Although I am not an immense fan of making debates out of opinion pieces, I am great fan of Martin Wolf and his analyses.
As such, I thought I would bring to your attention his recent column: “The transatlantic alliance is in trouble” (Martin Wolf) Financial Times 20 May 20 2003
Wolf herein discusses recent fall out from the Iraq war in the context of damaged Euro-US relations (and a damaged global image of the US). I am going to try to quote extensively from Wolf to provide a basis for comment:
He notes “I went to the [Bildinger] meeting convinced that divorce between the US and Europe had become possible. I left thinking that it could easily become unstoppable.” Wolf seques into discussing Clyde Prestowitz’s new book Rogue Nation noting Prestowitz, “a former member of the Reagan administration, has expressed the worry in his provocatively entitled new book, Rogue Nation.”
Wolf argues there are two significant points to take away from Prestowitz: “The first is that “the imperial project of the so-called neo-conservatives is not conservativism at all, but radicalism, egotism and adventurism articulated in the stirring rhetoric of traditional patriotism”. The second is that this radicalism both frightens and enrages foreigners.”
Well, I can certainly report first hand that the second is clearly true. The first is something perhaps a bit provocative. The reference is of course to Wolfowitz et al’s strategic document XXXXXXXXX
Wolf further observes: “What astonished me at the meeting is that these emotions are felt by pro-American businesspeople, politicians, academics and journalists. Americans believe that French and German opposition to the war in Iraq was a betrayal of decades of support. But many Europeans believe recent US behaviour was a betrayal of what the US has taught them. The ideological gulf is wide.”
Certainly I can add to Wolf’s observation that I have seen precisely the same reaction among pro-Western Arabs and others in my region. I speak of pro-western business people, running divisions of multinationals, or Arab mini-multinationals themselves.
Wolf further observes that while there are many common values, “Europe and the US have become very different. Most important, the US has now adopted old European theories of international relations, while the Europeans have embraced a newer American one.” An interesting reversal, I am not sure if I would personally agree that Europeans have adopted an American theory of international relations per se, but it does seem clear that the Wolfowitz et al faction has adopted parts of an old European attitude, mixed with dollops of idealism they call “Realism”.
Wolf notes that in the classical system “states recognised neither legal nor moral constraints. But states also agreed not to interfere in one another’s internal affairs. Today’s European states reject this view of the world, because it engendered catastrophe. Operating within an unstable balance of power, illiberal states fomented wars that brought the deaths of millions.” He adds “The answer … was to embrace the ideals proffered by …. Woodrow Wilson: peace, free markets and democracy. Within Europe, under American auspices, they created a supra-national order that stood the classical system on its head. Instead … Europe would have a supra-national authority and a shared commitment to democracy and human rights. Sensible Europeans are not naive enough to believe the world can operate without resort to force. They are also grateful to the US for its ability and willingness to apply that force. But they are Wilsonian, for an obvious reason: if Germany were to announce its adherence to the doctrines that now animate the US, stability in Europe would vanish.”
Fair enough analysis. One can certainly quibble with the details – although let’s recall it is a column and not a detailed analysis, as a quick paragraph collapsing of 50 years of history I think it’s serviceable.
Wolf then turns to the US, arguing that the US is no longer “Wilsonian” and points to the specific policy competition between factions in the Administration. He argues “we must recognise the tension within the administration between nationalists and neo-conservatives. Where they agree is in their rejection of moral or legal constraints on the sovereign independence of the US. Where they disagree is on how far pursuit of those interests requires interference in the internal organisation of other states. Nationalists focus only on direct threats, principally state sponsorship of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Neo-conservatives desire to embed liberal democracy, as well, since its absence explains, in their view, why states generate these threats.” Again given that this is but a paragraph summary of a larger argument, let’s not quibble over Wolf collapsing numerous details, the argument or analysis per se seems to me fair, in terms of contrasting two schools of thought with the underlined joining position.
