My workplace brags about security–it’s a major selling point when the marketing folks show potential customers around the facility. We have a 24 hour guard, dozens of security cameras, access only to authorized personnel, hand scanners, etc.
In reality, security policies are neglected and ignored on a routine basis, because “it’s too much of a hassle” to follow them to the letter. Whenever customers are inconvenienced because of the policies, management usually says, “Oh, we’ll let it go this time…” to avoid complaints. I can’t wait until their lax attitude backfires on them.
Can you quantify, and tell me which base? Because I work on a military base, and will tell you right up front that your assumption is false.
This is why layered policies and measures are a good blanket for security–while not the proverbial “woobie,” it does allow flexibility for more heightened periods, but it doesn’t put so much fatigue on those personnel that they burn out on things, give up, and totally neglect the job.
Awareness and monitoring can be mentally (and physically) stressful, which is a known fact. You have to have breaks or layers of security that when one fails, the other picks up–kind of like ‘interlocking fields of fire’. But yep, lax attitudes or sloppy performance can kill an organization and people. I’m constantly being evaluated for the security in my place. Sometimes it’s just a couple of cops rolling by to make sure the doors are still locked and no windows are smashed, sometimes it’s a full up paperwork inspection to make sure the written access logs match the alarm system printouts.
Tripler
Although, it’s not so bad the security guards have to stick some fingers in my coffee. . . yet.
I would say probably not, because talking about your security is violating the first rule of Operational Security, which is “We do not talk about Fight Club”
On a military installation, it’s worth noting that locked doors, secured safes (with required regular inspections) and all that other neat stuff is also accompanied by the fact that the entire base is fenced in and guarded/patrolled by on-base police forces who can be summoned very quickly by a variety of means, somewhat analogous to the security guards, except that our security guards wear body armor and can summon armor-plated 4x4s with machine guns.
There was a promo on History Channel about Fort Knox which claimed that breaking INTO Fort Knox was relatively easy, but good luck to anyone trying to get OUT afterwards (cue shots of armed soldiers, humvees, tanks, artillery, and attack choppers)
I believe that DHS mandated that companies with trucks that crossed the US border had to have a secured work facility. Doors that are locked and can be opened only via RFID ID cards, secured office and lab facilities and cameras that over look the building , plus cameras that oversee the shipping area.
Car companies that have just in time policies ,which pretty much means everyone, find it irratating to have a production line shut down, while the shipment is stopped at the border for customs to clear it.
So the system to work with that , is to pre clear shipments and that means we send paper work to customs and garuntee that whats in that trailer matches the documents, and no WMD or ilegals or what ever.
just out of curiosity, have you ever heard of a facility that really does that? (or more hygienically ban drinks coming and going?) I have heard urban legends of this, but never talked to anyone who has seen/experienced it.
I meant it more of a comical euphemism for “searching food and beverages.” Yes, I do know of places that do this but it’s either A) a clear liquid they visually inspect, B) make you empty your cups/containers and then visually inspect, or C) we’ll X-ray the fluid.
The latest thing is that they’re trying to keep USB or flash drives out of restricted areas. . . . and yes, you can wrap 'em up and make 'em sink in the bottom of a coffee cup.
Tripler
Nobody really ever follows the “No Food or Drinks” signs anymore.
Most of the computers on base here won’t even accept thumb drives at all. You have to get each individual USB device authorized, including printers and scanners (and, I suppose, in theory, authorized USB storage devices)
I work for a company that has warehouses with millions of dollars of slip-into-the-pocket sized small inventory.
In order for me, a visiting employee, to get in, I have to stop at security, have an ID check and be giving a visitors pass, leave bags at the front and be issued a clean smock. The whole place is covered by cameras as well, inside and out.
In our case, it’s not about stopping the terrorists. It’s about stopping employees, visitors and people off the street from shoving thousands of dollars in inventory into their pockets.
Cell phone cameras are nominally forbidden on many / most military bases as well; one I’ve visited for work had a sign saying they could not be brought on base. As it’s nearly impossible to find a cell phone these days that does NOT have a camera, I gather this is now widely ignored.
A friend of mine was working at a location where you weren’t allowed to have cell phones at all.
