I know we’ve had a lot of threads on this topic, but I’d like to give it another go. Like many, I’ve long been interested in the question of free will vs. determinism. My problem is that, for reasons to be discussed shortly, none of the conventional approaches (libertarian free will, determinism and traditional compatibilism) seem to me satisfactory. After years of wrestling with the issue, I’ve pulled together and would like to submit for discussion what I believe to be a new model, which I call soft or psychological compatibilism.
Before I start, two preliminaries. First, I’m a materialist, so it’s obvious to me the mind is a behavior of the brain. No magical ghost in the machine for me. Second, and related to the first, to me the problem of the mind is one of science and psychology, rather than logic and philosophy.* What matters is what the mind does. Understanding how it works would be interesting but isn’t essential. Gravity exists even though we can’t explain how it works. So, too, with the mind.
- Perhaps surprisingly, the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Free Will says something similar. Section 3.b summarizes the current state of the debate as follows: “Most philosophers agree that whether or not determinism is true is a contingent matter; that is, determinism is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. If this is so, then whether or not determinism is true becomes an empirical matter, to be discovered by investigating the way the world is, not through philosophical argumentation.”
As I said, I find the conventional approaches unsatisfactory. Taking LFW first, it ignores the evidence that decisions don’t happen in a vacuum. What we do is influenced by many factors, including genetics, socialization, personality and life experience. Moreover, LFW has a hard time explaining things like alcoholism, depression, homelessness and senility. On the other hand, determinism (including traditional compatibilism) conflicts with our ordinary experience of how we make decisions. Determinists assert this is an illusion, but that’s a philosophical argument, not a scientific one. Further, determinism has a hard time explaining important domains of human action like creativity and language. Also, there’s the evidence of socialization. Young children have very little impulse control. As they mature, they usually acquire the skill. What they are learning, it seems to me, is volition, i.e., the ability to direct their behavior. A similar analysis obtains for things like OCD, ADHD, alcoholism and violent temper. In each case, what we strive to achieve (by therapy or otherwise) is impulse control, i.e., restoring volition. Finally, it’s interesting to note we’ve had no success modeling human thought on computers. Computers, of course, are deterministic. That we can’t get them to think (in a human sense) suggests thought is a different sort of thing.
Can we find an alternate model which accommodates these observations? I think so. My thesis is this. As evolved creatures, we have the ability to make choices. Whether those choices are free or determined is the question. Instead of black or white (or both at the same time, i.e., traditional compatibilism), I submit it’s a little of each. Thus, we have volition, i.e., the capacity to make decisions based on complex inputs without benefit of a predefined decision tree, but our choices are influenced by many factors, including (as mentioned) genetics, socialization, personality and life experience. Which is to say, we’re neither the automatons suggested by determinism, nor the god-like autonomous beings suggested by LFW. Instead, as I said, we’re evolved creatures doing out best to get by in a complex world. Stated a little differently, volition is an adaptive mechanism which gives us more flexibility to respond to problems than genetics alone can provide.
Based on prior threads, most volitionists (at least here on the SDMB) probably will agree with the proposed model. Determinists (and traditional compatibilists), though, will object that I’m positing volition as something other than deterministic or random, when those two are the only things we see in other natural systems. I understand the objection, but science doesn’t work that way. If evidence conflicts with theory, it’s theory which yields, not the other way 'round. If volition exists and isn’t deterministic, there’s a third category (e.g., influenced but not determined) and that’s that. Besides, it’s not like there’s another natural system which thinks. Weather, for example, is fabulously complex, but doesn’t think. If thought is sui generis, there’s nothing inherently wrong or implausible about its having a sui generis mechanism. Incidentally, this is as good a place as any to mention that I don’t think volition is a uniquely human skill, though it does appear to be a uniquely animal one, at least on this planet. For that matter, if we ever succeed in modeling thought on a computer (a staple of science fiction), I’d say it thinks too (and has volition). A related determinist objection would be “how does this volition thingy work?” Frankly, I don’t know. But observation and introspection indicate it does. That we can’t explain how volition works doesn’t undermine its scientific validity (if true) any more than does our inability to explain how gravity works. Also, I notice no one can explain how determinism of the mind works either. It’s just assumed on philosophical grounds and, it seems to me, has the same bootstrapping problem as volition.
Note that, while I’m arguing for volition, I’m also arguing the mind isn’t as free as is commonly assumed using the LFW model. Moreover, real and observable constraints like personality disorders, addiction and senility sometimes keep people from acting with the sort of free will upon which our system of moral responsibility is grounded. If this is correct, there’s often something unfair in how we judge people, legally and socially. That to me is the important implication of my model, much more important than the conundrum of volition vs. abstract determinism.
Thoughts?
