Environment
Let’s start by looking at an area of conflict today between conservatives and liberals - the environment, and see how this party can devise rational policies that satisfy both.
The split between us has to do with one major fact – there is a huge market failure here. The market failure is that everything we do that affects the environment creates externalities that affect other people, yet we don’t really have good ways to compensate those people and pass the costs on to the polluters. So we’ve ‘solved’ the problem with government regulation. This has had decidedly mixed results.
Since the main market failure here is lack of accounting for externalities, we’re going to try to fix that with government policy that seeks to bridge that gap, without destroying the functioning of the market.
For example, let’s take the issue of car pollution. Environmentalists want to limit things like SO2 emissions because of problems of smog and health concerns in the inner city. So they advocate regulations that seek to set maximum allowable exhaust emissions on car manufacturers. This is at best a blunt instrument, and at worst it’s completely wrong in this sense: What the real problem here is that the people who are damaged by vehicle exhaust are not compensated for it, and therefore the people who drive cars are essentially being subsidized.
If the true cost of driving a car could be known, and the people damaged by it could be identified and compensated, then people would only drive when there was an agreement between them and the people who pay the costs, and everyone would be happy. Of course, the people who are damaged are the only ones who really know how much money they would be willing to accept as compensation for their damages. So in the ideal world, car drivers would have to come to a negated agreement with everyone they affect, and once everyone was happy, we’d be okay.
Also note that vehicle emissions don’t affect everyone equally, or affect every region equally. SO2 is a much bigger problem in Los Angeles than it is in rural Illinois. In a real market situation, residents of Illinois would be willing to negotiate a much smaller fee for their damages than the people of Los Angeles would.
Another problem with current regulation is that it generally affects only newer cars (aside from some places that test older ones and force them to upgrade). Having higher standards on newer cars effectively subsidizes those who choose to drive older, dirtier vehicles.
So here’s a concrete policy suggestion for this problem: Rather than set emission standards on cars, we allow manufacturers to emit whatever they want. However, we measure all cars for pollutants – new cars as they come off the line, all other cars through a mandatory test every year. Vehicles are then issued a sticker that says how much pollution they emit. Then we encourage municipalities and states to implement emissions taxes and pollution credits. The two together must be revenue neutral by law so it doesn’t become a tax grab and further distort the market.
The pollution credits are tax credits issued to the residents of the taxed area (whether it be at the municipal, state, or federal level). The tax is levied on drivers by mileage and their pollution rating. The mileage can be read at the same time the pollutant level is, and a tax receipt issued at that time. (This doesn’t solve the problem of people who drive the vehicle outside of their taxed area, which we’ll get to later). The amount of subsidy/tax will have to be determined on a regional basis. An area of high pollution will have high subsidies and high taxes, so the signal of the cost of pollution will be stronger.
There. Now think what we have accomplished – in dirty cities, people get larger credits from the government to compensate them for the pollution. But the people who pollute pay higher taxes. Now the market has the ability to transmit the information between all parties and allow them to make rational choices.
If you live in LA and ride a bicycle or take mass transit, you’ll actually earn money from this system. If you insist on driving your ’74 Pinto, you’re going to pay a hefty pollution tax for the privilege. So people in the most polluted cities will gravitate towards cleaner vehicles, and the market signals around pollution will be particularly strong and drive behaviour.
Also, for those of you who advocate denser city living, consider that now inner-city apartments will essentially be subsidized because the people who live there don’t drive much, but have higher pollution costs. So living there gets you a cheque every month that you don’t get today.
This will encourage people to buy or build residences in the inner city. The suburbs will be punished currently, because the people who live there will no longer get the free subsidy of no-cost pollution. In the short term, the effect might be to push them into cleaner vehicles, which means the clean vehicles are going where they do the most good, and the dirtier ones remain in areas where it matters least. This is much more efficient than just mandating that all vehicles in the country can only emit X
On the other hand, people in Illinois may not make much in credits or pay much in taxes. So the cost of regulation to them is minimal, as is the effect on their decision-making. So we maximize efficiency everywhere.
