As many posters doubtless know, Delta Air Lines Inc., one of the six “legacy” U.S. carriers, last week introduced a simplified fare structure that lowers ticket prices by as much as 50% in some cases. This *Washington Post * article notes that American Airlines tried something similar in 1992. The result? “Within months, American abandoned the plan, citing huge financial losses ($251 million in two quarters) and ‘intense competition’ that drove fares down to as low as $99 for a one-way ticket from New York to Los Angeles.” The article also quotes a Merrill Lynch analyst as saying that matching moves industrywide could cut airlines’ annual revenue by up to $3 billion.
It is not exactly news that the “legacy” airlines – Delta, American, United, Northwest, Continental and US Airways – are on a somewhat delicate financial footing, to say the least. United and US Airways are operating under bankruptcy protecton, and four of the companies lost money in 2003, the most recent year for which figures are available. The question before the house, then, is whether Delta’s action – which the other “legacy” carriers have matched on routes where they compete – will have an effect similar to American’s move 13 years ago and, if so, whether that may be enough to tip one of the group’s members over the edge.
Delta hopes to make up for the initial loss of revenue by winning passengers from other airlines and reducing operating costs further, according to the Post. It seems self-evident to me that the “legacy” carriers cannot all succeed in cannibalizing each others’ business, and while I’m no airline industry expert, it’s difficult for me to imagine the “legacy” carriers taking market share away from the budget operators. In addition, further cost cuts will to some degree be coming out of the hides of workforces that have already suffered multiple rounds of pay reductions and erosion of benefits – will there come a point when someone says “enough”?
By what I fully concede is a very rough and ready calculation using sales data for 2003, the most recent annual numbers available, I figure that an industrywide drop of $3 billion in revenue would equate to a decline of as much as 2.8% for each of the “legacy” airlines. Not a catastrophic thing, one might think, but in an industry whose finances are as precarious as this one’s, every dollar counts. I don’t know whether the group will be shrinking as a result of Delta’s action, but if someone does go under, I’d have to say US Airways looks like the laggard.
Here’s how I made my calculation of the possible impact of Delta’s move: I used the figures in tables 1 and 3 of this press release to determine each of the “legacy” carriers’ market share by number of passengers in the first nine months of 2004. (Together they had 52% of the market.) On that basis, the effect on each company of a drop of $3 billion in industry sales would be as follows, in the format company/2003 sales/decline in raw terms/decline in percent terms: Delta/$13.30 billion/-$378 million/-2.8%; American/$14.33 billion/-$345 million/-2.4%; United/$11.13 billion/-$291 million/-2.6%; Northwest/$9.51 billion/-$219 million/-2.3%; US Airways/$6.84 billion/-$180 million/-2.6%; Continental/$8.87 billion/-$150 million/-1.7%. A rough measure, as I have conceded, but better than nothing, I’d argue.
The sales figures for American and United are for the named carriers only and do not include other airlines owned by their parents, AMR Corp. and UAL Corp. The figure for US Airways includes the full calendar year 2003, for the first three months of which the company was operating under bankruptcy protection. It should be kept in mind that the above, in addition to being only a rough estimate, is based on the analyst’s worst-case scenario.