In what alternate universe were the Iraqi ground forces superior to the attacking coalition forces? Could they have made the coalition forces pay a higher price during the attack? Probably not even that. Iraqi units that tried to fight back were just wiped out by overwhelming firepower, often with absolutely no way to shoot back effectively.
Another World War II US Navy example: the Battle off Samar in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Japanese Admiral Kurita, commanding Imperial Japan 2nd Fleet Force “A” (“Center Force”) were in a position to blow past a US Navy Task Unit (Taffy 3, a dozen very light escort-type warships) and bombard the landing beaches of the American landings on Leyte. Their largest vessel – Yamato – by itself outweighed the entire US force it caught by surprise. 4 battleships, 8 cruisers, and 11 destroyers ambushed 6 “jeep” carriers, 3 destroyers, and 4 destroyer escorts.
The American response was to charge. :eek: Aircraft on the escort carriers, fitted with weapons unsuited for attacking warships, launched and bombarded Japanese ships with HE bombs (useful in ground attack, worthless against armored warship), depth charges, and even just machinegun fire. (Or, once all weapons were discharged, “dry” attacks designed to waste Japanese anti-aircraft fire against unarmed aircraft.) Destroyers and DEs began hopeless attacks to try to drive off the Japanese force, and succeeded beyond any rational expectation. Kurita gave confusing attack orders and apparently mis-identified his opposition as battleships, cruisers, and fleet carriers. The Japanese command saw what they were afraid of – that the Northern Force’s decoy action hadn’t succeeded and Center Force was facing the battle line and fleet carriers of the US 3rd Fleet – instead of what was really there. Somehow, they didn’t recognize that the actual enemy before them was one they should be able to curbstomp in passing.
Taffy 3’s suicidal attack charge reinforced this misunderstanding – the US force didn’t act like they were completely outclassed and defeated. So after a confusing melee, Kurita ordered his force to withdraw.
The US lost 2 escort carriers out of 6; 2 destroyers out of 3 (and the third damaged); 1 destroyer escort out of 6 plus two damaged; and about 1500 sailors. The Japanese lost 3 heavy cruisers (either to torpedo attacks during the main fight or follow-up air attacks as they withdraw), plus the other three heavy cruisers damaged.
Center Force could have pushed through and attained their objective after swatting away Taffy 3’s resistance. The 11 Japanese destroyers would have made the difference; as peers to the US destroyers and DEs, they were in the best position to oppose them. (The Japanese capital ships’ big guns became useless against the US counterattack once USN destroyers and DEs got close enough that the big guns couldn’t depress to aim at them.) In general, they were the ships that finished off the US ships that were sunk, other than the carriers (which were sunk with long-range main gun fire or kamikaze attack.)
Kurita withdrew because he didn’t believe he could win against the phantasm main battle fleet he imagined he was facing. He quit when every rule of logic says he should have won, big.
Too late to ETA: this is an example of an attacker who gave up too soon. Don’t know if that makes a difference to original premise.
Going to echo the posters citing the British collapse at Singapore. Not only were the British forces superior in number, but the Japanese forces were rapidly running out of supplies (having outrun their supply trains) at the time the British capitulation. Furthermore the Allied myth that the Japanese were superior jungle fighters is untrue – many of the Japanese troops involved were new, recently having been civilians, and had no special training in jungle warfare. The British notoriously defended the roads and left their flanks unguarded in the jungle, a classic blunder.
The most plausible explanation for the capitulation has always seemed to me that the steady tide of Japanese successes elsewhere panicked the British command (Slim mainly) and led to a very warped mental picture of the situation.
This was the worst defeat of the British empire and it came against inferior numbers, completely humiliating in a military sense.
For naval battles, the “Battle off Samar” is a classic:
TL, DR version: during the huge Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese willingly suffered crippling naval losses for the express purpose of trying to slip battleships past the American defenders and hit the landing forces invading the Philippines. Surprisingly, the sprawling Japanese battle plan worked, and giant Japanese battleships and cruisers descended on the landing area with only a tiny antisubmarine flotilla in their way. They then proceeded to be damaged and panicked into retreat by said grossly underpowered American flotilla.
Considering that the Imperial Japanese navy (thinking realistically for once) never intended to survive the battle intact, and was willing to take heavy losses for the chance to hit the US transports, the failure of nerve is extraordinary. The IJN never again mounted a serious attack – they had to know this was their last shot – and were suicidally willing to stand up to the Americans throughout the war. With success in sight after such great cost, why turn back? What were they saving the ships for?
