German vs Russian weapons in World War II

[Martini_Enfield]

And let’s not get into the fact that it seems pretty much every military rifle or SMG the Russians have designed since the 1950s seems to use some variant of the Kalashnikov action. I know they were onto a good thing with it, but even so…

[Dravin]

@Sailboat

Possibly he’s referring to the fact that artillery does not burrow into the earth and explode underground (or partly underground) in winter, but bursts right on the frozen surface.

Isn’t an artillery round burrowing into the earth before exploding undesirable? It’s expending it’s energy on making a crater instead of flinging shrapnel a greater and more uniform distance. My understanding is the use of proximity fuzes to allow air-burst is in difference to this idea. And while on the ground is less effective than an air-burst a few meters up one would think it’s be more effective than a partially subterranean burst.

Though I suppose having it dig into the ground might have a better chance of ruining a trench or foxhole with a near miss than a surface burst would. And I would expect a surface burst to lack the ability to reach in and touch someone in a trench, it’d just sail on over head. So I suppose if we’re talking about laying down artillery on a dug in position with contact fuses I could see how the ground being frozen would be less effective.

[Testy]

@Scumpup

If you want to look for things that made the papasha reliable, there are better places to look than the chrome-lined bore. The 7.62 x 25mm cartridge is bottlenecked, for starters. It’s easier to get a bottleneck cartridge to feed reliably than it is one that is straight walled or, like the 9mm, has a minimal taper. The PPSh series also featured the characteristically Russian generous clearances between moving parts; always a good idea in a weapon that has to function even when dirty or in intense cold. The drum was nominally a 71-rounder, but in practice was downloaded by several rounds due to (uh-oh!) jamming problems. Drum magazines, for just about anything, are notoriously slow to load and complicated to manufacture. The Soviets phased out the drum and replaced it with a conventional box magazine.

WRT drum magazines: I remember reading some years ago that British commandos in the early days of the war preferred the box magazines for their Thompsons as the drums were slow to load, rattled loudly, and were an inconvenient size and shape.

Scumpup

My father owned a Thompson in the early '80s and managed to get his hands on an old drum magazine for it. Our experience with it bears out everything you’ve said about them. Slow as hell to load and it was difficult to ever get the thing to feed properly.
It had a huge ‘cool’ factor to it but didn’t actually work that well. If I were taking a Thompson into combat I’d prefer a lot of 20 round magazines over the drums.
The Thompson, as an oh-by-the-way, was the loudest weapon I’ve ever fired, including things like Ruger Super Blackhawks and the like.

Regards

Testy

[Sailboat]

@Dravin

Isn’t an artillery round burrowing into the earth before exploding undesirable? It’s expending it’s energy on making a crater instead of flinging shrapnel a greater and more uniform distance. My understanding is the use of proximity fuzes to allow air-burst is in difference to this idea. And while on the ground is less effective than an air-burst a few meters up one would think it’s be more effective than a partially subterranean burst.

Precisely (since we’re talking pre-proximity fuse in this case). In winter, artillery’s effectiveness is changed. It’s more effective at killing people.

I was just replying to the idea that winter changes how things work – not trying to imply everything worked less well in winter.

The contact-fused artillery of the day was also somewhat more dangerous in forested terrain, because the shells would often burst in tree branches, showering fragmentation (and wood splinters) down from above, just like proximity-fused/airburst ordnance. To cite one example, this was a significant factor in the misery the American infantry endured in the Hürtgen Forest battle.

[Alessan]

OTOH, manhandling a gigantic piece of metal in sub-zero temperatures can’t be all that fun.

[Dravin]

@Sailboat

Precisely (since we’re talking pre-proximity fuse in this case). In winter, artillery’s effectiveness is changed. It’s more effective at killing people.

I was just replying to the idea that winter changes how things work – not trying to imply everything worked less well in winter.

Okay. That makes sense, I guess I had less effective stuck in my mind from RickJay’s post’s focus on armies being less effective.

