Free Will versus Determinism

In My Humble Opinion
181

I think this is a misleading framing though.

For one thing, my position is that your conscious mind, and all its private thoughts, are very much a part of the universe. Yes, just a small part of it, but I still feel that descriptions of the universe as limiting you is still implying “if determinism is true, you are a totally passive zombie” kind of logic. And I don’t agree with that.

The way I’ve put it in previous threads is: If we want to say your life is on rails, then your consciousness is an integral part of the track and not merely a passenger on the train.

Secondly, on the one choice thing: I made exactly one choice. I did what most appealled to me, based on what I knew and the options available to me. In a sense *I* limited myself. But, as I say, this is inherent in what we really mean by “choice”.

I think it’s a red herring to consider this a limitation of Determinism in our universe (if our universe is deterministic).
Forget our universe. Invent any universe you like. Define it as not being deterministic, and having souls and magic and unicorns. Now: can we come up with a sensible notion of what choice means in that universe? How do magic pixies decide between coffee and tea in a way that is not simply what they most want based on their predilections?

182

I definitely agree that our mind is part of the universe. But being limited by natural laws or genetics doesn’t make us zombies. We might have choices within those limits. My car not being able to go over 120 mph doesn’t mean I don’t have the choice of driving 40 or 60.

I don’t know if this means you are stuck on the track as a passenger or are the conductor who can go to other tracks at will. Passengers don’t get a choice except to get off at the next station.

Post hoc you clearly made one choice, but was that the only possible choice. Haven’t you been at a restaurant where there are several menu choices equally appealing, but you are limited to choosing one? Sometimes my wife wants me to choose something when I have no preference. When I do, she sometimes says she really wanted the other choice, and I am happy to change. Which choice was free, which was determined. Though we do have a bias to make something we chose (or possess) more valuable.

A soul not directly influenced by the environment or the body would be able to make freer choices. But where do the pixies get their predilections? Does God roll the dice and assign them line in a DnD game? Would the choices be random? It’s certainly a lot closer to free will - and seems to be the old model of it, where our minds which sit behind our eyes steering makes the choices. If that is free will to you, then I suppose the souls have free will.
But I may not be getting the point.

183

I think we’re talking past each other a little bit.
Let’s say I’m playing poker. I have the choice to bet, raise, call or fold. I have a desire to win money. So, for a given flop, I choose to call.
Did the universe limit my options? Absolutely – I could only do 4 things*, I had incomplete information, and I am “just wired” to want to win games.
But this is also the only thing we can mean by choice. What’s an unlimited scenario? One in which I’m an omnimax god who also doesn’t care what happens next?

* Yes obviously there are more than 4 options in a real poker game; I could punch one of my opponents in the face for example. But in my analogy, the rules of poker is representing all the options physically available to me; punching people is not a part of the game, and having lunch on Kepler-186f is not an option available to me in our physical reality.

What I mean is that your conscious thoughts are part of the equation determining where the track goes.
The point I am trying to make, is that when many people conceive of the universe being Deterministic, there is a temptation to believe that our conscious thoughts are just riding along, passively. That’s not the case. I can’t predict what you will do next without simulating your brain, complete with its conscious thoughts.

When I do something, I either did it for a reason, or I didn’t. And it’s the former we are describing as choice. We don’t typically say I decided to have the fish if all I did was roll a die and fish was option 4. I decided to roll a die.
This is why, as I say, most believers in free will as a coherent concept do not say that quantum indeterminancy is the mechanism of free will. Because it’s just a dice roll, it seems to have very little to do with the consciousness of the agent.

Exactly – we can’t talk about them being “freer” without talking about how the concept of choice makes sense here. You need to bring back in constraints for something like a reasoned choice to be possible and identifiable.

184

If God sets all the parameters in your pixie/spiritual existence then it is not free will. If the choices are random, then it is not free will.

Perhaps we are just radio receivers, receiving instructions from a pixie spirit that exists in another world, with a whole different history and set of casual influences. What is there about this pixie/spirit world that is non-deterministic? If we are acting under the guidance of God, it is his will that rules our actions. If we are acting under the rule of a demon, ditto. Perhaps free will creeps in because there is a dualist conflict between Good and Evil in the other universe, but I can’t imagine how that conflict would differ from determism either. Do Gods and demons roll dice in order to rule our actions? (Curiously enough, I think that is more or less how the Greeks and Romans imagined it).

