Yes, that’s right. I lost track of the details of your position in the shuffle.
Now this is precisely what I still don’t understand. If the outcome is predetermined, there is – I should think, by definition – no choice involved. For those who would claim that the universe is mechanistic and entirely deterministic – and remember, for the most part, I am one of them – the basis for the claim is that if we knew the entire current state, all the rules that govern the universe, and all the inputs, there is no libertarian free will (aka choice). Part of that claim is that mental states are inseparable from and entirely derivable from physical states – and can be no other way.
To be clear, note that that doesn’t affect the notion of illusory free will, nor does it address the proposed possibility that randomness is inherent in the universe. I’m only attempting to understand how one can reconcile determinism and decision making (aka choice).
Hmm, at least part of the problem here is built into the word ‘choice’; it both has the meaning of simply selecting one option from amongst many (which can clearly done via deterministic methods or even randomity (via a coin flip)), and also an alternate sense that, well, that feels to me to have ‘libertarian free will’ built right into it. I think this can be understood by restating the issue as: we clearly make choices; the question is, do we have any choice in which choice we choose?
In response to this, I’d say no, we don’t have any choice in which choice we will choose. We are slaves to our personalities, preferences, knowledge, memories, and personal thinking styles. You can’t factor those out of the equation and still claim that ‘we’ are doing the choosing (since those elements are clearly a significant part of if not the entirety of what makes us, ‘us’); however you can’t retain them in the equation and then pretend that our decisions aren’t dictated by who we are.
The fact that our personalities, preferences, etc have some kind of internal workings isn’t really a problem, not even if those internal workings are deterministic. I mean, they had to be made of something, and if the universe is entirely deterministic, well then, better to have deterministic brains than the alternative of no brains at all, right? And they seem to work pretty well either way.
Well, let’s be clear: decision making, we definitely do. So does your computer. That’s just the choosing-among-several-outcomes definition of ‘choice’. So that, we can reconcile with determinism just fine.
Yes; and I feel obligated to point out that the term you used originally – decision – seems to me (after looking the definitions up) to have less of a free will connotation. I felt that that might be important (how? I dunno), which is why I’ve tried to consistently at least include the term “decision” when I use the term “choice”. So there’s that. However – and I’m snipping lots of text here, so please point out anything you feel is a relevant omission:
No, it’s not clear to me that, given a deterministic stance, we do actually make decisions in any meaningful way. If you said that we have an illusion of decision making, my incomprehension would vanish. But I think you’re making a stronger claim. And I note that I’m trying to reconcile this with a strictly adhered to philosophic position concerning determinism (more about that below).
Let’s try this – we’ll look at representing decision making as a decision tree. Each branch represents a “choice” of some sort, whether the set of branches coming from a node is an enumeration of options or probabilistic estimates of likelihood. Now, we use this representation as a means of gaining clarity about possibilities. In other words, we use it to resolve our ignorance (at least, partially).
If, because of determinism, we could know enough to remove the superfluous probabilistic branches – after all, if everything is deterministic, all probabilities will be either 0% or 100%, and the 0% branches can’t occur and can be pruned – we’re only left with what you’ve characterized as decisions (or options, or choices). But, from the philosophical standpoint of determinism – that is, that libertarian free will is nonsense – each and every one of those options is immune to any actual choosing process. Rather, each selection is already determined by history, be it becuase of external forces (e.g., physics), our “internal workings” (as you put it), or some combination thereof. Thus, because the universe is already “in motion” and causation is strictly deterministic, the decision tree collapses and we’re left with a single straight line from top to bottom. There are no choices, nor can there be any.
It remains inescapable to me – even though it bothers me immensely – that, put simply, the decisions of which you speak can be naught but illusions, brought about by either our ignorance or randomness. And this is exactly why I never responded to Sophistry and Illusion’s response to me a page or so ago – much as I try, I can’t conceive of an example of a non-surjective or non-injective event that can be claimed to be free of (metaphysical) deterministic causation.
However, yesterday I was driven (caused? destined?) by this thread to order Dennett’s Freedom Evolves and Hofstader’s I Am a Strange Loop. I look forward to seeing if they provide any insight, although I won’t get them until early April (free shipping is awfully slow, donchaknow).
As long as we’re sure which question we’re discussing, I think we’re okay.
Hmm, I’ve never read those books. (I’m just making this up as I go along.)
Anyway. The decisions I speak of are instances where the external state of the world allows for more than one action or reaction by the agent. Because I draw a distinction between the outside of the agent and the inside of the agent (since it seems nonsensical not to), it seems clear that this can occur, even in a completely deterministic world.
In any given moment in a given specific situation, of course, you will also have a specific internal state to the agent as well. This internal state will have to process its input and go through its decision-making process. This process is what I consider “making a decision”, and it’s definitely occuring; just because you did the homework with your decision tree to determine what the eventual result is going to be, doesn’t mean that the agent doesn’t have to do the homework too.
Sure, sometimes a decision that’s going to be made is obvious from an outside point of view; and perhaps to a sufficiently well-informed individual all decisions would be obvious. That doesn’t change the fact that each day, all the time, all of us are going through our lives and making decisions based on the options we see before us at that moment. This is true even if those choices we eventually settle on are the ones we are ‘fated’ to make. (So to speak.)