[Dissonance]

@Tristan

That being said, there is a common effort to dismiss the logistical gift given to the Soviet Union, in the form of all those trucks, locomotives, food, uniforms, etc. I (and others) tend to hold to the theory that Allied equipment may have very well saved the Soviet Union.

You’re overstating the case. Official Soviet histories were dismissive of the importance of lend-lease, and of the efforts of the western allies in general for ideological reasons, but the Soviet Union hasn’t been around since 1991. Lend-lease was certainly of great value, amounting to ~8% of total Soviet production, but it didn’t save the Soviet Union, they did that for themselves. The Germans were halted and placed on the strategic defensive along the entire length of the front by December 6, 1941. Lend-lease to the USSR wasn’t authorized until October, 1941 with first deliveries in November. The initial deliveries were quite small compared to what they would become later on from mid/late '42 and early '43 once the floodgates had opened. It’s easy to forget how badly Barbarossa had mauled the Germans due to the scale of its successes. By November 1, 1941 German casualties on the Eastern front reached 686,000; 20% of all the German forces that had been sent east since June.

[ralph124c]

Regarding Lend-Lease to Russia-it wasn’t just trucks-millions of Russian soldiers went into battle-fed by cans of spam. Russia also received millions of tons of wheat, lots of gasoline, and many other necessities.

[ralph124c]

One of Germanys weak links was petroleum-the Reich had only a few sources of crude oil (Rumania, Hungary, a little in Austria and Poland). To supplement this, they had a big synthetic oil program (using hydrogenation of coal-the “Fischer-Tropsch” process).
According to Johnson (“Modern Times”) the synthetic fuel was not useable at the low temperatures of the Russian winter-it would separate into two unmixable components, and cause the engines to stop running.
If this cite is true, this would have severely limited the German’s ability to make war in Russia-imagine a panzer division unable to move its tanks. As far as I can find, German production of synthetic fuels increased throughout the war-so whatever its bad properties, it was really all they had.

[Oatwillie]

@Sailboat

For the record, only 1,347 Tigers were built. Compare this to 44,286 Sherman tanks and 57,339 T-34s produced during the war (more of these Allied tanks were produced postwar but are not included in these figures).

Side note – some innovations of the T-34 design (particularly the excellent off-road-capable suspension and the famous sloped armor) are the work of an American, Walter Christie, whose ideas had been largely ignored in the US.

An interesting line of thought I’ve been following lately is how many of the war-winning weapons were the product of two or more different nations pooling their creativity:

[ul]
[li]Poland, France, and Britain worked together on breaking Enigma.[/li][li]An American airframe and British engine produced the P-51 Mustang.[/li][li]The T-34 was the result of an American inventor’s ideas greatly expanded and adapted through Soviet design principles.[/li][li]The atomic bomb was built by scientists exiled from Germany and Hungary alongside British and American scientists.[/li][/ul]

I’m sure there are more examples.

t

It took 300,000 man hours to build one Tiger tank. It took only 20,000 man hours to build a B-29 bomber. Mass production won the war.
Bomber

[Oatwillie]

@ralph124c

One of Germanys weak links was petroleum-the Reich had only a few sources of crude oil (Rumania, Hungary, a little in Austria and Poland). To supplement this, they had a big synthetic oil program (using hydrogenation of coal-the “Fischer-Tropsch” process).
According to Johnson (“Modern Times”) the synthetic fuel was not useable at the low temperatures of the Russian winter-it would separate into two unmixable components, and cause the engines to stop running.
If this cite is true, this would have severely limited the German’s ability to make war in Russia-imagine a panzer division unable to move its tanks. As far as I can find, German production of synthetic fuels increased throughout the war-so whatever its bad properties, it was really all they had.

The first time I traveled to Canada during the holidays, it usually stayed about -30 below zero at night Before I left home I made sure to change the oil in my little Rabbit and used Mobile 1. In the mornings it would start right up after being in that temp all night. I understand that Mobile 1 was made using a German formula.

