Manning and the Colts have given every indication that he will play next year.
Just because the Packers were unable to get the tying score doesn’t mean it wasn’t the right strategy. I am a big Packer fan, and my recollection is that if the Packers stopped the Broncos n the 1 yard line a couple of times the clock would have essentially run down to zero after a Broncos field goal. So Holmgren had them score to get the ball back with as much time as possible, but Favre was unable to drive for the tying TD. Of course the Pack could have had them try the field goal on the small chance they screw it up or maybe fumble, either way the Packers had a small probability of winning once the Broncos got down to that point.
True, but until he’s actually on the field, I think it’s a very open question. And, even if he does play in 2012, the question of just how much longer he can play is out there, too.
It doesn’t matter whether Kentucky’s chance of scoring a TD is 1% or 99%. The PAT strategy only matters when they DO score. So for purposes of evaluating the PAT strategy, assume that Kentucky DOES score a TD and strip the problem down to its essentials:
Syracuse has a one-point lead and will attempt a PAT. Then Kentucky will attempt a PAT. What should Syracuse do?
If 2-point PAT’s were really 50% successful, it wouldn’t matter. If Syracuse goes for 2 and makes it, they win. If they miss, Kentucky kicks (assume 100% success), and the games goes to overtime where it is a 50-50 chance. So Syracuse would win 75% of the time.
If they go for 1, then Kentucky goes for 2 and makes it 50% of the time and has to win in overtime. So again Syracuse wins 75% of the time.
But alas, 2-point PAT’s (in college, from the 3-yard line) are not 50% successful. Year in and year out, the success rate runs around 45%–up some years, down others. So Syracuse should go for 1, and force Kentucky to go for 2.
Heh, look what just happened in the Super Bowl. It was like the parting of the Red Sea.
I suspect this will “mainstream” the strategy, and we’ll see more of it in 1-2 point games, plus discussion of it any time that it looks like it might come into play.
…except that the team that employed the strategy lost the game.
As for intentional safeties, as head coach of the Jets, Bill Parcells once called an intentional safety. The execution was a little odd, though: Shotgun formation, immediately after taking the snap the quarterback turned completely around and threw the ball through the uprights of his own goal posts. Safety.
It might. Collinsworth and Michaels were actually discussing the scenario right before it happened, wondering if the Giants might tell their running backs to go to the ground on the 1-yard line so they could run the clock down and make sure the Patriots couldn’t score. It made sense for the Patriots to let the Giants score because it was the only way they were going to get the ball back and they still had a chance to win. The interesting question for me is, were the Giants better off scoring or would it have been better if Bradshaw had successfully stopped at the 1? They told Bradshaw to take a dive, but I think it’s probably better to score the points even with such an easy field goal.
It almost becomes a farce at some point with one team trying to let the other team score and the other team trying not to score. It kinda reminds me of that South Park episode where the kids are trying to avoid the post season (and having to spend their summer vacation playing more baseball) by throwing games. The ploy worked until they ran up against employing the same strategy but more effectively. Of course, in the South Park, the kids were actually trying to lose, unlike the Patriots.
Considering that the team with the ball can just take a knee if necessary, it’s not that hard to not score. The Giants just weren’t expecting the Pats to make that hole.
Why? Short field goals are 99% successful, so with a dive and a FG NE had a 1% chance to win the game. Surely the chance of Brady leading an 80-yard drive in a minute was much, much greater than 1%.
It’s a very makeable field goal, although I think you’re overestimating how often they’re successful - nevermind that Tynes’ other kicks Sunday didn’t look very good to me. If you score a touchdown with some time left, you are definitely winning the game and you need to stop the Pats from scoring for about a minute. It’s not a sure thing, but you already have the points on the board and are in a position of strength. If you run the clock down and try the field goal, you lose if you miss. Running the clock down makes sense if you’re in a tie game and the worst that can happen is you go to overtime. Passing up a scoring opportunity when you’re losing so you can try for a last-second field goal? I’m not sure about that.
Not really. Look up the stats on FGs from inside 20 yards – hell, inside 30 – not to mention extra points, which is basically what this would have been. 99% is basically correct (if it turned out to be 98% I wouldn’t be too surprised; if it turner out to be 97% I would be).
Ok, if I counted correctly, in 2011 NFL kickers converted 96.3% of attempts from between 20 and 29 yards out (this one would have been 18 yards). Extra points are longer than this kick would have been; kickers this year attempted, it looks like, somewhere between 1100 and 1200 of them. They missed 7 (0.6%). Attempts from inside 20 yards are quite rare, somewhere from 8 to 18 attempts in a typical season, say; no team has missed one of these FGs in the last 9 years (Houston missed one in 2002).
But as to the larger point, I think it’s completely understandable to want to get the points on the board right away, and as a Giants fan I wasn’t totally immune to that desire. Still, from a purely objective view, scoring the TD is the wrong choice. All it does is swap out some immediate risk now in favor of a *larger *amount of risk later.
However, I will say that I don’t think successfully kicking the FG would have meant a 100% victory. The Giants would have been up by 1 and kicking off with about 15 seconds on the clock. I’d definitely give the Patriots a chance – somewhere between 2% and 4%, maybe – of kicking a game-winning FG (or running back the kickoff for a TD) in that instance.
According to this article at Slate the win probably for the Giants if Bradshaw had kept himself out of the end zone, allowing them to run off the clock would have been 98%.
By giving the ball back to the Patriots with a minute left the win probability fell to 88%.
This isn’t the first time in the Super Bowl. Superbowl XXXII
It didn’t work then either.
I think it’s been pretty well established that in cases like this, the correct strategy for the defending team is to allow the touchdown in order to save time. All the math says that this strategy is correct, and there have been several cases of teams employing it - this game, the Packers-Broncos Super Bowl, the MJD game, and the time Brian Westbrook did it and killed a million fantasy teams.
Psychologically it’s a hard decision to make, though. I know that for myself, taking the points feels better, and playing for this future probability makes me feel nervous.
One thing that might argue for not allowing the score is the possibility that kickers screw up more often in the playoffs. I don’t know if this is actually true - it may just be my Chargers bias talking :). But I wouldn’t be surprised if it turns out that kickers are more likely to miss chip shots in these high-pressure spots.
It will almost never work, in terms of winning you the game. The context is a pretty terrible situation for the defense, so it’s a question of changing your odds of winning from things like 1-in-30 to 1-in-20. No matter what, you’re probably losing.
That also confirmed what I thought, the Patriots actually should have let them score even earlier.
It was sure amusing to see Bradshaw fall over like a guy who just leaned against a door he thought was latched.
And strange to imagine that he could have gone down in history as a goat, for scoring the go-ahead touchdown.
Once the Patriots opened up, wouldn’t the optimal strategy have been to just stand around waiting on the 1 yard line until they came back and forced him down, to burn even more time? Or would that have been some sort of penalty?