The entire post was very well stated and dead accurate. Thank you.
I rise to quibble with you, sir. A minor matter, to be sure, but that’s the trouble with quibbles…
Can an inference be “beyond a reasonable doubt”? By its very nature, isn’t an inference less solid than a fact?
All the evidence you need, right there. 
Yes, an inference can be beyond a reasonable doubt. Let’s say I tell you there’s one thousand dollars hiding under a particular trash can in Central Park. Later that day, you find one thousand dollars hiding under that particular trash can in Central Park.
In the absence of other evidence, we can infer, beyond a reasonable doubt, that you found that money because of my tip and did not just stumble upon it.
Boiled down, then, it appears that given the most excruciatingly precise semantic rendering from a sympathetic view, Mr. DeLay is not guilty of a crime. This is a proud moment for Texas and Republicans everywhere.
And to find reasonable doubt that they did indeed know requires believing the donors to be too stupid to breathe unassisted. The jury’s finding is entirely reasonable.
I think that’s probably overstating it. I don’t think the acquittal is some partisan nonsense. I do think it is a closer call than suggested by the panel or by others in this thread.
I’m in a rush, haven’t read the thread and have no opinion as to the belated acquittal, but I just can’t resist the opportunity to say:
Justice DeLayed is justice denied!
This precise difficulty was raised in Ellis as an example of why the statute should be found void for vagueness:
The Court’s response was to note that despite those problems, the statute was not void, and that intent could be proven by evidence. Now this very hypothetical comes home to roost, and your response is that it’s sufficient to prove the criminal intent by disbelieving the claims of innocent intent and looking selectively at what they were told about the contributions, selecting only those aspects that tend to inculpate – the precise danger that the Court in Ellis said was nothing to worry about.
First, I’m not saying the disbelieving their testimony is proof of anything, as I’ve repeated over and over. All that does is remove their testimony from what evidence is to be considered. Please stop suggesting otherwise.
Second, where does this “looking selectively” come from? What else were they told about the contributions that creates a larger or different picture about what they knew the money would be spent on?
Third, here intent is being proven by evidence. Or are you suggesting that discussions between donor and donee of how the contributions will be used is not the kind of evidence that Ellis had in mind?
The remarkable thing about reading lawyers argue is how it makes time pass so slowly. Did Einstein’s equations account for this relativistic effect?
The jury was told that the money contributed to TRMPAC by corporations was done to show their support for DeLay’s causes, and that they hoped to have the opportunity to have “face time” with DeLay to discuss policy, educate him on their particular issues of concern, and build a relationship with him.
It is precisely the kind of evidence that Ellis had in mind, and not one scintilla of evidence of those discussions evinces anything except lawful purposes. Every corporate contributor testified that their intent was that his contributions be used lawfully. Every such witness testified that their intent was to assist DeLay’s causes as opposed to contribute specifically to Texas candidates.
Oh, is that what the kids are calling it, these days?
And here you’re referring to the testimony given at trial? So when you say “looking selectively,” you’re referring to the jury not crediting that testimony?
This is very simple:
(1) The jury is free to disbelieve any of the testimony of the contributors. Pointing to that testimony as proof of the insufficiency of the evidence is entirely incorrect as a matter of law.
(2) There is other evidence of their intent. It includes what they were told about the use of their donations, in addition to the other usual evidence of intent (such as what their interests were, what their actions were, etc.).
(3) The question of law is whether that evidence was sufficient for a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Which of those premises are you disputing?
You’re also misreading Ellis. In Ellis, one argument against the law was that “enforcement of the law is virtually impossible because law enforcement will not be able to ascertain the intent of the corporate contributor or the recipient.” The Court correctly explained that “What renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is.” You’re trying to use the party’s mistaken argument about vagueness to make some inference about the evidence that Ellis required to convict. It doesn’t make any sense. Ellis didn’t have anything to say about the type or quantum of evidence. It said “The State has the burden to prove the applicable culpable mental states, and if it cannot, then a defendant charged under these provisions is entitled to an acquittal.”
Indeed, Ellis noted that “courts and juries every day pass upon knowledge, belief and intent—the state of men’s minds—having before them no more than evidence of their words and conduct, from which, in ordinary human experience, mental condition may be inferred.” That’s exactly what we’re talking about.
None. I agree.
Except that #3 is answered,“No,” as a matter of law.
Ok. But you seemed to be making a claim that the nature rather than the quantum of evidence in this case required that result as a matter of law.
Specifically, you seemed to be suggesting that in no case would proof that contributors were told their donations would go to candidates be sufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that they knew their donations would go to candidates.
If that wasn’t the claim you were making, then I don’t understand why you think this case was an easy call.
There was massive intent to defraud in this case. Tom DeLay violated the spirit of the law like I violate Bricker’s mom every night. And fuck Texas politicians, every single crook and sociopath among them. ROFL
Hey, DeLay was on his knees in Congress when he got the glorious news…
C’mon now, Sheila Jackson Lee is a nice lady who respects the flag the space men planted on Mars.
Eddie Bernice Johnson knows how to help the poor childz related to hurrr as well.
Oh, no – far from it. If contributors were told that their contributions would go directly to candidates, in a way that left no room for other reasonable inferences to be drawn, then that would be sufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that they knew their donations would go to candidates.
Of course, you still have the problem of the conspiracy to perform that action not being against the law in 2002.