[the_diego]

What ever happened to Dissonance?

Let’s take them one-by one:

1. The Germans found their petrol often froze in their tanks. Did the Russians have that problem (I read they did in at least one account)? In general how did either side fix the problem?
2. The Germans complained their tank telescopic sights fogged up. Same line of questioning.
3. The German panzers didn’t bog down in mud and snow any more often than the Soviets’. The Soviets just had better mastery of the land. An example were the “invisible bridges” which were really just spillways built below level of the water.
4. The Panzer Mk IV was no less reliable than the T-34 ca. 1941. The T-34 just rode lower, had sloping one-piece cast armor, and was deployed by tankers right out of the factory.
5. As everyone now realizes, the German war machine even at its height went “vroom! vroom!” up front and “clip-clop clip-clop” at the rear. Often it was more a case of horses freezing to death, bicyclers getting frost bite, supply trucks bogging down, than main battle tanks malfunctioning in the heat of battle.

[MarcusF]

@Oatwillie

t

It took 300,000 man hours to build one Tiger tank. It took only 20,000 man hours to build a B-29 bomber. Mass production won the war.
Bomber

The general point is valid but can we have a cite for these figures? 300,000 man hours sounds way too high. (This is General Questions after all!)

[engineer_comp_geek]

@MarcusF

The general point is valid but can we have a cite for these figures? 300,000 man hours sounds way too high. (This is General Questions after all!)

I’m not sure exactly where that number comes from, but it’s all over the net (without any cite given in any of the places I found it). Here’s one example:

Production was ordered to start in August 1942. It began at a rate of 25 tanks per month and peaked in April 1944 at a rate of 104 per month. It took 300,000 man hours to build one Tiger, almost twice as much time as a Panther required.

The average cost of a Tiger was 250,000 Reichsmarks. In comparison, a PzKpfw III cost RM 96,200, a PzKpfw IV RM 103,500, and a PzKpfw V Panther RM 117,000; all these figures are exclusive of weapons and radios. The Tiger cost $100,000 in 1941 U.S. dollars. Adjusted for inflation, a Tiger I today would cost approximately $1,282,051. By comparison, the United States current M1A1 Abrams tank costs $4,300,000.

From here:
http://www.alanhamby.com/history.shtml

I think that when compared with other things, like the B-29 in the previous post, different calculations are being used to arrive at the total man-hours. For example, were the man-hours involved in setting up the factory included or does it only include the man-hour cost for the actual production of each unit? For example, on google books I found a cite that it took 1.5 million man-hours to design the B-29. Was that factored into the man-hours per plane? Probably not, in the previous post’s figures.

This web site doesn’t give actual figures, but does give a Tiger’s relative cost of double the Panther and triple the cost of an Me 109. Most sites tend to agree that the Tiger was double the cost of a Panther.

However, many Germans were critical of the heavy cost to build and maintain the tank. One Tiger tank cost the same number of skilled man hours to produce as two Panther tanks or three Messerschmit 109 fighters, and at 57 English tonnes overall weight it required 2.75 gallons of gasoline to drive one mile.

Gbosky | Link Gabung Slot Akun Gacor Gampang JP Tanpa Pola

This page has some numbers for the B29 with more detail:

The initial XB-29 (Serial Number 41-0002) was rolled out on the runway at Boeing Field, Seattle, and made its maiden flight on September 21, 1942, in front of almost all the Boeing employees who had contributed over 1,300,000 man hours to the project. This first XB-29 remained at Boeing throughout the war as a test aircraft.

At the end of the war Boeing-Wichita was producing 4.2 Superfortresses per working day for an average of 100 a month, which was the military’s schedule. The plant had also reduced the number of manhours to produce a single B-29, from 157,000 (the average required for the first 100 bombers), to less than 20,000.

