Illinois recently passed a law – thought by many to be tailored to the Drew Peterson case – that changed things. The “Hearsay Exception for Intentional Murder of a Witness,” rule allows for hearsay evidence to be admitted if, inter alia, the proponent of the evidence can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the party against whom the statement is offered intentionally murdered the declarant.
It’s not as novel a concept as the Peterson defense team wants to believe. In the federal system, Rule 804(b)(6) provides, “A statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused — or acquiesced in wrongfully causing — the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result,” is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Similarly, at common law, there exists the concept of “forfeiture by wrongdoing,” which reaches the same general result.
Note, however, a key difference: in the new Illinois law, the intent of the murderer is irrelevant – if the court finds that Ted killed Bill, then Bill’s hearsay is admissible against Ted. But in the federal system, Ted must have killed Bill intending, at least in part, to prevent him from testifying.
This is not a meaningless distinction: the Supreme Court, in Giles v California, overturn the conviction of a man who shot his girlfriend. He claimed self-defense. At trial, the prosecution introduced a statement she made three weeks before she died that Giles had accused her of cheating on him and threatening her life.
He was convicted and appealed, raising the Confrontation Clause. He said he was not permitted to confront the witnesses against him, as the Sixth Amendment requires. The Supreme Court agreed, saying that because the prosecution failed to prove that Giles killed his girlfriend to stop her from testifying, her hearsay testimony did not fall within the exception and was barred by the Confrontation Clause.
However, the Court also discussed when such intent might be inferred, and (in dicta) mentioned domestic violence as one example of a situation in which the intent to isolate the victim from friends and family might also be considered an attempt to stop her from reporting the crime or testifying…so Peterson’s domestic violence cord might be the key that allows the court to assume her death was intended to prevent testimony, and thus an exception to the Confrontation Clause.