So, uh, does he think that George is not guilty? Inquiring minds want to know.
It depends on the timing. Prior to January 20, 2009, the capture and incarceration of GWB would clearly be an act of hostility against the U.S. After January 20, 2009, I do not think that there would be any legal basis for U.S. belligerence in scenarios 1 or 2. (#3 would clearly be even more illegal than our murderous attack on Panama, of course.)
Anyone who argues against #'s 1 or 2 (once GWB has left office) had better be prepared to provide a citation that they have protested the capture and (attempted) trial(s) of Milošević or Pinochet or I would figure that they had demonstrated rank hypocrisy in conjunction with an overabundance of chauvinistic “AMERICA! #1! #1! #1! YAY!”
Correct me if I’m mistaken, but you also oppose any sort of law that would penalize future Presidents as well for starting a War of Aggression?
I think that Bush’s conduct is so egregious that we should amend the Constitution specifically to outlaw Wars of Aggression and to punish Bush ex post facto. And if you’re going to say that’s unamerican, what about the Nuremberg trials? Weren’t those ex post facto?
No, the idea was that Crimes against Humanity have always been crimes, no matter the lack of printed laws regarding them. And, the Nuremburg trials took place outside of US Courts, of course. They also were legal due to the unusual surrender of Germany*
And, Congress gave their consent for this War. So, they are all guilty of a “war of aggression”.
- wiki: "*The legal basis for the jurisdiction of the court was that defined by the Instrument of Surrender of Germany, political authority for Germany had been transferred to the Allied Control Council, which having sovereign power over Germany could choose to punish violations of international law and the laws of war. Because the court was limited to violations of the laws of war, it did not have jurisdiction over crimes that took place before the outbreak of war on September 3, 1939.
The war crimes tribunal tried and punished personnel only from Axis countries. Accusations arose claiming victor’s justice, since Allied war crimes could not be tried[citation needed]. It is, however, usual that the armed forces of a civilised country[3] issue their forces with detailed guidance on what is and is not permitted under their military code. These are drafted to include any international treaty obligations and the customary laws of war. For example, at the trial of Otto Skorzeny, his defence was in part based on the Field Manual published by the War Department of the United States Army, on 1 October 1940, and the American Soldiers’ Handbook[4]. If a member of the armed forces breaks their own military code then they can expect to face a court martial. When members of the Allied armed forces broke their military codes, they could be and were tried, as, for example, at the Biscari Massacre trials. The unconditional surrender of the Axis powers was unusual and led directly to the formation of the international tribunals. Usually, international wars end conditionally and the treatment of suspected war criminals makes up part of the peace treaty. In most cases those who are not prisoners of war are tried under their own judicial system if they are suspected of committing war crimes – as happened to some Finns at the end of the concurrent Finnish-Soviet Continuation War. In restricting the international tribunal to trying suspected Axis war crimes, the Allies were acting within normal international law…Part of the defence was that some treaties were not binding on the Axis powers because they were not signatories. This was addressed in the judgment relating to war crimes and crimes against humanity[31] contains an expansion of customary law “the Convention Hague 1907 expressly stated that it was an attempt ‘to revise the general laws and customs of war,’ which it thus recognised to be then existing, but by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were recognised by all civilised nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war which are referred to in Article 6 (b) of the [London] Charter.” The implication under international law is that if enough countries have signed up to a treaty, and that treaty has been in effect for a reasonable period of time, then it can be interpreted as binding on all nations not just those who signed the original treaty. This is a highly controversial aspect of international law, one that is still actively debated in international legal journals.
*