No, but with Shodan’s “reasoning.” At least that’s how I read what **Elvis **said.
Amusingly, one of the judges who acquitted Delay got herself elected by violating the campaign finance laws. (She got a slap on the wrist because the violation was minor, involving a donation from her in-laws that would only have been permitted if they were blood family members, but amusing nonetheless.)
No, because that inference is not the only reasonable one to be made. All the testimony from the corporate contributors showed that they intended for their donations to be used lawfully. Once in the TRMPAC, the contributions could be sent out of state or used for any legal purpose. To prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence must eliminate all reasonable scenarios except that of guilt. Even if the jury thought that such an interpretation might be correct, or probably was correct, they had no evidence that would have allowed them to eliminate other reasonable inferences. And, obviously, criminal statutes must be read strictly against the state, and leniently against the accused.
When the only countervailing evidence is self-serving testimony, the jury is generally free to discredit it, aren’t they?
The dissentmakes essentially this argument, with some other nuance about how the donations were solicited.
The actual text of the ruling (from the source provide above by Human Action) reads “It was not a crime to conspire to violate election code in 2002”. So, they say there was no violation, then they say that even if there was, conspiring to do it was not a crime at the time. That sounds a lot like splitting hairs to me. Do they mean that conspiracy is just a misdemeanor? Does the law have to include conspiracy explicitly in its text?
Sorry for the snark – I leveled it because your critique was just so at odds with the actual decision that it made me mad. I should have realized that the press seldom gets these things anywhere close to right, and placed the blame where it richly belonged: on the reporter.
And I appreciate beyond measure your ability to both respond to the snark with equanimity and to acknowledge error. And in the Pit, no less.
Shodan is technically correct, but his explanation suffers from a similar flaw as that unnamed reporter: he doesn’t distinguish between this case, which involved the state proving their whole case but finding that the acts involved are ultimately not a crime under the law, and the appeals court deciding that the proffered evidence of a real crime under the law was somehow not sufficient.
I have only read this thread (and haven’t clicked any of the links or followed this case), but I thought based on what was presented here it just simply isn’t money laundering unless the funds themselves are the proceeds of a crime. Thus the argument is money laundering is basically trying to or in fact producing “clean” money out of illegal money. Moving money around the circumvent election laws in and of itself isn’t money laundering. It might be conspiracy to commit election violations under Texas law, but based on some of the posts here such conspiracy wasn’t a criminal action at the time (as per For You’s post.)
Basically what he was doing was moving money around in ways to circumvent the law, but not to hide some illicit revenue stream (which is what money laundering is under Texas law), so what he was doing wasn’t money laundering.
I don’t think there’s any doubt that if the corporate contributors intended for their money to be given to candidates that the money would be considered the proceeds of a crime, but I could be mistaken. I’ve only briefly skimmed the opinions.
“Money laundering” is simply a shorthand vernacular, a term widely understood without a precise and legalistic definition. It is almost meaningless in Texas, which proudly maintains a long-standing tradition that political power properly rests in the hands of those who can write the biggest checks. As God intended.
Nope.
They mean that in 2002, the crime of conspiracy in Texas said, in effect, “Conspiracy happens when you agree with someone else to violate any crime listed in the Texas Penal Code.”
But the Election Code was not part of the Texas Penal Code. Even though the Election Code listed violations of itself as crimes, the Election Code’s crimes were not part of the Penal Code, and so agreeing to violate the Election Code didn’t count as a conspiracy.
Now, there’s a loophole! But it wasn’t original to Tom Delay and company. It was used in 1977, in Baker v. State, 547 SW 2d 627 (Texas Court of Criminal Appeals) when a guy selling marijuana was convicted of conspiracy and he pointed out that the Controlled Substance Act didn’t include a conspiracy charge; a similar case the previous year flopped because there was no general “attempt” clause there either.
And DeLay himself, along with his pals John Colyandro and James Ellis, got their conspiracy charges in 2007 dropped with the same reasoning: in State v. Colyandro, 233 SW 3d 870 (Texas Court of Criminal Appeals), the court said:
So that’s what it means. At that time, the conspiracy statute did not apply to any crimes that were defined by law outside the Penal Code, as the Election Code is.
Well ok…but can we at least uphold “Fuck Tom DeLay”? Because really that really should stick.
What awful news for the authors of Texas Penal Code § 34.02(a). The poor dears thought they were specifically defining the crime of money laundering.
What were they thinking, not consulting you?
Would it be fair to say the statutes of Texas at least appear to be strangely written such that they don’t actually effect what we can (presume) the legislators probably intended when they passed some of the statutes? I would think such clear examples of loopholes as have been laid out here would be examples of poorly crafted laws and strangely these loopholes have been known it appears for many years without any move to rectify them by the legislature.
Well, one way to find out would be to examine what the legislature’s reaction is when one of these loopholes comes to light. If they promptly move to apply inchoate offenses like conspiracy and attempt to all crimes, then we can assume this was a mistake.
It would depend I suppose on the composition of the legislature when the statute was passed versus when the loophole came to light. It being possible the majority of the legislators who voted to pass the legislation had one intention, but by the time the loophole was discovered a different collection of legislators were in office who would have had different intentions had they passed the initial statute and thus would not be desirous of making changes.
I agree though, a quick attempt to “patch” the law, made by the legislature not long after the initial law’s being passed would be strong evidence of the loophole being a legislative mistake. But if the passage of time is fairly large, we may have to try and deduce from the text of the statute itself what the intent of the legislature was–just for conversational purposes.
Ultimately, though, the rule of lenity is still the major factor: even if we all agree the legislature meant to criminalize conspiracies to commit all crimes, the fact is that they didn’t, and the public is entitled to criminal laws which clearly and specifically define the conduct that is prohibited.
So regardless of what their intent was, the law as written has to reach the conduct in question, or there’s no crime.
That is a true point, but immaterial to the question I raised: is it fair to say the law as written probably did not effect what the legislators who wrote it intended?
If I had to guess?
Yes.
But only slightly less likely is: they never even thought about the applicability of inchoate offenses when they wrote it.
Forget it bup, it’s Texas.