Free Will Revisited - A New Compatibilist Model

I know we’ve had a lot of threads on this topic, but I’d like to give it another go. Like many, I’ve long been interested in the question of free will vs. determinism. My problem is that, for reasons to be discussed shortly, none of the conventional approaches (libertarian free will, determinism and traditional compatibilism) seem to me satisfactory. After years of wrestling with the issue, I’ve pulled together and would like to submit for discussion what I believe to be a new model, which I call soft or psychological compatibilism.

Before I start, two preliminaries. First, I’m a materialist, so it’s obvious to me the mind is a behavior of the brain. No magical ghost in the machine for me. Second, and related to the first, to me the problem of the mind is one of science and psychology, rather than logic and philosophy.* What matters is what the mind does. Understanding how it works would be interesting but isn’t essential. Gravity exists even though we can’t explain how it works. So, too, with the mind.

  • Perhaps surprisingly, the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Free Will says something similar. Section 3.b summarizes the current state of the debate as follows: “Most philosophers agree that whether or not determinism is true is a contingent matter; that is, determinism is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. If this is so, then whether or not determinism is true becomes an empirical matter, to be discovered by investigating the way the world is, not through philosophical argumentation.”

As I said, I find the conventional approaches unsatisfactory. Taking LFW first, it ignores the evidence that decisions don’t happen in a vacuum. What we do is influenced by many factors, including genetics, socialization, personality and life experience. Moreover, LFW has a hard time explaining things like alcoholism, depression, homelessness and senility. On the other hand, determinism (including traditional compatibilism) conflicts with our ordinary experience of how we make decisions. Determinists assert this is an illusion, but that’s a philosophical argument, not a scientific one. Further, determinism has a hard time explaining important domains of human action like creativity and language. Also, there’s the evidence of socialization. Young children have very little impulse control. As they mature, they usually acquire the skill. What they are learning, it seems to me, is volition, i.e., the ability to direct their behavior. A similar analysis obtains for things like OCD, ADHD, alcoholism and violent temper. In each case, what we strive to achieve (by therapy or otherwise) is impulse control, i.e., restoring volition. Finally, it’s interesting to note we’ve had no success modeling human thought on computers. Computers, of course, are deterministic. That we can’t get them to think (in a human sense) suggests thought is a different sort of thing.

Can we find an alternate model which accommodates these observations? I think so. My thesis is this. As evolved creatures, we have the ability to make choices. Whether those choices are free or determined is the question. Instead of black or white (or both at the same time, i.e., traditional compatibilism), I submit it’s a little of each. Thus, we have volition, i.e., the capacity to make decisions based on complex inputs without benefit of a predefined decision tree, but our choices are influenced by many factors, including (as mentioned) genetics, socialization, personality and life experience. Which is to say, we’re neither the automatons suggested by determinism, nor the god-like autonomous beings suggested by LFW. Instead, as I said, we’re evolved creatures doing out best to get by in a complex world. Stated a little differently, volition is an adaptive mechanism which gives us more flexibility to respond to problems than genetics alone can provide.

Based on prior threads, most volitionists (at least here on the SDMB) probably will agree with the proposed model. Determinists (and traditional compatibilists), though, will object that I’m positing volition as something other than deterministic or random, when those two are the only things we see in other natural systems. I understand the objection, but science doesn’t work that way. If evidence conflicts with theory, it’s theory which yields, not the other way 'round. If volition exists and isn’t deterministic, there’s a third category (e.g., influenced but not determined) and that’s that. Besides, it’s not like there’s another natural system which thinks. Weather, for example, is fabulously complex, but doesn’t think. If thought is sui generis, there’s nothing inherently wrong or implausible about its having a sui generis mechanism. Incidentally, this is as good a place as any to mention that I don’t think volition is a uniquely human skill, though it does appear to be a uniquely animal one, at least on this planet. For that matter, if we ever succeed in modeling thought on a computer (a staple of science fiction), I’d say it thinks too (and has volition). A related determinist objection would be “how does this volition thingy work?” Frankly, I don’t know. But observation and introspection indicate it does. That we can’t explain how volition works doesn’t undermine its scientific validity (if true) any more than does our inability to explain how gravity works. Also, I notice no one can explain how determinism of the mind works either. It’s just assumed on philosophical grounds and, it seems to me, has the same bootstrapping problem as volition.

