I spelled it out, explicitly, twice in my last post:
If you think that some change might make this world better, then it is possible that either you are mistaken, and the world overall gets worse, or the resulting world isn’t one a tri-omni God could bring about; hence, it’s possible that this is the best possible world, and possible that a tri-omni God exists. Thinking that ‘but if I change X, the world would be better’ is a counterargument to this means nothing except that you haven’t understood the argument.
OK, I confess I don’t get how what you’re saying here is different from what I said. Sure, all of that’s possible: but the possibility falls short of being a counter to the argument. It only needs to be possible for there not to be perfect conditions, where everybody only chooses good. As for heaven, one possibility might be that going through this mortal quagmire of choices is the only way for at least a sizeable fraction of beings to end up, eventually, in those conditions, i.e. ‘choosing God’s presence’.
I don’t see that at all. Plantinga’s argument shows that there is no reason to believe that tri-omnihood and evil are inconsistent with one another, and as noted, the way this is achieved does not need to be ‘so much as plausible’. It means that to the degree that the believer is justified in believing in a tri-omni God, they’re justified in believing so even in the face of the existence of evil. Of course, the argument also doesn’t give any sort of reason for having such a belief in the first place.
No, that’s both a huge mischaracterization of what even a moderately powerful & benevolent god could do, much less an “omnimax” one, and ignores how much blatant awfulness there is in the world. And ignores my whole point that the simple fact that we can improve the world demonstrates that it isn’t the best of all possible ones, or we couldn’t do that.
To be blunt, the most the argument that a"good god" made the world does is serve as an argument for evil, since apparently things like curing cancer are acts of “evil”.
Well firstly you’re illustrating why I brought this up: because you keep characterizing the absence of suffering as “only choosing good”. That doesn’t follow; there are infinity of morally neutral / tangential actions, as well as different levels of good action.
And the relevance to Plantinga is this: we’re talking about the problem of evil and one proposed “solution” is free will. But for this solution to work there’s an implicit premise: that free will entails evil, suffering-causing, actions are necessary. And I am questioning that premise, because in the abstract there is no reason why benevolent entities, and/or in a safe universe, could have a rich existence while not knowing suffering.
If that’s the objective, then I think it failed.
Call it circumstantial evidence if you like. We find ourselves in a universe that appears very far from the best possible. Where great suffering happens, and appears almost random (some of it caused by humans, but a heck of a lot of natural suffering).
It’s very hard to reconcile this with the idea of an omnimax god, where one of the omnis is omnibenevolence. The idea that maybe there’s some explanation (that no-one has thought of yet) does not take away from the fact that, on its face, it’s reason to doubt the existence of an omnimax god.
You need to provide some plausible reason that the baby had to die in the tsunami, not assume it. I’ve heard people say that a baby might grow up to be a murderer. Okay - but all of them? I can freely grant that God allows us to feel pain about unrequited love because the benefit of both sides agreeing to a relationship is higher than the pain of a rejected suitor.
If this were the best of all possible worlds, I’d agree that it would be impossible for god to change anything, but it trivially isn’t. Unless you just assume that it is. I’m not at all denying that there is evil in the best of all possible worlds - just minimal evil. Anyhow, is there evil in heaven? If that exists, it is a demonstration that a world without evil is possible. And of course there is the problem of free will in heaven. The problem of evil is not just the existence of evil, it is the amount of evil.
Are you asserting that both God A and God B are omnipotent, but God B is more omnipotent than God A? I think you are finding yourself trapped into an absurdity here.
This is why I reject the definition of God as the greatest, since that is ill-defined. Is God A greater, being omnibenevolent also, or is God B greater being “more” omnipotent (shudder) than God A?
Oh sure, if we tinker with the definitions of the words then we can provide any old answer to the problem of evil.
“Omnibenevolence doesn’t mean can’t do evil or won’t do evil, it just means won’t do evil without a good reason. Evil exists, therefore God must have had a good reason.”
If god created Adam and Eve in Eden and created them without sin and created them innocent of knowledge of good and evil, then how would Eve know what kicking in the nuts would do and why would she even want to? Oh he gave her “free will” but if she doesn’t know right from wrong, then can she truly choose evil freely?
“She was told not to eat from the tree” doesn’t help when you don’t know disobedience is wrong and you are tricked by someone with greater knowledge.
You are not a tri-omni being who created the world that allows bagpipes, you just live in a world that already existed.
But I will admit I may have fumbled my meaning.
