You do realize that if you make no distinction between the particles that compose you and the particles that are outside you, that you have literally undefined the term ‘you’? Think about it. If all there is is particles, then refusing to distingush which particles are yours or not makes it impossible to say anything about you at all.
I fill like I’m trying to tell you that a given car has four wheel drive, but when I point at the car, you’re carefully looking in every direction but where I’m pointing and saying “car? What car?”
A few questions:
What definition of ‘fatalistic’ are we using again? I’ve been tryihg to argue against the notion that determinism should inspire a fatalistic attitude. You know, the “Nothing we do matters” perspective. I’m not trying to argue that we don’t have a ‘fated’ outcome in a purely deterministic universe. (That would be a very difficult argument to make.)
Sure, the future is fixed, or at least perfectly predictable. (Presuming no randomity, anyway.) But this isn’t because the actions of people don’t matter. Quite the opposite, really.
(By the way, and I’m not sure this is relevent to anything, but I find it very odd that you speak of past events being determined as though that’s a point of debate. Of course the past is determined; it can’t change, no matter what you believe about free will; it’s the past!)
I’ve been giving this some thought today. Here are my tentative conclusions:
I think it might be possible for you to argue the following: “Any argument that reason is unreliable is self-defeating.” (As I argued above, I don’t actually think this is incoherent as a strategy. It would be a classic reductio: you assume something is true, and then show that *by its own standards * it is false. The only incoherence revealed would be in reason itself. But I don’t think reason is incoherent, so I won’t pursue this line.)
But it is a different thing to argue that for reason to be justification-conferring, we must be able to produce evidence for the reliability of reason. Thus, you are not arguing that reason is unreliable; you are merely asking that reason present its credentials. But of course the only evidence for the reliability of reason would come from reason itself, or would make crucial use of reason. So ultimately, an attempt to justify reason must be circular.
Ah. Hm. Well, OK then, that does indeed clear some things up, and I thank you for your patience.
BUT (and there’s always a big ol’ butt in the way, isn’t there?), it’s not clear to me why determinism shouldn’t inspire a fatalistic attitude. In fact, if the universe is deterministic, the notion of “inspiration” is silly on its face – you either will or will not have a certain perspective. Since there is no choice, one does not actually decide (in any meaningful sense, i.e., with libertarian free will) on what one’s attitude will be.
Well, it’s only relevant when attempting to ascertain the causes of some (illusory) choice. The argument for determinism, taken to its foundation, says that the universe is analogous to a computer: if we knew the initial state, current state, and the rules in all their complete and total glory, we could extrapolate and determine the future. So, from the determinist’s point of view, the past and future are indistinguishable once personal ignorance (and randomness) is excluded.
Which, incidentally, opens another line of questioning. Namely, if one accepts that an observer affects that which he/she is observering solely due to the act of observation, might that provide some “in” with which to attack determinism? I don’t think so, due to that infinite causal regression – the observer really had no choice in making the observation, because the action was a deterministic consequence of prior causes. Urgh.
Learning that you lack the mythical concept of ‘libertarian’ free will might, in combination with a prior attachement to that idealized concept, inspire* the person to go through the deterministic mental gymnsatics to decide** that their life is meaningless and pointless, which would be incorrect in the sense that you still have your own and your friends’ well-being to pursue. Even if this is unavoidable in various specific instances, it is still unfortunate when/if it occurs.
Inspiration is just a long term for ‘contributing cause’, and I think we can all agree that causes are present in a deterministic universe. Don’t get crazy in trying to undefine things!
** “(in any meaningful sense, i.e., with libertarian free will)”? Please. :rolleyes: Here’s another meaningful sense for ya: the sense that you take all your inputs and stored knowledge and do something with it. That process of chewing up the inputs and producing the output is deciding. (Haven’t we already gone over this?)
In fact, the carrying out of the decision-making process is a more meaningful sense of ‘deciding’ than libertarian free will offers, since libertarian free will is an incoherent concept that loses all meaning once you ask, how does it work.
Aside from a :rolleyes: at the “(illusory)” on ‘choice’, I agree with this. Presuming there is no randomity, the only significant difference between the past and the future is that one hasn’t happened yet.
I wouldn’t think that tampering with something by looking at it would be any different (determinstically speaking) than tampering with something by manhandling it. I don’t know that additional considerations about the unchanging tapestry of the space-time continuum are necessary.
My only point is that one’s attitude, whether positive (“go get 'em tiger!”) or negative (“eh, what’s the point?”), is unavoidable either way. Que sera, sera.
As to the included :rolleyes:, I suppose I could have qualified “meaningful” with “as generally understood”, but I didn’t think it was necessary. While there seems to be a consensus (for the most part) here, I think it’s fair to say that belief in libertarian free will is dominant in the general population. With that said:
That’s a good way of putting it that hadn’t occurred to me.