Note that, while I’m arguing for volition, I’m also arguing the mind isn’t as free as is commonly assumed using the LFW model. Moreover, real and observable constraints like personality disorders, addiction and senility sometimes keep people from acting with the sort of free will upon which our system of moral responsibility is grounded. If this is correct, there’s often something unfair in how we judge people, legally and socially. That to me is the important implication of my model, much more important than the conundrum of volition vs. abstract determinism.

Thoughts?

I hate to say this because I think we have similar beliefs/positions, but it seems to me that you’re not really providing any additional substantive argument. By avoiding any explanation for a free-will mechanism (i.e., the how it works), you’re just claiming an explicit assumption is true (that “introspection and observation”* are enough to establish “scientific validity”).

*It’s not clear to me why you include “observation” as part of your assumption – if applied to oneself, it seems to me to be part of “introspection”; if applied to other entities, I don’t see how (without explaining a mechanism that can be observed) one distinguishes between actions that are free vs non-free.

IMO, your proposal is getting most of the way there. So many free will discussions get sidetracked by caricatures of LFW, which you mostly avoid. And the fact that the mind evolved certainly is important in explaining how free will could be possible.

Have you read Dan Dennett? His book, Freedom Evolved covers a lot of material like this, and exposes many errors in thinking about free will.

FWIW, Digital Stimulus, I think observation is the more useful evidence. Introspection is evidence to which only I have access, whereas observation is something we can compare and discuss on an equal footing. I observe what people do and notice several lines of evidence which point in different directions, some showing freedom and some showing constraints. I look at creativity and language, for example, and see that as evidence of volition. You can look at the same data and draw a different conclusion, but at least we’re talking about the same data set. In any event, I think we can draw the inference without understanding what’s going on inside the black box. I guess it comes down to a question of philosophy of science. If you say a model isn’t scientific unless we understand the mechanism, what do you say about gravity? Similarly, when Darwin published his thesis, we didn’t yet understand genetics. Was he doing science?

Dr. Love, thank you for your comments. As it happens, I have Freedom Evolves on its way to me as we speak. But I’m familiar with Dennett’s views from other sources, including articles, interviews and his public lecture at Edinburgh University in 2007. It seems to me his concept of “evitability” is volition in sheep’s clothing.

I don’t see how you’re invalidating the determinist position, but that’s cool because the easy solution is to introduce some form of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle into your thesis.

You can always say that whether a neuron fires or not and therefore whether one thought is formed or another can ultimately be traced back to random quantum fluctuations. However the result doesn’t have to be random in the same way that table salt always tastes like table salt and never peppermint schnapps.

Yes, that’s exactly my point. Unless I misunderstand you, a determinist can simply accuse you of begging the question, and justifiably so. Like so: you present a set of observations of a functionalist, black-box variety. (It’s not at all clear to me what the inputs/outputs would be, so I have to be necessarily vague.) You see a particular correlation of input/output and say, “Look, free-will!”; the determinist says, “Where? In the box!?!” Surely you see the problem there, right?

To the degree that I’m familiar with Darwin’s original works, sure. He gathered observations and produced a hypothesis/theory. But surely you’ll acknowledge that he provided a theory (evolution) AND an accompanying mechanism (natural selection). Genetics then provided the mechanism corresponding to (part of) natural selection’s black box, yielding ever more explanatory power. And so on…the mechanisms of genetics are still being explored (e.g., questioning the Central Dogma). It’s unclear to me how this is an analogue to what you’re proposing, which is a conflation of the box itself and what’s inside.

Now gravity, excusing my layman’s knowledge, I can sort of see where one might make the mistake of considering it analogous. There’s a tremendous difference though – “gravity” is the name given to the black box itself. That there is an effect is not in contention; the apple bonks Newton on the head, it’s an empirical fact, and everyone is fine with calling that “gravity”. Not so with free-will: the “name” of the box is exactly what’s in contention; the effect’s very existence is what is being disputed; determinists are most decidedly not fine with calling it “free-will”. Rather, “free-will” is just one explanation (erroneous, in their opinion) of what’s in the box.

dzero, you don’t say why you don’t find the argument persuasive, so it’s hard to reply to that comment. But you’re certainly entitled not to be persuaded. It’s a subject over which reasonable minds have differed for a long time. As for quantum indeterminancy, I don’t think anyone believes that undermines determinism (which allows for randomness), nor that it supplies free will or volition.