To go out of character and wax poetic for a moment: Just because you have a destination, doesn’t mean you aren’t really making the trip.
Yes, I believe that even the most strict determinist would agree with that.
I think so, but let’s go back and make sure. This line of discussion has grown from a response of yours to Mangetout in post #209 (again, if I’m missing any pertinent points, please correct me):
So, I’m pretty sure that you’re saying that determinism is not fatalistic, and that’s what I’m not understanding. Now, in the post of yours I originally responded to (#212), you said:
From a deterministic standpoint, I agree that “you” (as an entity in space-time with a discernable boundary that is subject to physics) will affect the future. Taking the causal determinist position, however, your “knowledge and characteristics” are inevitable products of what came before. The fact that you’re a member of the SDMB is at least partially tied to the fact that you kissed little Susie behind the barn when you were four years old, if you trace the causal chain backwards far enough. Any actions “you” perform are not only purely and solely determined by prior causes, but each and every one of those causes is purely and solely determined by other prior causes. (Hence my question to Diogenes the Cynic concerning an infinite causal regress.)
In that sense, it’s just like a computer – each and every calculation, barring malfunction, can only produce one answer. After all, that’s not only the way we engineer them, but that’s the very nature of symbolic computation (as defined by a universal Turing machine). Even if we introduce randomness into a computer program, it’s not really random, but pseudo-random; there is an entire field devoted to figuring out equations that produce unpredictable values out to millions of repetitions. Such equations only appear random to us because of our ignorance: if we knew the equation and its inital values, we could determine what the next number will be. (In fact, there are various known computer hacks based on exactly that.) Furthermore, assuming the universe as a whole is deterministic, then even malfunctions are predetermined: that bit flip in memory was caused by a radiation spike from the sun, which was caused by…
This seems to me to be the most trivial definition one might give to the terms “decision” and “choice”. As far as I can tell, determinism and fatalism are equivalent unless there is a way to allow libertarian free will. And I (still) can’t see any way to breach it outside of saying it’s simply either an illusion stemming from our ignorance or that randomness is inherent in the universe.
Once we can all agree that the brain is nothing but an organic computer which, after all its evaluations and calculations, can only arrive at one output (what orders to give out to the body), the definition of free will really just can’t work with our decision making process.
Free will exists in the sense that we will always do exactly what we “want” given the circumstance (in other words, our brains will always have one output for the combination of all the inputs at any given time), but it doesnt exist in the sense that THAT IS THE ONLY THING WE CAN AND WILL EVER DO. We do the one thing that we most “want” to do–if someone were to go out can cut their pinky off just to prove me wrong, that just shows that their “want” to prove me wrong was great enough to outweigh all the negatives.
I agree that is the implication of all this. Your summary doesn’t really address innovation and creativity though - it seems to assume that we pick from a menu of choices packaged and presented to us, rather than making choices too.
Maybe that’s because it was just a summary, and I’m sure your statement could be applied to lower and lower levels of cognitive activity, to address the issue - it’s just that you didn’t.
Optical illusions are a great example - as far as they go - the difference, and I think it’s a very important one, is that optical illusions are something we look at, then we look away. The illusion of free will - if illusion it is - is something we are - no - it’s everything we are - it’s so fundamental to our every experience of everything, it can’t merely be brushed aside, while we continue on our way.
Sure I evaluate things. But the outcome is determined (ideally, by the best evidence/reasons).
Hmm. Despite my brilliant argumentative sallies, I am failing to sway anyone in this thread. Notably non-swayed are **Mangetout ** and II Gyan II. It just defies explanation.
I think I’m just finding it annoying that (it appears to me) people are more concerned I just accept their position as correct, than that I actually understand what they mean - your post above is an example of it.
There’s a case for a contradiction in there. You say, in the active voice, that you evaluate things, but then, in the passive voice, the outcome is determined. By whom? In the case of NFW, not by you. So, you don’t evaluate things.
I’m busy now, so later I’ll have something to say on the tendencies and assumptions that creep into the free will debate
Oh, and I did mean it above when I said that I think I have explained as well as I know how why I think libertarian free will is incoherent. I think at the end of the day, we just have different intuitions about what kinds of causation make sense. You understand my position just fine, AFAICT; you just think it’s wrong.
I do actually understand your position really and entirely (or at least I think so) - if I’m ‘unswayed’, it’s perhaps because the illusion you describe is compelling and inescapable.
Or you could just be wrong.
The weighing is done by my cognitive apparatus, which it seems likely would be forced by evolutionary pressures to be reasonably reliable. You won’t live long if you can’t figure out whether there is a sabre-tooth tiger hiding in the bushes or not.
Of course, your response again will be that reason cannot validate itself under these conditions. But I still maintain that reason cannot validate itself under any conditions. And so we return to where we began, alas.
No one is suggesting the illusion, the experience, be brushed aside - only acknowledged. And even that isn’t necessary if you’re not interested in doing so. I think you’ve highlighted the stumbling block with the “it’s everything we are” comment. It seems that engaging on the free will topic in an emotion-based mode isn’t very productive for either of us. My failure to see a coherent accounting of libertarian free will is similar to my failure to see a coherent accounting of a soul. Both are rational positions, not emotional ones. I wish you peace in whatever understanding you come to.
