Because that’s all that’s needed. No amount of handwaving and throwing out text walls and pseudomathematical bafflegab will change that. The “problem of evil” exists in the first place because anyone just needs to casually observe the world so see how much evil and suffering fills it.
Yeah. Who needs logic and reason and coherent thinking when they’ve got convictions?
Seriously, I don’t get this. What I’m trying to explain to you is a way to make your argument better, to shore it up against potential counterarguments (which at this point only need to amount to ‘nuh-uh’ to be perfectly sound), to actually push back against a point of view you claim to oppose, but handed an actual weapon rather than a squirt gun, you decide to shoot yourself in the foot instead.
I would q
The irony of this statement.
What you’re calling irrational is taking the observation of X as evidence to support X. Seeing God do evil (as for example all natural suffering is, since God has ultimate control) gives us reason to suspect that God is a being that does evil i.e. not omnibenevolent.
The more examples, the more reason.
Now, virtually all proofs of God, or apologetics, feature some kind of special pleading IME.
But this argument has been “extra special” in requiring us to turn off empiricism, inductive reasoning etc, to handwave even a hypothetical reality where 100% of our observations imply God is evil.
My only regret with this thread is that we wasted so much time on ratcheting up the hypotheticals. We should have gone straight to “gruesome sadist god” from the get-go.
That is not what I wrote, because I made a distinction between having no reason to doubt and having no reason to doubt without further assumptions.
I remind you that an argumentum ad absurdum still requires a contradiction, which you have not shown. You appeal to common sense, but formally, your argument is incomplete. And that is the only charge I have ever laid against your argument, on its own terms…
- “God” has said He is evil.
- [missing premise!!!]
- Therefore, “God” is evil.
I never said the conclusion was unreasonable, only that it is irrational without adding another premise.
~Max
The missing premise could be “god never lies” which is Biblically supported and Biblically not supported. Like pretty much everything else about God in the Bible.
But a better way is prediction. It is fairly easy to predict what a world would look like with a truly tri-omni god. We’d not be able to point to areas of unnecessary suffering.
It is easy to explain children dying of cancer with the circular argument that since god is omnibenevolent those deaths are by definition contributing to the best of all possible worlds, but a bit harder to say that a natural outcome of an omnibenevolent god is children dying of cancer.
Sure you can excuse away the evidence. I’ve seen flat earthers do it all the time.
Exactly, and I’m pushing Mijin to state the assumptions that underly his argument that the suffering we observe is evidence of unnecessary suffering. Right now I understand he makes an inductive premise, (‘the more suffering we see, the more evidence we have of unnecessary suffering’), but he has not committed to a basis for that argument.
~Max
While not a complete rebuttal, I recall my observation that the passion of Christ is a core doctrine of Christianity. If you accept the necessity of God allowing his one and only son to be literally tortured… and making a world where that would become necessary…
~Max
So I am not misrepresenting you, right?
I’m putting a hypothetical to you, and confirming your response to that hypothetical.
Your “correction” is to say that that is indeed your response without further assumptions.
So, what I said is accurate. With the hypothetical as given, your position is what I said.
However, I will give you credit for experiencing discomfort at acknowledging the idea that witnessing a god apparently torturing humans for fun wouldn’t give us grounds for doubting he is perfectly loving. Because frankly it’s one of the most batshit propositions imaginable.
It’s saying in a hypothetical world of infinite evidence of X, we have no reason to think X.
No. As I explained upthread, one kind of argumentum ad absurdum is to show a contradiction. There are other kinds, like showing it leads to something agreed to be false or absurd.
Not that it matters anyway. Call my argument a “blargumentum” if you like. My blargumentum remains to point out the absurdity and irrationality of suspending empirical / inductive logic (as well as throwing in “mysterious ways” as a bonus extra).
…which is not my position.
I have been very clear that I am not talking about conclusions or certainty. From the very beginning in this thread I have simply said that each example of apparently unnecessary suffering gives us more reason for doubting that a perfectly-loving all-powerful being exists.
Formally speaking, there is no absurdity until you state a contradiction. Why would each example of apparently unnecessary suffering give us more reason for doubting that a perfectly-loving all-powerful being exists?
Should we expect to perceive the necessity of observed suffering?
~Max
If I accept that necessity for the sake of argument, we still have a lot of people tortured a lot worse for a lot longer, including no doubt some of my ancestors with the torture being done by Christians.
