Hi,
I’m interested to know if serious, respected historians are debating whether FDR had advance knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 or whether the question has been settled, and is only debated among conspiracy theorists? If there is debate among serious/respected historians, which books on the the market are worth reading on the subject?
I look forward to your feedback
davidmich
Nope. Nobody at all who’s seriously credible buys into that CT.
The key here is “serious, respected historian”.
Don’t know of any who believe that conspiracy theory.
That an attack was expected is mostly beyond debate.
That an attack at Pearl Harbour was expected? Nowhere except perhaps in some Naval warplans in the files of the Navy Department.
Well, the issue is resolvable simply by thought experiment.
Firstly, FDR did indeed want to get the US involved in the war – against Germany. Not Japan. War with Japan would be a huge distraction from his main focus; indeed, when war came, “Germany First” became official policy and there were constant minor struggles between American military branches and civilian agencies to balance the war effort between Germany and Japan. So it seems unlikely that FDR would “allow” an attack on Pearl
Secondly and more importantly: Assuming an attack on the fleet at Pearl would trigger American involvement in the war, it wouldn’t have to be a totally successful attack on Pearl. Hell, a Japanese fleet in full war formation even appearing within airstrike range of Pearl would itself be an act of war and the American public would have been riled up.
So if FDR knew about Pearl and wanted to permit the Japanese to attack, there’s still no reason to be caught with one’s pants down. An alerted US Pacific fleet could have had scouting planes out (and let’s be honest, a peacetime fleet should damned well have had scout planes out, given the tensions of the time) and could have at least engaged the Kido Butai and done some damage. A draw, even an American victory, would STILL have aroused the American people to war, and we would have started it without the huge disadvantage of losing most of our fleet and giving our enemies the reputation for invincibility they would carry for the next six months.
edit: Conclusion: it makes no sense that FDR would have allowed the Pacific Fleet to be surprised and sunk, even if he wanted war with Japan. People who think that the defeat aroused American fury more than a less-total defeat, or simply an attack, would have, are just showing how little they understand the Americans of those times. What pissed us off was that we were attacked during supposedly “good faith” negotiations. Not that they won the battle.
As an aside to Sailboat’s point about the disadvantage of losing the U.S. fleet at Pearl, I’ve read that in some ways, it was a ‘blessing’ to have had the battleships sunk there. The logic was that, if the battleships weren’t sunk there, they’d have sortied against the IJN in v. late 1941 and early 1942, and been sunk in deep water by aircraft. Like HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse. Getting them sunk at Pearl allowed them to later be raised and available in for shore bombardments during the amphibious landings from 1943-1945. Except for USS Arizona and Oklahoma, of course.
My question related to this observation is: would the USN have lost battleships in a similar manner to the way the Royal Navy lost the Prince of Wales, given that they would probably have sent the battleships with some form of carrier aircraft escort?
I’ll just say that there is an alternate history short story out there where Jimmy Doolittle puts 2 and 2 together and trains his wing of B-25’s to perform low-level attacks on ships. They spot KB right before they launch their planes, and attack said fleet. The disruption prevents a coordinated attack on Pearl, and IIRC they sink one CV and damage a couple of more. But the author then posits that, because the US didn’t lose any of their BB’s, that the level of outrage against the Japanese was less than it was in this timeline, and thus the war in the Pacific drags on longer than it did here.
I didn’t really buy the author’s reasoning.
It’s a totally theoretical question. The U.S. simply didn’t have any battleships after Pearl Harbor, and you can only fight with the weapons you have. By the time battleships were available, at Guadalcanal, the nature of naval warfare had changed.
The only thing I can add is that the Navy’s pre-war contingency plans had battleship-based task forces, not battleship/carrier forces.
I don’t have time for a lengthy anwser at the moment, but in a word: no. Nobody has ever credibly argued that FDR had advanced knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there is no credible evidence he did and a mountain that he didn’t. Claims that we knew Pearl Harbor was going to be bombed but let it happen are solidly in the realms of CT.
However, that Japan attacked was very expected; war seemed unavoidable by that point, and Japan had a habit of attacking first and declaring war later. There were numerous war warnings issued to the Pacific Theatre that war with Japan was possible or likely and might occur without formal warning, but that US forces were to make no overt hostile action except in response to an actual attack; that if hostilities occur it must be clear that Japan made the first overt act of war.
There’s a fatal flaw in that alternate history: Jimmy was only given a wing of B-25’s after Pearl Harbor, specifically to make a propaganda-value strike on Tokyo.
Not to mention that
a) I think the bigger effect on US public opinion would come from finding out that some crazy pilot attacked and sank a Japanese ship when we were still at peace with them;
b) in a fight of B-25’s vs carrier fighter cover, I wouldn’t bet on the twin-engine bombers.
I think you mean “Billy Mitchell’s Overt Act” by William Sanders (Review -- Alternate Generals by Harry Turtledove)
Which serious historians have mounted a solid rebuttal (if any) Day Of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor. (wiki “book by Robert Stinnett alleging that the Roosevelt administration deliberately provoked and allowed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in order to bring the United States into World War II.”)
davidmich
(Bolding mine.)
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=739
Had FDR read Mitchell’s 1924 report and heeded the warning, things might have turned out differently. Or maybe FDR read the report and had it in the back of his mind that Sunday morning in 1941 … 
Hindsight is easy. Did anyone predict that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor? Certainly. Did anyone predict the Japanese would make their main attack in the Philippines? Yes. Did anyone predict Japan would start the war by bombing California? Yes. Did anyone predict Japan would attack the Dutch East Indies and not attack American territory? Yes. Did anyone predict Japan would attack the Soviet Union? Yes.