Well, tactically the Japanese were attacking, but strategically they were trying to defend the Philippines.
Perhaps a classic, if we go back a ways, is how Bonnie Prince Charlie took his rebel army and marched within 60 miles of London, then gave up and turned around. London was in a panic, national bonds were selling at firesale prices with the anticipation that the government would fall (and they wouldn’t be repaid). Some say Charlie realized he was not getting the local support he expected to toss out the German usurpers, but whatever the reason, he gave up too easily.
I believe you meant Percival.
Slim was a successful WW2 British commander who eventually defeated the Japanese.
This is a good example.
I did say “it has been argued” :D. Without necessarily disagreeing strongly, but just to play Devil’s Advocate, the counterargument is that delaying the inevitable was a goal in of itself in the east. The Pakistanis may have been substantially outnumbered and the fight effectively lost, but my understanding is that many of their major combat units were still largely intact. The Indian offensive had been a strategic maneouver victory. Stubbornly holding out( or trying to )in Dacca and other strongpoints may have resulted in a more favorable peace treaty if they were able to bleed India on two fronts for an extended period of time. Bowing to the inevitable just meant more pressure available to apply to Pakistan on the western front.
Or possibly not. But I know the idea has been floated, because I didn’t come up with it ;).
Labeling attacker and defender is susceptible to where you draw the lines. One possible option is the Battle of Maritsa in 1371.
The two Serbian leaders went on the operational offensive with 20,000-70,000 troops estimated. They were faced by an estimated eight hundred troops of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans chose the tactical offensive. They raided the Serb camp at night. Waking to throats being slit, the Serbs routed. Serb casualties were heavy including several thousand troops that drowned trying to escape across the Maritsa River. The Serbs also lost both of their monarchs. The remainder of the Serb army didn’t surrender but the defeat did end their campaign.
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The Spartacus army was apparently breaking up even when they were numerically much superior, and therefore probably actually superior, if they stayed together. The command had them break up and sent about third to cover a way to retreat… This cost them and they were routed and hunted down and exterminated. It was a mistake as they were besieged… retreat was retreat to nowhere. They needed to remain together and take over a port so that they could feed the entire army…and then perhaps slowly evacuate by boat or something.
Spanash Amada goes to invade England via the English Channel… . Rather than holding the mouth of the Thames and sending a few boats to ferry soldiers over from France, they all go over to the France to collect them… And the soldiers weren’t even there to collect.
So the Brits send out the Navy, and catch the Amada off guard. Ok, thats a major stupid thing… Invate the enemies waterway… THEN go and sit still in a huddle just a few hours away.
Then, when startled, the Amada took off north. Apaprently that was disasterous, they weren’t ready for the North Sea… and the vast number of hazards around the islands on that side of Britain. They would have been better to do a suicide run southward… safer than north… Or they might have even won. But they tried to run north…
May not be exactly what the OP is looking for, but I love this story about Rothenburg ob der Tauber Germany (very cute town).
Basically, in WWII Americans had surrounded the town and it was lightly defended. If the Germans did not surrender, the town would be hammered into dust by artillery. Both the Americans and Germans knew about the historic importance and beauty of Rothenburg. Six Americans hiked in under a white flag to negotiate a surrender to save the town from destruction. The German commander agreed ignoring Hitlers orders to fight to the death.
I love that little town. It’s touristy now of course, but much of it’s long, long history remains intact because a few men decided to not be fools.
The Siege of Detroit in 1812 is perhaps the most wonderful example.
General Hull’s force defending the Detroit outpost was 2,000 strong and could have resisted any attack the enemy could have mustered. Hull was, however, about as defeatist and pessimistic a man as has ever worn the uniform of the United States Army, and he was becoming convinced he was doomed long before anyone was actually ready to attack him. The British/Canadian/Indian force was commanded by Sir Isaac Brock and Tecumseh, who were, by comparison, excellent officers.
Anyway, Brock knew from intelligence sources that Hull was ready to give up, so he engaged in a variety of deception techniques to convince Hull he had something other that the smaller ragtag force he did. At one point Brock and Tecumseh literally had their men march in sight of American lookouts, duck back into the forest, run around back and march past them again. He sent a letter to Hull saying he demanded immediate surrender and implying his Indian forces might go crazy if a surrender wasn’t forthcoming, though Tecumseh’s men would have done no such thing.