And think of what it does for the manufacturer. Now, instead of having to figure out a way to make their ¾ ton trucks zero-emission (which may cost a lot of money), they can focus their R&D on cleaning up vehicles used in cities. Or, a company that has a vehicle that’s especially hard to clean up (Say, a Mazda RX-8 with a rotary engine, or a diesel engine) will be at a competitive disadvantage against companies that have cleaner technologies, and seek to regain it in other ways (or drop the dirtier engine technology).
In any event, now that the market is sending signals to everyone involved in the transaction, the market will adapt in the most efficient way. It will push people harder into mass transit in areas of high pollution, and leave people alone in areas without the problem. People who choose to drive older, dirtier cars will pay a premium for doing so, which will drive them to retire those cars sooner. On the other hand, you might see the market adapt such that new cars are driven in the city, and used vehicles tend to migrate out to the country where the tax disadvantage is lower.
The beauty of the market is that we don’t care or know what the solutions will be. All we know is that if the informational signal of cost and benefits is transmitted to everyone affected by the transaction of buying and driving cars, the market will adapt to the new reality.
For example, another adaptation that could happen is that poor people will be attracted to more polluted cities. They don’t drive cars, so they’d get a tax break for living in those areas and come out net beneficiaries. Of course, lots of poor people live in the inner city today, and they’re paying a pollution cost they aren’t compensated for. So a real-world effect of this would probably be a subsidy for the poor. Especially if they use mass transit instead of driving old beaters.
For environmental issues that have national or global scope (global warming, etc), there may be federal taxes and credits as well, and international agreements between countries that set up an international market in pollution credits that countries can trade.
For example, we could have a national greenhouse gas tax levied the same way we do with the SO2 emissions tax, and a national greenhouse tax credit. The tax credit goes to everyone equally, and the tax is taken from those who emit greenhouse gases. Tax credits could also be given to those who have property that absorbs greenhouse gases.
If every country agrees to this, we set up a market in greenhouse credits. Countries that begin emitting more have to buy more, and raise their greenhouse tax on their citizens to cover the cost. The price of the credits will be set by supply and demand. Countries that pollute relatively little will have excess credits, and countries who have more pollution will have to buy them. They will bid for those credits, and the price that comes out will represent the true cost of producing greenhouse gases, given a politically-set maximum tolerable global amount.
A country that emits more per capita than the world average pays a net tax, and a country that emits less than the world per-capita average gets a greenhouse credit. All monies must flow from and back to citizens in the form of taxes and credits. If the world decides that greenhouse gases must be further reduced, the simple solution becomes to auction off fewer credits in the next year. This drives up the price, which drives up the size of the tax and the credit in each country, which causes citizens to change their behaviour accordingly.
Now think about what happens here. Greenhouse emitters start paying a tax. They now have an incentive to cut back. People who have tree farms, on the other hand, get a greenhouse credit. Now, some greenhouse gases are very expensive to eliminate, and some are relatively cheap. Now that those who emit them are paying a cost, they’ll eliminate the greenhouse gases that are cost-effective to do so. We don’t care how. Hell, if they want to make a tree farm to compensate for their emissions, that’s fine. Or perhaps they’ll invest in carbon sequestering. Or maybe some products or energy sources will become cost-prohibitive and be eliminated from the market. But now we have market signals that reward good behaviour and bad, and then we step out of the way and let society adjust itself and let the market work to solve the problem in the most efficient way.
If we decide to auction off fewer credits on a global basis, this basically makes all the signals stronger. It rewards low polluters even more, and punishers high polluters more. That’s all we need to do. The market will take care of the actual solutions.
Other areas of discussion if this isn’t boring people to death:
Education
Urban Planning
Welfare
Trade
Defence
Science and Technology