Digital Stimulus, as I said, we seem to have a difference of opinion about philosophy of science and that’s okay. To me, science is simply about evidence and observation, as distinguished from philosophy which is concerned with propositions and logic. I don’t think philosophy is helpful on the problem of the mind. Whether science can be depends on what one expects of it. I think we can do useful science without explaining the black box. You, obviously, think we cannot. I assume you agree that determinism has the same problem. Out of curiosity, since you said in your first post that you have similar beliefs/positions on the overarching issue, what do you call those if not science?

BTW, for the benefit of others reading the thread, I notice I failed to mention that the Dennett public lecture linked above is a YouTube video almost an hour-and-a-half long. Whether it’s worth watching depends on how interested you are in the subject.

I must be misunderstanding you…it seems to me that you’re explicitly removing reason from Science. Yes, evidence and observation are necessary to Science, but they’re not sufficient. But Science is more than mere record-keeping, isn’t it?

Let me put it this way: one (hastily formulated and perhaps inartful) definition of Science is “pursuit of knowledge through objective, repeatable, testable hypotheses”. The way I read it, your “evidence and observation” is part of “testable”; but by discounting “propositions and logic”, it’s not clear to me how you account for “hypotheses”. (I note that “objective” rules out introspection, “repeatable” assumes broad consistency, i.e., inter-agent in this case, while “hypothesis” not only entails causation but also includes the notion of explanation.) Where am I going wrong?

The subject of investigation here is free-will. In the OP, you say “Can we find an alternate model which accommodates these observations? I think so.” Well, of course we can – there are, in principle, an infinite number of models that accommodate any set of observations. One role of philosophy is to reduce that infinity, winnowing out the incoherent, unsound, and invalid models. Then, for any potential model, Science can take over.

My objection here is as I stated above: it seems to me that you’re assuming free-will is “in the box”. Perhaps you can come up with some experiments that obliquely get at the box’s contents. Yes, that would be useful Science. Eventually, it might even successfully lead to a hypothesis that explains free-will. Fantastic…but, as the subject of inquiry, it needs (eventual) explaining.

I do not see the same issue with determinism. That’s because “objective, repeatable, testable hypotheses” incorporate strict causation. It’s already in the box, and is inherent in the very act of performing Science. I see no way of avoiding it; it’s totally pervasive.

I call them “wishful thinking”. :smiley:

Honestly, it certainly seems like I experience free will. I feel like I have free-will. It’d be nice if I have free will. But, much to my chagrin, I can’t form a coherent account of it (perhaps due to my own failings rather than any impossibility of one being formed). And I haven’t yet come across what I would consider a coherent account either.

And I think there lies the difference between us – until I have what I consider a coherent account of the mechanism of free-will, I cannot accept it as anything but an illusion. You, on the other hand and if I understand, are happy to assume free-will exists, substituting a “black box” for the coherent account. To some degree, I’m sympathetic to that, even while remaining unconvinced and not seeing how it gets you anywhere.

To clarify, when I said science is about evidence and observation, I didn’t mean to imply it’s just record-keeping. What I meant is that it’s grounded in evidence and observation, as opposed to philosophy which is grounded in propositions and logic. Incoherence, for example, is a logical argument and has no place in science. Light behaves like both a particle and a wave and whether that makes sense doesn’t mean tuppence. Similarly for quantum indeterminancy.

As for the rest, if you think a model is useless without an explanation of mechanism, mine of course will not appeal. Conversely, to me a model is useless unless it conforms with observation. Determinism has the advantage, as you say, of assuming causality. It has the weakness, though, of being unable to explain how that would work and not fitting with the evidence. Relatedly, I object to the characterization of my model as asssuming free will (actually, I call it volition, to dissociate myself from the baggage of LFW, which which I also disagree). Rather, I’m inferring volition (inductively) from what the black box does. You may disagree with the inference and/or believe it’s useless without an explanation, but give me credit for not just assuming the conclusion.

