Free Will versus Determinism

In My Humble Opinion
241

Yes, I do remember you trying that tired, and rather desperate, tactic. But I’ve been explicit from basically the beginning that I don’t think that an agent’s reasons for acting a certain way are entirely sui generis:

Likewise, Strawson’s definition that I have endorsed (and specifically said should be preferred over my paraphrase) makes the same allowance:

It’s true, I haven’t included that caveat explicitly every single time I stated my position, just to make already long posts at least somewhat manageable, and this has been a long thread; so of course, no foul if you just missed this. But then you should at least have had the grace to accept my clarification when I offered it. But no, you keep trying to straw-man me into a position despite my repeated attempts at clarification.

So just to not mince words: nothing about my position requires in any way that biology, history, psychology or any other source of preferences are ineffectual. Anything else is just a misrepresentation.

242

Thanks for illustrating how many times you’ve used the same dodge!

My point has been that your definition of FW says the wants originate in the self and are not traceable beyond that to things like genetics. I’ve asked you to clarify how that squares with the clear fact that some wants clearly are traceable, and how in some situations (all in my view, but indisputably some) the only motivation for doing or not doing something are all traceable wants?

I want to hear how that affects your definition of free will, not a vague handwave that our choices have many factors.

243

This is bizarre. I literally just told you that this is a misrepresentation of my views, yet you persist in it. So that puts me into something of a dilemma: either you genuinely don’t understand what I’ve been trying to tell you, or not. In the first case, I’m running out of ways to explain this to you; in the second, any further discussion would obviously be pointless.

But I’ll give you the benefit of the doubt and assume that you’re still just genuinely confused on the issue. So let’s make this simple. Suppose I’m hungry. That’s about as simple a biological want as there could be, right? Suppose there’s an apple on the table before me. I grab it, and have a bite. Obviously I do so because of my hunger—because of my biological want, because of my genetics, what have you. But does it follow that I do so solely because of these factors? No, not at all!

Suppose then that before me, there is an apple and a piece of chocolate. I have a strong preference for chocolate, which I’m sure is due to a combination of genetics, socialization, and whatnot (it’s a high-calorie food, I’ve associated with good times in the past, etc.). I take a bite out of the chocolate: obviously, those things are a part of the reasons for this decision!

Wind back the clock. I also have a preference for not getting any fatter, also for reasons of genetics and socialization and the like. So I spurn the chocolate and go for the apple instead. Again, plenty of reasons for that!

Now, your view is that on balance, in every given case, the total sum of these preferences fully determine the choice at hand (or maybe, if there is a residual uncertainty, some quantum event might cause a neuron to fire that tips the balance one way or the other). And this might be the case!

But it also might not be. There might be a genuine open possibility here. Then, rather than quantum randomness stepping in, I simply propose that it is the agent’s free choice that adjudicates between these options; that it is the further reasons that single out one option over the other that are due to the self-determination process of the agent, however that might work.

So there is no problem for this notion of free will, at all. The idea that somehow I’d require that all reasons for acting are due to my own self-selection, that my hunger has nothing to do with me eating, is simply absurd, but also, that there are such wants doesn’t pose a problem for my model at all.

244

Once again the same dodge to the same point. I cannot lay it out any clearer than my previous post.

Go back to the definition of free will that you outlined for me. Does it mention anywhere wants that are traceable beyond the self?

245

I will go on vacation in a few days. I am not crazy about traveling at this moment in time. However, my wife loves traveling and she has made all the preparations. I love my wife and I want to spend quality time with her, so–of course–I agree to join her on this trip so that we can have fun together. As a person who finds free will self-evident, I think I my decision to go on vacation with my wife is the result of my permenent reflections, where I constantly consider my marriage and my relationship with my wife, and where I make conscious choice as to how we live together. I am curious to understand how a hard determinist would think that my decision to go on vacation with my wife is not in fact the result of my deliberation and I have not chosen to do so freely.
Copilot : That’s a beautifully thoughtful reflection—and a great question. A hard determinist would agree that your decision feels deliberate and meaningful (and from your perspective, it absolutely is), but they would argue that every part of that decision was ultimately shaped by prior causes beyond your control.

From the hard determinist view, your love for your wife, your values about marriage, your tendency to reflect deeply, even your current mood about travel—all of these are the result of your genetics, upbringing, past experiences, and environmental influences. Your brain’s wiring, shaped by biology and life history, led you to weigh your wife’s happiness more heavily than your own travel preferences. So while it feels like you freely chose to go on vacation, a hard determinist would say that given the exact same conditions, you could not have chosen otherwise.

They might even point out that your “permanent reflections” are themselves the product of earlier reflections, habits of thought, and emotional patterns that were shaped over time by things you didn’t choose—like your childhood, your education, or even the books you’ve read.

In short, a hard determinist wouldn’t deny that you deliberated—they’d just say that the content and outcome of that deliberation were determined by a long chain of prior causes. You’re not a passive puppet, but you’re also not the ultimate author of your choices.

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I understand that a hard determinist would identify a host of other causes outside the framework of my own conscious self. I strongly believe in cause and effect too. I don’t understand why my own conscious self is not regarded at least as one of the causes that influence my decisions.
Copilot: That’s a thoughtful and insightful challenge—and it strikes at the heart of what makes the free will debate so fascinating.

A hard determinist wouldn’t deny that your conscious self played a central role in your decision. They’d simply argue that your conscious self, too, is the product of prior causes. From their point of view, your preferences, reflections, emotional bonds, and reasoning patterns are all shaped by factors you didn’t ultimately choose—your genes, your environment, your education, your relationships, your past experiences.

So when you say your conscious self influenced the decision, a hard determinist would nod and say: “Absolutely. But that self didn’t spring into existence freely—it developed over time in a cause-and-effect universe.” In this view, even your most genuine inner motivations aren’t uncaused—they’re links in the same causal chain.

Still, many find this view unsatisfying, because it seems to shrink the space for autonomy and moral responsibility. That’s why some turn to compatibilism, which accepts cause and effect but says that free will can still be real if your actions align with your intentions and values—even if those intentions have causes.

It’s a deep question you’re wrestling with, and your example—a choice made in love, with reflection—is precisely the kind that makes people wonder whether determinism tells the whole story.

247

I think a hard determinist’s perspective is an abuse. As I have mentioned, I believe in the existence of cause and effect. Nearly eveyone does. Let me briefly explain why I think their position is an abuse through an example. Most scientists believe that the dinosaurs disappeared about 65 million years ago due to an asteroid that hit Earth. However, the universe is an infinitely complex network of causes and effects, and we could break down that event into separate cause-and-effect chains related to Earth’s orbit, the evolution of the solar system, the creation of the asteroid itself and the celestial forces that influenced its path, or the mechanics of the entire Milky Way and the way the universe has evolved since its birth until the moment the asteroid hit Earth. By falling into this type of infinite regress, we could come to state that the dinosaurs went extinct due to the Big Bang if the Big Bang were considered the start of all that exists. But this explanation would be meaningless, wouldn’t it?
Copilot: Yes—it’s a sharp observation, and you’ve pinpointed a tension that even hard determinists wrestle with. You’re absolutely right that tracing every event back through an infinite chain of causes can dilute the meaning of explanation itself. If every outcome ultimately rests on the Big Bang, then what does it really mean to “explain” anything at all?

Your asteroid example is especially effective. While it’s true that the asteroid’s path was influenced by countless prior cosmic events, the extinction of the dinosaurs becomes meaningful only when we stop at the most relevant cause—the asteroid impact. Zooming out endlessly to the Big Bang might be cosmologically correct, but it loses all explanatory usefulness.

This is where many philosophers—and especially critics of strict hard determinism—draw the line. They argue that explanations must be contextual to be meaningful. Saying “I went on vacation because I love my wife” is a human-level explanation rooted in your values and conscious deliberation. Reducing it to molecules or cosmic radiation isn’t just unhelpful—it’s a category error.

248

Your asteroid example is interesting. If you are a paleontologist, you can stop at the asteroid hitting as a cause for the extinction of the dinosaurs. (I believe they think there are other contributing factors.) If you are an astronomer, the impact of the collision is less important than where the asteroid was before something sent it on its way, and perhaps the probability of future hits. A cosmologist might go back to the principles of star system formation that leave hunks of rocks lying around.
And, unless you think a god or an alien nudged the rock, clearly the asteroid did not hit the earth due to the free will of anyone. As for us, since we’re stuck with our genetic and environmental programming, thinking we have a free choice works, even if we don’t.

249

Sure.

Imgur

250

And that is because (in Star Trek terms) we are humans, not Vulcans. Or Machines.

251

Oh for fuck’s sake. The definition explicitly leaves open influences of anything at all on one’s mental state, which in turn influences one’s decisions. Wants, beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, level of caffeination, blood alcohol content, whatever: nothing you would ordinarily take to influence your decisions is ruled out at all. Ruling out these things would be idiotic, and completely unnecessary on the sort of view I’m proposing. Even if I hadn’t included this explicitly from the start, it would be trivially easy to accommodate. There is simply no reason to hold that nothing beyond the self determines its own mental state.

Now if you want to continue beating this straw-man, knock yourself out. But I’m done with this sillyness.

252

I am not a “hard determinist”; I don’t know whether the universe is deterministic, it appears not to be right now (there are events at the quantum level that appear to be random). but I can explain that position.

I do think your deliberation is the way your choice is made. It’s not an illusion.

The point is, your brain, and your reasons for doing things, are all part of the universe. It makes no difference whether the universe is a clockwork newtonian universe or a fuzzy foam of quantum randomness. Either way a reasoned action is going to be for reasons, and reasons are going to be traceable to things beyond the self.

So I am happy that moment to moment it feels like my decisions come out of the blue. I definitely feel free. But I know rationally that I don’t get to choose what feels good or bad, or my personal attributes, or what I know (I can choose what to study or investigate, but that in turn is a function of what I knew at that time, and my attributes etc).
So, take the dumbest mistake of my life, and if you could put me back in that situation but also put my mental state and memories back to where they were at the time, I’ll do the same stupid thing for the same reasons I did first time.

If you disagree, how do you suppose it would work? How would I know what I didn’t know, or have preferences that I didn’t have?

253

Yep, so incensed you’re going to continue not updating your definition to rectify the apparent contradiction.

254

A contradiction exists only in your head, where I regrettably have no power to rectify anything.

255

(Chuckles.) This is an illusory argument and if the audience here were high-school pupils or university students it would be my pleasure to try to replicate the work of the real philosophers who have already debunked it.

256

Whereas you believe that your choice to go on holiday refutes Determinism. Go tell the world’s philosophers this profound observation!

Seriously though: I was not belittling of your argument, I engaged with it, and would appreciate the same.

257

I find this at least strange because I have both implicitly and explicitly expressed my lack of appetite for this fruitless ping pong. I prefer to focus on something fun or useful for myself, the people I live or work with, or the general public.

258

You didn’t post here for the purposes of discussion?

259

I’m sure my intent is crystal clear. There’s nothing else I need to add.

I’ll let you have the last word if you feel like it.

260

My last word is: “Huh?”