After the attack is over, it’s easy to see which of these predictions was accurate and say “we should have listened to that guy.” But beforehand, you’ve got a hundred people offered you a hundred different possibilities and you have no way of knowing which one (if any) is right.
This was not the only “warning” that the IJN would attack Pearl Harbor. In fact, it had been demonstrated later in a war game. Sunday mornings were known to the the most vulnerable. The direction of the attack was also figured out.
When the US implemented crippling sanctions against Japan in the summer of '41, they were opposed by a number of top officials including the Secretary of the Navy as his branch would have primary responsibility for the war. The US was actively rearming, building more ships and strengthening its forces in the Pacific. US military leaders believed there would be war, but that it would occur in the spring of '42. This is probably a case of wishful thinking. We can’t get ready until then, so they won’t attack until we’re ready.
FDR ordered the Pacific Fleet to be stationed in Pearl Harbor in that summer. This is one of the reasons that conspirasists claim the FDR knew about it. However the move was made with the assurances of the Navy that the fleet could be protected at their new home.
Going back to the “warning” from 1924. After the fact, you can always go back and put together a string of evidence for anything you want. Hindsight is 20/20. However, no one can seriously take a speculation from 17 years prior, when the technology to carry out such an attack were yet to be developed, as a serious “warning.”
Likewise, any navy which requires the president to sort through miscellaneous conjectures isn’t worth its salt. It was well known that a war was coming. The Army and the Navy had the responsibility to be ready and to take steps to defend itself and they failed in that duty. They are not alone, and in fact, it was all too common for all of the participants of that and other wars.
Trying to find a conspiracy is unnecessary when human nature better explains the results.
He didn’t have any hard knowledge but the United States and Japan were headed for some kind of confrontation with the U.S. embargo on steel and oil. But the entire military system from FDR on down were lazy about intelligence gathering and modern aircraft capabilities the British showed earlier at Taranto.
One exception was LDCR William Outerbridge of the destroyer Ward, who was alerted to a Japanese midget submarine trying to enter Pearl Harbor, sank it before the Japanese airplanes attacked.
Unfortunately lots of times nations, and people, have to “get their nose bloodied” to do things they should already have been doing.
Very possibly none. However, that would be due more to historians not wishing to waste time and energy debunking a known falsehood than a failure to be able to debunk Stinnett.
You will also find a paucity of serious historians debunking the anthropological findings of Horace Miner in his study of the Nacirema tribe.
Don’t forget Privates George Elliott and Joseph Lockard, the two Army Signal Corps radar operators on duty. Amazingly enough, Pearl Harbor did not have round-the-clock radar coverage and they were supposed to shut down at 7:00 am. But they noticed a large incoming sighting on their set just as they were supposed to be shutting down, so they stayed on duty, ran a quick test to make sure their equipment wasn’t malfunctioning (they later said they had never received a sighting that big) and then they reported it in. Unfortunately, the office they reported to was also shutting down and they were told their sighting was probably just some American planes and to go ahead and close down. Elliott and Lockard were walking into the mess hall to eat breakfast as the bombs started dropping.
Both survived the war. George Elliot died in 2003 at the age of 85 and Joseph Lockard died in 2012 at the age of 90.
There’s also a lot that Billy Mitchell proved to be entirely wrong about, which is often forgotten. He advocated pretty much disbanding the entire Navy which he considered now obsolete, and having the shores of the US protected by long range heavy bombers. Long range heavy bombers such as the B-17 and B-24 proved to be almost entirely useless in an anti-shipping role. Notably in that 324 page report written in 1924 there is something which the National Museum of the US Air Force cough forgot to mention while praising him as a prophet of air power. He said the attack would come from land based bombers, not aircraft carriers which he considered to be practically useless along with the rest of the Navy. From here:
While it’s a theoretical question: yes, probably, although the extent of the damage likely to have been done to the battleships on the high seas is difficult to ascertain. There were a number of things that played into Japanese hands at Pearl: the battleships were not at battlestations, and not in watertight condition; they could not maneuver; they were not covered by aircraft; they were not ideally placed for anti-air defense; and, of course, they were surprised. But at the same time, there were a number of things that went rather well for them: unless they capsized (Oklahoma; in fact, if she had been urgently needed, Oklahoma could probably have been repaired) or exploded (Arizona), they would sink only to settle in shallow water; they were approachable only from one side, and that with only a narrow angle, and with specially modified torpedoes; they were only attackable by air, and immediately safe once Kido Butai withdrew.
If caught at sea, they would have traded some advantages for others, and some disadvantages for others still. Overall, the balance of power at sea, for example under the plan Admiral Kimmel envisaged, clearly favors the Japanese: complete interception of Japanese aircraft by U.S. carrier planes (especially in early 1942, when the U.S. carriers did not even carry 30 fighters) is impossible; battleship AA defenses in early 1942 were nowhere near late-war standards; the tactical profiency of the Japanese carrier air crews would still have come as a rough surprise; and so would such surface sweeps as the Japanese would have managed to mount against retreating U.S. forces.
The real question, to my mind, is not whether the U.S. would have suffered more if caught at sea in December 1941, or even into the late summer of 1942; the real question is whether they would have been caught at sea. It is often forgotten that by mid-spring 1942, the U.S. had reconstituted a significant battleforce–Task Force 1 under Vice-Admiral Pye at San Diego–that Nimitz did not use only partially because they were not useful, and mainly because he could not find enough tankers to keep them at sea. A very similar problem would have been troubling Kimmel in December 1941, despite his aggressive planning.