Re the OP “Neither of those security protections are required for buildings which house Government Top Secret information. TS information can be kept behind a few ID card/PIN doors, an alarm system, and a couple of combination locks.” - This is not true. Although I’ve never handled TS information myself, I’ve visited sites where such was certainly handled. Yes, there were keycards / PIN pads to get into those areas, but there was also definitely security guards / video surveillance to get into the buildings.
I’ll agree with Tripler that it’s not quite half. But I’ll also say that it’s more than just the “obvious” ones. That’s because, as mentioned upthread, the protection measures for TS info aren’t such that they must be conspicuous to outside observers. A few limited-access doors, alarms, and some combo locks are all it takes. This means that any random office building (which would describe most of the buildings on my base) is potentially capable of storing any level of classified material without making a big “scene” out of it. You could work in such a building yourself and easily have no idea that in some corner, there is a vault containing TS information.
That’s not to say that getting those measures in place isn’t a big deal. And special approval must be granted before a facility can house highly-classified material (so it’s not just a matter of putting up a key-card door and saying “voilà!”) But my point is that once all the proper steps are taken to be able to store such material, it can all happen behind some very nondescript door in a nondescript office building. And that’s a good thing…being conspicuous is a liability.
Not at a government facility - but I worked as a computer contractor at a place which banned eating or drinking at your desk. It was a pharmaceutical company and at one other location, where they actually manufactured product, the desk workers had to go through or near the production area to get to the office areas, so they didn’t want people carrying anything that might contaminate the product.
For consistency, they applied this policy to their other locations even though the other buildings were strictly administrative.
Nobody ever tried to stick their fingers in my drink, though.
Well, these things vary a lot. I know of a couple different areas on my base which store TS material and are relatively accessible. That is, if you can get on base, you can get very close with no additional security. The buildings that house these particular storage facilities not themselves access-controlled. Once on base, you can walk right through the front door of the building (you’re only subject to being challenged by the building residents, but not as a practical matter), and right up to the front door of the vault, if you can tell which of the many similar-looking doors it is.
Now, just getting there doesn’t do you much good, because you’re still several limited-access doors, combination locks and intrusion alarms away from any actual information. However, it goes to show that the buildings themselves aren’t always swarming with armed guards and cameras. Sometimes “hidden in plain sight” is the way to go.
Let’s see… my company has guards, CCTV cameras, proximity ID card readers, and alarms. Much of that is equired by various government regulations, the rest by the fact that we’re rated a top tier terrorist target… and that’s in Washington, D. C. where targets abound.
Yeah, this is a new rule that I learned a few months ago. Apparently, it’s across the Air Force. I was a bit surprised when our network guys said, “. . . and don’t ever plug a thumb drive in. They’ll know it in minutes!” He explained to me the new rules on 'em being verboten. I asked him how I was supposed to move big files around and he said, “Stock up on CD-ROMs.”
Tripler
Hell, they even have USB port ‘safety plugs’ to keep you from “accidentally” trying to plug one in.
It’s not just the Air Force. When I was at the Army clinic near me last week, their information monitor had a slide about not being able to use thumb drives.
I worked for the phone company here (previously a publicly owned corporation) and they have spent a lot of money on ID cards for everyone which doubled as building entry and restricted area entry as well (and in some cases access was restricted to times of day). It was annoying to be planning apparatus installation in an area upstairs from the office which even you weren’t allowed into (or you had to make out a case for temporary access, typically one day).
Previously you had to have a great big jailer’s bunch of keys to get in to all the buildings in your area of responsibility - and that was with the supposedly ‘master’ Ingersoll pass key which would let you into any of the building with an Ingersoll on the front door. As was typical with this company, somebody would have a fit of enthusiasm for security measures - and then the budget would run out before the program was finished, leaving some buildings with an older layer of security. There were several generations of this. I once arrived at a single-storey ‘large hut’ site to find a locksmith installing a £60 lock on a 3-ft high wooden fence you could have jumped over (or pushed over with a nudge from a van).
Older security measures inside the buildings included code locks - typically, if you came across one of these, you hunted around a nearby wall until you found where someone had scribbled it on there.
Apparently, it’s a huge issue with contractors who forget/think they’re above the law and try to get away with it anyway. We are one big, happy DoD network after all. . .:rolleyes:
