But the trouble is that if it were possible for God to create a world without suffering that meets their criteria (e.g. significantly free creatures existing), then they would be obligated to do so, by omnibenevolence; but then, creating a world with suffering would actually not be possible for them. That’s why Plantinga argues for ‘transworld depravity’: all significantly free creatures would, in every possible context, commit at least one evil act. In this case, a certain amount of evil is logically necessary for a greater good that outweighs it.
[I]t is fair to say […] that it is, at least, very doubtful that one can establish that there cannot be cases where some evil is logically necessary for a greater good that outweighs it without appealing to some substantive, and probably controversial, moral theory.
The upshot is that the idea that either the actuality of certain undesirable states of affairs, or at least the possibility, may be logically necessary for goods that outweigh them, is not without some initial plausibility, and if some such claim can be sustained, it will follow immediately that the mere existence of evil cannot be incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.
How does this bear upon evidential formulations of the argument from evil? The answer would seem to be that if there can be evils that are logically necessary for goods that outweigh them, then it is hard to see how the mere existence of evil—in the absence of further information—can provide much in the way of evidence against the existence of God.
This is, of course, exactly what I’ve been arguing for: if the free will defense against the logical problem of evil goes through, then the mere existence of evil can’t provide evidence against the existence of (tri-omni) God.
First, you switch from talking about suffering to about evil midstream. Second, a tri-omni creator can certainly create a world with no evil choices are made; all choices in a world made by such a being are by definition made beforehand by it. Nor is there any way for such an evil to be “necessary” when an omnipotent is involved. There’s no need for natural laws or consistency, no meaningful cause-and-effect; all that matters is the whim of the omnipotent. Necessity isn’t a concept that makes sense when an omnipotent is involved.
And of course there’s always the “don’t make the universe” option, which would be far morally superior to creating the universe as it is.
Alright, let’s try and make this simple. Suppose there’s a vast Library of Babel-esque collection of films. The only constraint on them is logical possibility: there can’t be anything like square circles or married bachelors or what have you in them. Other than that, every possible film is present.
You’re free to choose between those films to play one. Say you want to choose one without any nudity, because you’ll be watching with your underage nephew. Can you find one? Well, certainly: there are innumerable possible films without any nudity. But say you also want to select a film that shows some medical procedure, say for educational reasons. Can you simultaneously satisfy both constraints? Arguably, it’s at least possible that you can’t: even though you can choose between all possible options, and have full knowledge over every film’s contents, there simply might not be a film where that medical procedure is shown without any nudity, because performing that procedure entails the removal of clothing. So even your omniscience (in the sense of knowing the full content of every possible film) and omnipotence (in the sense of being able to ‘make real’ any possible film) don’t necessarily allow you to simultaneously meet competing goals: you have to compromise. There may simply not be any possible film that meets your goals that you could choose.
It’s the same thing with an omnipotent God: they likewise can only choose from what’s on offer. Contrary to your posit, they are absolutely governed by necessity: they can make anything real that is possible, but not the impossible (i.e. the necessarily false). So it is at the very least possible that there is some greater good—like the existence of significant moral freedom—such that there is no possible world that contains this greater good that doesn’t also contain evil. And that’s all the argument needs.
I’m truly sorry that this is how you see the world. But you should realize that this is not a universally shared assessment.
No, because they can make evil simply not happen. Both by not creating people to do evil acts, and by simply not allowing them to succeed even if for some reason they want to make people act evilly.
And “freedom” is simply a meaningless concept in the context of an omniscient and omnipotent creator; whether its creations have absolute freedom or are mindless clockwork automaton, they are both exactly as predictable, planned and pre-ordained in their actions. No one but the creator has or can have any moral choice in such a scenario.
Try admitting it for the sake of argument. Otherwise your argument for an evidential problem of evil amounts to mere window dressing for the logical problem of evil (contradicting your earlier statement that the two are different).
I think if you admit the existence of teleologically necessary suffering (e.g. the Passion of Christ!) then your argument is merely incomplete. All you have to do is acknowledge the missing premise, analogous to common sense knowledge in your vegetarian analogy. But if you don’t admit the existence of necessary suffering, your argument is worthless.
