Yes.
At this point, I’d like to highly recommend a book I’ve been reading: The Undercover Economist: Exposing Why the Rich Are Rich, the Poor Are Poor–and Why You Can Never Buy a Decent Used Car! (Hardcover)
Many of the ideas I’m talking about here are discussed in the book. It’s an explanation of why free market economics works so well, but it’s no Libertarian polemic. He’s more than willing to discuss serious market failures in areas like the U.S. health care system, and from the title, why the used car you buy is likely to suck. It’s really just econ 101, and for those of us who have been thinking about market economics for a long time, there’s nothing really new. But it’s very well written, and he exposes a number of issues that really make you think. It’s also a fun read.
The latter part of the title, btw, is an example of the cost of hidden information in the functioning of a market. It works like this: Let’s say you have a car that you want to sell. It’s in extremely good condition and well maintained. Its value to you is $5,000, and that’s what you want to sell it.
Now imagine you’re someone with the same model and year of car, only this one’s a lemon. It’s always breaking down, and its value to you is $2500. That’s what you’d take to get rid of it.
Now imagine you’re a buyer. You know an excellent specimen of the car you want is worth $5,000, and a lemon is worth $2500. But you have no way of knowing if any individual car you look at is a lemon or a great car. So what’s the value of any random car of that type? If there’s a 50% chance its a lemon, and the difference between a lemon and a great car is $2500, then the ‘discount’ for the chance that the car might be a lemon is $1250.
So, the market prices such a car at $3250. But wait a minute… If the cherry version of the car is worth $5,000, the owner isn’t going to sell it for $3250. So that car goes off the market. In fact, ALL the really good examples go off the market, leaving only lemons. But as those cars leave the market, the probability of getting a lemon goes up, which the market reacts to by discounting the average price even more. Pretty soon all you’ve got left are lemons, selling for the value of a lemon. The market has failed to provide a way to buy a quality used car.
In the real world, we’ve evolved several ways to solve this problem. For example, car dealerships make a profit on buying and selling used cars by using their reputation as a value-added service. If a car dealer has been in business for a few decades, and has very expensive fixed assets (a beautiful showroom, etc), then you can believe that it’s less likely that they’ll sell you a lemon, because they have a reputation to protect. They in turn have teams of very good car inspectors and mechanics to inspect cars at auction and sort out the lemons from the good ones. They buy the good ones at a discount then resell them at a higher price than the fly-by-night guys can. This means that you can be almost assured that the dingy "Cars R’ Us’ places will only have lemons on the lot, whereas the used car department of the local BMW dealership probably has only cherry specimens, for which the dealership can extract full value by trading on its reputation.
Likewise, there are industries of free-lance car inspectors, ‘certified’ used car programs, etc. All designed to compensate for the fundamental asymmetry of information in this market. But even with all this, there is always some information the seller knows that the buyer doesn’t, and this causes the market to operate less than optimally. It also explains why new cars can sell at such a premium over even late model used cars, and why depreciation on new cars is so great in the first year. It’s not because the wear-and-tear is higher, but because the car goes from being a known commodity to one with some hidden information when sold used.