I’m not sure why you are quite so huffy. As has already been pointed out in different ways, it is not in the interest of the government to proclaim, or even acknowldge, torture related information on several levels:
The administration wants to pretend that we do not use torture, because we’re the “good guys” (despite several efforts by administration spokespersons to redefine torture to require increasingly higher levels of abuse).
If the administration did get genuine information as the result of torture, admitting that torture was used would set up a massive outcry against the U.S.
Due to the first two situations, no tortured person can ever be released to tell the tale and no information derived from torture can be linked to the interrogation.
If some rogue agent wanted to play Jack Bauer on the international stage, that agent would have to be prepared to resign from whatever U.S. agency employed him or her and leave the country for Egypt or Syria or somewhere out of reach of international law, and would probably have to have an event like a suitcase nuke exploding over the Nevada desert to even admit that an event had taken place.
In one way or another, each of these points has been mentioned in the preceding posts.
Being upset that genuinely secret information has actually remained secret is hardly a good reason to express displeasure with those of us who do not even work inside the secret agencies.
Now, I am not sure whether the following is the article mentioned, above, but the New Yorker, on February 14, 2005, ran an article, “Outsourcing Torture” that provided a close (but still outsider’s) view of the history and apparent abuses of the “extraordinary rendition” program. Beginning on page 6, ex-FBI agent Jack Cloonan describes the history of the interrogation of Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, the head of an al Qaida training camp. Cloonan notes the differences in approaches taken by the FBI and CIA, makes the claim that the FBI thought that they were getting good information regarding al Qaida internal organization while the CIA wanted to get more information faster, regarding al Qaida operations that Cloonan believes would have been unknown by a training camp administrator. At some point, the CIA took Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi out of the interrogation process and shipped him off to Egypt for more intense interrogation. Later, the administration made the claim that a high-ranking al Qaida member questioned in Egypt had led them to evidence of cooperation between Iraq and al Qaida–information that we now know (well, we knew it then, too) was false, although it was one more lie used to rationalize our invasion of Iraq. Cloonan asserts that at that point, Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi was the only “high ranking” al Qaida leader in captivity and that the location of the “questioning,” Egypt, seemed a bit too coincidental.
It would be only a small stretch to claim that torture resulted in far more deaths and destruction, in this case. It certainly did not save any lives. (Of course, the administration was going to invade Iraq even without this “information,” so I would not claim that the torture was the direct cause of the Iraq mess.)