That wasn’t “necessary suffering”, in fact it’s commonly used as a point to mock Christianity because it makes no sense to anyone who isn’t already emotionally invested in it.
Also, the God of the Bible is not even close to omnibenevolent, so bringing in the Bible is a self-defeating argument here.
Not if something like transworld depravity is possible. I know that to you, it’s dogmatic that it isn’t, but just saying ‘is not’ is not an argument; the notion doesn’t involve any logical contradiction, at least not that I can see.
Knowledge of the outcome of free acts doesn’t entail that these acts weren’t free. If I watch a movie of somebody doing something, I know perfectly well how every act turns out, but that doesn’t mean those acts weren’t free. Now, knowing how something turns out before that act is performed may be a different question, but that stipulates that God stands in a particular temporal context to the world, which seems unlikely, as time is itself a particular property of the world.
Again, omnipotent and omniscient. No evil is possible if such a creator doesn’t want it to happen. The concept of “transworld depravity” is simply irrelevant, it wouldn’t matter how evil someone was; if such a god wanted to they could simple stop the evil from happening.
Also, you keep bringing up the idea that it can’t be proven that a perfectly good world is possible as if it mattered. It’s nothing but a meaningless diversion from the actual issue that the world isn’t anywhere near to being without evil and suffering. Just a rhetorical game to avoid admitting that the tri-omni concept is blatantly false. The only thing that bringing up arguments about the alleged impossibility of preventing every last tiny bit of evil does is manufacture page and page of empty diversionary arguments preventing people from having to defend the indefensible idea of a tri-omni god. And drive away everyone not willing to wade through it all, of course.
But that wasn’t what I claimed. My point was that “freedom” is an irrelevant concept with an omniscient and omnipotent creator, since free or not all thoughts and actions are by definition determined by such a creator; since otherwise, they wouldn’t be omniscient and omnipotent.
In such a universe, every last crime and cruelty happened for one reason, and one reason only: the creator planned for it to happen. Otherwise, it wouldn’t have. Same goes for every positive act, of course. There’s just no distinction between “free” and “unfree” in such a universe. And only one moral agent: the creator.
How so? In my last post I made clear the distinction between accepting the logical possibility for something and believing in its existence. It’s logically possible that Godzilla lives in my town but is really good at hiding. I remain unconvinced however.
If you want to claim this is “window dressing”, I’m ready to hear an argument.
I didn’t say “common sense”. You kept pressing about “background knowledge” and I said that all we needed was "obvious common knowledge like the definition of vegetarian”. Which you’ve agreed with, I think.
If your position that necessary suffering exists, rests on such basic and undisputed premises as the definition of “vegetarian”, let’s hear that argument.
In the meantime, no, I do not agree that “common sense” would entail the existence of (god’s eye view) necessary suffering / the impossibility of a world without it.
But possibly, they could not stop it from happening and have there be significant freedom. There simply may not be such an option—the two pull in opposite directions.
The point is, rather, that it is possible that there is no world in which there is significant freedom, and no evil. And this does matter: if somebody claims that necessarily, there is no evil if there is a tri-omni God, showing that possibly there is decisively refutes that point of view.
But what do you suppose is my motivation for that? After all, I’m convinced that the notion of a tri-omni God is ‘blatantly false’. I’m just pointing out that your argument doesn’t support that conclusion, so you ought to appeal to a better one.
I don’t see how that follows from the definition. Certainly, it’s possible for somebody to commit an act, which God knows about, but doesn’t influence. So why would all acts be determined by God? They merely set up the playing field, upon which we act; that they know how we act, as noted, doesn’t mean we don’t act freely.
First of all, planning for something to happen is very different from causing it to happen. I’ve packed an umbrella because I’m planning for rain, but that doesn’t mean I’m making it rain. But more importantly, ‘planned’ again implies a certain tensed relation between God and the world that is a category error, in the end: it’s not that God plans and then creates a world according to plan, because ‘and then’ is a part of the world. God’s plan is (possibly) to instantiate that world in which beings act maximally freely while doing the least amount of evil—which however may not be zero.
But possibly, they could not stop it from happening and have there be significant freedom. There simply may not be such an option—the two pull in opposite directions.
