This is probably as close to what I think as possible, that while the universe may be purely mechanistic(possibly in a way we don’t understand) it is too complex to make any meaningful predictions in everyday life. So even if our choices are just the sum of the parts and past it appears for all intents and purposes that we do have agency. I’m not sure that makes sense.
Democracy is based on the idea that people can make rational decisions and conscious choices. If your vote is predetermined, then it is pointless. If your vote is random, then it is pointless.
I want to believe that democracy matters. Therefore I have to assume that volition exists.
Think about this constructively. Consider a universe made fundamentally out of billard balls. Each collision between billard balls is perfectly deterministic; if you knew the state of the universe at any one point, you could compute its state at any other point. Now you might say that this isn’t a very interesting world, but in fact, you can build a universal computer, i.e. a computer capable of computing anything that is at all computable, in this world. This computer could, for instance, simulate a being which—much like you—takes itself to be capable of free choice. But it’s obvious that in this case, it would be an illusion: everything he thinks, feels, or does, is absolutely determined by the underlying billard balls. But then, since we can imagine setting up a simulation of our world on this computer, free will is as much an illusion in this world.
Adding in a nondeterministic element won’t help: if, say, the outcome of some billard ball collisions is random, then at most it might be the case that for some alternatives you decide between, your choice depends on a die throw; but this isn’t any more ‘free’ than in the deterministic case. And now, since anything that happens happens either deterministically or indeterministically, you see that there’s simply no room for the kind of free will you want: it’s not possible to act in the same set of circumstances in a different way and have that difference be a meaningful act of choice (as opposed to a random event).
Or look at it from the other end. What would the world look like if you had no free will? Would you feel coerced to perform certain actions? No, of course not—that would presume a will against which you can be coerced. Rather, you would find yourself performing certain actions and thinking certain thoughts—which is exactly what happens to us everyday. How often do you find yourself performing certain small actions—scratching your head, as I just did, or folding your arms, changing the position of your feet, reclining in your seat—that don’t seem to necessitate any sort of decision for being performed? And even in those cases that you do make a choice—say, between vanilla and chocolate pudding—, you make that choice based on a thought, on the answer to the question: “right now, which one would I prefer?”
But it’s even more obvious with thoughts that we don’t choose to have them. Our language reflects this clearly: thoughts occur to us, ideas pop into our heads, we happen to notice things—in all of these language forms, we are the passive recipient rather than the active originator of a thought. Upon such a thought, a choice is made: you take the vanilla pudding, because the thought “I like vanilla” popped into your hand. But this choice is determined by the thought, hence, not free; in order to be free, the thought itself would have to be the result of some choice.
But it’s not hard to see that this runs into a contradiction: if the thought itself would have to be the result of some choice, then what about whatever choose the thought, in the same way that the thought choose the pudding? Clearly, that something—whatever it may be—must itself be the result of a choice; for if it weren’t, it must be either determined or random, and once again, we are without footing for the whole ‘free will’ thing. But then, we are left with having to postulate an infinite regress of choices that is necessary for you to choose the vanilla pudding! This, however, is a contradiction: a real infinite regress is simply not possible.
However, it also means we had no choice but to implement democracy.
Me too, but where does it come from?
Just because we suspect that people are deterministic, doesn’t mean that democracy is invalid. We can’t identify all the factors that influence behaviour, and for many circumstances, people are on the cusp (chocolate vs vanilla icecream, for example) - those hidden factors can move us one way or another. And personal happiness is going to be an influencing factor. If a political party can keep the populace happy, they will be more likely to retain that party in an election. If they are not happy, a change is more likely. But happiness is more complex than a few election year handouts, or the promise of a contentious referendum down the track. So democracy works for the happiness of the populace (in a strict utilitarian sense) even if individuals really have no actual volition.
The weird thing is: We couldn’t have made it any different.
I think free will as it’s typically defined, particularly by those of a religious mindset*, is incoherent. Determinism here is a red-herring; the kind of free will they have in mind doesn’t make sense in any kind of universe. Or at least, not in a self-consistent universe.
You can’t have a willed, deliberate action, that takes into account past information and a person’s own predispositions, that just appears as a bolt in the blue with no causal link to anything else. It makes no sense.
But note that saying that (this kind of) free will doesn’t exist is not the same thing as fatalism. When you think over a problem and come to a decision, that thought process is not an “illusion”. It’s really how you came to your decision. It’s just that your mental thought process can also be described in entirely physical terms.
