When did the Japanese realise the odori was up?

Sister thread to this one on when Jerry realised it was game over.

Do we know when in the war the Japanese (by which I mean any contemporary Japanese source, civilian or military) started to realise that it would end in defeat, even if they had to keep the doubts to themselves?

The obvious answer is after Hiroshima and Nagasaki went up in blinding flashes of nuclear fire, but the Japanese had been losing long before August 1945. The earliest I can find is from Admiral Yamamoto, who realised early on that the whole thing would end in tears, although it doesn’t look like he said the “sleeping giant” quote but he did say “In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.”

I know the official party line was that Japan would fight a defence of the home islands so bloody that it would make the Americans accept a peace more favourable to Japan, but how many beyond the militarists thought this was likely? Was it comparable to Hitler’s promises that the ‘wonder weapons’ would turn the tide of the war, something that only fantasists could cling to? What would be the ‘Japanese Stalingrad’? Marianas? The loss of the Yamato? The first use of Kamikazes? Falling back in Burma?

Some in the military never did. Its too complex for a simple answer. Those who advocated surrender were assassinated. They almost killed the Emperor. Thank god for the atomic bomb.

There was no Stalingrad with the possible exception of Okinawa. They still controled large chunks of China and Indonesia and Malaysia. The secret wepon the Japanese military relied on was its people.

I’d say Midway was Japan’s Stalingrad. The loss of most of their naval aviators and carriers was irreplaceable, and once they lost the ability to contest at sea it was simply a matter of time.

Prime Minister Konoe (to whom Yamomoto made the ‘six to twelve months’ statement) probably believedthat Japan could not win before Pearl Harbor. So mid-1941?

Speaking of the Emperor according to this wiki cite it was the aftermath of Operation Meetinghouse, the firebombing of Toyko, that pushed him into personal involvement with the peace process.

…And also thank Stalin for invaded Manchuria at about the same time…

I think he knew but the structure of the Japanese government was a mess and he had to rely on respect for his position to get most of the army to go along. Give the Japanese credit for handling the postwar period about as well as possible.

I have to go with this as the decisive turning point. Yamamoto sensed the strategic necessity to keep the war short to avoid a long battle of attrition that they were ill equipped to win. While they still had a well trained and equipped fleet there was still a hope of one big success. After Midway they couldn’t challenge for the sea and were ground up in detail by a country with the population and economic capability to win at any point they chose.

That’s different than leaders both realizing and being willing to admit it.

The Japanese “Secret Police” had the job of making sure no one spoke publicly of even the possibility of defeat. So no, there are probably no written record of “defeatist” thought, and certainly no public demonstration.
I saw a documentary by a Japanese-American (second generation) whose uncle had been assigned to Kamikaze duty. She regretted not talking to him and went to Japan to find and interview the surviving pilots and find what she could.
The story included the tale of a pilot who was the Ace of the group - and who was assigned to “become a god” (sound familiar? no virgins in this one), despite being able to hit an enemy ship on each mission. “If they are willing to sacrifice me, they must be in trouble” was his thought.
His wife wrote him a letter about doing his duty - and added - “perhaps it will be easier if I go first”.
She then took their two children and jumped with them into a river.

So there were some who were painfully aware that things were not going well.

How on earth did the military explain away Doolittle’s raid? When your capital is being bombed, it must be hard to claim invincibility.

How do you judge such actions? Psychotic and demented or incredibly brave and devoted???

How does anyone judge “Suicide for God and Country”?

Time and place vary - my best friend in High School was raised to believe that “Dying for your Country” was the finest thing a man could hope for. This was 1967. It took him 6 months to find a Vietnamese Patriot who was quicker than he.
I couldn’t talk him out of it. His devoted girlfriend couldn’t talk him out of it.
Randy, another time and place would have been the first Kamikaze or suicide bomber.

I cannot wrap my head around the mindset.

I wouid say the Marianas. June 1944.

Brave and stupid. :frowning:

Among the (military) leadership, you have to distinguish “The war cannot be won.” from “The war is lost.”

Right up until near the end the general thinking among the top brass (which mainly ran the country) was while the war could not be won, if they could win a “decisive victory” somewhere, they could negotiate an end to the war that was naively favorable to them: no occupation, keep Taiwan, Korea, etc., the Western colonies would not revert to colonies but become independent, no change in government, no war crimes trial. Virtually a “back to things the way they were before” goal but with extras for them!

This “decisive victory” idea came from the way they won the Russo-Japanese war at Port Arthur at the end of 1904. (Militaries always fight the last war, you know.)

The military also kept the Emperor snowed about what was going on for the longest time. It was only well into 1945 that he was getting reports from family members about the dire situation the country’s military and civilian population were in that he decided to open up the range of war-ending options somewhat. (And then not really start to act until the dual blows of the a-bombs and Russia entering the war.)

The Japanese civilians knew things weren’t going well. E.g., American bombers were roving at will with no fighter opposition late in the war. But they were mostly in a state of shock about things. When the US Navy started direct shore bombardment of Japanese ports, the locals really thought that the IJN would soon show up and blast the Yanks right out of the water. And they couldn’t understand why that didn’t happen. They really didn’t know what had happened to the IJN.