Perhaps I am intruding on a conversation above my pay grade, but I wish to point out that I am uncomfortable with the above characterization of science – and I believe many scientists would agree with me. (At least the ones with whom I’m acquainted, who are, admittedly, economists.) How would I form a hypothesis at all without some notion of coherence? Without relying on some kind of notion of “this makes sense”, my hypothesis (first) could be random garbage and (second) could never be falsifiable, because no evidence for or against it could be said to cohere with it.

The existence of a set of theories which, taken together, seems unintuitive or incoherent is not the same thing, I think, as saying that logical argument has no place in science.

I hope I am not mischaracterizing anything, apologies if so.

Are there any examples of non-determinism other than pure randomness, or a component of randomness mixed with or on top of determinism (as in QM wave function collapse)?

I suppose ‘free will’ would be an example, but it is a term that makes no sense to me. I need a simple concrete example of non-random non-determinism to help me understand.

Paranoid Randroid, welcome to the conversation. As I understand it, in logic, incoherence is a term of art and means the premises and/or definitions are contradictory. That’s similar to how you’re using the term (or, rather, its converse) but not identical. Moreover, I doubt you ever use formal logic in formulating economic hypotheses. In any event, do you disagree that if evidence conflicts with theory, it’s theory which yields? Because that’s really the point I’m trying to make.

iamnotbatman, the short answer to your question is that, outside the mind, the only example of which I’m aware of a nondeterministic and nonrandom phenomenon is quantum indeterminancy. (Allow me to emphasize that I don’t think QI provides anything like volition or free will.) As regards the mind, though, volition (if nondeterministic) may not be the only instance. Cognition and memory, for example, seem to be pretty fluid. Similarly with motivation, personality, emotion and other “high” brain functions.

Quantum indeterminacy is not non-random. The quantum mechanical description of nature posits wave-functions that describe probability distributions. The time evolution of the wave functions themselves is deterministic until an observation takes place, at which point the behavior is as far as anyone can tell purely random, the outcome of repeated experiments consistent with the probability distribution. In other words the quantum description of nature includes two separable phenomena: deterministic wave function evolution, and purely random wave function collapse. (this is not my specialty, but IAAP)

I only make a point of this because it seems like you can’t point to a simple theoretical or empirical example of a non-trivial non-deterministic process (outside of the disputed area of subjective phenomena inside the human mind). If this is true, it seems like a major stumbling block for anyone attempting to discuss non-determinism (again, beyond the trivial example of stochastic phenomena).

Can someone please define “volition” for me? How would someone recognize volition in someone else?

The opposite of determined or deterministic is random, right? Language and art are certainly not random. Is there some sort of middle ground between “determined” and “random” in which “volition” exists?

Yes, if that is your point then I am very much in agreement. But I wish to point out that although I would not use symbolic logic to make an economic argument, I have made arguments that could nevertheless be so formalized; logical argument from the premises established by the current state of evidence is how further theories are made. Thus it remains difficult for me to agree with the original statement, that logical argument has no place in science.

Carry on, though, my reservations are probably not material.

iamnotbatman, I mentioned that objection in the OP. It’s pretty well known. I explained why I don’t find it compelling.

Mosier, I gave a definition of volition in the OP and illustrated by example. One of the points I’m trying to make is that we can observe people with impaired volition, e.g., because they have OCD, which suggests the normal state is to have it. Of course that’s not a logical proof. It’s an inductive argument.

Paranoid Randroid, rereading the post to which you were replying, I see I expressed myself poorly. Of course logic in the ordinary sense enters into it. Indeed, it’s the basis of my argument. I just don’t think formal logic is very helpful on this subject. The mind is messy, where formal logic wants concepts and principles which can be rigorously defined and related.

BTW, stepping back, I decided not to discuss in the OP the elephant in the room in this debate (moral responsibility) because I was hoping for a discussion of the observational evidence. But do let’s bear in mnd that a theory of mere determinism without content pretty much ducks the important issue. That’s why traditional compatibilists spend so much time trying to give determinism content.