- I don’t mean to have a snipe at the religious. But I think part of the reason free will has the odd definitions that it does (e.g. “You are free if you could have chosen differently”) are because of the implications for religion. If you actually dig down and try to come up with a coherent definition of free will, it will entail that an omnimax god is partially culpable for every entity’s actions.
It sort of is the same as fatalism though, because from a religious (or even just nonscientific) viewpoint, we don’t want to accept that what we perceived as a process of choice was really just a bunch of atoms behaving in their entirely mundane and ordinary fashion - and that this process took a completely natural - inevitable - course.
This is pretty much what I was going to say. Free will in the strict sense cannot exist in this universe, because there is no such thing as a “mover unmoved”. But we do in fact do something that kind of, if you’re not too picky about it, resembles free will. It’s an emergent property of our brains.
I did read an interesting article about this recently, specifically talking about how processes emerging from a ‘bottom-up’ system can start to work in a ‘top-down’ manner.
That is, although the processes in our brains are based on little electrochemical things doing their stuff, the effect they have on the system cascades so as to cause macroscopic outcomes that affect the whole system. Some tiny stimulus makes you want to turn left instead of right, but that little decision affects the whole system, including its physical location - this isn’t just a cascade of cause and effect from small to large, it’s a whole load of feedback too.
“Free will” as the term is commonly used isn’t the same as “choice”; a computer executing an IF/THEN command can be thought of as making a choice, but most people don’t consider that free will.
No it isn’t, because we don’t have perfect knowledge. If our votes are predetermined, and we already knew what they were then yes there’d be no point in voting; but we don’t know, so there is.
In a lot of ways, “free will” strikes me as attempt to put a profound sounding label on ignorance; we aren’t conscious of most of our decision-making process, so we label the resulting black box “free will” because it sounds & feels better than “I dunno”.
This strikes me as begging the question. The concept of free will is the concept that there is an alternative to randomness and determinism. That you have free will means that you are a free agent, able in at least some circumstances to make a choice between more than one alternative.
As I’ve said before in other, quite similar discussions we’ve had about free will, it seems obvious to me that we have either free will or the illusion thereof. And if it’s the latter, we can at least talk about free will as that which it looks to us like we have.
So… under this paradigm, were criminals always destined to become criminals? Or could it be argued that raising them in various ways (could have) affected their brain chemistry that made them criminals?
More minor view: Stephen King was always destined to be a writer? Barack Obama a politician? Hell, was Obama destined to become President twice (never mind that we didn’t know that beforehand in this case)?
Extra question: under this paradigm, what kinds of decisions by others can be legitimately criticized without being a hypocritical asshole? (Not that it’d matter, since we couldn’t help but do so, but ignore that for now.)
Regarding the point I made above: what do you think would it look like if it looked like we didn’t have free will?
FYI, here’s a nice short book that explains it very well (although some of the descriptions in this thread are very good as well)
Free Will: Sam Harris
And here’s the author on YouTube arguing his points: Sam Harris on "Free Will" - YouTube
That depends if there’s genuine randomness in the universe; it’s not just a “free will” question.
This. If one is a materialist, then it seems clear it’s the latter, but it’s useful to behave as if free will exists. The idea of free will is a reminder that we can influence the “choices” made by other individuals. Someone who is otherwise predestined to knock you down and steal your wallet ultimately won’t do it, because he’s been fed various inputs over his lifetime that tell him there will be negative consequences for doing so (prison, defensive action by the victim, guilt, shame, etc.). In his mind those inputs mingle with his desire for your cash, along with every other input that he’s had over his lifetime, including thoughts of what he ate for dinner last week, and the result is that he doesn’t attack you. Even though true free will may have been absent, all those inputs together tipped the machinery of his brain from “attack” to “don’t attack.” It looks like free will, and so it’s useful to act as if there is free will, e.g. incenting people to conduct themselves in a manner that suits you.
Trouble with that though, Machine Elf, is that despite yourself you’re talking as if you had free will; otherwise it’s meaningless to talk about it being “useful to act as if there is free will”, because none of us can act any way other than uncontrolled influences on us cause to act.
If we grant there is no free will, bringing up volition at all just confuses things. I’ve never been able to comprehend the position of Compatibalism. I’m with William James on this in that accepting a materialistic universe while still somehow arguing for free will amounts to nothing more than a “quagmire of evasion.”