So the bulk of the Japanese civilian population didn’t know the war was lost until after the Emperor’s announcement and even then this was mainly via media interpreting what the Emperor had said and made it clear that the war was lost.

Stupid and ultimately futile -

“No bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. You won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country.” - George S. Patton.

The Doolittle Raid did not do much damage. It a gesture for the US citizens. The only Japanese version I recall was a child who saw the American aircraft and believed it to be Japanese. The B-25s still had the “red ball” in their insignia. It was removed because nervous antiaircraft gunners would think it was the rising sun insignia and fire on their own aircraft.
I imagine that the Japanese press did not report the raid.

I don’t think Yamamoto ever believed victory was possible in a war with the United States, or that the war could be kept short. Another thing that he did say that was quoted out of context for propaganda purposes during the war was that "Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. " What he was saying was that it was impossible, as the next sentence makes clear “I wonder if our politicians, among whom armchair arguments about war are being glibly bandied about in the name of state politics, have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.” The first part of the statement was bandied about in the US to show just how evil and villainous the Japanese plans were.

Even if Japan had sunk every US ship it encountered from Pearl Harbor to Midway and not lost a single ship of their own, they would face naval parity with the US mid-late '43 and be outnumbered by nearly 2-1 by the middle of '44. Any hope of winning one big decisive battle was an ephemeral one.

Unfortunately, I gave away most of my WWII books when I was still living in Japan, because of space considerations, so I don’t have them for reverence. I’ll google a bit to find some info.

The average Taro and Hanako did not think about it. They simply endured the hardships and consigned their fates to fate. They had no say or power to stop what was happening. People who wanted to read between the lines of the official news would have known things weren’t going well, as the great victories over the evil Americans were coming closer and closer to the homeland. More likely than not, however, most people just ignored what they were powerless to change.

The B-29s brought the hell of war to their shores on March 9/10, 1945 in the deadly Tokyo firebombing raid which killed more people than either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. My former MIL lived as a child in the area which was targeted. They went one way and their neighbors went another, only to never return.

One unintended consequence was that the displaced working class people who were taken in by kind strangers in the more prosperous parts of Tokyo were shocked to see how much better the other half lived, even in the middle of war. This became a serious problem for the government which started to become concerned over the reaction of the people.

In 1940, 50% of Japanese lived in rural communities and on farms. The majority of them were functionally illiterate and most lacked radios. From 1942 onward, in the forth year of the war (for them, the US skipped the first couple of years), these families started to feel the effects of the war rationing and loss of male labor. The rice crop that year was disastrously low.

By 1943, labors throughout Japan were forced to skip work at times in order to obtain food either through theft or on the black market. To combat this, the government increased the rations for certain workers. Increasingly, the Japanese were becoming dependent on food from the Ryukyu islands (Okinawa), their colonies and conquered areas, a dependency which would cripple them as the USN slowly sank their merchant fleet. IIRC, that fleet was only 75% of their civilian needs at the start of the war, and they lost something like 60% of that.

By mid 1944, workers were not able to receive enough food. Daily calorie intake for nurses in one hospital were only 1,475, a mere 67% of recommended allowances. People complained of chronic fatigue and became more susceptible to disease and malnutrition.

Junior high school children became an important part of the workforce during the final year of the war as high school student were already taken for either labor or inducted into the army.

PM Tojo was forced to resign in June or July, 1944 after the loss of Saipan and an ineffective place keeper was set up in his stead.

By late 1944, some noted civilians and government officials were (extremely quietly) suggesting negotiations to end the war, but the military dominated government refused to consider this.

The Imperial Japanese Navy should have known that it was all over by the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October of 1944 which finished it off as a fighting force. This was after having its air power destroyed in the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot earlier that summer.

In February 1945, former PM Prince Konoe urged the Emperor to negotiate for a conditional surrender but Hirohito declined, preferring to wait for a “grand victory” in some battle in order to negotiate from a position of strength.

After the invasion of Okinawa in April, 1945, PM Koiso resigned and Admiral (ret) Suzuki was installed in order to find a way to end the war.

I’ve posted a number of times on the final days of the war, so I’ll skip that this time, but as others have noted, the fanatical elements would have preferred dying over surrender.

It took the Japanese 3 years to build an aircraft carrier-the US could build on in less than a year. Even if the US navy had been decimated, the war in China would have eaten up the IJA. Victory was impossible.

Some additional thoughts.

The firebombing raids caused damage to all of Japan’s major cities, and many of their smaller ones.

By late spring to early summer of 1945, USN sub warfare, surface shelling, carrier based attacks, USAAF strategic bombing and mine laying, and whatnot meant that there would be few people in Japan who didn’t realize that the war was going very badly.

After receiving the reports from the postwar fact finding missions to Japan, the US was starting to switch targets in Japan and increasingly attacked the transportation network. Japan was dependent on coal from the northern island of Hokkaido, for example, and attacks on the transportation system reduced that supply by 80%.

It was only the fanatical view of the military which kept it going.