Does the U.S. still need the Marine Corps?

Great Debates
21

Hmmm… I was thinking of the Israeli wars - 1967, naturally, is the best example, but also 1956 and even 1973 (when, after the first 3 days, the IDF took the offensive and didn’t stop). In fact, you can say that the whole IDF is very similar to the USMC; it’s designed to mobilize and deploy in hours and win the war in under a month, with all branches working closely together.

However, now that I think about it, we’re talking about different scales here. I’m thinking Sinai, you’re thinking Europe. It’s not a matter of numbers - the Arabs in 1973 had more tanks than the Germans ever saw - but a matter of lengths, those of the fronts and those of the supply lines. Maybe the U.S. military can’t expect to win a war in six days because there’s simply too much ground to cover. I’ll have to consider this a bit.

I still think the Corps should be larger, though, and should have access to bigger weapons.

22

I think you might be misunderstanding the idea behind the offensive. You can have an army that’s strategically defensive (its goal is to protect its territory) but also tactically offensive. For an example from US history, look at the Confederacy during the Civil War. The Confederacy never really had the manpower to go on the strategic offensive, and everytime they did, they failed…Antetiem, Bragg’s invasion of Kentucky, Gettysburg. However, what the confederacy had, and what made the war go on for so long, were generals who were tactically offensive. Stonewall Jackson, for example, was a master at this, which was why he was so valuable to Lee. He consistantly outflanked Union armies, attacked supply depots, and forced the Union armies to respond to him, rather than him responding to them.

There are times when you can’t or shouldn’t go on the offensive, like if you’re outnumbered, are waiting for reinforcements, and are in an extremely well fortified position, but you can’t win if you spend the entire war sitting there and just reacting to what your enemy does.

23

“better uniforms and lance corporals”

:still laughing:

Dude, You ROCK!

24

Not in contention. But the fact is that infantry still wins the war, and it does so by taking a hill and denying the enemy the hill, then taking the next hill and denying the enemy that one, et al. Everyone else, from armor to artillery to intel to quartermaster, is supporting that infantryman, because you cannot win a war without him.

Hitting the enemy as hard as you can is fine. What happens when he commits his reserve? Germany found out how well the Blitzkrieg really worked when they went up against a country that could absorb more than one punch.

See, I wouldn’t call anything under a month a “war.” A campaign, certainly, but Marine Corps strategies and organizations could not have, say, beaten Hitler. Or even Hussein (and whether we really did is for the politicians to decide).

Please bear in mind that all of this is not intended in any way to disparage the fine men and women of the U.S. Marine Corps. I would stand with any of them at my back in a heartbeat. But they can’t win a war without the Army any more than the Army can win one without them, and suggesting that the two services are interchangeable is like saying we don’t need an Air Force because the Navy has planes.

25

I agree with most of what you’re saying, however:

Sorry, but tanks win wars - and I’m saying that as a former infantryman.

26

They haven’t won one yet.

Because when a tank is buttoned up, one infantryman can take it out. When the tankers get out to stand guard, they’re infantry.

27

That’s why you need infantry to support the tanks.

28

And anyway, you try to jump on a tank moving 40mph.

29

If a tank is moving 40 mph, it better hope that the infantry is adequately securing its rear area, or the fuelers and maintainers are going to get killed trying to get to the tank.

We’re not really arguing here, we’re just goofing around. Armor is a critical component of modern warfare, no question. But the base unit of deciding large-scale conflict is still the man on the ground.

30

They had the Pacific Front to take care of. It would’ve been a pain in the ass to ship a whole lot of marines halfway across the world for one invasion - and then back to the pacific. Since the army was capable, the army did it.

31

Of course.

32

tomndeb: been reading your C.S. Forester lately, hmm?

:rubs hand together: Now, and without trying to sound insulting to the Marines: the [Marine] Corps opens the door, and the Army steps through.

Marines are experts at amphibious assault; they establish the beach heads. Then the Army rolls through.

Two books by Ralph Zumbro address this very issue, The Iron Cavalry and Tank Sergeant. In Tank Sergeant he discusses and relates through anecdotes from WWI and II Veterans how tanks operated in WWI and II, but also illustrates how they were employed differently by the different branches of the service.

The one that comes to mind is from a Marine, who spent days in high-intensity combat establishing a beach head (at Guadacanal, IIRC) for the Army, and then watched dumbfounded as the Army tankers and infantry slowly but methodically took out the Japanese defenders in one set piece engagement after another.

