Polycarp: “I don’t believe that has been established.”
(Would it be plagiarism for me to use that as my sig line?)
Esprix: “… and chairs. Chairs might be nice!”
If we’re talking about the actress who plays her, it’s Mo Gaffney, who used to be the comedy partner of Kathy Najimy.
Hastur, yes we are talking her, but scott meant her character’s full name. I got two-thirds of it right.
Y’know, maybe Polycarp’s right, and we need to start a new thread over in Cafe Society.
Sorry to interrupt with a relevant point, but in reading the BBC story on this, I was surprised to find
**These kind of cases happen periodically in the US, where the court will prohibit a school or group from discriminating in a certain way, but will not further involve itself in management decisions by that school or group. Often, the response will be,
“If we can’t stop a gay club, we won’t have any clubs.”
or
“If we can’t prevent the KKK from sponsoring a mile of road to keep clean, we won’t have any such program.”
or
“If we can’t stop competitors from using golf carts, we just won’t have any competitions.”
Ok, so the PGA didn’t do that last one. But they could have.
Why the court chose to insist on the dance being held is obvious, but why did the court take that extra step when in so many other cases courts have chosen not to impose themselves on a private organization or government agency? Is it just a Canadian thing?
dqa, interesting question, but it isn’t really clear from that BBC story that the court forbade the school to cancel the dance. There may have been other factors, unrelated to the court case, which prohibited the school from cancelling.
Of course, in the examples you give there is difference between an organization saying, “We don’t want these specific people involved” and “Fine – we’ll arrange it so that no one is involved.” If the intent of such a blanket action is, effectively, to discriminate against a certain protected class by doing an end-run around the law, then it’s an example of how the intent to discriminate against one group can affect everyone, even those not part of that group – a point some of us were trying to get across to another earlier in the thread.
So, to frame your question a different way: I wonder if a court can forbid such blanket behavior because the intended result of the behavior was to discriminate against a protected class?
If I understood you correctly, you’re suggesting that the court may have taken the additional step on the grounds that in Canada, gays are a protected class?
This could be. In the examples I cited, except for the last, it was merely a freedom of speech/assembly issue, and the plaintiffs were not members of a protected class.
Well…yes. We don’t know why this dance couldn’t be cancelled, but I’m wondering: if the Canadian court did forbid an eleventh-hour cancellation, was it on the grounds that doing so would be construed as a desire to circumvent the court’s intention and, effectively, carry out illegal discrimination anyway?
Or, if this is not what actually happened, could it ever? Are there legal grounds or precedents for this?
This seems tricky. The act of cancelling the dance is not clearly illegal discrimination against homosexuals, because it does affect all student equally and “going to the prom” is not a guaranteed right in Canada or the United States. Yet barring extenuating circumstances (such as a fire at the dance location or an outbreak of the Black Plague), the most probable reason for the school to cancel the dance at the last minute would be the court’s ruling, which goes to intent and smacks of contempt. At least to this layman. I don’t know enough about the law in either country to construct a more detailed argument.
I’ve not had a chance to read the decision yet, and it’s not on the net, so I can only speculate about this point.
However, I remember from the earlier reports that Marc Hall was seeking two injunctions: an injunction to allow him to attend the prom, and an injunction to forbid the school board from cancelling. From the BBC report, it looks like the judge granted both orders.
I’m just speculating, but I think that there would be two grounds for the second injunction. First, as Jerevan Somerville points out, cancelling the prom would allow the school board to circumvent the effect of the first injunction. Courts don’t normally like it when people try to defeat the effect of a court order.
Second, you have to remember that these are preliminary proceedings, before trial. The injunctions are interim injunctions, not permanent injunctions. If a court decides to grant an interim injunction, the purpose is to keep matters as close to the status quo as possible, pending the trial on the issues. In this case, the judge may have concluded that the combination of the two injunctions was necessary to give relief to Marc Hall, and the closest to maintaining the status quo in the circumstances.
If the matter proceeds to trial (and that’s a big if - trials cost money, Marc Hall’s been to his prom and got what he wanted. Will there be enough community support to keep the action going?) and Marc Hall is successful on the merits, I would nonetheless be very surprised if the court were to grant a permanent injunction requiring the school board to hold proms. That would get the court into the business of running the school, which I doubt that they would want to do, as dqa notes.
I’ve not had a chance to read the decision yet, and it’s not on the net, so I can only speculate about this point.
However, I remember from the earlier reports that Marc Hall was seeking two injunctions: an injunction to allow him to attend the prom, and an injunction to forbid the school board from cancelling. From the BBC report, it looks like the judge granted both orders.
I’m just speculating, but I think that there would be two grounds for the second injunction. First, as Jerevan Somerville points out, cancelling the prom would allow the school board to circumvent the effect of the first injunction. Courts don’t normally like it when people try to defeat the effect of a court order.
Second, you have to remember that these are preliminary proceedings, before trial. The injunctions are interim injunctions, not permanent injunctions. If a court decides to grant an interim injunction, the purpose is to keep matters as close to the status quo as possible, pending the trial on the issues. In this case, the judge may have concluded that the combination of the two injunctions was necessary to give relief to Marc Hall, and the closest to maintaining the status quo in the circumstances.
If the matter proceeds to trial (and that’s a big if - trials cost money, Marc Hall’s been to his prom and got what he wanted. Will there be enough community support to keep the action going?) and Marc Hall is successful on the merits, I would nonetheless be very surprised if the court were to grant a permanent injunction requiring the school board to hold proms. That would get the court into the business of running the school, which I doubt that they would want to do, as dqa notes.
Good point, Northern Piper. I had forgotten that the decisions at hand were injunctions, not verdicts. That makes more sense now. Court injunctions beforehand can often prevent the possibility of end-runs later. Thanks.