Despite being told by his subordinates that he was being had, Hull panicked and surrendered. There is evidence he may have been drunk. He was court martialed and sentenced to hang for his cowardice, though it was dropped to being tossed from the Army.
The battle was a disaster for the USA. Natives throughout the northern USA rose up to support the British, and Canadians rallied to the cause. the war swung widly in Britain’s favour and much of Michigan and New York might today be Canada except that Brock and Tecumseh got themselves killed shortly thereafter and were replaced by vastly less competent generals, while the Americans replaced their inept generals with capable ones.
I wouldn’t call the fall of Singapore an example of giving up too soon or too easily. The Malaya campaign lasted for two months during which the British fought as well as they were able to, but were still outfought. The battle of Singapore itself lasted a week and was pretty fierce. The British could have held out longer, but without control of the air or sea the prospect for victory (or even of not getting slaughtered) was remote.
I’d say the main mistake the British leadership made in Malaya and Singapore was underestimating the capabilities of the Japanese, not overestimating them.
I am not versed in military history so could you explain the “sooner than necessary” part? If the outcome to be was indeed read correctly then why would taking a longer path with more death and destruction by both sides not be something best avoided?
I can imagine such could be the case if prolonging an inevitable loss in a battle served a role in greater war, such as causing a greater degree of enemy losses even if the one battle’s defeat, or allowing for some other goal to be achieved … Would such have been the case here?
I don’t disagree. I just think it points to how the question is purely subjective. The Malaya-Singapore campaign was deeply humiliating to the British/CW. You can IME see that down to today in the attitudes of many Brit/CW’ers interested in military history. It’s only natural for them to think in terms of the better military performances and higher capability of British Empire forces (particularly later) in WWII, compared to which it might be said the British command ‘underestimated’ the capability of their forces. But the equally valid subjective interpretation is that with the forces actually at hand relatively quick defeat (even the whole Malaya campaign, 2 months but a whole of advance in 2 months by the Japanese) was the best they could do against the IJA even with a 2:1+ numerical advantage.
And that applies no matter where you consider the Japanese superiority to have resided, whether at command level or the rank and file soldier (but the latter is again a quite sensitive topic down to the present). However the idea the British failure was preordained day 1 of the Japanese landings in Malaya/Thailand because British were ‘cut off from resupply’ is simply not true. Eventually, most of the way to giving up a 650 mile advance from northern Malaya to Singapore in less than two months, the British force could no longer add to its months of remaining supplies, though against a Japanese force at the end of its logistical tether as has been pointed out. But the campaign was over in a few weeks from that point.
“Amateurs talk strategy [or tactics depending on version of the quote]. Professionals talk logistics” applies less than usually to this campaign. The basic British problem was being outfought consistently tactically. Which extends actually to the RAF fighter force being eventually wiped out by Japanese Army and Navy fighters therefore subjecting the British field army to the nuisance (which is all it was generally to WWII field armies) of operating under enemy air superiority. Mainly, the Japanese fighters just shot down more British ones than they lost in almost every engagement. Logistics would have sealed British defeat if they’d held out a lot longer, but not in the actual campaign.
So again with the Japanese on Singapore island and making key breakthroughs there was no point in continuing resistance, like the moment of defeat in most battles/campaigns where the defeated side does not have a ‘fight to the death regardless’ ethic. Whether over the larger campaign the British command ‘underestimated’ the (assumed) high capability of their forces, or whether the (arguable) incompetence of that command meant it wasn’t an underestimate, or whether the rank and file forces were as potentially capable as some like to believe based on later British successes*, that’s all pretty fuzzy IMO.
*the British-led Allied campaign in Burma 1944-45 v the Japanese was highly successful, but the Allies often outnumbered the IJA even more heavily in that campaign than they had in Malaya.
And how horrible it would have been if he had won. More religious persecution, and likely no British colonies in North America, leading to a really weird Alt Hist with no USA.
Considering that the first colonies were established during Queen Elizabeth’s reign (about 100 years earlier), I have trouble imagining how the British would have no colonies because Charlie won. Admittedly, the subsequent events in the colonies would have been different, so possibly no USA, but they still would have had colonies.