Wolf, on the basis of the above resume (and do recall it is a resume) argues that “* (n)ationalists then are anti-Wilsonian in both their means and their ends. Liberal imperialists are anti-Wilsonian in their means, but Wilsonian in their ends.*” A fair assessement I would say, if we take as given the resume, which given the constraints of the space, seems broadly fair to me. Wolf further observes “Yet both groups unambiguously reject the secular religion of contemporary European elites, which is Wilsonian in means and ends. The new US doctrines are, from the general European point of view, poison. They invite them back to the world of Bismarck. For many Europeans the contemporary American ideology is made more bitter by the perception that it represents a betrayal of what they have learned from the US.” I would amplify the observation, which certainly as an expression of a point of view is broadly correct, even if some of our observers might argue the perception is incorrect. I would hazard the opinion the perception is also correct, but let us lay that aside. Amplifying then, it strikes me that reaction among elites, and in this I include, as Wolf does, business elites who have typically been pro-American in broad terms and certainly not leftist, outside of Europe has been quite similar.
Finally, Wolf argues – and I note that I agree with the argument – that the “transatlantic alliance cannot be sustained if the US remains dedicated to its current doctrines, except as a state of dependency on one side and mastery on the other. There are, instead, two alternatives. The first is a divorce, with abandonment of the institutions that bring the two sides of the Atlantic together. The second is a pragmatic partnership, in which the two sides work together in areas of common interest.” Very obviously I think this is true – I further note that this is precisely why I have found the frequent arguments about French, German and Russian ‘perfidy’ to have been so dangerous – as well as badly informed but that is another matter. I happen to know that among Wolfie et al’s bunch favorite readings are the Thucydides and specifically the Melian dialogue (See here http://www.hfienberg.com/irtheory/thucydides.html for an encapsulation), which in itself (in part) teaches that the powerful make the rules, as they like. In a larger context, however, one also can understand the a single hegemon acting in its own interest w/o regard for rules generates its own opposition. ‘Punishing’ France et al, for following their own interests and when one’s own case looks weaker and more fabricated daily, when one needs assistance in stumbling Iraqi and Afghani reconstruction efforts, as well as in combating resurgent and resilient al-Qaeda, as well as in trade policy and dealing with potential international financial crises….is short sighted and peevish, and likely to have negative consequences. (I do recall some simple recourse to simple models on game theory on punishment, but then I point that one on one models where we have multiple actors do not capture coalition building reaction)
Returning to Wolf, he notes that pragmatic partnership on shared interest is “approach advanced by a number of foreign policy thinkers, from both sides of the Atlantic, in a statement released at the end of last week.**”
Wolf notes that “if practical co-operation is to be achieved, much will depend on US behaviour. Tony Blair now plays a pivotal role. Should the credibility of his support for the US be destroyed, his country may range itself more closely alongside Europe’s principal powers. For the UK, too, is thoroughly Wilsonian. Should the US replace an Iraqi tyranny with enduring anarchy, as has happened in Afghanistan, or fail to alter the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it will be hard even for this prime minister to support the US in further ventures.” Results matter, in other words, and I would further add, as Wolf has not, that the exaggeration of the Nuclear-Biological-Chemical threat has badly hurt US credibility to date, for the growing perception of outright lies (fed by the pre-war fabrication of the nuclear evidence) implies a degree of cynical untrustworthiness that does not encourage cooperation. An impression that feeds into a number of realms, including the economic.
Finally, I find the following analysis from Wolf dangerous, yet perhaps sadly correct. I say sadly for it implies decreased cooperation in key areas, such as global economic policy: “The US believes in unbridled freedom of action. Europeans believe in international rules. The US wants to transform the world. Europeans want to manage it. The difference reflects differences in power and in attitudes to its legitimate use. The transatlantic relationship is now a partnership of convenience. It is already no more than that for the US. Europeans should adopt a similarly utilitarian view. If they fail to do so, the amicable co-operation that is indispensable to both sides may become impossible.” Freedom of action, like freedom from foreign entanglements strikes me as a dangerous fantasy, a naïve belief all can be done single handedly or assembled ad hoc. The 19th and early 20 centuries are replete with examples of the “attraction” of such.
)