Ah I see there has been some confusion, probably caused by me, so let me clarify:
I didn’t mean hell as some separate place that some people go after death. Forget I used the word “hell” at all. It was an argument ad absurdum about @Half_Man_Half_Wit 's position.
Basically, HMHW had argued that the observation of suffering does not give us reason to doubt that God is omnimax, because since omnimax God and suffering are compatible, there’s no expectation of how much suffering we’d expect to see. (please correct me if I am wrong in this summary @Half_Man_Half_Wit , I have no desire or need to misrepresent anyone’s position).
So I took it to the extreme of unlimited suffering: a version of our world, here on earth, where we all have our skin burned off and reformed, and whatever other torture you can imagine, every day without respite. And heck, since the “set of universes” logic implies that anything short of proof can be disregarded, we can add in that God laughs at our suffering, spits on us, says the words “I am entirely evil” etc etc. None of these things, apparently, would give us even reason to doubt that God is perfectly loving. And HMHW has indeed accepted this entailment (again feel free to jump in HMHW, but I’ve put this to you many times at this point).
And this is now your position too, right?
I mean, on first draft I started going through your premises as you outlined (very well) here. But then I realized of course that you are basically just alluding to the same position as HMHW.
So you also believe, that in a world of unbounded suffering and torture, we would be irrational to doubt for a second that God is perfectly loving? Right?
Well, ‘argued’ kind of implies too much, here; after all, it’s just an immediate logical consequence. So I have no need to ‘argue’ this any more than I have to argue that 1 + 1 = 2; it’s an implication that can be directly grasped from an understanding of the concepts involved. If the logical PoE can be defeated, the expected amount of evil in a world with a tri-omni God is non-zero, but we have no information beyond that, hence in particular no information on how much evil to expect (beyond that it is more than none). But still, this is essentially correct.
This on the other hand is completely wrong. There is no ‘sets of universes’ logic; possible worlds are just a device I had hoped could make the logical structure of the argument more clear to you, which however seems to have had the opposite effect, so it’s probably best if you just forget about that. Also, I have never said nor implied anything about a need for proof: as noted, one can make perfectly good evidential arguments that yield probabilistic conclusions. In a hell-world as you’ve been proposing, such an argument would probably be very convincing indeed. But you still have to make the argument, that is, you still have to introduce a factual premise to the effect that some evil exceeds what you would expect in the presence of a tri-omni God. This is clear from elementary logic as well as from every cite on the evidential argument, which you however keep studiously ignoring.
But still, the logic is just: you either have zero or non-zero expectation of evil if there’s a God, if it’s zero, then God and evil are logically incompatible, so if they are compatible, it must be non-zero, but we don’t know how large. And that’s it! No ‘sets of universes’, no need for proof, nothing, just kindergarten logic.
I wasn’t thinking of intense suffering, more romantic suffering. Pain is not fun either, but we evolved it for a reason. I believe there are people who were born without the facility to feel pain, but they get into trouble with things hot stoves.
Which leads to a nonhuman issue of the problem of evil. In the natural world, some predators cause great pain to their prey. Makes sense in terms of evolution, but why would any god cause it? Why punish them for man’s fall?
Regardless we know of no reason why either physical or emotional pain is necessary in a hypothetical universe.
Yes, in our universe, where life has evolved through natural selection, pain of all types serves a purpose (though it’s still debatable whether p-zombie higher life forms could have evolved, instead of feeling beings like you and I).
But these restrictions don’t apply to an omnimax god. In fact, apart from logical contradictions*, we don’t know of any restrictions at all. * And that was a late addition to dodge various hypotheticals.
Also, I expect that a purely positive-feedback system of behavior is possible. From a practical viewpoint avoiding harm “because it hurts”, and doing so “because it feels better” have the same results and so would both serve the needed purpose. It’s just that the unthinking process of evolution doesn’t care how things feel, all that matters is what variations survived and bred. A conscious designer could do far better.