And, being Jewish, I find it patently absurd that anything approaching an omnipotent god requires torture to forgive our since. When I believed I’d ask for forgiveness every year on Yom Kippur. It seemed to work since I was indeed written in the Book of Life.
This is not an argument against omnipotence. The Christian God could have the power to forgive everyone without torture, but is a bit twisted and so needs it, no longer getting people to burn up things for him.
What I’m saying is very simple, and I sincerely believe that if you could step back from your emotional appeal to incredulity for a second, you’d have no trouble seeing that. But of course, by now, you’re too invested to allow yourself to do that, so the smart money is again on this going entirely ignored. Nevertheless:
- No evidence can disfavor a hypothesis unless it disagrees with an implication of that hypothesis.
- The hypothesis that there is a three-omni God implies that we should expect a non-zero amount of Evil.
- Any amount of evil is therefore in agreement with this hypothesis.
- Consequently, no amount of evil disfavors this hypothesis.
This argument is clearly valid. The question remains then, is it also sound? The only nontrivial premise is 2., so any possible attack should land there. Why should we accept 2.? Well, the only way for the expectation of evil to be zero would be if the probability of evil, given that a tri-omni God exists, were zero. Then, that there is any evil at all if such a God exists would be logically impossible. The free will defense establishes that it is logically possible for there to be evil, if a tri-omni God exists. Hence, 2. is a direct consequence of the free will defense (is, in fact, logically equivalent to it). So accepting the free will defense renders the above argument sound.
Given this, what can we then do? We can add further premises, of course. The most simple way to do so is to add a premise to the effect that ‘it is probably the case that some instance (or type, or amount, or pattern) of evil E is gratuitous’, i.e. of a form or intensity we should not expect in a world with a tri-omni God. If we then find some such instance of evil, like e.g. the Bambi or Sue cases, observing that sort of evil gives us logically sound grounds to disfavor the hypothesis of God’s existence. In scenarios like the hell-world, such premises are easy to come by, and very convincing, so a very strong evidential argument can be made; that still necessitates it actually being made, however.
This is how the argumentation actually proceeds ‘in the real world’, so to speak, so the assertion, following from my reasoning, that this is how things ought to proceed is well supported by the fact that they actually do. Like the argumentation itself, this has so far failed to make any impression on you—presumably, if you’re on the street with all the traffic coming towards you, you’re the type to wonder why everybody else seems to be going the wrong way. But maybe you can just once find it in your heart to allow the idea that maybe, not everybody else is wrong, to occur to you. Maybe those people who think about such arguments professionally actually do have a point.
This then leaves the only true, formal absurdity in the debate, which is the assertion that ‘any amount of evil at all disfavors the hypothesis of a tri-omni God’s existence’. This could only be the case if the expected amount of evil were zero (since only then would any amount of evil disagree with the implications of the hypothesis, see 1.), but if the expected amount of evil were zero, then the existence of God and evil would be logically incompatible. But then every instance of evil would immediately, deductively disprove the existence of a tri-omni God. You can’t have it both ways.
But again, I don’t expect you to engage with these points. I’m simply reiterating them to show the reasoning behind my thinking, so that it’s not lost in the dust kicked up by your angry foot-stomping around the emotional ‘absurdity’ you keep trying to tar me with. If there were anything beyond this appeal to incredulity, you’d have no problems engaging with the argumentation as laid out above. The implications of the fact that so far, you’ve studiously avoided doing so, are left as an exercise for the reader.
Agreed. This would’ve made it immediately clear that beyond the emotional weight you attach to the situation, you have no argument. The thread should’ve been over the first time I pointed out that from the free will defense, it follows that tri-omni God and the existence of evil are logically compatible—because everything else is an immediate consequence from that fact. That your own emotional investment doesn’t permit you to accept this conclusion doesn’t make it any less logical.
In my previous post, I suggested that you call my argument a “blargumentum” because I anticipated a deflection into whether it counts as a formal or informal version of the argumentum ad absurdum.
And I understand why. The position that even a saw-movie like sadistic maniac God would give us no reason to doubt his perfect loving nature must not be much fun to defend.
But yeah, let’s not chase squirrels (or waterfalls). I hereby declare that my point is not an absurdum ad argumentum. Let’s proceed.
