I’m still willing to play along if you are. Tell me what you want me to do for you to contiinue your argument that whether slaveowners are morally responsible for slave uprisings (hereafter: X) is not meaningless.
I think that’s the problem here. I literally don’t understand what you want from me. Earlier, it appeared that you wanted me to concede that X is not meaningless, but that is what you said you would prove. Maybe I misunderstood.
Also, I don’t understand Revenant Threshold’s post at all.
Anyway, try again, and no hard feelings. We both called each other names, no big deal. Tell me what you want from me so you can continue.
Address it with the issue of inciting crimes legislation first. We say that it’s illegal to advocate criminal activity; presumably our reason for doing so is that we believe the person advocating criminal activity contributes to the possibility that someone else will commit criminal activity. Saying that someone is morally responsible for the actions of another has real-world effects, just like saying someone is morally responsible for their own actions has real-world effects.
I’ve never asked you to agree with this statement. Let me make this clear, since you’ve repeatedly misunderstood.
IF YOU DISAGREE, SAY WHY YOU DISAGREE.
Note that I’ve never made the argument that slaveowners are responsible for deaths during slave results. I will not address this complex issue until we can get the most basic issues under control, namely:
Is it meaningful to say that someone is morally responsible for their own actions, even if you disagree with the assignation of moral responsibility?
Is it meaningful to say that someone is morally responsible for someone else’s actions, even if you disagree with the assignation of moral responsibility?
If you answer “no” to either of these questions, please explain why, addressing the examples I’ve given previously in the thread. If you answer “yes” to both these questions, we can finally address the question you’re so interested in (one that I’m not especially interested in, btw).
A. It is meaningless to say “action X is immoral.”
B It is meaningless to determine whether one person is morally responsible for the actions of another.
In both cases, I am saying that it’s meaningless because there are no consequences to the determination.
You disagreed with me. You said they both do have consequences and are therefore meaningful.
You have made your case for saying “action X is immoral” has consequences, but haven’t made your case that determining whether one person is morally responsible for the actions of another has consequences
Now, with your post above, it looks to me like you want me (by agreeing with your 2) to say that my B is wrong. Well, I’m not prepared to do that yet. You made a case that my A is wrong, and you said you’d make a case that my B was also wrong, but you haven’t yet. I don’t think that I should have to agree that my B is wrong as a precondition to you showing that it is wrong.
If I’ve gotten any of the above incorrect, please explain why.
While I don’t want to interrupt your discussion with LHOD, did you read my post 68? Because your question above has been answered: the question of slaveowners’ moral culpability for slave uprisings played an important role in the ultimately successful campaign to abolish slavery. How much more meaningful do you want?
That is a mere temporal quibble. It is your position that determining that A bears moral culpability for the actions of B is meaningless, because there can be no consequences to such a determination. The slavery example is just that, an example. But it serves to give crystal clear evidence that there are in fact consequences to deciding precisely that question. The fact that it happened in the past rather than right this very second is irrelevant.
No no no–im saying it’s meaningless to discuss that issue on a messageboard because there are no consequences to a determination mader by any participant in the discussion. It therefore doesn’t matter that other people may have discussed the issue in the pasrt at a time and place where the determination could have had consequences.
Two statements:
“Jack is morally responsible for stealing the ice cream.”
“John is morally responsible for the deaths caused by people reacting to his oppression.”
Both are meaningful, when discussed on a messageboard, in precisely the same way, a way I’ve already discussed: the statements may hold persuasive power. People reading the statements, and arguments for them, may be persuaded not to steal ice cream. They may be similarly persuaded not to oppress other people.
I’m sorry what? Your argument in the narrow and highly specific question about discussing the moral burden of slave uprising on messageboards is completely and utterly divorced from your general point that there is never any value in determining moral culpability of third parties? Because as I read the thread, it seemed that you made the general point, and then accepted **BrainGlutton’**s challenge that the slave uprising discussion proved your general point wrong.
If you want to tell me that you see no connection whatsoever between this particular discussion and your belief that all discussions about morality are meaningless; if you assure us that, should we all acknowledge that the discussion over slave uprisings is not meaningful, you would not even consider taking that as proof of your general point, I will of course believe you.
… or, indeed, to take their own stand against oppression by, for example joining or donating to Amnesty International, voting for a political party who support strong diplomatic, economic or military intervention against oppressive regimes, boycotting oppressive regimes and companies that trade with them or finding ways to lend support to opposition movements within those regimes. Recent events in Iran, and the response of ordinary people in the West, might provide you with some concrete evidence.
Something occurred to me that crystallizes an argument I’ve had with historians.
Morality may find history instructive.
History does not find morality instructive.
If you study history to find examples in which to explore moral questions, you’ll be richly rewarded. If you make moral judgments on historical figures in the process of trying to understand history better, you’ll just get in your own way. It depends on your purpose for studying historical examples.
The relevant aphorism is Santayana’s: those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
I have a strong, mysterious desire to go find some ice cream. Where did that come from?
Is there any way we can encourage LHoD and RR to find a room?
Anyway, I think saying Crowley is responsible for Gates’s having received death threats is pretty darn stupid. An action may have the result of causing another action; whether the original actor is therefore morally responsible for the subsequent action does not necessarily follow.
Crowley is morally responsible for his over-reacting arrest. Gates is morally responsible for being kind of a dick with a chip on his shoulder. How other people react that scenario subsequently is not either man’s responsibility. Can we move on, please?