It might be interesting to try and construct a hypothetical world where there is 0 pain and suffering. And be logically consistent. And not be the equivalent of heaven, what ever that is. Would the inhabitants of that world be zombies? I think so.
But it is so obvious that we are not in a minimal suffering/pain world (unless you use circular reasoning that god by definition causes minimal suffering which neither of us do) that it seems pointless to even try.
Why? Suffering is just an unpleasant mental state, not some defining quality of personhood. It’s not like real life people are zombies if they aren’t suffering at the moment, after all.
A few things here:
Firstly, in the strict sense, we can just conceive of a universe with no life, so logical consistence is pretty clear.
Secondly, ruling out heaven gives the game away. You’re alluding to a free will defence of the problem of evil, but the belief in a place of free will and zero suffering creates massive problems for that.
Finally I agree with @Der_Trih’s postulation of thinking agents that are motivated only by different positive inputs. I don’t think it’s a given that the way that our sensory and emotional systems work is the only game in town.
The point of your “set of unvierses” logic is that we can disregard observations of suffering because there is a non-zero set of hypothetical universes that have both suffering and a perfectly loving all-powerful god. Don’t blame me that we can use the same logic to point out that there is a non-zero set of hypothetical universes that have both a God that says “I am entirely evil” and also is perfectly loving. There might be some reason that the best possible world features a God who really, really looks evil.
Anyway, take that part out if you like. I think just the suggestion that unlimited suffering – e.g. every one of us being crucified on a daily basis – would give us no reason to even doubt that the world is the best possible creation of an all-loving God…is ridiculous enough already.
Again, forget the ‘sets of universes’ if they are confusing to you. The logic is just: there either is zero or non-zero expected suffering, and if it’s zero, that means God and evil are logically incompatible, thus any evil at all would disprove their existence. Hence if God and evil are compatible, the expected amount of evil must be non-zero. And that’s it: that’s all we can conclude with just this information. This is all the argument I’m making, but frustratingly you just keep ignoring it.
That actually doesn’t follow, since we can only conclude that the expected amount of evil is greater than zero, which does not entail that there is any particular amount of evil possible. The expected amount of evil could just as well be one stolen piece of candy from a baby every ten thousand years: we just don’t know.
But just that you consider something ridiculous doesn’t mean it’s not true; in fact, mere incredulity is generally a poor guide to truth. You might find it ridiculous that you can increase your odds of winning in the Monty Hall setting by switching, or that in a room with 23 people there’s a greater than 50% chance that two of them share a birthday, nevertheless those things are true.
And again, just ask yourself: why does every formulation of the evidential problem of evil introduce a premise to the effect that there probably is some evil that exceeds what should be expected if there’s a tri-omni God? That’s perfectly self-evident if what I’m saying is right, while it’s entirely mysterious and completely redundant if it were true that, as you say, any amount of evil yields disconfirming evidence for the existence of God. Yet again, you refuse to even consider this.
But the simple point remains: the failure of the logical argument from evil yields nothing but a non-zero expected amount of evil. If we want to take the amount of evil we’re seeing to reduce our credence in the existence of God, we first have to argue that this amount exceeds what would be expected. That’s trivial in the case of the hell-world, of course, and at least plausibly possible in ours; but it’s still a step in the logic you need to make, or else end up with an inconsistent position.
To be conscious involves having desires and goals, and in a world with other people no one is going to be able to fulfill our their goals and desires. Simple game theory - you can reduce the difference between desires and achievements, but not eliminate them. I’d say that causes suffering - definitely not the tearing one’s heart out suffering, but some. If that doesn’t affect a person at all, that person is more or less a zombie I’d say. Just like in heaven, which is why I’d never, ever, want to go to the Christian heaven.
That’s pretty much why I ruled out heaven, just to focus on the worldly situation. I agree with you that heaven causes all sorts of problems. I’ve never seen any version of the Christian heaven that would make me choose it over hell. Now Shaw’s heaven, with open gates and a free flow between heaven and hell, is a lot better.
