Bricker:
But in the case of Indian reservations, doesn’t that remove the state’s authority? Isn’t it federal (not state) recognition of an Indian tribe’s status that makes possible for the tribes to do things that are otherwise in violation of state law (e.g., run casinos)?
OK, but don’t say I didn’t warn you!
An acquittal is an acquittal on each and every element of the charge that a rational jury could have, on the record, rejected.
So a subsequent prosecution for another crime that includes any elements from the first crime must also take that into account. The concept is called collateral estoppel, also known as “issue preclusion,” and it means that once a particular issue is fully and finally litigated between two parties, it cannot be relitigated in a subsequent proceeding.
But notice how fact-dependent this inquiry has suddenly become. To illustrate the question, we can turn to the facts of the seminal case on the issue, Ashe v. Swenson. In Ashe, the accused and others were said to have broken into a home and robbed the six men that were playing poker there, taking from each money and various articles of personal property.
Bob Fred Ashe was brought to trial on the charge of robbing Donald Knight, one of the men at the poker table. As evidence, the state offered the testimony of each of the six victims, who all agreed that Knight’s money had been taken. The evidence was virtually airtight that a robbery had been committed, but because the robbers were masked, identification of Ashe as one of the robbers was weak. Two of the witnesses thought that there had been only three robbers in total, and could not say that Ashe was one of them. Another of the victims said that Ashe’s voice sounded like one of the robbers. Another victim identified Ashe by his size and height.
The jury acquitted Ashe.
Six weeks later, the state brought Ashe to trial again, this time for robbing Roberts, another one of the six. Ashe objected that this violated double jeopardy, but the state pointed out that this was a different crime, with a different victim.
At this trial, the witnesses were much more certain that Ashe was one of the masked robbers. This jury convicted Ashe.
The Supreme Court overturned Ashe’s conviction, pointing out that the doctrine of collateral estoppel meant that looking at the facts and evidence, the obvious conclusion was that the jury doubted Ashe was present. The state was thus precluded from trying to prove the issue of Ashe’s presence at some future trial, even for a new charge where the elements differed.
But we can see that another set of facts might reach a different conclusion.
For example, if the evidence had been strong that Ashe was one of the robbers, but none of the poker players could say for sure that Ashe stole anything from Knight, then a rational jury could have concluded that Ashe was there but stole nothing from Knight. A second trial for the robbery of Roberts would be permissible.
So Ashe v Swenson stands for the proposition that protections of the double jeopardy charge include the concept of collateral estoppel.
Sort of. As the Supreme Court advised us in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978):
So Indian tribes have a sovereign existance separate and apart from any federal grant of power, and are generally a separate sovereign for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis. Because tribal lands exist within state bounderies, typically laws grant shared jurisdiction between states and tribal law, and subscribe to the notion of “comity of justice,” meaning that whoever can most effectively prosecute you gets you first.
Is this an accurate summary of the thread so far? – A single act may in fact violate a number of criminal statutes of one or more jurisdictions, and so might result in several separate criminal charges made by multiple government institutions. The fact that a person is found innocent of one or more of the crimes resulting from the act in no way precludes the continuing prosecution of other charges. But if one of the trials finds that the person did not in fact perform the act itself, then further prosecutions based on that act are precluded.
Assuming this is correct, more questions…
First of all, doesn’t this require an appeals court to infer from the trial transcript why the jury rendered its verdict? I would assume there is going to be little to no evidence in the transcript about which alleged elements of the crime the jury decided were weren’t committed.
Also, if the first verdict is a conviction, does that preclude the defense from using the “I didn’t do it” defense in subsequent trials? After all, hasn’t that been already litigated and decided?
If the defense CAN re-use the “I didn’t do it” defense, and are successful in a later trial, how would that impact on subsequent trials or earlier convictions?
Not exactly. It’s important to remember that subsequent prosecution after an acquittal is limited to a new crime, a crime that doesn’t consist of all the elements, or a subset of all the elements, of the original trial. Only then do we explore the collateral estoppel effect I discussed above.
Good point. Sometimes a jury will be given detailed instructions, and asked to note each of their factual findings. More often, though, the jury is simply instructed as to all the elements and asked to render a final decision.
Since there won’t be a detailed jury set of findings, then yes – the reviewing court would have to infer from the trial record what a rational jury might have found.
Well, if the first veridct is guilty, under what circumstances would there be a subsequent trial?
There are times this comes close to being so. If you’re arrested and convicted for punching me in the nose, and then I sue you for that act in civil court, I am allowed to introduce your criminal conviction as proof of the act.
But it may not be conclusive proof, and it’s not an example of collateral estoppel, because of what I said above: …once a particular issue is fully and finally litigated between two parties…. When I sue you in civil court, the parties are you and me. I can’t raise collateral estoppel as to your criminal offense, because those two parties were you and the Commonwealth.
I seem to recall a few cases where there were local and federal charges for the same act. I wasn’t aware that the verdict on one charge would necessarily have any bearing on whether or not a subsequent trial on other charges would proceed. Of course, a prosecutor might reconsider given the evidence presented.
Unless you live in Springflied in the USA. They even have their own presidental primary 
I may not be one of those high-priced big-city lawyers (or any lawyer at all), but even I came up with this answer. 
Sure – but those are permitted because of the dual sovereign rule. Double jeopardy does not forbid state (or local) charges and federal charges arising from the same act.
And neither does collateral estoppel – remember the mutuality of parties requirement. In the first trial, the parties are you and the United States. In the second trial, it’s you and the People of the State of New York, or you and the Commonwealth of Virginia.