What I meant is that god created everything. If evil exists and he created it, then he can’t be all good. If evil existed without him creating it, then he isn’t the creator of everything. There was some “place” for there to be evil and some “one” to do the evil.
Absolute nonsense. You’re not changing the world by doing something good, improving something, what have you; you’re just acting within the world. A world is the entire four-dimensional history from start to finish, possibly to infinity; making a world better would be to remove some event from that history, and ensuring this doesn’t change anything down the line to make the whole worse overall. You certainly can’t do that, and it’s possible that God can’t, either, since if we’re in the best possible world, it’s impossible to improve it further.
Yes, and of those, if you want only good things to happen, you can choose only the good ones (as for morally neutral choices, those we can just ignore, since they play no role in the overall calculus; and of course, if there is a morally good option, then there can’t be a morally neutral one, since not doing the good thing would itself be evil—if something is morally obligatory, not doing it is not morally permissible).
Again, no, that’s exactly not the point of the argument. Recall, free will need not be plausible, it need not even be metaphysically possible, it’s just introduced because it shows that tri-omnihood and evil are not logically at odds. From that point on, we can just about forget about free will: we live in a world containing evil, and that fact we know thanks to the argument is perfectly compatible with a tri-omni God.
No, this gets things exactly the wrong way around. What is needed is that free will makes evil possible, i.e. that it is at least not completely out of the question that every possible free agent you could instantiate in every possible circumstance chooses to do something bad at least one time. To argue against this, you would have to exhibit a set of circumstances such that it either is impossible to do something bad in those circumstances, or that you can put somebody into those circumstances such that they will never choose something bad.
This is completely true, but it’s too weak! On a purely syntactic basis, this isn’t enough to counter Plantinga’s argument. It’s simply formally fallacious to assert that such a thesis suffices to refute it. The argument asserts ‘possibly X’, and you against this wish to assert ‘possibly not-X’. But this does nothing to counter ‘possibly X’! You need necessity: if you could show that God necessarily can bring about circumstances of this sort, then the argument would be defeated. But just that you see no reason that God couldn’t do this falls far short! It’s certainly imaginable that whenever two humans come together in whatever idyllic circumstances, one finds cause to call the other a poopiehead.
What do you mean you think it failed? That’s just a logical consequence—it’s like being presented with a proof that 1 + 1 = 2 and then going, well, still seems more 3-ish to me. I think the argument failed!
No, again, that completely inverts the logic of the argument. Those who want to resist Plantinga’s logic would have to show that whatever act of evil or instance of suffering indeed was extraneous, that a world without it, and better in sum, would have been possible. This is what the form of the argument necessitates, because as long as it is merely possible that that’s not the case, it goes through.
And how much evil do you think this minimum is? How do you know we’re not at that minimum (while maximizing the overall moral value)? Sure: it’s possible, even plausible, it even might seem obvious that we aren’t, but again, on a purely syntactical level, that just doesn’t cut it.
I don’t know, I’ve never been and don’t expect to. But as noted above, a possible answer to this is that you can’t just instantiate heaven with free creatures in them, because they would at least sometimes choose evil; but perhaps you can create a process of moral choice that ultimately makes at least some of those choose heaven, in choosing God’s presence (or what have you), who then get to experience existence without suffering. Not unlike Buddhism, where you have to ride the wheel of rebirth a few (thousand) times in order to be able to suitably shed your cravings to enter Nirvana. I don’t know if that’s compatible with mainstream theology, and it’s not a thesis I’d hang my hat on, but again: possibility is all that’s needed.
No, they are exactly as omnipotent in exactly the same way. For an omnibenevolent entity, however, it’s simply as impossible to do evil as it is for a circle to be square.
Well, in traditional theological discourse, that’s the reason none of the omnis ever occur in isolation: only a being with all of them, the reasoning goes, is necessary; every other option would be contingent. If a being isn’t omnipotent, but has some level of power, then you could ask, but why that level, and not more, or less? Same for being just finitely good, or finitely knowledgeable. Only the tri-omni point, it’s argued, suffers from no such further questions.
That doesn’t seem to connect in any way with what I said in the quote. In fact, I explicitly say that it’s impossible for an omnibenevolent being to do anything evil.
