That’s not really true. At the start of the war Britain did not have universal conscription. As a result their standing army was 6 divisions compared with about 70 each for France and Germany. There was a great deal of consternation about leaving the home islands essentially undefended. In addition, Lord Kitchner was one of the few people who thought the war was going to last indefinitely. As a result he wanted to keep the 6 divisions as a nucleus to build a proper army around. The prewar plan called for all 6 divisions to land in France, but only 4 were sent.
Germany really had no need for a navy. Their overseas colonies were of minimal value, and they really didn’t need overseas trade. It would have been a much better plan to court England’s friendship, or at least neutrality in a war. England’s policy was to have a navy bigger than the next two combined. Germany’s increased naval power was a direct threat to them because England, unlike Germany, did depend on overseas trade and their colonies.
Which brings us to the answer to the OP. Germany was making moves that were aggressive towards England. If they had defeated France, they would have crippled her. With no continental power to challenge Germany, she would have concentrated more and more on the navy. Which, given enough time and effort they could have easily outpaced England. Germany had an army of 70 divisions compared to England’s 6. The navy in Germany was more or less an afterthought, and it was still powerful enough to be a threat to England.
I think Haig gets somewhat of a bad press in general (hey, I also defend Bomber Harris too…). The British were in a very bad position during the Great War. Alone of the major powers, she had no conscript army, relying instead on incredibly well trained professionals back up by the Territorials, a force which was dwarfed by the continental armies. They acquitted themselves wonderfully early in the war - the stories from Mons of German units reporting they were facing machine gun units of the British, when instead they were simply unprepared for the spead of fire of the riflemen. But once the war settled down, you have to look at the situation - Britain was coming from behind on building a mass volunteer (and I think every battle up to and including the Somme was fought with essentially volunteer troops) and then a conscript army. Many of the qualified NCOs did not survive the early stages of the war, and unlike Germany, Britain had no pool of previous draftees to call upon to replace them. Further, Germany was in possession of territory from which they needed to be removed. Attack at this time was weaker than prepared defense. Germany also stopped in the right places - she tended to control the high land, important for artillery (by far the greatest killer of all the weapons in the war), but also for defense and for simple things as comfort - much of the British line, was, I believe, below the water table. British politicians also interfered - I have no cite at the moment for this but I think British generals wanted to withdraw from the Ypres salient as it was a killing ground, but the politicians refused to countenance this after First Ypres.
Britain, and Haig once he took command, was unable to pick and choose the timing of its offensives. They were sped up as a result of the need to support the French, deprived of troops by the need to take on more of the line from the French, etc. The Russians also launched offensives unprepared to help their allies in the same way (the Brusilov offensive I think). And while Haig did dream of cavalry charges, I think this has in some ways been overemphasized, and also the criticism ignores the fact that, after a break through, cavalry could be used to great effect. The problem was the break through was much harder than expected, because of the German superiority in position, the defensive technology, etc.
At that time, then, I am not sure what choice Haig and the army had. In the end, they won the war in the same way that Grant et al won the US Civil War. They bled an often military superior, but numerically inferior opponent until they could no longer resist. Politicians proposed alternatives, like the catastrophic, mis-conceived Gallipoli campaign, but in the end, the Great War was going to be won in France, and to win it, the Allies had to attack the Germans, who could sit back in their conquered territory and wait (this of course is an overstatement because of the naval blockade…).
I don’t believe the terms of the understanding between England and France required a British declaration of war - the British government at the time seemed to feel that declaring war was an option not a requirement.
But the British didn’t want to see Germany become too powerful, which it would have as a result of a victory of France and Russia. Germany would then be a threat to Britain and under the circumstancs, Britain would have a hard time finding allies when it hadn’t helped others in their time of need.
The most specific fear was that Germany would establish control over Belgium (and maybe the Netherlands). This was part of the German plans so it was a realistic fear. If it had happened, the British Navy would have no longer been able to blockade the German navy and the Germans would have been much closer to England for an invasion strike. So Britain fought Germany to protect the independance of Belgium.
I agree with your comments about his reputation, but he was created 1st Earl Haig in 1918, and that’s a high honour - higher than Montgomery got. I think only Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington scored better in reasonably modern times.
It was almost all the idiot Kaiser’s idea to specifically build a fleet to challenge the British on the high seas.
As long as no one was building a real fleet to challenge the British control of the seas, the British would just meddle on one side or the other to keep a balance of power, so that Napolean would never happen again.
I agree with treis Imperial Germany should have concentrated only on a defensive navy and courted the British, they likely could have got the British to stay neutral.
To reiterate Little Nemo’s point, Great Britain had no military or defensive treaties with either France or Russia prior to the outbreak of the war. The Entente Cordiale had led to increasingly warmer relations between Britain and France in the years before the war, and had resolved most of the colonial disagreements that were the source of friction between the two countries. But Britain had no formal treaty obligations to come to France’s defense.