185

Right – better put that I managed.

And this is also when we should circle back. Instead of lamenting that there can be no free will, it’s the moment where we should ask: if free will can’t exist in any universe, does it even make sense? Is it a coherent concept?

186

And even if you could simulate my brain, you’d have to load it with all my memories, and feed all my sense perceptions into it. Which is as close to impossible as I want to see. This is what I’ve been saying all along. However, the inability to prove or disprove free will does not mean we have it (or don’t). It just means the problem is undecidable.
In your analogy, I’m happy to admit that if you did have a free choice among those four options, you’d have free will, even though your choices are limited. But if you had been conditioned to always fold, you would not. The question is whether the universe has set up our internal state in a way that you are conditioned to do whatever “choice” you make.

187

Good points. I’m not advocating for pixies or a soul, just noting that the naive view of free will comes from some sort of soul/observer which isn’t limited by our physical bodies. I agree that this idea is at least a bit incoherent.
My best guess at the moment is that our actions are unpredictably deterministic. Consider the stock market as an example. For each day, the business writers explain why it did as it did. But no one can predict what it is going to do tomorrow - even if there is no big and unpredictable news. The market obviously does not have free will, but it often acts as if it does.

188

Well that’s what I meant.
In a deterministic universe, I can in principle calculate a future state based on the current state, with perfect information. However, that calculation will include the conscious thoughts of your brain. You’re not a passenger in this, you are very much a part of the “future making machine”.

Well it’s a philosophical discussion, so a proof here was unlikely. My interest here is more in pointing out that the problem is ill-formed and free will is ill-defined.

I don’t think you got the analogy. The point was, that the way that the universe “conditions” your choice is with things like having a desire to win, limited choices and limited information. The things that we need for “choice” to even make sense as a coherent thing.

189

But that just excludes the option that how you react to the information available to you, and what you desires are, is at least to a certain extent relevantly up to you. But let’s backtrack to the definition of free will you asked for:

It seems pretty clear to me that something fulfilling those criteria (again, deferring to Strawson where I condensed things too much) would count as acting freely, that is, at having its actions determined (to at least some degree) by nothing but itself. Would you agree?

I presume you meant ‘output’ there. But again, the answer is simple: a self-determined one. If what Strawson describes is possible, then that just answers the question. Of course, Strawson’s point is that it isn’t possible; indeed, I take it that Strawson’s argument is what people generally have in mind when they talk about how free will is nonsensical (or at least, that’s pretty much the only actual argument for this assertion I know of—the consequence argument doesn’t trade on any supposed incoherence). But then, what of randomness? What of the origin of the universe? All of them involve the same trilemma: either dogmatism, or circularity, or regress. Yet somehow, this renders only free will incoherent. Why not just be consistent and say, our theories—since they can’t account for the creation of novel information—necessarily fail to supply ultimate explanations?

But you don’t really seem to be disagreeing? Your example just notes that the regress can’t be completed, and hence, the ultimate cause for any moral action (or any moral principles guiding such action) lies outside you. This is just what Strawson seeks to establish.

190

It *is* up to you. I’ve said this many times. I do things because I want to. I just don’t get to choose what things are more desirable to me, nor what I know, and what I can do. These are the factors that together determine my choice, regardless of what flavor of universe I am in.
My position is simply: choice exists. Libertarian free will not only does not exist but cannot exist because it’s incoherent or self-inconsistent (depending on how it’s defined).

No; I think this kind of reasoning falls down at 6 / 7; that preferences are down to the agent. It’s just kicking the can down the road.

For example; I don’t like being socially humiliated. I’m just wired that way; I didn’t choose it. And the same is true of the vast majority of people, which is one factor helping to keep society (relatively) safe and civil most of the time.
Is it possible for someone’s neurology to be different such that they like humiliation, or some combination of events happened where someone acquires a positive association with such events? Sure. But note that again we are describing factors external to deliberate choice. No matter what you do, all analyses end outside of the individual.

No, input. What other inputs are there than things ultimately external to the individual, and how do they influence reasoned choice?

191

You’re right. They’re still morally responsible in a practical/attributive sense and we can still punish them for reasons other than retribution. Determinism being true doesn’t mean moral facts aren’t true or that it isn’t truly bad to rape, steal, kill, etc.

I never understood this either. Is it better to believe that it’s fairy dust or clockwork elves that make a bad person bad or a good person good or one person have willpower and another person give in? Even if souls existed it wouldn’t matter because you can’t control what soul you have in the same way you can’t control what brain you have. Ted Bundy didn’t choose to have the soul/brain of a bloodthirsty psychopath. Hitler didn’t choose to have the soul/brain of a fascist. Mr. Rogers didn’t choose to have the soul/brain of a nice person that wanted to help people and so on.

192

That’s why I said “if you have a free choice.” I’m not saying that’s a given.

No argument here. Now, ill-defined might be because of our lack of analysis of the problem, or that it is more complex than we see. The term “species” is somewhat ill defined for example - it is more of a human definition than a natural thing. Perhaps free will is like that - but what I’ve been trying to say is that we can never find out, since it is impossible to test for any reasonable definition of free will.

193

The problem here is “itself.” Where does itself come from? The ancient idea of itself say it came from god, as the soul, and was in some sense fully formed at birth. But we know that our “itself” comes in fact from a combination of genetics and experiences. So if you are a determinist in any way, the itself would be determined.

Exactly.

194

Species is a categorization, and categories are often difficult to apply to messy-old nature.
“Free will” OTOH I maintain is simply an obsolete concept. It once sort-of made sense, while the brain seemed like a black box. But now that we have neuroscience, and computer science, we realize that decision-making does not have to be magical. It means we can ask more formally what “free will” means exactly, and find we cannot even define it coherently. We have this angst of missing something, but what exactly are we missing?

But I won’t belabor this point further, I think you get me, and we’re at the point where all we can do is respectfully disagree.

195

So it is not up to you. Desires are not typically absolute things; I might prefer chocolate cake to carrot cake, but still decide to have the carrot cake. It is an assumption that this choice originates in something external; if Strawson’s definition is apt, it does not (or at least, not fully).

You keep asserting this, but what’s your actual argument for it? Is it supposed to be self-evident? I’ve supplied the BA as the, to me, most reasonable way to spell out this inconsistency, but so far, you seem reluctant to either indicate whether you agree, or point out where you disagree. So then what is your argument for this inconsistency?

There is no reasoning there, this is just the definition, hence, an initial assumption (per impossibile, by Strawson’s lights). Strawson then purports to lead this definition to a contradiction, by pointing out the infinite regress, and again, you seem to have a similar intent with ‘kicking the can down the road’. So may I presume that you agree, barring this, that the definition used (if it were consistent) outlines a notion of free will that captures the intuition about it adequately? (Otherwise, the argument against it obviously gets no traction, as it would be aimed at the wrong target.)

(Indeed, this shouldn’t need to be pointed out, but the ‘nobody has given a definition of free will’-gambit, mistaken as it is, cuts both ways: if it were true, then the statement ‘free will is impossible’ would also just be vacuous.)

Again, that’s just an assumption—taking the ‘infinite regress’ horn of the Münchhausen trilemma, and presuming that the agent couldn’t contain that regress. You could just as well use the ‘dogmatic’ horn, as you and others seem to be willing to do with randomness: random outcomes just happen; likewise, free choices just happen, i.e. are not subject to further analysis.

This is not a problem unique to free will, it’s a problem with the ultimate foundation of anything, and highlights nothing other than inherent limitations to theory-building. Most people are happy with these limitations when it comes to randomness or the origin of the world, but suddenly find themselves bothered when it comes to free will, which indicates that it’s really the subject matter, not the issue pointed to that’s troubling to them.

Ah, gotcha. But then you’re again just assuming that whatever an agent does must be due to its inputs; this is not the case, for instance, for the Zeno machine.

There’s nothing problematic about ‘itself’, it’s just a denotational term. Call it ‘Bill’, if you prefer. What Bill does is ultimately due to Bill.

196

…according to your position on what “choice” is. I’m disagreeing that choice requires libertarian free will, because my position is that LFW is a garbage concept, not even wrong.
LFW requires a reasoned choice that is not chosen for reasons (because then those reasons can be traced to prior states or causes, and no, I don’t buy an infinite regress model). It makes zero sense, and only persists as a term because people like to imagine the thoughts in their head as being separate to the universe even though that would not explain choice, even if it made physical sense.

Well I’m asking what else can there be? We have inputs, we have randomness (which most proponents of LFW do not consider to be sufficient), what else is there?
Of course this is the point at which we might just say it is the same as something like dark matter, say; that we’re trying to figure out what it might be, and not being able to say what causes it does not mean it is not real.
The difference of course is that dark matter is trying to fill an explanatory gap; there is a real set of observations not explicable by our current models. LFW is not doing that; there is no known need for this concept.

197

No, you misunderstand. I was stipulating that you’re excluding the option where what we desire, or more broadly, what our determining factors in making a certain choice are, is up to us, to which you replied, apparently contradicting, that ‘it is up to us’, but then continued to again claim that what we desire (or again, the preconditions for our choices) is not something we can choose. Again, that’s just part of how Strawson defines what it means to act freely, so denying this from the outset just sneaks in the conclusion you want to draw.

Ok, so then why don’t you think that’s a problem e.g. with randomness? The same infinite regress pops up there, it’s just that people don’t insist on a model for it, accepting it as a dogmatic point. Likewise with the origin of the universe, or again, any point at all where new information enters—which is just due to the fact that all ‘mechanistic’ explanations are merely transformations of initial assumptions, axioms, or what have you. Why is free will a garbage concept but randomness isn’t, when it takes exactly the same resources to realize either?

Self-causation (or agent causation, as it’s sometimes put). Sure, there might not be such a thing, but again, excluding it from the outset just makes your argument circular: free will doesn’t exist because free will doesn’t exist. As a concept, it’s just as well-defined—or as problematic—as randomness or a universe popping spontaneously into existence or existing forever without further explanation are. Every explanation reaches a bedrock somewhere, but for some reason, you seem intent on believing that the lack of explanation in the case of free will means the concept is ill-defined, but that just doesn’t follow.

Of course there is an explanatory burden answered by the reality of free will: the datum that we experience ourselves as having free will. Sure, we can question that, just as we can question the evidence for dark matter, but we can also simply take it at face value—arguably always the strategy one should explore first before discarding any data one doesn’t like.

198

I wasn’t talking about the word “itself” but to what it represents. The word was in what I was responding to. Bill is just as good. The question is whether Bill is a truly free entity, or just a state machine built from nature and nurture. My point in this thread is that this question is untestable. Bill acts as if what he does is his choice, but whether it is or not is unknown. More telling, predicting what Bill is going to do is basically impossible. We can do it better than chance - maybe - but not like if we had access to the full information of Bill’s inputs and states. And we certainly can’t do it in real time.
TLDR: Are we free or automatons that simulate being free? Impossible to know for sure.

199

Let me clarify for you.
My position is that I’m happy to use the meaning a “choice” that is basically the same as everyday use: that it is doing what we want to do. Where the want comes from is not part of the definition; if I say Bob chose to skip breakfast I am not making any kind of philosophical claim about a ghost in the machine.

And in terms of excluding options, no, I am not apriori excluding any definition or explanation. I simply remain unconvinced that either the infinite regress or general concept of free will have met the first step of coherency.

I disagree that randomness entails infinite regress.

The difference is that we know that this universe exists (yes, putting solipsism aside, as we have to in pretty much every context). So, as perplexing as its existence remains to us, it’s a known unknown.
Whereas free will is a solution for zero explanatory gap that has no particular reason to exist.

Explanatory gaps don’t work like that. Empirically, there’s nothing to explain here; entities making choices is perfectly compatible with what we know of neuroscience, and the physical universe, whether it is deterministic or not.
The feeling that santa claus is real does not mean we have to find some entity that can magically give out toys; there’s no empirical data that such a being exists.

200

I dispute this notion of us “acting like” we have free will.

If I knew, with 100% certainty, that the universe is deterministic, and my brain was part of that, it would change absolutely nothing about how I live my life. Because it wouldn’t entail that some photon from the outside world knocks over a line of dominoes in my head, resulting in simple rod A into slot A thinking. Instead, it would continue to be the case that my choice of what to do now is the result of billions of computations which are almost entirely introspective and based on my memories and understanding of the world.