Bribery can work - but not with fanatics.
In Iraq, there were several groups of people involved in the insurgency:
(1) the highly motivated religious nutbars. The ones who traveled from other countries to kill Americans. Al Qaida in Iraq. Religious fundamentalists.
(2) Criminals who used the violence and chaos to their advantage.
(3) Opportunists who joined whatever side was ‘winning’ in an attempt to profit from the spoils of war or to secure a decent position after the war is over.
(4) People just trying to keep their heads down and survive, who will gravitate towards the side least likely to kill them. Some of these people joined the insurgency after a, "join us or die’ campaign.
Group (1) can’t be bought off. These are people ready to die for their cause. It’s pretty tough to bribe someone who’s ready to strap a bomb to his chest and blow himself up. All you can do with such people is kill them or jail them.
Group (2) can be bought off, but they’re unreliable. They’re likely to take your money and then do whatever they please anyway.
Group (3) is the prime target for a bribery campaign. They’re looking for opportunity and profit. If you can convince them that their future livelihood depends on you, they’ll fall into line. They might even become cheerleaders for you. It depends how much they feel they have to gain.
Group (4) can’t be bought off, unless they feel that their safety is assured. No one wants to take a payment from Americans only to be killed as a traitor once the Americans leave.
The key to the success of a payment campaign is that it has to go hand-in-hand with security and progress that indicates the country will eventually return to rule of law. It also works when the bribery money comes in the form of infrastructure or business loans and grants, or reconstruction of destroyed buildings. The idea is to speed up the rebuilding of a middle class so that the people have something to protect. That gives them an incentive to help you put down the insurgency.
Almost none of these conditions apply to Afghanistan, except for perhaps bribing warlords to prevent them from joining the Taliban. But there have already been numerous cases of warlords who were bought off, but flipped sides again as soon as the Americans looked like they might not protect them.
The key problems in Afghanistan are that there’s no middle class to build up, no way to establish permanent rule of law, and no real promise for a future for the people that looks any better than the present, at least in the next ten or twenty years. Under those conditions, I’m worried that any counterinsurgency program would have only temporary success no matter how many people you buy off. That’s why I’ve always said that Afghanistan is going to wind up needing a relatively permanent occupation by the U.S. in a peacekeeping role, with side missions to wipe out terrorist cells and prevent the country from being used as a big training camp for bad guys.
I simply don’t see a path to the kind of stabilization followed by withdrawal that looks likely in Iraq.