But, as a signatory to the Treaty of London which created Belgium, Great Britain had an obligation to protect Belgian neutrality. It’s arguable whether that obligation extended to military intervention in the case of an invasion, but Britain cited the treaty in its decision to intervene in the war. But Britain doubtlessly would have intervened regardless of treaty obligations to defend the Low Countries – the Germans were foolish to convince themselves otherwise.
Nevertheless, he wanted them. It was called Weltpolitik. Bismarck had been content with making the German Empire the greatest military power on the Continent. That wasn’t enough for Kaiser Bill. He wanted Germany to be a world power, like Britain and France.
It’s a commonplace to say all the parties to WWI got dragged into it blindly, following their treaty obligations, with no clear victory scenario in mind. But historians now believe, based on Wilhelm’s papers and correspondence, that he had his heart set on a war – one that he expected would elevate Germany to its rightful place on the world stage – and was determined to get it sooner or later, on any pretext he could find. See The American Way of Strategy, by Michael Lind.
Required? No, not required. However, the British had agreed to protect the channel in event of war, allowing the French to concentrate in the Mediterranean. There were no more than a few French torpedo boats. The British and French army had been working together, and there was an agreed upon place for the BEF on the extreme left wing of the French line. If the British had backed out of these commitments on the eve of a war that would decide Frances fate as a country Britain would have lost all honor and respect as a country. The government would be viewed by history as, quite possibly, the greatest villains to ever have lived. Think of how history views Chamberlain. Multiple that by 1000 and you might reach the level of scorn Asquith would have garnered.
There was no piece of paper requiring the British to declare war, but national pride and honor required them to do so.
Please could people stop this lazy use of “England” and "Britain " as if they are interchangeable? Even if some officials at the time used “England” when they meant “The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland”, there is no justification for the usage now. I realise there are problems with using “Britain” when you mean the UK, but I’ll leave that for Irish people to opine on. What I am sure of is that there has not been an English government for 300 years.
The battleship class firepower was what “drew the eye”, and the admirals didn’t want to waste that precious firepower potential on subsidiary operations. The battlecruisers were seen as a “fast” wing of the battle line, used to flank the enemy.
regarding the British navy; in reading the history of the battle of jutland, one is struck by how lucky the Germans were-they managed to escape Adm. Jellicoe’s main battle force. They were set upon by Adm. Beatty’s battle cruisers-and sank 4 of them. The author claimed that the British naval guns ahd all kinds of technical problems-like detonators that failed 9a 12" shell would hit a german ship, and break up withouit exploding)-also the british rangefinders and telescopes were not as accurate or durable as the german ones.
Nevertheless, the British DID win the war at sea-the german fleet never ventured out again.
Curiously, the battleship admirals kept the battleship alive into the 1940’s-long afetr their worthlessness had been amply proven.
On numerous ocasions when reading a WWI book I’ve had to put it down in frustration over how unlucky and blundering so much of what happened was. The British should have trapped the Germans at Dogger Bank. The navy could have forced through to Constantinople. Etc, etc. When you think about all of the lives and money that was subsequently wasted as a result of all the bad luck/blundering, its enough to drive you batty.
:dubious: I agree that by WWII battleships were no longer the primary instruments of any fleets battle line…but worthless? Hardly. You do know that the US used battleships quite effectively not only throughout WWII but in Korea and Vietnam as well, right? They might not have been as useful as sea-born surface combatants by then…but they were hardly worthless.
For that matter we were still using the few we had left until fairly recently…and the reason we DON’T use them today is that they are so expensive to maintain and operate…not because they are worthless.
Well, they did at the Battle of the Falklands. But most German Raiders were either converted Merchant ships or light cruisers, thus the BC was overkill, and also they ate coal like a mo-fo. Frigate run on wind.
but didn’t Britian NOT declare war right away? Did they not declare war after Belgian neutrality was violated?
Methinks Britain would have been content for France and Germany to bash themselves over a short border (no Belgium) but had to join in when Germany extended the war meaning France would be in danger of falling…plus the fact that Germany blatantly violating neutral Belgium showed her respect for neutral nations.
Germany declared war on France on 3 August, 1914. German Battlecruiser SMS Goeben, and the light cruiser Breslau, shell the French north african ports of Philippeville and Bona on the morning of 4 August. The German ships turn east.
Germany invades Belgium on 4 August. The UK demands the Germans withdraw, with the ultimatum to expire on midnight of the 5th. On the 4th, the Goeben and Breslau pass within sight of the British battlecruisers HMS Indomitable and Indefatigable. The British ships attempt to follow, but by nightfall, the Germans have lost their shadowers.
The German ships coal in Messina (Sicily) on the 5th, and then leave before the 24hour time limit set on them by the Italians. The Germans slip out, headed east (while the British ships waited for him to the west of Messina).