I don’t see how this can be true - WWII submarines were diesel, and could not submerge for long - and even if they were nuclear, a nuke sub can’t last more than 2-3 months underwater before needing to surface for food. Axis submarines surely knew they were headed towards national defeat more than 2-3 months before V-E Day.
Wow. Were you one of Philip Dick’s drinking buddies?
For a lot of top brass they were only hoping to avoid the obvious scenario: Russians marching thru Berlin and beyond. Hoping isn’t the same thing as believing it will happen. Outside of the toadies surrounding Hitler, the majority of regular army German generals knew the situation was very, very bad. It is human nature to dream up alternate endings to the way things were going just to keep getting up in the morning and doing your job.
I did hoist a drink with him at a Con once, iirc, but there was a room full of us. I think Pournelle was there too.
Don’t know about PKD, but I don’t doubt Pournelle was there…especially if there was booze.
Both Japan and Germany were gambling here, with appropriate bluffing to go. But Japan had not even had a pair and no re-draw option at all … Germany had some very very vague chances but even that fizzled quickly at redraw(s). Again I’d say, second half of 1942. Both, brighter people in regime and some ordinary people had to have some pretty good idea that nothing good waits ahead. Neziplebs, do not forget, had by now to deal with buzzing bombers over the head while en masse getting telegrams and coffins from/of beloved on eastern front.
So very true. We got The Col. to be our special Con bid guest by by having a scotch tasting party. Great man.
Japan had a four flush and was bluffing.
Germany had small two pair, but was betting like a high full house.
The situation in Asia was actually quite complex and not simply that the Japanese wanted the oil and other resources.
It would have been inevitable that the US and Japan would have clashed at some point. Alt-hist fan like to dream up scenarios where Japan can do this or that and the US wouldn’t get involved, but Japan wasn’t going to withdraw from China and the US wasn’t going to let them dominate China and South East Asia. There was antiwar sentiment in the US, but if you look at the polls, people were less opposed to war in the Pacific.
As ** Corry El**said, the US had placed aggressive measures against Japan because of their occupation of China. Those measures were opposed by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy because they felt it was too aggressive. (There wasn’t a Secretary of Defense then, just a Secretary of War who handled the army and his counterpart who handled the navy.)
There were dilutional hotheads in the Japanese military who were pushing Japan further and further along. They were never going to be satisfied.
There really wasn’t anyone in charge in Japan. The situation was quite complex and had many completing groups and individuals. A good book to read on this is Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy by Eri Hotta. It discusses how the policies were being defined by lower level officers and then the top generals and admirals were not stopping the lower level officers.
Having worked in Japan for 25 years, and being intimately familiar with their culture, that book and others really made sense to me.
Countries and organizations need leaders who aren’t afraid to say no to the crazy people below them. Japan lacked that in the late 30s and early 40s.
When your service had a 75 percent casualty rate, broadcasting the truth to the men was probably not widely practiced. Or it was simply ignored.
DrDeth, the problem with the Zhukov hypo, as I see it, is two fold. First, while Khalkhin Gol was a great asskicking by the Soviets, it didn’t really need Zhukov’s genius to achieve. Soviet armor and artillery was decent, they were willing to commit sufficient resources for victory; Japanese armor was garbage. They were going to win whether Zhukov was there are not. Maybe if Budenny was running the show instead…
Second, even if the IJA wins, I don’t think petroleum had been discovered in the region at that point. What Japan needed was gas, and to the best of their knowledge, Siberia didn’t have any However, if the Japanese did decide to invest Soviet East Asia, maybe Stalin doesn’t release the Siberian reserves, and Army Group Central doesn’t get a 45 division surprise in December 41?
Neat hypo. Great story.
Leaving things deceptively vague is typical of Japanese style authority. That way you can later claim either case is true.
Germany might have been lost the moment they went to war with the Soviet Union, but they probably didn’t know that at the time. Considering the piss-poor performance of the Red Army in the Winter War, it might have looked easy from the point of view of German high command. Also, lend-lease is often cited as being vital for keeping the USSR in the war and the Germans, AFAIK, couldn’t have know that was going to happen.