In quite a few cases, the Marines can be “on the ground” kicking butt before even RDF units like the XVIII Airborne Corp can arrive. They still serve a tactically and strategically functional role in getting their quick and intimidating the hell out of anyone foolish enough to look at them twice until they can be relieved by the Army.

The Marines, being closely linked with the Navy and their Carrier Groups, and all the strategic mobility they provide, are a functional and vital asset in the American military arsenal. On a planet that’s surface is 70% water, the Marines can quite often get somewhere before the Army can, making them indispensible, IMHO.

And this is coming from an ex-Army tread-head.

As far as the Army not being “at the ready” like the Marines: Bullshit.

I spent two years in the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Bamberg Germany. We were the eyes and ears for VII Corps 24/7/365 (and you can’t be that by sitting in the barracks waiting for the call), and the tip of their lance to boot. We could roll our entire Squadron (essentially a reinforced Battalion) in less than an hour to deploy anywhere in our GDP Zone.

It boils down to mission: when it’s required, the Army can roll just as quickly as any other branch of the military, albeit usually “in theater.”

And I’d bet real money that the Cav was just about as strack as the Marines; coming into it right out of basic, it didn’t bother me as much. But Army Lifers who had never been in a Cav unit before got a very rude awakening to life in the Cav. Fast paced, no-bullshit, move yesterday, save the excuses for weaklings and wimps hoo-rah gung-ho.

Boots and Saddles!

33

ExTank , I agree with 95% of what you said. I would, though have to say that while you may have been in a unit that maintained a comparable state of readiness; much of the Army does not. The entire Marine way of life is geared to the “Every Marine Is A Rifleman” creed. Any MOS you have is secondary to 0311(infantry). The Army has hotshot units that are every bit as good (like Cav), but they don’t represent the bulk of the force.

34

Because without the marines we’ll never get pulse rifles and smartguns!

Well, that’s about the best I can contribute. Everyone’s already hogged all the real reasons :slight_smile:

35

You know, I hear this all the time, and I just have to ask:
Does that mean that everyone goes through all the 0311 training, and then the guys in actual Infantry MOSs just go straight to their units without any further training while the non-infantry MOSs go to their training?

36

Actually, check these out:
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/oicw.htm

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/ocsw.htm

37

Heh… Seen it, actually, but the OICW is incredibly crude compared to the pulse rifle :wink: (But that’s a completely different subject…)

38

“Wasn’t it a Marine who was quoted as saying: ‘Retreat? Hell, we just got here’ (I’m not sure about that quote).”

http://www.tun-tavern.com/slogans.php3
“On May 28th, 1918, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines of the 4th Marine Brigade were sent to help in the Belleau Wood sector. As they were approaching they were met by the French Commander of the troops that were already there who advised Marine Colonel Wendell C. Neville that the discreet thing to do was retreat. Neville’s reply was a characteristic “Retreat Hell! We just got here!” They stayed and drove the numerically superior Germans out of Belleau Wood and other strong holds.”

http://www.tamu.edu/upress/BOOKS/1996/asprey.htm
“Retreat, hell. We just got here.”—Captain Lloyd Williams, USMC to a French major, June 3, 1918

They don’t seem to completely agree who said it, except that he was a Marine. :smiley:

39

The OICW is a non-soldier’s idea of a good weapon. It’s ergonomics (or lack thereof) make it a pain in the ass to carry and use for more than a few minutes. Way too much “gee wiz”, not enough grunt-level input.

40

Pretty much sums up my opinion of the weapon, too. Good idea, but not good enough. Maybe in a couple more decades :slight_smile:

If anything, the millitary now is moving toward lighter and smaller for firearms. The Marines are strongly considering replacing their M16A2s with M4s (That’s what my Marine buddy said anyway). The OICW is just the opposite, big and heavy (And with much of the high-tech gear, is getting the whole propoganda “best weapon ever” treatment). Seems terribly over-complicated. They’d probably do better with an M4A1 and a small magazine-fed 20mm under-barrel launcher (Similar to the OICW’s). Seems like that would be a much simpler and more battlefield-oriented weapon.

Though maybe big-and-heavy is making a comeback. My friend was also mentioning the prospect of having platoon-level individual .50 machineguns (!). He’s on the SAW now, qualified for the Gulf, and still wants a bigger gun :slight_smile: