PS. To address your counter-hypothetical directly, PBear42…
Punishing someone close to a murderer may very well work as a deterrent. That is if a potential murderer desires that that person not suffer the punishment; and if we can efficiently identify who that someone actually is or if they even exist. It seems to me that punishing the perpetrator would be generally more effective and efficient than punishing the friend or relative. Whether or not that is the case, there is an additional reason why such a system would be selected against.
We’ve already conceded that Fred’s factors of desire and his calculations can overcome the deterrence factors of potential punishment. If we don’t also physically prevent it, his current programming is more likely to lead to more transgressions. So punishing Fred has additional effectiveness that punishing the other completely misses…but all that is an aside to the purpose of this thread. I’m all for preventative measures and rehabilitation of offenders. These things are additional means of achieving our (collective) desires. They’re just not relevant to my argument that responsibility does not require even the feeling of free will.
PC
Oh, I understand the thought experiment. Perhaps I’m not communicating clearly the objection. My point is that you need a justification to punish Fred. The status quo’s justification, as you note, is that Fred is responsible for his behavior. But that’s based on free will conceptions, which you reject.
Let’s go back to where you started. “Is punishing a person really all that different from leveeing a river that floods?” Well, yes, in a fundamental way. The river has no rights that we recognize. We can levee it all we want, for any reason, and no one is going to feel it’s being ill-used. About people, however, we feel differently. Broadly speaking, we think people should be allowed to live their lives unfettered. To levee them, if you will, we need a justification.
So, it is legitimate to inquire whether punishing Fred on utilitarian grounds is adequate justification. This is where my counter-hypothetical comes in. It demonstrates, I think, that utilitarianism, standing alone, is not adequate justification. From this, it follows we can’t punish Fred just because it will make the world a safer place. We need a justification to punish Fred. The status quo supplies one. Your system does not.
As for your last point, please notice that my counter-hypothetical was that we punish both Fred and someone close to him, so I’m not giving up anything. It sounds like you doubt whether punishing the someone close would be an effective deterrent. I’m certain it would, but this is a thought experiment. Let’s assume for purposes of discussion that it would. The question is whether it can be justified. And, if not, how punishing Fred is different.
PBear42,
We have a fundamental disagreement of what the status quo really is. No doubt you feel my view is unsupportable and perhaps even ludicrous. I feel your view is irretrievably invested in a pervasive post hoc explanation. Because of this we continue to talk past each other. I see little hope of progress for what, in the end, is a very small payoff. So thank you for your interest and polite attention but I think I’ll just withdraw now.
PC