Sure, but at the same time, the decisions (should that be ‘decisions’?) that we make have direct effects, even on our attitudes. You might say that I’m forced to argue this point due in part to my awareness that if other people have the knowledge that determinism isn’t a short hop to pointlessness, it might improve thier attitudes and therefore lives in the event they ever have their illusion of libertarian free will popped.
It certainly is. Not that most people have actually given the issue much thought, it’s not exactly a common conversation topic, after all. (Aside from the word being held up with as explanation or justification of various elements of theology, that is.)
The attempt would be incoherent. If “Any argument that reason is unreliable is self-defeating.” then this argument (in quotes) is also self-defeating to deny the attempt to do so. So is the previous sentence, ad infinitum. So is the previous sentence…
Let me see if I can kill two objections with one argument
Both these attitudes embody to me the mechanical subdivision attitude that is the form of scientific explanation e.g. Why does an apple fall to the ground? Because gravity acts on it. Why? Because an apple has mass and so does the Earth. And? Objects with masses exert G-forces on each other. Why? Some fundamental physics explanation here. All explanations simply terminate at some stage where things just are as they are, grounded only by appeal to base cognitive intuitions (like the 2+2=4 arithmetic belief).
Free will, to me, simply implies two things
1)the ‘self’ really exists
2)it has (some) control i.e. it can do something
Asking how ‘free will’ works is, by very nature of the question, to want to define free-will in terms of other things. The apple falls because it is subject to gravity. It is subject to gravity because it has mass. It has mass because its constituent entities exhibit {some fundamental physics explanation} and so on. Until things just are. ‘Free will’ means that the self can act. The question “How does it act?” presumes NFW. If free-will is true, it just does.
It seems you would have been against any inquiry to the phenomenon of gravity beyond “things fall down.” When others examine the phenomenon of the free will experience rationally (without emotional attachment) they often come to the conclusion that free will isn’t what it superficially seems. It isn’t libertarian free will. I hope you’ll understand why others discard the self-imposed limits implied in your response.
No, there are utilitarian reasons for inquiry as far as gravity goes. In the case of free will, the idea of explanation is a non-starter for reasons I explained.
You should justify your implicit assertion that folks who come out for free-will have emotional commitments guiding them that way, whereas “pure rationalists” can see the Truth.
You cannot imagine utilitarian reasons for inquiry into the nature of free will? If I am understanding you correctly, this strikes me as further incuriousness. I found your attempt to undermine rationality equally unmoving.
I’m perfectly willing to cede that not all libertarian free-will supporters do so for emotional reasons. And I was careful to not say that (all) pure rationalists can see the Truth - or even there is Truth. You’ll find very little foundationalism in me.
Only because I don’t see the scope for practical results i.e. results which aren’t, in essence, arbitrary and simply individual intuitions dressed in the garb of objectivity.
Based on that definition of free will, a computer definitely has it. It exists, and it does things. It has control over its peripherals; it can make pretty colors appear on its screen. Ta-daa, it has free will, by your definition.
We define EVERYTHING in terms of other things. Look in a dictionary; that’s how it’s done. But that’s not the problem with libertarian free will. Analyzing free will naturally leads us to ask what impact our knowledge, memories, and preferences have on it. Libertarian free will, however, fails to remain coherent under even that much examination.
I don’t think the analogy holds, because action is by its nature analyzable. People act for reasons; they have motives. And this has a bearing on whether their will is unconstrained or guided by these motives. So I think that action demands investigation, and when you investigate the nature of action and human psychology, you learn things about the roots of human action that are incompatible with libertarian free will. Positing an ‘unanalyzable’ free will is a non-starter if you have another, better explanation for human agency readily available to you. And as a defender of reason, you of all people should be committed to going with the best explanation.
I just read about a study that seems somehow relevant to the free will question though I haven’t completely worked out how.
They stimulated a part of the brain using magnets somehow, and this resulted in the person whose brain had been stimulated moving his finger. And the person was absolutely convinced that he himself initiated the action–decided, of his own free will, to move his finger. But he didn’t. The scientists made him move his finger by stimulating his brain.
That’s a study by a pair named Wegner and Wheatley, as discussed in an intro to philosophy book called Engaging Philosophy by Mitchell S Green.
Anyway, this seems to lend credence to compatibilism IMO, but like I haven’t really thought it through.
Interesting. Perhaps they stimulated the ‘wants to move his finger’ part of the brain - though I balk at thinking that our brains are actually divided into buttons that specific.
I wonder if they repeated the test under other conditions? Like, “We’ll give you twenty bucks if you can keep your finger still for the next ten minutes.”
Free will clearly exists. God does not oppress us… but mankind does. If you lived in Communist China or Cuba, I would say free will is extremely limited. So it depends on the government you’re living in…