No, it would be trivial for an omnipotent. Your claim literally asserts that it’s not possible to have “significant freedom” unless somebody can just wander around shooting people without somebody stopping them, which is absurd.
he point is, rather, that it is possible that there is no world in which there is significant freedom, and no evil. And this does matter: if somebody claims that necessarily, there is no evil if there is a tri-omni God, showing that possibly there is decisively refutes that point of view.
Again, irrelevant; it doesn’t take a world with no evil to disprove such a god. It just takes one with blatantly, massively more than any “minimum evil”, and the real world qualifies. You are metaphorically telling people on fire that they can’t prove that fire exists.
I don’t see how that follows from the definition. Certainly, it’s possible for somebody to commit an act, which God knows about, but doesn’t influence.
No, it’s not. Such a god has by definition chosen every single thought and act that a person will make before they ever existed. In such a universe absolutely nothing can exist that is beyond the creator’s “influence”. Everything is planned down to the last quantum fluctuation.
First of all, planning for something to happen is very different from causing it to happen.
Not when you are the one who caused it to happen; you might as well shoot somebody and say you aren’t responsible; it was the bullet’s fault.
What argument is there to make? You are the one claiming that an omnipotent being can’t stop a mere human from attacking someone. If you want arguments, then come up one that supports such an extraordinary claim.
I should really just let this go, because either this is your honest best understanding of what I’ve said, or it’s not, and both cases mean that there’s no plausible route to sensible debate here. But just for the sake of correctness, no, this has no relation to anything I’ve said at all. The closest one could get is that it is possible that an omnipotent being could not in every situation prohibit evil actions by every existing being without at the same time also significantly reducing their freedom. But there’s a gulf between that statement and the one you ascribe to me.
The logical PoE claims that the problem of evil is unsolvable because belief in (tri-omni) God contradicts belief in evil/suffering. The logical PoE is defeated by the possibility that some evil/suffering is necessary (for some purpose). But this defense does not claim any particular solution is probable, only possible, to defeat the strong claim that belief in God logically contradicts belief in evil/suffering.
A consequence of defeating the logical PoE is the existence of two categories of suffering: instrumental and gratuitous (i.e. necessary and unnecessary). Another consequence is that only belief in gratuitous suffering, as opposed to other suffering, contradicts belief in God.
No quantity of observed suffering, without any additional knowledge (such as common sense knowledge) as to its nature, contradicts belief in God.
You have admitted that sneaky Godzilla could exist. You look all over and do not see any traces of sneaky Godzilla. This data alone–excluding inferences that rely on unstated assumptions–gives you no confidence whatsoever to conclude sneaky Godzilla probably does or does not exist.
I note the sudden serve at the end where you suddenly switched from talking about the tri-omni god to “belief in God”, which isn’t even a subject of this thread.
No amount of suffering contradicts a belief in God for the simple reason that belief in God doesn’t require believing that God is good. Or omnipotent, or sane, or much of anything other than just existing. Maybe God is just evil; that’s perfectly compatible with believing in God. Just not a tri-omni one.
You may be using the word existence in a different sense than I am. I remind you of the point we are presently disputing:
My argument here is categorical (modus tollens) and only requires existence of gratuitous suffering as a potential category of suffering.
But as I think about it more, I may have discovered your hidden premise.
If I know some swans are actually black, but all swans sound alike, then every time I hear a swan I have some evidence that it is black. Most of the time, that evidence is mitigated by sight of white feathers. But in the first instance, hearing a swan cry provides at least some minimal evidence that it is a black swan… If I listen to enough swans, all else equal, there is an increasing probability that I will come across a black one.
Is this analogous to your thinking? If so prepare for a major gotcha.
