I am scratching my head over this one. I don’t watch the news so maybe that’s my problem (not being up and up on the latest drama). But from what I have gathered, Iran stands to benefit greatly if they are put in power. Iran is predominantly Shi’a, and so is the Alliance. But then I see that the Iraqi National Congress is also this ticket, and since I know that this was put in place by the United States, who is currently ‘threatening’ (ok, not ruling it out) to kick Iran’s ass, it seems that we are put in a pretty funky circle.
Can someone straighten this out for me? I can handle american politics, but there don’t seem to be any really good sources of info for this.
The reason there is some cause for Iran to welcome a UIA win is A) they represent, more than any other grouping, the Shi’a Islamists and B) the single largest party ( but hardly dominating ) in the UIA is SCIRI ( plus their now apparently technically seperate, but in effect sister group the Badr Organization, which budded off SCIRI’s military arm ) , which is a group that was long funded by, based in, and of complementary ideology ( i.e. backing the concept of velayat e-faqih ) to Iran. Also there are pro-Iranian or Iran-sympathetic sections of al Da’wa, Hizbullah and some of the other Islamist parties in the UIA.
The INC is not a powerful group, but they have been out of favor with the U.S. since Chalabi was accused of bartering info to Iran and proved such an unreliable and duplicitous agent ( something they should have realized years ago, but oh well ). A rather slippery character, he is well-used to playing both sides of the fence and allying with what is almost certainly the single strongest Iraqi political slate makes good strategic sense. Especially as he can’t or won’t ally with his old rival Allawi and his INA, who are the current in-favor U.S. ally and are running a more “secularist” slate. Allawi and Chalabi were essentially patronized by different U.S. agencies during the exile period, Chalabi by the Pentagon, Allawi by the State Dept. if I recall correctly. Chalabi was long dominant, but now events have shifted heavily against him and Allawi rules the roost. He has little to lose and much to gain by hitching his cart to a different power-broker at this point.
This may be a case where Iran’s interests and U.S. interests coincide. From what I’ve gathered, Iran has actually counselled Iraq to NOT install clerics as leaders. And Ayatollah al-Sistani comes from a Shia sect that believes that religion and government should be separate, or at least religious leaders should tend to the religous health of the people and stay out of all other affairs.
A secular Shiite state in Iraq, with solid representation by Sunnis and Kurds may be a very good thing for Iran, the U.S., and the Middle East. Those who stand to lose are the Arab Sunni states. A secular shiite Iraq could be a moderating influence on Iran, but also be a natural ally of Iran. Perhaps in that role Iraq could become the natural gateway between the U.S. and Iran, and a gateway between Iran and the Sunni Arab world.