Sorry, that’s on me, I should’ve known that example would lead you to bring in irrelevant outside info. So let’s say God creates Badam and Skeeve, two normal humans, and lets them interact. It’ll basically always be possible for one of them to do something bad to the other, from calling each other names to murder. God doesn’t have to ‘create evil’ for that; it’s not like there is some artefact, the Gemstone of Megiddo or what have you, that corrupts human hearts and needs to exist before anybody ever chooses to do something bad. Could God create them so that they don’t make these choices—well, possibly, but as by now expounded on at some length, possibility simply doesn’t cut it, because you can’t refute a ‘possibly’ with a ‘possibly not’.
So nobody ever could’ve invented bagpipes? Would that it were so!*
‘Evil’ isn’t a thing. It’s not that there is some evil substance that has to be brought into existence for there to be evil. It’s just humans doing bad stuff to one another. As soon as you have humans doing stuff, you have at least the potential of humans doing bad stuff, and hence, the possibility of them actually doing so—no need to create anything more.
As said earlier, that is playing games with definitions rather than making real arguments. Something not count as changing the world unless you somehow alter history? Come on, that’s basically trying to declare that change has never happened in all of history. It’s a useless definition except for the purpose of “winning” this specific argument.
And you are also drastically limiting the definition of “omnipotence” - making identical to powerlessness, in fact - again in a way that has no purpose but to win this specific argument.
And as far as this being the “best of all possible worlds”; that is both absurd on the face of it, and is itself an accusation of God being evil. Because if this world with all its suffering is the best possible world, then there should be no world. Only an evil god would create the world as it is.
Disagree. For one thing, this would seem to entail that me scratching my nose just now was an evil action because there is a virtuous action that I could have done instead.
But even if we were to argue that we are required to always do good within this world where suffering exists, it doesn’t follow in a hypothetical world without suffering
I think you’re just rephrasing what I said, and my phrasing was a bit clumsy, so sure, let’s use your phrasing: that free will entails evil being possible is an implicit premise of the free will solution.
I am questioning that premise. I think it’s relative to what kind of universe we’re talking about.
And the burden of proof of showing it is a logical necessity is not on me, because I am not invoking the free will defence, I am the one being skeptical of it.
I explained why it failed in the paragraph that follows the bit you quoted.
But I’ll put it yet more simply. It’s like if we were arguing over the “Never Red” god who desires, and has the power, to not have anything in the universe colored red at any time. And someone points out that there are many red objects, which seems hard to square with the Never Red god.
Plantinga’s argument is essentially supposing that Never Red might have reasons for tolerating red temporarily. And I have conceded, multiple times, that I think this is correct – there’s always scope for reasons outside of our current understanding.
But you went further than that. You said his argument shows there’s no reason to think Never Red and red are incompatible in the first place, and that’s simply false. On its face, with no further information, they of course are incompatible, indeed by definition.
No, that’s just standard framing for talking about possibility—possible worlds are standardly used to explore what could’ve been the case, but wasn’t, and as such, form entire histories.
Again, no, nothing has been changed regarding the definition of omnipotence—not being able to do what isn’t possible isn’t a limitation on it.
But then, there would also be no moral value at all—the same as in the world where every decision is predetermined to come out ‘good’.
No, not at all. The choice here is between scratching your nose and not scratching your nose; either is morally permissible, so there is no moral value in choosing one over the other. But in choices where there is moral value, not making the right choice is doing something evil—it is wrong to not do what is morally obligatory. Recall Plantinga’s words, “an action is morally significant, for a given person at a given time, if it would be wrong for him to perform the action then but right to refrain, or vice versa”.
Sure, and again, such a world might be possible, but again, that doesn’t change anything. As I said, it might be that God could bring about ‘perfect circumstances’—where either everyone always chooses good freely, or good is the only choice available (or out of a set of choices, all options are equally good)—but again, that’s not enough.
And that’s exactly why the burden of proof is on you: because the free will defense only needs possibility, the only way to question it is by showing necessity. The free will defense asserts ‘possibly X’, you assert ‘possibly not-X’—but both can be true at the same time, and if they are (and I agree that they are), then the free will defense goes through.
Again, no, that’s not what the argument does. The argument shows exactly that
or more precisely, that the presence of red is not inconsistent with the existence of the Never Red god. Hence, you can’t validly point to the existence of red and claim that this casts doubt on the existence of Never Red god, because in a world in which the Never Red god exists, there’s nothing to say that there is no red.
Example: a baby dies after six months of painful cancer. Let’s say this maximizes good, since the baby would grow up to be a murderer. But would it be worse if the baby died after only 3 months? 1 month? In the womb? Obviously none of us knows for sure how actions affect the entire world - but we have plenty of plausible reasons saying that this is not the best possible world. The only response you seem to have is that you believe it is, and no one can prove you wrong. That’s very weak.
Since Christianity tells us we are all sinners, then we are either sinners in heaven or God somehow makes those who go not sinners. The former seems incompatible with any definition of heaven I’ve read (except Shaw’s) and if the latter was true why can’t God remove suffering here from those going to heaven in the future? Some degree of suffering naturally comes from conflicting desires. Are these removed in heaven, in which case I’d argue that the souls in heaven are very different from what they were on earth, or is there some magic way of getting what you want?
Heaven is incoherent. I’m glad I didn’t grow up with the idea of it.
Please give a definition of omnipotence that strongly depends on omnibenevolence. Maybe your definition of god requires all three omnis, but it is logically possible to have an omnipotent but not omnibenevolent entity - which you wouldn’t call god. Fine. But as I showed, this entity can do more things than your “omnipotent” entity, so calling both omnipotent either redefines the term to be useless or is logically absurd. And, since an omnibenevolent entity would have a very limited range of actions it could take (none leading to more harm) it’s a pretty poor example of omnipotence.
“Hey God,” says the mean little kid. “Can you squash this ant?”
“No,” says the bi-omni deity.
“Guess I’m more powerful than you,” says the kid. Who may get hit by a lightning bolt, but still.
It is when you claim that God can’t even do what humans can.
This is common with such arguments. The tri-omni God is so obviously contradictory to both reality and logic that its adherents will keep redefining what the words mean until it’s indistinguishable from a god that doesn’t exist at all. But somehow a powerless, utterly passive god that completely ignore all the suffering in the world is still all powerful, all knowing and omnibenevolent.
Again, completely misunderstanding the logic here, on two counts: one, nobody needs to believe for this to be the best possible world for the argument to work, and two, that one needs only a weak commitment to possibility is what gives the argument its strength, since that means those who want to resist it can’t content themselves with possibility. But I think I’ve run out of new ways to try and explain this.
Well, then it obviously can’t work as an example of a better possible world.
Omnipotence doesn’t depend on omnibenevolence. It’s just that an omnibenevolent entity can’t commit evil acts anymore than a circle can be square. If they did, after all, they wouldn’t be omnibenevolent anymore. There is really no great subtlety to this.
If you think that this is a reasonable and honest takeaway from what I’ve been posting, then I don’t think I can have any hope of explaining things any better to you.
You claim that God can’t make things better, when we can. It’s not even hard. That is claiming that we have more power than God. Not because we are strong, but because you have defined God as being so ineffectual that anything capable of taking an action is more powerful than he is.
You have repeatedly, in your attempts to push the idea that this is the “best of all possible worlds” that God could create. The fact that we can and do improve the world (as do many non-human organisms, for that matter) means that we are more powerful than God, at least as you’ve defined him. The fact that we do anything at all makes us more powerful than a hypothetical god that can do nothing.
Yes there is, the fact that the god is defined as having the power and desire for there never to be red. Whether there might ultimately be some way to reconcile these things doesn’t take away from the fact that, based on only what we know now, they are incompatible.
It’s a shame HMHW because I do like your takes on many issues, but I don’t think you come into these things to genuinely engage. You’ve started from a position that Plantinga’s argument not only works, but supports your strong claim, and you’re just not listening to points that counter that.
As pointed out to you, then summarily ignored by you, the only sensible notion of ‘world’ in this context is a complete history—it’s that whose overall moral value is relevant to God’s point of view, and your actions within this world are just ‘according to God’s plan’, if you will, and add to the overall total value of the world.
But it is exactly the conclusion of Plantinga’s argument that they are not incompatible! If you understand the argument, you can’t validly claim that they are, not without introducing any further premises.
I don’t know, I think I’ve shown quite a lot of engagement on this issue. But so far, most counterpoints that are being raised just seem to come from a misunderstanding of the modal logic of the argument—so what exactly am I to do but try and correct that misunderstanding? People are essentially saying, but I can imagine that the world might be better, so the argument fails. This is just syntactically, just based on the form of the argument, an entirely wrong approach! To the best of my ability to tell, I’m not bringing any even slightly original thought to the argument here, but merely relaying what’s the generally accepted consensus (to the extent that there ever is such a thing). Take the paper I referred to earlier:
As Plantinga observes, however, establishing that not even God could causally secure that there are agents who perform morally good acts but always refrain from performing morally bad acts is not sufficient for establishing that (3) is possible. It may be that even though God could not have causally secured such an outcome, he could have secured it in some other way. He might have been able to do so, for instance, if he had knowledge of various counterfactual (or subjunctive) conditionals concerning what the creatures he could create would freely do in various non-determining circumstances were he to create them and place them in those circumstances. If God did have knowledge of such counterfactuals of freedom, then one way in which he might have secured this outcome is by creating only those creatures he knows would never freely go wrong (in any circumstances in which he might place them). Another is by placing his creatures only in those circumstances in which he knows they would not freely go wrong (rather than in circumstances in which they would go wrong).
This is, I think, the objection you’ve been raising, and @Voyager has been gesturing at. It might be that God could create what I have called ‘perfect circumstances’, where either all creatures only ever freely choose good, or no evil choices are available to them. But simply because of the way the argument is structured, this isn’t a counterargument! Compare (my bolding):
Surely the atheologian is right to insist that if God has knowledge of the sort described above, it is at least broadly logically possible that it was within God’s power to weakly bring it about that there is moral good without bringing it about that there is moral evil. But in order to show that the free will defense fails, the atheologian needs something much stronger than a mere possibility claim. She needs the claim that it is a necessary truth that if God exists it is within his power to weakly bring it about that there is moral good but no moral evil.
So just this gesturing at ‘there possibly could be less evil in the world’, or ‘there possibly could be less red in the world’, simply does nothing at all. It is just based on the pure form of the argument—‘possibly God can’t create a better world’ and ‘possibly they can’ can simultaneously be true, in the same way that ‘possibly it rains tomorrow’ and ‘possibly it doesn’t rain tomorrow’ can. And the argument needs only that the first remains unrefuted, and by asserting the second, it does, so asserting the second doesn’t do anything to refute the argument!
That argument again makes no sense, and ignores the supposed omnipotence of God (who wouldn’t have to worry about “history”). And ignores just how awful the world is. That “complete history” includes millions of years of suffering.
The claim you’ve made, repeatedly now, goes further: you have said we have no reason to think they are incompatible, and that is false.
It’s the difference between saying I can’t know for sure that I’ve never been on the moon and saying that right now I have no reason to assume that I have not. We have reason to think evil, and a god that wants there to be no evil, don’t fit together, in the absence of further information.
Please respond to my actual objection to your claim, or I’ll just take it you can’t.
And this is why either this logic is flawed or your usage of it, because Plantinga’s argument is also just positing a possibility, indeed a weaker one.
The logic basically goes: the existence of an omnimax god, and suffering, appear on their face to be mutually exclusive.
Plantinga points out that’s not necessarily the case; for example, the best world might be one with free will and free will might necessitate the possibility of evil and suffering. (This is what I’m calling a dubious possibility, because this really doesn’t look like the best possible world and free will doesn’t even touch natural suffering. But sure, let’s give it a non-zero possibility).
The response is to suggest the possibility of a world with less suffering, either by being safer, or having beings that desire to do evil less, or some combination. This is much more plausible because we can trivially change one thing and have a better world while having no obvious connection to free will. (And upthread I have been talking about a world with no suffering, but it occurs to me this is unnecessary. A retort to the free will defence only needs less suffering).
And again, the big picture is because the free will defence fails, Plantinga boils down to: God might have “mysterious ways” reason for allowing suffering.
How? If we know they’re compatible—which we do, per Plantinga’s argument—how could we, at the same time, have any reason to think they’re incompatible? Those are just mutually exclusive!
This is logically false: Plantinga shows—proves, with full logical force—that it is definitely not the case. If you can find a proposition r such that r together with p entails q, then p and q are mutually compatible.
Apart from everything else, how would you possibly assess that? What is your baseline? How much evil would you be fine with, in order to still accept it? Everything being the same, but one baby didn’t have their candy stolen at one point? Or is the maximum allowable evil having a baby’s candy being stolen once every 10,000 years? Of course, you can’t have any rational grounds for setting such a baseline—both much better and much worse worlds than this one seem possible. You might feel it in your bones that a better world should be possible, but that just doesn’t make a compelling argument—that’s just an appeal to intuition.
No. A retort to the free will defense needs the establishment of the necessity of less suffering. Again, if I hold that ‘possibly it rains tomorrow’, you can’t refute me by saying that ‘possibly it doesn’t rain tomorrow’. This isn’t an opinion, it’s just the logical form of the argument.
