Effectiveness of no-fly list re: terrorists

Factual Questions
1

Our illustrious government, in its post-9/11 wisdom, has compiled a list of names of suspected terrorists, criminals, ne’er do wells and general security threats. The list has occasionally caught some mope trying to get into our country. Mostly, though, it seems like it has been more of an inconvenience to regular citizens who unfortunately share a name with number 73 on the FBI’s Most Wanted List.

My question, though, is what good is the list if terrorists use fake IDs? These guys are criminals who are OK with blowing up themselves and innocent people; do we really think they’d pause at the idea of using a counterfeit passport and driver’s license? In countries where there was state supported terrorism (Iran and Afghanistan come immediately to mind) why couldn’t the government issue a passport to Osama bin Ladin in the name of Warzi bin Hiedin?

So, can anyone speak to true effectiveness of the No-fly Lists in fighting terror?

2

I agree they’re full of flaws, but seriously. Think of the alternative. (Same thing I always say when someone says we’re doomed coz the protection isn’t 100%. Not that you did that of course)

A terrorist gets into the country despite the fact that we know his name, and everyone yells “Why don’t we have a list of these people if we know who they are??”

At the very least I would say it makes it harder for the less-well-funded terrorists to get in. Of course they’re only the annoying ones that could kill a dozen or two, not the big players.

3

[QUOTE=essell]
A terrorist gets into the country despite the fact that we know his name, and everyone yells “Why don’t we have a list of these people if we know who they are??”
[/QUOTE]

Isn’t that a matter for immigration, and nothing to do with having a domestic no-fly list?

4

[QUOTE=essell]
I agree they’re full of flaws, but seriously. Think of the alternative. (Same thing I always say when someone says we’re doomed coz the protection isn’t 100%. Not that you did that of course)

A terrorist gets into the country despite the fact that we know his name, and everyone yells “Why don’t we have a list of these people if we know who they are??”

At the very least I would say it makes it harder for the less-well-funded terrorists to get in. Of course they’re only the annoying ones that could kill a dozen or two, not the big players.
[/QUOTE]
I agree that it is better than nothing but if scumballs in the US can perform identity theft so they can get state IDs and birth certs then I think that terrorists can too. The no-fly list should be updated to include mug shots (where possible) so Huz bin Fahrteen, the peaceful restaurant owner isn’t confused with his namesake, the AQ supporter.

Crap. How can we make things better?

5

[QUOTE=erie774]
I agree that it is better than nothing but if scumballs in the US can perform identity theft so they can get state IDs and birth certs then I think that terrorists can too. The no-fly list should be updated to include mug shots (where possible) so Huz bin Fahrteen, the peaceful restaurant owner isn’t confused with his namesake, the AQ supporter.

Crap. How can we make things better?
[/QUOTE]

We can’t. Large lists don’t scale well and are a tremendous drain on resources (until they stop being updated).
The problem here is that congress critters and security types can only think of single events-the bad guy getting in and doing harm. They can’t think of what is really going on-a list of 10,000’s of names checked against 10s of millions of travelers. No list effort can keep up with the natural changes in those two populations.

What we need to do is look to the people who do this for a living-credit card companies. Since it is real money, their money, they figured out how to handle this situation long ago. They don’t care who uses any given card-all they care about is whether the purchase will be paid for. They examine and track the purchase not the individual. If the purchase is part of a pattern for that card, it goes through. If Osama wants to peacefully fly to Disney World for a vacation, why should the airline get all huffed up about it? (neglecting the idea of arresting the guy for crimes against humanity). The key isn’t who is going to fly, the key is what they are going to do. The name is the least important ingredient in that equation. It is far more important to attempt to determine whether that card was recently used to purchase ingredients for a bomb or a one-way ticket from Karachi. Of course it isn’t likely that a smart terrorist will use the same card, but databases can be linked. All you are looking for is a hint, not a ban.

As it is, once the terrorist finds a name that isn’t on the list, he/she is home free. But it makes good security theater. I suspect the real benefit is that the nervous passenger who doesn’t like the look of that stranger and demands that she not be allowed on “their” flight can be re-assured if the airline says that she is OK, her name didn’t show up on the no-fly list. Keeps the public happy and flying.

6

[QUOTE=erie774]
Our illustrious government, in its post-9/11 wisdom, has compiled a list of names of suspected terrorists, criminals, ne’er do wells and general security threats. The list has occasionally caught some mope trying to get into our country. Mostly, though, it seems like it has been more of an inconvenience to regular citizens who unfortunately share a name with number 73 on the FBI’s Most Wanted List.

My question, though, is what good is the list if terrorists use fake IDs? These guys are criminals who are OK with blowing up themselves and innocent people; do we really think they’d pause at the idea of using a counterfeit passport and driver’s license? In countries where there was state supported terrorism (Iran and Afghanistan come immediately to mind) why couldn’t the government issue a passport to Osama bin Ladin in the name of Warzi bin Hiedin?

So, can anyone speak to true effectiveness of the No-fly Lists in fighting terror?
[/QUOTE]

I fly for a living now and my name is on the no-fly. I am unimpressed with security in general and the no-fly in particular. There are so many names on it that it’s been rendered useless.

A simpleton could defeat the TSA screening, anyway. Without meaning to be overly cruel, I don’t think the typical TSA screener was out there competing for a full professorship as their alternative job opportunity. Moreover the notion that we will apply screening equally to any and all comers renders the screening effectiveness comical.

To the point of the no-fly, for example, I share a name, but not the skin color, of the guy on the no-fly with my name. Now you would think someone could take a peek at me; call TSA and confirm the no-fly name info, look at me, and decide I am not the fairly handsome African American who got my name in trouble(I’m a bald, pasty white guy). No siree bob; when I get pulled I get to wait til the airport poleece come and decide that “officially.”

We should get rid of 2/3 of the TSA screeners. Hire better-trained protoplasm at 3x the salary whose job it is to go down the line interviewing everyone waiting in line for the weapons screening process. If their gestalt is that you bad, you get pulled. No questions. No whining about profiling. It’s assinine not to profile b/c it wastes resources. But that’s a rant for another day.

7

Seems to me that its less about real effect, and much more about butt covering - looking like something is being done, and to appease an uncertain electorate, after all, it would not do to have a ‘war on terror’ and yet not appear to be taking some measures to protect the public.

8

Here is one example of when the No Fly List was a success. Of course, there’s many, many incidents in which its performance was less than good. Here is a PDF report from the GAO which touches somewhat on its effectiveness, but more on the inconvenience it causes.

Setting aside how the program is carried out by the TSA, there seems to be a question about the fundamental concept of these types of security measures.
I don’t think anyone will tell you that there is any fully effective security measure that can stand alone. If you lock your front door, a crook can still break your window. If you lock your door and bar your windows, he can pose as the UPS guy and get you to open the door. At some point, there becomes in the crook’s mind a diminishing return for burglarizing your home. If all he has to do is walk through your open front door, he may rob you blind; but if you make him jump through too many hoops – like make him go through the trouble of buying the UPS uniform – he may decide to look at other crimes.

So, let’s say our No Fly List creates doubt in Osama bin Laden’s mind that he could safely travel on his Saudi passport. He can maybe get a passport from a terrorist-sponsoring country under an alias, but surely our TSA would give additional scrutiny to Iranian passports. Or maybe he could get a fake Canadian passport, but getting a really good looking fake passport might cost, say, $5,000. Maybe that won’t stop Osama bin Moneybags, but it may be too much for his low-ranking henchman to afford.

Again, these kinds of security measures on their own don’t guarantee the bad guys will be caught, but they could force bad guys to do other things that make them more vulnerable to getting caught. In another analogy, it is like if your teenage kid misbehaves, you take away his/her computer. He will stop using IM, and start using the phone – and it may be easier for a parent to track a kid’s phone usage than to know what they’re typing on a computer keyboard.

9

[QUOTE=casdave]
Seems to me that its less about real effect, and much more about butt covering - looking like something is being done, and to appease an uncertain electorate, after all, it would not do to have a ‘war on terror’ and yet not appear to be taking some measures to protect the public.
[/QUOTE]
AKA, as per the term rbroome used, security theater.

10

I never knew it had a name it was always just a feeling I had, coupled with natural cynicism, who’d a thunk it !

11

It’s like the practice of having a soldier in full uniform, carrying a rifle, guarding an airport or train station. It’s foolish. You’re just making him a target. Any terrorist will know where the guard is and will make sure the first step of their attack is to shoot him.

The sensible idea would be to build hidden areas where the soldiers can monitor the crowd without being seen. This way they could defend against an actual attack. But the point apparently is to have the soldiers look like they’re doing something useful rather than actually have them doing something useful.

No doubt, there are security plans that aren’t shared with the general public. I’m sure that there are soldiers who are waiting in hidden sports to respond to any attack. But that doesn’t justify the fact that other soldiers are being used as targets just so the government can look good.