This is very well and concisely (a virtue that sometimes escapes me) put. Although I think the argument is simply logically convincing, I think it’s useful to point out that this line is also the consensus between (to the best of my knowledge) all cites on the topic that have so far brought forward: pointing just to ‘evil’ (or suffering, the distinction matters relatively little at the present level of coarse-graining) in an abstract or non-specific way simply does nothing by way of an evidential PoE; you need to instead specify to concrete instances that plausibly constitute gratuitous suffering in order to make any headway. This is e.g. the gist of the article on the Pragmatic Problem of Evil, helpfully supplied by @Mijin:
Mackie makes a non-specific formulation about evil (the datum is only that evil exists). Due to this, theists may levy criticisms against the argument [referring here to Plantinga’s FWD] that work in virtue of this non-specific datum. […] Mackie’s non-specific formulation of evil (only stating that evil exists) harms his argument, as this non-specific formulation lends itself to criticism regarding the possibility of God allowing for the existence of evil. […] As a result of the free-will defence and the subsequent defeat of Mackie’s logical argument from evil (1955), the debate has shifted to the evidential problem of evil. […] This may be for a particular reason: as established with the example of Mackie, it is notably difficult to defend a logical argument from evil with non-specific formulations of evil.
The probabilistic nature of such arguments manifests itself in the form of a premise to the effect that “It is probably the case that some instance (or type, or amount, or pattern) of evil E is gratuitous.” This probability judgment usually rests on the claim that, even after careful reflection, we can see no good reason for God’s permission of E . The inference from this claim to the judgment that there exists gratuitous evil is inductive in nature, and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument.
An evidential argument, therefore, makes reference to gratuitous evil, citing a specific kind of evil as unlikely to be in line with a tri-omni God’s existence. This point is made more forcefully in the article by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
[I]t is fair to say […] that it is, at least, very doubtful that one can establish that there cannot be cases where some evil is logically necessary for a greater good that outweighs it without appealing to some substantive, and probably controversial, moral theory.
The upshot is that the idea that either the actuality of certain undesirable states of affairs, or at least the possibility, may be logically necessary for goods that outweigh them, is not without some initial plausibility, and if some such claim can be sustained, it will follow immediately that the mere existence of evil cannot be incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.
How does this bear upon evidential formulations of the argument from evil? The answer would seem to be that if there can be evils that are logically necessary for goods that outweigh them, then it is hard to see how the mere existence of evil—in the absence of further information—can provide much in the way of evidence against the existence of God.
The mere existence of evil fails to yield substantial evidence against the existence of (tri-omni) God, because the failure of the logical PoE entails the consistency of God’s existence with that of (non-specified) evil. Therefore, we must pivot to concrete examples and give a justification that these probably fail to be consistent with the existence of God.
It’s slightly amusing to read the hint of disgruntlement in the SEP article’s writer that despite the fact that it’s obvious that appeals to abstract evil don’t work, people still persist in making them:
The prospects for a successful abstract version of the argument from evil would seem, therefore, rather problematic. […] A much more promising approach, surely, is to focus, instead, simply upon those evils that are thought, by the vast majority of people, to pose at least a prima facie problem for the rationality of belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person.
Given that the preceding observations are rather obvious ones, one might have expected that discussions of the argument from evil would have centered mainly upon concrete formulations of the argument. Rather surprisingly, that has not been so. Indeed, some authors seem to focus almost exclusively upon very abstract versions of the argument.
I won’t lie, it is slightly gratifying to see my own exasperation mirrored there so closely.
Anyway, given the otherwise so empirical focus of the debate, one would think that the weight of this textual evidence to have at least some effect on the opinions on offer. So far, this does not seem to have been the case, which is at the very least surprising. But I don’t expect this further highlighting of the apparent scholarly consensus to make any difference to the matter, much less to convince @Mijin or anybody else. But maybe this post can at least help to give a snapshot of the way the issue is considered ‘in the wild’, so to speak.
But by this logic we could never gain or lose confidence in any claim.
We should never convict anyone of a crime, for example. Because just as gratuitous suffering includes a determination, so does incriminating evidence. So, if we’re handwaving any and all suffering because there might be reasons that we’re unaware of, well we should handwave all criminal evidence because there might be reasons that we’re unaware of.
But I am not making any conclusion. I am checking that you understand the difference between acknowledging the logical possibility of something, and believing in its existence, because you were using these concepts interchangeably.
The fact that, even in your description, I believe that Godzilla is possible but also do not hold the belief that he exists, suggests you understand the distinction, but you’re replying as if you’re disagreeing with what I said.
I’ll stop you there. If, in your analogy, the black swan is supposed to be analogous to necessary suffering, then no, I don’t know that some swans are actually black.
If that’s not what you meant, then can you explain the analogy please?