Off topic, but I would dispute the idea that the USA was “conned” into joining the Great War. The USA got into World War One because the Germans reinstated unrestricted submarine warfare and resumed sinking of American merchant ships. No nation can let that go on indefinitely.
I think US isolationism had a lot more to do with the fact that the war was sold as “making the world safe for democracy.” Once the European powers went back to the same old squabbling the US became disillusioned about ever getting involved with those jokers again.
That is a great book, I will agree, and yes, it is hard for us westerners to truly understand the sitrep in Japan during that period.
We let the British sink our ships with mines and board them. And why were American merchant ships carrying contraband to Britain, anyway?
Japan was doomed, and at the very least Admiral Yamamoto knew it, when Japan dropped bombs on Pearl Harbor and the carriers were out at sea.
The primary goal of that Pearl Harbor strike was to neutralize the Pacific Fleet, and this meant killing the aircraft carriers. The battleships were, frankly, already obsolete by that time. Without the sheer firepower and utility of the carriers fleet’s aircraft, the Japanese navy would have been able to attain and maintain supremacy in the Pacific.
It would not have won them the war, in the long term. But it would have extended the likely duration of the war by several years, possibly enough to force America to a non-interference peace accord.
Germany?
Pretty much as soon as Churchill took over from Chamberlain.
Germany had a very flakey ‘alliance’ with Russia. Both sides knew it was only to delay their war. Germany needed to get a surrender or rigidly enforced nonaggression treaty from England before the fight with Russia started. Under Chamberlain, this was very possible. Even likely. But under Churchill, England turned their fear to anger and resisted.
And yes, while hitler and his high command might not have admitted it, there was a very significant part of the German leadership that realized this spelled their doom. Hence the multiple attempts to dethrone hitler. Pity they failed each time.
OP asked about the Axis nations? Ok, Italy…
So sorry, Italy was doomed from day one. Earlier than that, even.
Even if by some really weird twist of history Germany managed to conquer and keep Europe, that would have been the whole Europe. A victorious Germany would have done to Italy what they did to Czechoslovakia. Roll in the tanks, and take over with virtually no resistance.
And of course, of Germany did not conquer, then the south of Europe is so obvious a route to invade by that Italy could not stop the Allies. Slow them, hurt them, yes. Stop? no.
I think you’ll find that isolationists persuaded the US Senate to walk away from the international security system Wilson was so instrumental in developing, before it even got off the ground, while the European powers continued to try to use it.
By this time German U-boats all had snorkels and S.O.P. was to come to periscope depth at night to recharge and then run deep during the day.
“Göring has two but they are small…”
There’s a difference between holding a hope in your head and seriously attempting to negotiate a treaty with a foreign power. Asking for a long shot in negotiations is one thing, but everything that I have read about attempts by plotters attempting to or contemplating overthrowing the Nazi government indicates that their proposals to the allies were always of the form ‘we will execute a cease fire, then fight the Russian horde together!’ and that talks broke down completely when the Allied person involved started discussing actual surrender. That’s not dreaming up alternate endings, that’s attempting to negotiate said ending as an actual treaty.
Of course, if one posits exactly the same situation with the same people making decisions the same outcome is inevitable. That’s not interesting. What’s interesting is what conditions would have to change to bring about a different outcome.
Of course the US and Japan were already in conflict over Japanese aggression. The question is how willing the US would have been to engage in total war if Japan hadn’t directly attacked US forces, or for the sole purpose of re-taking European colonies. The latter becomes even more questionable if Germany had managed to neutralize Britain as it had France.
In any war, who wins depends in part on strength, but it also depends on the will to fight. Two decades later Vietnam was able to defeat the US, a vastly more powerful country, simply because they were more committed to winning.
Pearl Harbor motivated the US to pour all its resources into defeating the Axis. Without that, would the US have been willing to incur 400,000 casualties in the Pacific?