new addition that doesn’t follow deductively from God’s tri-omni nature, but from our grasp of the world and our observations within it—which is what makes it an evidential argument.
You thus have two consistent options:
- either you claim there is zero expectation of evil, in which case, you’re making the logical argument from evil;
- or you argue for the existence of gratuitous amounts of evil exceeding what should be expected if a tri-omni God exists.
But what you can’t consistently do is claim that the logical argument of evil doesn’t work, and that nevertheless any amount of evil works against the hypothesis of God’s existence. That is logically exactly equal to saying ‘the amount of expected evil if God exists is zero and non-zero’.
This is, to the best of my ability to tell, a logically perfectly sound argument. But I’ve formulated it many times, yet you keep persisting in claiming that any evil is evidence against God, without giving a shred of a hint of where you disagree with it; indeed without acknowledging it in the slightest. So if there’s anything in the above you think doesn’t follow, if you feel I’ve made any error in my argumentation, could you please just point that out?
Another fairly common response to extreme suffering is that it is part of God’s plan.
I admit that gratuitous suffering is incompatible with a tri-omni God. But if you want to argue that all suffering is always bad, in a teleological sense, that just isn’t compatible with traditional Christian values, the most important of which is that it is a good thing God allowed his only son to be tortured and die, because it was necessary for a greater good. The greater good is saving the world from its fallen state. God clearly has the power to create a world where the Passion is unnecessary. He could have created a world where Adam and Eve never ate of the forbidden fruit, and thus the world was never cursed. But upon greater reflection, I think most if not all Christians will tell you that would be like deciding not to have any children on principle; our world with all its suffering is still better than a world without love.
~Max
Now you are arguing both that God would never make Hell and that he already has.
You may have misunderstood me. I said “A tri-omni God simply wouldn’t inflict such torture [as in Hell] gratuitously.”
~Max
And yet that was exactly what was under discussion. You equated the hypothetical “hell world” under discussion with the supposed Hell afterlife.
Setting aside the traditional depictions of hell are extremely gratuitous suffering. No, people don’t earn hell. They are given hell because they didn’t choose to believe in God before there was evidence to believe in him, or which description was right. But that’s a separate argument.
I’m not sure what you’re asking at this point. I can, however, point to the Catholic Catechism as to the fates of righteous people who predeceased Jesus:
636 By the expression “He descended into hell”, the Apostles’ Creed confesses that Jesus did really die and through his death for us conquered death and the devil “who has the power of death” (Heb 2:14).
637 In his human soul united to his divine person, the dead Christ went down to the realm of the dead. He opened heaven’s gates for the just who had gone before him.
~Max
Because in traditional Christianity, God IS evil, and demands evil, and does evil. And his behavior does not remotely resemble that of a “tri omni” god. And only an evil God would make Hell.
Your argument fails completely against somebody who doesn’t care about “traditional Christianity”, which is probably most people. Or who doesn’t base their idea of morality entirely on “if God says so, it’s right”.
The original point about a hell-world was to examine the extent of the claim that because we don’t know how much evil/suffering is necessary, we can’t make any judgment about the likelihood of god being omnibenevolent based upon what evil we see.
The hypothetical was if we lived in a literal hell-world, we still would not have any justification to question God’s omnibenevolence.
Your answer was a confusing mess. You argued
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Omnigod wouldn’t do that. Reject the hypothetical.
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Omnigod already did it. He created actual Hell.
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Innocents don’t go to hell.
I’m pointing out the seeming self-contradiction.
I’m pointing out that “hell-world” and “actual hell” were different concepts. Hell- world is the world of life. Actual hell is afterlife.
I’m saying that the idea that people deserve hell is laughable. Traditional Christianity says that everybody deserves hell. All are sinners. The child who steals a piece of candy deserves hell.
Christian theology determines who goes to hell by one criteria - requesting forgiveness from God. Mao Zedung is rotting in hell not because of all the people who died as a result of his leadership, but because he wasn’t a Christian. Hitler might be lounging in heaven if he prayed before he blew his brains out.
It’s laughable to describe that as omnibenevolent.
To return to the question of whether incidents of evil/suffering is sufficient in itself to question the existence or omnibenevolence of God, I think there might be a semantic difference over what it means to look for gratuitous evil.
Is gratuity a defined line, a specific event or act, or can the accumulation of evil acts add up to gratuitous level of evil by virtue of quantity?
(back from holiday)
Yes, I mentioned this explanation already: mysterious ways. A universal get out of jail card for any theological problem.
Firstly, I think there’s a bit of equivocating between different defences of the problem of evil here. I’m not accusing you of doing this deliberately, but let’s just clarify the different arguments.
You originally objected to the idea that suffering is simply bad, and alluded to ways it might be good for personal growth. So this defence is that suffering in itself can be a good. And that, for example, if I could live a life without physical pain that would be bad for me; my soul would be “lesser” than if I’d experienced pain.
Another argument is that God would have liked to make a universe without suffering, but it’s a necessary evil. For example, if the best possible world requires both free will, and that free will entails person X can harm person Y.
You’re free to hold both positions, but we should be clear about which logic we are applying and how. So, for the example of a child diagnosed with leukemia, is it something good for them, or a necessary evil of the best possible world? Or mysterious ways?
And just to expand on this part of the quote:
Firstly, again, it matters what we mean by “bad” here. Very clearly, for us as humans there are necessary evils; a course of horrible, sickening chemotherapy might be the thing that cures this hypothetical child of leukemia. But in itself, yes, suffering is a bad thing, basically by definition.
If tomorrow we had a cure that involved no discomfort, we’d use that instead.
Secondly, this is a minor point, but I still think this discussion of “traditional” christian values is irrelevant here. The problem of evil is not something I invented, nor is it solely an atheist thing. It’s a problem for believers, indeed it may be the one that they grapple with most of all. It’s not a very convincing defence to tell them they are not true scotsman christians.
Thank you for calling this out. It’s been eating me up. We start with the claim that God is omnibenevolent (omnimax, but this is the feature in question). The POE arises specifically from the OB aspect, since it is the Evil that is the problem. The rest of the omnis are drawn in because they provide rebuttals to some of the reasons provided that OB might not be able to stop Evil.
Then someone (I forget if it was @Max_S or @Velocity) said they prefer the term suffering over evil.
Ok, but then they turn around and argue that not all suffering is a bad thing. Sometimes it can be a good thing.
Or looks like changing the word to then discount the problem.
The original definition of the problem is stated as evil, in contrast to benevolence. Benevolence is seeking good, malevolence is seeking evil.
Sure, we look at various forms of suffering as evil. But if some particular form of suffering is actually good is a separate debate. The context of the POE is the existence of evil.
Also in this case, effectively a claim that God is evil. Since if “God’s plan” is to inflict extreme suffering, that IS evil.
Indeed, we wouldn’t. This much I agree with. “Omnigod” would never inflict gratuitous suffering. The “hell-world” hypothetical does not explicitly say that any suffering is gratuitous. No contradiction.
According to Christianity, “Omnigod” also created “actual Hell,” which by definition has no gratuitous suffering, and contains no innocents. If you find yourself in either Hell and think you perceive gratuitous suffering, then according to traditional Christianity, you perceive wrong. None of this reasoning is subject to evidentiary claims because the logic is all deduced from first principles. You cannot reason someone out of a position he did not reason himself into in the first place…
~Max
Clearly–I argued that without omniscience, necessity cannot be ruled out. Thus placing determination of gratuitous versus necessary evil beyond the reach of science and evidence.
~Max