(Backgound: I’m currently listening to Neptune’s Inferno. I have previously read Richard Frank’s book on Guadalcanal, but I don’t remember what if anything he had to say about my question)
Fletcher’s decision to get his carriers out of danger has some strategic justification, but why did Turner have to leave with the cargo ships on 9 Aug?
Because Fletcher had left with the carriers. The carriers were there to protect the cargo ships. Without air cover, Turner assumed his ships would be helpless against Japanese aerial bombardment.
And because the Japanese under Mikawa had just sunk four allied heavy crusiers at a loss of only one of theirs.
There are times when marines who just landed on a hostile beach have to make it on their own for a while, and August 9, 1942 was it.
Is it not true that Fletcher had decided to go before the Battle of Savo Island? Crutchley left the southern cruiser group to go have the conference with him about this.
Regarding the second comment, the carriers were supposed to protect the amphibious fleet and themselves. My point was that the cargo ships were not as valuable as the carriers and could have been risked.
Was it Fletcher that commanded the fleet to relieve Guam that was ordered to turn around?
He commanded the fleet sent to relieve Wake Island.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Wake_Island#USN_relief_attempt
No they couldn’t. It’s hard to picture it with the massive volume of ships of all types produced by the US during the war, but the transports were irreplaceable in the short term. They were not simple cargo ships but attack transports (APA) and attack cargo ships (AKA). Had they been lost, operations in Guadalcanal were over. There was nothing to replace them with. By mid-1943 APAs, AKAs, and landing ships of all types were being produced in enormous quantities, but in August 1942 what was being used at Guadalcanal was essentially all that there was to be had. By comparison, if even if Kurita had somehow made it to the transports off Leyte Gulf in October 1944 all it would succeed in doing is push back the timetable of operations. Just as at Guadalcanal the Americans were already securely ashore at Leyte, but unlike in August 1942 any loss of transports could immediately be replaced by assets already in theater.
Correction: Mikawa didn’t lose any of his ships.
He did on the way back. There’s just the argument of whether or not the sinking of the Kako was part of the battle.
You’re right and I was wrong.
The thing was, Fletcher decided to abandon the troops on Guadalcanal without supplies BEFORE the Japanese counter attack began. The Marines there had to survive on captured Japanese rations for quite some time.
Technically, Turner abandoned them, not Fletcher. Turner had the supplies, and he did try to drop as many supplies as he could before retreating.
They would have done the Marines little good at the bottom of the ocean.
Yeah, but with a couple of more hours, they could have offloaded more supplies and Marines. They didn’t do the 1st MarDiv much good sailing back to Hawaii either.
You are of course correct, the loss of the Kako to a submarine torpedo on the return trip had entirely slipped my mind.
You probably didn’t mean Hawaii literally, but the troops still loaded were dropped off at Espiritu Santo and the transports themselves withdrew to Noumea. It was actually rather ballsy of Turner to continue unloading for several hours on the 9th before departing at General Vandegrift’s request; Turner had intended to leave by 0630 but postponed it until mid-afternoon. His air cover had departed and wrecked ships from last night’s naval action were still burning. Had he stuck around and lost the transports, the Marines really would be on their own, for good. They’d be living off of Japanese rations for the rest of the war.