We rarely have perfect knowledge when it comes to empirical claims. We gain confidence, or doubt, hypotheses on the basis of observations.
We see suffering. A lot of it, particularly natural suffering, does not fulfill any wider objective that we can see. It doesn’t prove that there’s no omnimax God, but each instance leaves an explanatory gap and the more instances, the more implausible that all the gaps will be filled. Right up to the “World is a Saw movie” situation, where you’d have to be mad to not at least doubt that God is perfectly loving.
If my partner regularly hits me, burns me etc, I would doubt their love for me. The fact that, hypothetically, they might be doing it for some higher purpose that I am unaware of, does not make it unreasonable to doubt.
From the very first time you mentioned the logical problem of evil I agreed with you.
The fact that you keep retreating back to talking about the logical problem speaks volumes.
I will say though that this has been amusing. That now, the idea of a person regularly having their skin peeled off daily say, by a laughing God, would be being “emotional” if they ever doubted that that God was perfectly loving. 
I’m trying to explain to you the consequences of the circumstance that the logical problem of evil can be defeated, namely, that there is a non-zero amount of expected evil. These are after all the circumstances in which the evidential problem is formulated. Since this seems to be hard for you to grasp, I have to return to this again and again.
It is amusing to find my predictions of you avoiding my points again and again confirmed, again and again. But only so much: I genuinely would prefer it if you could find the intellectual honesty within yourself to address the points I make, rather than retreat into emotive language and ridicule.
On the contrary, such a person might be perfectly rational, if they considered themself to have reasons to believe that a tri-omni God wouldn’t do that. And such reasons, as pointed out several times now, would not be hard to come by in this situation. But without such reasons, they’re indeed making an inference without a logical basis for that inference. This is the part that you continue to miss, to somewhat tragicomical effect, even Danthing yourself in the process.
I do still wonder, on the basis of purely psychological curiosity, how you justify to yourself ignoring every cite on the matter that explicitly makes my point. What is it that you tell yourself to ignore your own better judgment? Because surely, some part of yourself must at least be whispering doubts. Or does it just not penetrate at all? Do you just scan my posts for some easy pretext of dismissing them, and then shut down any further thought?
This says that s vast amount of evil is consistent with a tri-omni god. In fact a world of maximal evil is. Do you really want that premise?
I’d make it “We should expect a minimal amount of evil for the case of a tri-omni god.” Sure we have to define how we enumerate evil, but I think even defining evil and what zero evil is in your suggestion is problematic.
Yes, exactly.
The question isn’t what I want, but what can be justified. That the logical problem of evil can be defeated entails nothing but that there is a non-zero amount of expected evil, so anything more needs further assumptions.
Without any further definition of ‘minimal’, however, that just amounts to the same thing: there’s some amount greater than zero.
The usual way to amend this is to argue that a certain amount/kind of evil is gratuitous, i.e. such that a tri-omni God both could and would avert it. This leads to the evidential argument from evil.
No; I would say that the minimal amount is potentially zero.
Showing the logical possibility of suffering and omnimax being compatible tells us nothing about whether either exists (obviously we know suffering exists, I’m just making the logic as clear as possible), let alone telling us that one must be non-zero.
It does tell us that we ought to expect evil, though. If it is possible for there to be evil, the probability for there being evil is non-zero, hence, the expected amount of evil is non-zero. And that’s what’s relevant for whether any amount of observed evil disfavors the hypothesis of God’s existence.
Nope, it doesn’t entail anything about probability, because the number of universes with and without suffering are both uncountably infinite. This is one reason why the “set of universes” logic is completely bankrupt in practice. The logic of “if there’s a conceivable case, then p > 0” can’t be applied here.
Not to mention that if your logic worked, we could use it to prove the existence of anything. Is the existence of our universe and godzilla consistent? Yes. So we have an expectation of at least one godzilla?
First of all, you can’t possibly know that; the set might well be finite, indeed, it might have only one element, for all we know. Second, there’s no problem at all with defining probability measures on infinite sets.
Also, if it were possible at all for God to instantiate a world with zero evil (that met other constraints like logical possibility or nontrivial free agency), then by omnibenevolence that’s what they’d do. So in fact it can’t be possible.
No. Even if Godzilla were a consistent being, the expected amount of Godzilla would probably be way, way below one. But in principle, yes: anything not impossible has a non-zero probability of occurring, since otherwise it’d be impossible.