OK I’m going to try to re-rail this trainwreck and summarize the whole thing.
The free will debate is normally framed like this: that either the universe is Deterministic and we just have the illusion of choice, or there’s free will and we actually do have choice. The OP and thread title of course follow this framing.
However, it’s also usually the case that quantum indeterminancy is dismissed as being inadequate as a mechanism of free will.
Why?
Because the whole point of free will is culpability for actions, and it’s hard to see how just some coin-flip type events at a quantum level makes a person more (or less) responsible for murder, say. Or, for theists, how it absolves God of responsibility for evil in the world.
If people in this thread want to claim that quantum indeterminancy is absolutely enough for free will, then great, I am happy to say that definition of free will is possible. Heck, I’d say it’s more probable than not because we currently think that our universe is not deterministic.
But in the classic framing, libertarian free will is what is being postulated. And not only could things be different if time were re-run, but in a way that means you are more culpable than in a pure deterministic model, then I continue to say it’s an incoherent mess. Libertarian free will makes no sense because what even is an input that is neither based on a past state nor randomness that somehow impacts a rational choice?
(@Exapno_Mapcase I am not ignoring your post #146 but hopefully you see how this post addressed it, if you don’t think so I am happy to respond directly)