And I also agree that belief in heaven means that one does accept that there can be free will and no evil. Which is absurd. For believers in heaven, here is one problem.
Can you see what people on earth are doing? If not, I’d miss them, and that would be suffering to some extent. If God took that capacity away from me I’d be no better than a zombie. If I can see them, and see them suffer (which is going to happen) I’ll be unhappy that I can’t help and also suffer.
If God could somehow solve this in heaven (probably not since it is logically impossible to solve) he could do it on earth, which he doesn’t,
Anyhow, that’s why I excluded heaven, to focus on the problem on earth.
What appears to cause suffering is some mental switch that when flipped indicates “this sensation is suffering”. Disable or evade the switch and there’s no suffering.
You’ve experienced that if you’ve ever stubbed your toe or stepped on a nail and noticed the damage before the foot starts hurting. There’s two types of pain nerves, one of which is faster and more precise but doesn’t hurt, and the older c-fibers which are slower, less precise and do hurt. The distance to your foot is enough that the message from the c-fibers take long enough to reach your head that the lag between the two types of pain is noticeable.
It’s also pretty disturbing that there are people walking around happily talking and interacting with friends, colleagues etc, all while believing that those people will ultimately suffer infinite agony.
If I held that belief, I could do nothing but proselytize all day every day.
I choose to believe that most people who claim to believe in this particular conception of divine judgement still harbor significant doubt in reality. The alternative is simply that they are deeply selfish and callous.
Or indeed reflexes and the autonomic system. There are plenty of things that the body can detect as “bad”, and trigger a response, but the response does not include an unpleasant subjective experience.
I believe it would be irrational to doubt God’s benevolence in those circumstances without adding at least one additional premise that isn’t on this list:
I am having trouble even identifying the argument you use to conclude the God in this scenario is less than omnibenevolent. It’s not that I can’t think of arguments to get there, and it’s not that I think it is irrational to conclude that God is evil. The problem is that I don’t know which argument you are using, and all the arguments I can think of involve at least one additional premise.
If that level of blatant, admitted evil won’t convince someone, then nothing short of mind control will. If the literal word of God and every bit of evidence they see won’t convince them, then convincing them isn’t possible.
It also renders the entire concept of benevolence meaningless, if it’s indistinguishable from pure evil.
Nobody admitted God was evil, only that He said he was evil. I am pushing Mijin to make a complete argument.
You yourself made an argument based on the premise that this is not the best compossible world. I admit that is a rational argument. Someone who believes this is not the best compossible world could rationally doubt the existence of an omnibenevolent God. How you get to believe this is not the best compossible world, I’m not so clear on, but at the top level, you at least have a fully formed argument.
A casual look around? It takes outright denial of reality to think that this world is even close to the best possible world, without even postulating a god at all. Extraordinary claims take extraordinary evidence, and claiming this is remotely the best possible world is one of the most extraordinary claims anyone could make.
I’d be pretty convinced that no loving God exists in this scenario; after all, I’m already pretty convinced of this in the real world, although for reasons entirely distinct from the problem of evil. That isn’t the issue. The issue is that the information on offer doesn’t suffice to establish that conclusion: we only know that ‘the expected amount of evil given that a tri-omni God exists is greater than zero’, which is not in tension with it being absolutely humongous. We need an additional premise of the form that ‘it is probably the case that some instance (or type, or amount, or pattern) of evil E is gratuitous’, that is, exceeds what would be expected if a tri-omni God exists. Only then is what we see inconsistent with such a God’s existence.
This is, of course, terribly easy to argue for in the hell-world scenario. But that doesn’t mean that you don’t have to make that argument if you want to make a compelling case. That’s the thing @Mijin fails to grasp, and apparently so do you.
If that information isn’t enough, then nothing is enough and the entire question becomes meaningless because there’s literally no difference between a perfectly good god and a perfectly evil one.
The fact that the defenders of the tri-omni god have to retreat into what amounts to solipsism to defend their claims just demonstrates how irrational and contradictory to reality the whole concept is.