From here:
http://www.planesofthepast.com/b29-superfortress.htm

[Bert_Nobbins]

@ralph124c

According to Johnson (“Modern Times”) the synthetic fuel was not useable at the low temperatures of the Russian winter-it would separate into two unmixable components, and cause the engines to stop running.
If this cite is true, this would have severely limited the German’s ability to make war

I’ve read quite extensively on the Russian campaign, and I have never come across this. More detailed cite available?

[MarcusF]

@engineer_comp_geek

I’m not sure exactly where that number comes from, but it’s all over the net (without any cite given in any of the places I found it). Here’s one example:

From here:
Tiger I Information Center - Tiger history

I think that when compared with other things, like the B-29 in the previous post, different calculations are being used to arrive at the total man-hours. For example, were the man-hours involved in setting up the factory included or does it only include the man-hour cost for the actual production of each unit? For example, on google books I found a cite that it took 1.5 million man-hours to design the B-29. Was that factored into the man-hours per plane? Probably not, in the previous post’s figures.

This web site doesn’t give actual figures, but does give a Tiger’s relative cost of double the Panther and triple the cost of an Me 109. Most sites tend to agree that the Tiger was double the cost of a Panther.

Gbosky | Link Gabung Slot Akun Gacor Gampang JP Tanpa Pola

This page has some numbers for the B29 with more detail:

From here:
http://www.planesofthepast.com/b29-superfortress.htm

As you say, the 300,000 figure is all over the net but there is no reference (at least that I can find) to where it comes from or what it covers. I just find the comparison between Tiger and B29 meaningless and probably misleading. It is not as though tens of thousands of the B29’s were built - less than 4000 in total including those post-war. Not exactly mass-production and the B29 was reputed to be an order of magnitude more complex than any other WW2 aircraft, never mind tank!

I think everyone accepts that the cost of producing the Tiger was excessive but the “twice the cost of a Panther” figure seams more useful.

[terentii]

In the biography of Erich Hartmann, there’s an incident in which someone asked a Russian POW how the Sovs kept their weapons from freezing. The Russian was proud to show them how they did it: He took a German machine gun and put it into an oil drum filled with boiling water. Once the German lubricants had been removed, the gun fired normally.

IIRC, Anthony Beevor’s Stalingrad describes how Germans not only froze to death while on sentry duty (they had no option but to stand still and try to stay awake), a great many of them starved to death at an accelerated rate because of their bodies consuming their own tissues in an attempt to stay warm (a minimum of 5000 calories a day is needed under Arctic conditions and normally comes from animal fat). German doctors were horrified when they examined some of the emaciated corpses; they had never seen anything like it.

There’s a documentary on the Winter War on YouTube. It describes how the Finns went to great lengths to keep their troops fed with hot food full of animal fat while the Red Army rations consisted mainly of bread and tea. (At one point, the Sovs captured a Finnish field kitchen and were chowing down on sausage and stew when the Finns called in an artillery strike on the position.) Since they were able to thrash the Germans so soundly in the winter of '41 and every winter thereafter, I assume the Russians learned a great deal from this experience. (Those shipments of SPAM must have been greatly appleciated!)

[robert_columbia]

@Scumpup

Of the widely issued rifles from that war, the M1 required the most sophistication in production. Garand had to design tooling and processes as well as the rifle itself. That said, once he had done that work, many companies were able to produce the M1, not all of which were gun companies. The other rifles were 19th century guns that could be produced with 19th century technology.

Very true. One of the big manufacturers of M1 Garands was IBM. So it turns out that IBM has produced decent equipment for both cyber warfare and conventional warfare.

[DrDeth]

@Sailboat

For the record, only 1,347 Tigers were built.

Also about 500 Tiger II and a number of Jagdtiger’s, etc.

[John_DiFool]

@Bert_Nobbins

I’ve read quite extensively on the Russian campaign, and I have never come across this. More detailed cite available?

ralph hasn’t logged on in more than a year.